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Volume XII Spring 1968 Number 1

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Reflections on the Quarter

France's Domestic Strife: Challenge to the Fifth Republic

IN his New Year's greeting to the French people, President de Gaulle praised France for her stability and prosperity. At a time when so many other states were beset with domestic turmoil and, in the case of the United States, burdened with international commitments, Gaullist France seemed exceptionally fortunate. Less than six months later, however, France lay paralyzed by a general strike and appeared on the verge of civil war.

The springtime disorder in France began with a student strike at the University of Nantes, led by declared anarchists. Sorbonne students joined the protest, and soon students elsewhere in universities and secondary schools seized classrooms and administration buildings. Protesting students were joined by striking workers, many of whom adopted tactics similar to the students' and occupied factories in protest against wage levels and working conditions.

The French general strike thus featured two principal groups: the students and the workers. In each situation, to the astonishment of government leaders, opposition politicians and union officials, small radical factions, whose members called themselves followers of ideas propounded by Mao, Castro and Marcuse, were able to whip up widespread popular sentiment in support of their cause.

The enraged students utilized strategic concepts developed by the late Che Guevara: concentration of forces, retreat and dispersion. When faced with police action, the students broke up into smaller groups, each of which rushed to another part of Paris, where they again fought until police caught up with them. The students gave expression to pent-up grievances against a school system whose teaching techniques, administration and subject matter were more appropriate to an earlier period than to France in the age of advanced technology. The workers revolted against a regime whose economic policy did not provide for adequate wage increases. Although the French GNP has more than doubled over the past decade, consumer prices have risen by about 39 per cent and wage increases have lagged behind those of other West European countries.

The magnitude of the crisis was not immediately apparent to the French government. Its first reaction was to use force to quell the student disorder. Then the government decided upon concessions to the protesters. This, in turn, led to the outbreak of massive strikes in French industry. When students won some of their demands, workers proposed to make similar gains by the use of similar tactics. When the workers struck, the government was reduced first to issuing orders without force and then to embarrassed silence.

When President de Gaulle left for his state visit to Rumania on May 14, France was already gripped by unrest and striking students had occupied the Sorbonne. The deepening crisis led the French President to cut short his visit and return to Paris in order to meet the growing challenge to his regime. In an address on May 24, de Gaulle called for a national referendum in support of his government. He acknowledged that "the university crisis—a crisis provoked by that great body's inability to adapt itself to the modern necessities of the nation as well as to the role and employment of young people—has, through contagion, unleashed in many other groups, a tide of disorders, abandonments or work stoppages." He called for a "mandate" from the electorate in the form of a referendum, which he claimed would enable him to "reconstruct the universities" and reform "narrow and outmoded structures" in the French economy.

Far from calming the situation, de Gaulle's speech seemed to increase unrest. Strikes spread to universities which previously had not been affected. On May 29 the French President left Paris for his country home. En route he met with army leaders and obtained their support. Thus fortified, he addressed France again on May 30 and announced that he would not resign. After acknowledging that the prevailing chaos made it "materially impossible" to hold a referendum, President de Gaulle dissolved the National Assembly and announced legislative elections. In his message, de Gaulle hinted that he would take "other paths" to maintain the Republic should the disorder continue. He appealed for public support and denounced "totalitarian communism." He offered himself as the only alternative to communist dictatorship. Shortly thereafter, the General reorganized his cabinet while his government attempted to settle wage disputes and other issues with striking workers.

Although the elections of June swept the Gaullists into a commanding position in the National Assembly and strengthened de Gaulle's hand to shape domestic reforms and foreign policy, there was general agreement that, in Premier Pompidou's words, "Things will never be the same in France again." In his memoirs, de Gaulle wrote that "only vast enterprises are capable of counter-balancing the ferments of disintegration inherent" in the French people. Gaullist policy has been designed to enlist Frenchmen in "vast enterprises," especially in foreign relations. At the moment of the convening of the Viet Nam peace talks in Paris and de Gaulle's visit to Rumania in support of his grand design for "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," the "ferments of disintegration" paralyzed France. Such enterprises in foreign policy were not sufficient to divert Frenchmen from domestic problems. Given the magnitude of these problems, France will undoubtedly find it necessary to divert resources from the pursuit of foreign policy objectives to programs at home. Domestic demands can be expected to compete for resources with space programs and the development of a French military posture to meet a challenge from any direction—the "all azimuth" strategy outlined by the late General Ailleret and President de Gaulle.

The consequences of the unrest for France are unfortunate. Although French gold reserves are sufficient to finance payments deficits for some time to come, the French economy, at a crucial stage of tariff reductions in the EEC, must now adjust to higher wages and prices. Prolonged domestic strife in France would weaken the Common Market and produce new economic problems for other Western countries. Whatever the discord which has often marred relations between Fifth Republic France and her Atlantic allies, French domestic unrest bodes ill not only for France but for the entire Western world.

Czechoslovakia's Quiet Revolution

ON January 5, 1968, Antonin Novotny "resigned" as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, a post he had held since 1953. He continued to function as President until March 22 when, under mounting pressure, he was forced to relinquish that position. Although few, if any, political observers would have predicted Novotny's total political demise, it should not have occasioned great surprise when it came.

Since 1962 Czechoslovakia's political life had been undergoing a transformation from totalitarianism to authoritarianism under a variety of political pressures which even Novotny's Stalinist regime could not contain or dismiss. The most potent pressures were (1) the ethnic cleavage between Czechs and Slovaks which has always divided the nation and has been exacerbated by Slovak resentment of domination by the Czechs; (2) the intellectual ferment, which began in Slovakia soon after the final desacralization of Stalin at the Twenty-second Party Congress in Moscow and placed the Stalinist Novotny leadership under constant pressure; (3) mounting economic problems, beginning with a decline of Czechoslovakia's national product in 1962. Although Czechoslovakia designed a progressive economic reform program between 1964 and 1966, its implementation was hamstrung by the elite of old-guard apparatchiks who, like Novotny himself, had risen through the ranks of the party during Stalin's time.

None of these pressure-building problems could be mitigated or resolved through the application of coercive totalitarian measures; they were susceptible only to pragmatic solutions. Novotny, though an astute politician, was not a pragmatist, nor were the party elites upon whom his political power rested. Novotny could make concessions to the liberal forces within the country in the face of unavoidable necessity, but he was unwilling and unable to implement these concessions in such a way that they would effectively lessen popular pressures on his regime. In a political environment where popular demands could no longer be kept out of the public media, the status quo gradually became untenable.

Three consecutive plenums of the Czechoslovak Central Committee (October 30-31 and December 19-21, 1967, and January 3-5, 1968) dealt with the question of Novotny's continuing tenure in the highest office of the party. Between the first and second of these plenums, on December 8, Leonid Brezhnev arrived in Prague, reportedly at the request of the Czechoslovak Central Committee. (One Central Committee member has since denied that this body had any knowledge of the invitation or of the topics discussed with Brezhnev.) If Brezhnev's purpose was to support Novotny against the opposition, he evidently failed.

Novotny's ouster made way for the ascension of the forty-five-year-old Slovak leader, Alexander Dubcek, to the supreme post of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Although he graduated from a three-year (1955-1958) course at the Political College of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow, Dubcek has shown much less subservience to Moscow's wishes during his brief tenure in office than did his predecessor. For the present he must be regarded as a reformist, either by conviction or under the pressure of popular demands. Dubcek faces the difficult task of reuniting the party and the population at large within a political framework acceptable to the Soviet Union and neighboring regimes in Eastern Europe. It appears that he is seeking to do this by removing the totalitarian fetters of communism and introducing a political process which provides for the articulation of grievances and demands and a degree of accommodation with the great variety of competing interests and groups calling for reforms.

Czechoslovakia is in the throes of a quiet revolution which is taking place not in the streets, but in conference rooms and assembly halls. Interest groups have formed and announced themselves with a spontaneity reminiscent of the Polish October of 1956 — among them writers, journalists, students, farmers, and trade unionists. The Czechoslovak news media, giving voice to a wide range of views, have reported the political ferment with unusual objectivity and candor. Liberal groups within the Communist Party have raised demands for a re-evaluation of the party's role in government and society — specifically, for a clear division of functions between party and government, government responsibility to the National Assembly, abolition of censorship, and independence of the courts. There have also been demands for a re-evaluation and rehabilitation of the pre-communist past and its more prominent political figures. The death of Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister before the communists rose to power, became a troublesome issue, and long-standing suspicions that he died at the hands of Soviet agents were now raised in public.

Understandably, Czechoslovakia's quiet revolution gave rise to considerable anxiety in the capitals of the Soviet bloc, particularly in East

Berlin and Warsaw, where it was feared that the popular ferment would spill across national boundaries. There was also concern lest the new leadership in Prague breach the united foreign policy front of the Warsaw Pact countries (as Rumania had done repeatedly), particularly with respect to West Germany. At a hurriedly convened conference of Warsaw Pact leaders in Dresden, East Germany, on March 23, Dubcek was asked to explain Czechoslovakia's course of socialism and assure bloc leaders of his regime's continuing solidarity with the Warsaw Pact. Whether Dubcek was able to satisfy his Soviet and East European colleagues on all points is not clear from the communiqué which was issued after the conference.

However, relations between Czechoslovakia and its two neighbors, Poland and East Germany, have visibly deteriorated since Novotny's fall. The Warsaw regime is reported to have made entry into Poland more difficult for Czechoslovak citizens, particularly students. The East German press continues to slander Czechoslovakia's reforms. At the Philosophy Congress on Marx on March 26 (three days after the Warsaw Pact conference), East German Politburo member Kurt Hager asserted that the reform movement in Czechoslovakia was promoted by "the Kiesinger-Strauss government" of West Germany. This remark was received with public consternation in Czechoslovakia and evoked a vigorous diplomatic protest by the Prague government to the East German ambassador.

Czechoslovakia's relations with the Soviet Union have also taken a turn for the worse. Not only does the Soviet leadership manifest a poorly-concealed antipathy toward the Czechoslovak reform movement, but it is also sensitive to the lack of restraint that characterizes news reporting in Czechoslovakia's public media. Particularly irksome to Moscow are allegations appearing in Czechoslovak media that Soviet agents were instrumental in the death of Jan Masaryk in 1948 as well as in the purge trials of 1952. On May 9 there were reports of Soviet troop movements in Poland along the Czech border and a twenty-four-hour travel ban was imposed on Western diplomats in that area. This gave rise to apprehension that the Soviet Union might interfere militarily in Czechoslovakia. In June Soviet troops moved into Czechoslovakia in order to participate in a Warsaw Pact "staff exercise." While the exercises were to be of small scope involving signal units of battalion strength, the Soviets managed to deploy an estimated 16,000 troops, 70 tanks, 4,500 vehicles and 40 aircraft. The maneuvers ended on June 30 without a clear indication that Soviet forces would be withdrawn immediately. In view of the spillover potential of Czechoslovakia's popular ferment with respect to neighboring communist countries, the specter of Soviet intervention could not be dismissed.

Czechoslovakia's quiet revolution continues. It has yet to crystallize in a new equilibrium. For the present Dubcek's regime remains an unknown quantity, more a prisoner than a master of events in its own divided country.

The International Monetary Crisis

IN March 1968, for the second time in less than a year, the international monetary system faced a crisis which threatened to undermine both the dollar and sterling as reserve currencies. Despite the devaluation of sterling in November 1967 and steps taken by the United States in January 1968, including restrictions on the flow of U.S. investment capital abroad, the world's two leading reserve currencies came under attack again. During the first two weeks of March, holders of dollars and sterling rushed to convert these currencies into gold. So great was the demand that between March 1 and 14, some 750 tons of gold were purchased. On March 14 alone, just before the London Gold Exchange was temporarily closed, 225 tons of gold changed hands. At the official price of $35 per ounce, a ton of gold is valued at $1.1 million.

The gold crisis can be traced to several causes: the inability of the United States to take domestic economic measures, including a tax increase, to stem inflation; a rise in U.S. imports relative to exports; and large-scale, long-term U.S. investment overseas, especially in Europe. Britain has not provided sufficient evidence that her payments can be brought into equilibrium and that wage-price spirals can be halted. In addition, the gold crisis appears to have been triggered by reports that South Africa, in response to British opposition to its racial policies, would shift its sales of gold from London to Paris.

Whatever the precipitant, on March 4 demand for gold rose rapidly in the gold markets of London and Paris, and during the next few days reached the level of $45 per ounce—five dollars above the high point of October 1967 and ten dollars above the official world price supported by the United States and other leading countries that are members of the so-called Gold Pool. This was formed in 1960 by an agreement among the United States, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands to make available a portion of their national reserves in support of the world gold price in an effort to bring private speculation under control.

Although the Gold Pool was patently inadequate as a deterrent, it contributed to curbing the speculation in gold during the crises of October 1967 and March 1968. During the March crisis, members of the Gold Pool, with the exception of France (which withdrew in 1967), sold gold at the price of $35 per ounce in an effort to lower the price in the London and Paris markets to that level. The result of panic purchasing of gold was to reduce government reserves, especially those of the United States and Britain, as officially held gold was sold to stabilize the price at $35 per ounce. As gold passed from the reserves of countries into the private hands of hoarders fearful of the future of paper currencies and of speculators who saw an opportunity for financial gain, international liquidity was reduced.

During the early days of March, the stampede to purchase gold received impetus from rumors that several members, including Belgium and Switzerland, would leave the Gold Pool, thus reducing the stock of gold available to support the official price. The governors of central banks of Gold Pool members held consultations in Washington during the weekend of March 16-17. At the end of their deliberations, they issued a communiqué calling for a two-level gold price. The official price of $35 per ounce would remain in effect for transactions between governments. A freely fluctuating price for other buyers and sellers was established, thus reducing the value of paper currencies in terms of gold. In order to stem the flow of gold from official reserves to private hoards, the seven nations agreed not to sell gold to countries which make available officially held gold for sale on private markets. The conferees reached agreement on special standby credits for Britain which would bring to $4 billion the total funds made available in recent months to support sterling.

At the beginning of their communiqué, as if reminding the United States of the need for changes in its economic policy, the central bank governors "noted that it is the determined policy of the United States government to defend the value of the dollar through appropriate fiscal and monetary measures and that substantial improvement of the U.S. balance of payments is a high priority objective." They expressed satisfaction with Congressional legislation making available the entire official U.S. gold stock for the support of the dollar at the existing price in gold. Finally, the representatives at the Washington meeting agreed that the existing stock of officially held gold is sufficient for international monetary demands "in view of the prospective establishment of the facility for Special Drawing Rights."

Previously, at the Rio de Janeiro meeting of the International Monetary Fund in September 1967, members had reached tentative agreement on creation of so-called Special Drawing Rights (SDR's or "paper gold") which would be allocated to Fund members in proportion to their IMF quotas. Countries facing a balance of payments deficit could draw upon SDR's, which would be transferred by debiting the SDR account of the user country and crediting the account of the receiver. The country that received SDR's would make available an equivalent amount of convertible currency to the user country. The communiqué issued at the end of the Washington Gold Pool meeting announced substantial agreement on the need for SDR's as a supplement to existing forms of international liquidity. At a meeting in Stockholm during the last week of March, the so-called Group of Ten leading industrial countries reached agreement on details of the SDR plan. Only France abstained from endorsing the SDR.

According to Finance Minister Michel Debré, France could not accept the SDR plan because the U.S. dollar was not yet subjected to "discipline" and gold had not been permitted to reach a higher price. In contrast to palliatives for existing international monetary arrangements, France has advocated the development of a new system based primarily on gold. French officials favor the convening of a conference, similar in scope to the Bretton Woods Conference, to make fundamental changes in the international monetary system. France has held that the United States has used its privileged position as a reserve currency country to run up balance of payments deficits. If the dollar were no longer a reserve currency, foreigners would not be willing to hold dollars in such large amounts and the United States would be forced to take more drastic steps to achieve payments equilibrium. Yet, the SDR plan has been termed the single most important change in the international monetary system since the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. Given the large gold reserves that France has accumulated over the past decade, such a system would not only enhance the value of gold, but would give France an international financial role of major importance.

Despite the cautiously expressed optimism of the communiqué following the Washington meeting of Gold Pool members and the adoption of the SDR plan, the future of the international monetary system is uncertain. So long as the dollar and sterling remain important reserve currencies, economic conditions within the United States and Britain will have a major impact on the international monetary system.

On the one hand British and American payments deficits add to international liquidity by placing dollars and sterling in the hands of foreigners. On the other hand, however, persistent payments deficits reduce international confidence in the dollar and pound sterling and lead holders of these reserve currencies to convert to gold. At the very least, the effect of this transaction is to reduce international liquidity. At worst, its effect is to undermine the international monetary system by depleting the gold reserves of the United States and Britain through panic sales of dollars and sterling.

Because of the continued expansion of world trade, the need for international liquidity will increase, especially in a world in which at any given time at least some countries are likely to be experiencing payments deficits. Even France, despite its greatly increased gold stock and economic gains registered during the past decade, is likely to require assistance in order to cope with payments deficits resulting from the large-scale domestic unrest of May-June 1968. Additional forms of liquidity, such as reserve currencies other than those now in use, will be needed. Although the SDR's provide at least a temporary solution to the liquidity problem, the need remains for a plan capable of attracting the active support of all countries, especially in the industrialized West (including France), all of whose economic health is tied closely to international trading relationships. It is by no means certain that the international monetary system could survive a third challenge similar to those of 1967 and early 1968 without more far-reaching reforms than envisaged in the SDR plan. Not the least of the achievements of the Stockholm meeting was that the leading reserve currency countries gained additional time to make necessary economic adjustments.

The Nigerian Civil War

THE end of the bitter civil war that has raged since May 1967 between the Nigerian Federal Military Government (FMG) and the secessionist Eastern Republic of Biafra appears to be in sight. Precisely when and how the conflict will end is as yet uncertain, but Biafra's days appear to be numbered.

The history of the war can be summarized as a bitterly-contested, yet inexorable, march to victory by forty-one million Federalists over fourteen million Easterners. Better trained and equipped, the federal forces have slowly asserted their superiority over the past year. By July 26, 1967 they had captured the important Bonny oil terminal and had set up a naval blockade of the Eastern region. By late August they had captured the Biafran capital, Enugu, as well as the port of Calabar. The capture of Port Harcourt in May 1968 closed the last major Biafran airport. By mid-June 1968 much of Biafra's population faced starvation. All of the major battles of the war have been fought on Eastern soil, with the exception of one Biafran attack last August through the Mid-Western region into the Western region to within 135 miles of the federal capital, Lagos. However, by the end of September this threat had been repulsed and the Mid-Western region recaptured.

The war has been bitterly fought by both sides, with quarter rarely given or expected. The Ibos, who constitute the major Eastern tribal group, are convinced that the federal government is waging a war of genocide against them. The mass murder (30,000 dead) of the Ibo minorities in the Northern region in the fall of 1966 frightened over two million Ibos into returning to their Eastern homeland. This factor and continuing Federalist atrocities reinforce the Ibos' belief that their very survival is at stake. Such an attitude serves to prolong the war; hence, there is little hope for its early termination by anything short of a complete Federal military victory, which may be months away.

The method by which the war is concluded will largely determine Nigeria's postwar course. If the war is ended by a Federal military victory, then undoubtedly Biafra will be treated as captured "enemy" territory. Since it would be difficult for the FMG to control fourteen million people, including nine million hostile Ibos, over so large an area, protracted guerrilla warfare would become a very real possibility. The residue of Ibo bitterness born of massacres and defeat in battle could, on the other hand, be ameliorated by a negotiated compromise settlement to the war.

Unfortunately, efforts by the Organization of African Unity

(OAU), the United Nations and the Commonwealth to end the conflict have been fruitless so far. Although the OAU, in particular, has repeatedly sought to bring both parties to the negotiating table, the positions of both sides have remained irreconcilable. The FMG demands that Biafra renounce its right to secede twelve hours before any cease-fire, disarm its soldiers, and accept federal administration —with no guarantee of amnesty for Biafran leaders. In short, the FMG is demanding a Biafran surrender before talks begin. As the Biafrans see it, this gives them no choice but to fight on, since the federal government will not agree to their minimum terms, namely, an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of Federal troops from Biafran soil, and an end to the naval blockade. Then, and only then, will the Biafrans discuss the terms under which they will return to the Federation.

While a Federal military victory may preserve the territorial integrity of Nigeria, national unity is likely to remain a remote goal. The present united Federalist front may well collapse after the Eastern secession has ended, and the future of the present military rule is in doubt. General Yakuba Gowon, present FMG head, has abolished the old four-state federal structure in favor of a new twelve-state structure. Whether such a design will prove viable is uncertain at best. In effect, his proposal would divide the present Eastern state (Biafra) into three states: the South-Eastern, Rivers and East-Central. This would confine the nine million Ibos largely to the East-Central state since they would probably fear to migrate to other states. The Ibos would be desperately overcrowded since the population density was greater than 500 per square mile (the most dense in sub-Saharan Africa) even before the influx of two million refugees in the fall of 1966. The Ibos hardly find this prospect an attractive inducement to end the war.

Like most other internal conflicts, the Nigerian civil war attracted international intervention. At the onset of the war in July 1967, both sides had very small, lightly-armed military forces; neither possessed tanks, fighters, bombers or missiles. One year later, FMG Czech fighters piloted by South African mercenaries and MIG-15's flown by Egyptian mercenaries, on a mission to destroy Biafra's two B-26 bombers being flown by French mercenaries, had to dodge Biafran radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns and ground-to-air heat-seeking missiles. The amount of covert French and Portuguese aid to Biafra is unknown, but it is considerably less than the more extensive Soviet and British aid to the FMG. Mercenaries have been freely employed by both sides. In November 1967 Roger Faulkes, a French mercenary veteran of Yemen and Katanga, entered Biafra with eighty men. Biafra also has employed a variety of mercenary pilots, including an American, German, Canadian and several Frenchmen. The FMG, in turn, has employed both Egyptian and South African pilots for its communist-bloc aircraft which are serviced by over 200 bloc "technicians."

When the conflict began, the United States, France and Britain formally prohibited arms sales to either belligerent. As the FMG stepped up its military campaign in the fall of 1967, only the United States maintained strict neutrality. Britain reluctantly granted export licenses for limited sales of "defensive" weapons to the FMG (aircraft were excluded). France unofficially departed from her neutrality by allowing—perhaps even encouraging—French nationals to aid the Biafran side. The United States has maintained a tight ban on arms sales to both sides, while continuing to recognize the FMG as the legitimate government. Generally, the Western powers decided to watch the war from the sidelines rather than to become heavily involved.

The Soviet Union quickly moved into this partial vacuum with an arms offer to the FMG in June 1967 of about six Czech L-29 jet fighters and approximately twenty MIG-15's, complete with maintenance staff, on a strictly commercial and cash basis. The Soviets have evidently cast oil-rich Biafra in the role of copper-rich Katanga, both of whose secessions were allegedly abetted by "imperialist" investments in the area. Since the Western powers had opted to sit on the sidelines and since there was virtual unanimity among African states not to choose sides, the Soviets had little to lose and much to gain by their entry into an area of Africa long under the aegis of Western powers.

Once again the Soviets have shown that they are willing, given appropriate circumstances, to intervene in sub-Saharan African affairs. In the absence of a settlement between Biafra and the FMG, outside powers, including the Soviet Union, are likely to find inviting prospects for the use of military aid to gain enhanced influence with one or the other contending faction.

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LAND REFORM AS A MEANS TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN VIET NAM

by John D. Montgomery

FOR nearly twenty years most of the clamor for agrarian reform in Viet Nam has come from American sources rather than Vietnamese. There are two reasons for this remarkable imbalance: the nostalgic, almost mystical American recollection of the virtues of homesteading, combined with a guilt-laden national regret over the fall of Chiang Kai-shek, and the political passivity and patient inarticulateness of the Vietnamese peasant himself. American specialists, full of faith, have found enough misery in the lives of Vietnamese tenant farmers to confirm their basic sympathies. They have proposed direct action based on experience gained elsewhere, even though local conditions did not at all resemble those of the United States or China before the war and despite the fact that Vietnamese peasants have traditionally been among the best off in Asia. Dozens of experts have devised scores of plans to redistribute land and reduce rents, and liberal sentiments have consistently supported all of them, from the time of Emperor Bao Dai until this moment. When one RAND Corporation study pointed out that the rural areas controlled by landlords were more "secure" than those in which land had been redistributed,[1] the difficult methodology employed was less horrifying to American readers than the want of faith it displayed. When a Congressional subcommittee came out for a more vigorous land reform as a solution to the peasants' apathy after twenty years of war,[2] an enthusiastic press ignored the absence of evidence that the proposed program was politically necessary or possible, and passed lightly over its unworkable program of title redistribution. Through it all, the peasants themselves remain silent, inarticulate, and, as always, ignored.

This rural apathy is the key to the problem. Governments cannot withstand sustained attacks by fanatical revolutionaries if they can arouse nothing stronger than indifference from their own people. If issues of land tenure are to provide the basis for nation-building, then they must first become matters of vital political concern among the dispossessed. None of the neat schemes for handing out land titles in village ceremonies, or for registering rent contracts in some national ministry, has much to do with political activism. The somewhat more dramatic demonstrations of aerial photogrammetry and overlay title maps in An Giang Province are also less convincing than the use of airpower for other purposes. Even the Viet Cong, unrestrained by concern over the niceties of property rights in the areas under their control, have not obtained much political mileage out of their desultory experiments in land reform. The problem evading both contestants for peasant loyalty is how to introduce a political process that will engage villagers in a constructive relationship with the central government.

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[1] Edward J. Mitchell, *Equality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, June 1967), reprinted in *World Politics,* April 1968. See also his "The Significance of Land Tenure in the Vietnamese Insurgency," *Asian Survey,* August 1967, pp. 577-580.

[2] *Land Reform in Vietnam: Twentieth Report by the Committee on Governmental Operations* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

I

The problems of land tenure in South Viet Nam are too complicated to be resolved by forms and procedures. Americans should have learned from their extensive efforts between 1955 and 1961 that simple formulas will not change things much. Nor is it a mere matter of administrative inefficiency or corruption on the Vietnamese side. After all, under Ordinance 2 of January 1955, the government registered more than 700,000 rent contracts and thus provided security of tenure, at least theoretically, to about one-half of Viet Nam's tenant farmers. Under Ordinance 57 of October 1956, the Diem regime succeeded in expropriating 1,000,000 acres of private rice-lands—about 15 per cent of the nation's total. Shortly thereafter, the French government gave Viet Nam 500,000 acres of private and public holdings for further redistribution. With U.S. aid and an all-out administrative effort, the government sold most (80 per cent) of the expropriated lands by 1961, issuing some 116,000 temporary titles. A massive machinery of land reform was set in motion. Indeed, until the very moment of the Tet Offensive of February 1968, expropriations were still continuing in some areas on the basis of the old Diem laws.

But the complicated patterns of ownership and the administrative complexities of the law defied even these relatively ambitious efforts. There were still 20 per cent of the original expropriated lands to be distributed; only 1/16 of the "French lands" had been transferred; some tenants were still paying rents far in excess of the contract ceilings fixed under Ordinance 2; most province chiefs remained indifferent to or ignorant of these provisions; and nearly all of the rent contracts had been allowed to lapse. Even before the collapse of rural security, violations of rent control laws were rarely punished. In the "model" province of An Giang, where the United States has mounted a demonstration land reform project, most tenants had only verbal contracts and many of the rest were paying more than the contracts call for.

Thus land reform in Viet Nam may have followed the conventional pattern worked out in other countries, but it brought few of the conventional benefits. The program proved to be mechanical, inflexible and hard to administer. It was legalistic in the French rather than the Vietnamese tradition. Some, and perhaps many, large landowners evaded redistribution by simply transferring portions of their ownings to other members of their family. And even conscientious province chiefs found it difficult to enforce rent contracts as land values rose and the demand in secure areas outran the supply.

If between 1955 and 1961 the Vietnamese government was unable to carry out conventional land reform under strong U.S. pressure, using an autocratic and overstaffed central administration and suffering little resistance from the Viet Cong, its capacity to do so since 1961 has been considerably less under a martial government, with its administrative ranks decimated and its rice-lands a battleground. Clearly it could not assign land reform responsibilities to the present overworked, understaffed agricultural agencies, especially while the cumbersome procedural systems remain unchanged. Apart from basic organizational deficiencies, military mobilization has reduced their available manpower below the level of effectiveness even for routine operations. In the Commission General for Land Affairs, nearly half of the engineers, administrators, technicians, draftsmen, surveyors, clerks, mechanics, and other specialists were mobilized even before the March draft extension. There were only thirteen engineers on duty, for example; fourteen of their number had been drafted; the total number of skilled employees on duty was 255, but 233 more of their colleagues were in the army. When these personnel shortages are considered along with the inefficient colonial administrative style which those who remain behind are compelled to observe, it is clear why the government could not carry out land reform in the rural areas by using conventional methods.

Any land reform proposal that called for immediate national action would fail to accommodate the almost incredible range of local variations of landholding in Viet Nam. The rural economy is more differentiated and complex in Viet Nam than in almost any other part of the world. It is also more difficult to deal with than most because of the shortage of records and even of verifiable facts. Many of the statistics available are illusory and misleading, and because the country itself is so fragmented and highly differentiated, the data that do exist may represent meaningless averages. Centralized national programs of land redistribution like those followed by the Diem regime, however well administered, could not relieve the rural crowding in the northern regions where moving people out of agriculture rather than redistributing large holdings is the desideratum.

Even the Viet Cong, unrestrained by these administrative and legal traditions, did not find it necessary or possible to carry out the usual land reform measures in South Viet Nam. Its approach has been pragmatic rather than ideological, and personalized rather than systematic or institutional. A captured Viet Cong statement establishes maximum rents at 15 per cent of the principal crop in contrast to the official (and unenforced) 25 per cent in secure areas; but the National Liberation Front permitted local Viet Cong leaders to exact "taxes" that often exceeded the rents previously paid for the same property. Where it seemed convenient, the NLF also permitted local landowners to continue collecting rents, subject to heavy "taxation" (and thus gained some "bourgeois" support in the process). In other places (in parts of Quang Nam Province, for example) the Viet Cong imposed no taxes, preferring to take cash "loans" from the peasants and to issue promissory notes supposedly redeemable after the war—thus giving the recipients a vested interest in Viet Cong victory.

The National Liberation Front did not bother to issue permanent land titles. Nor did it reduce the real rent in areas under its direct control. Wherever the Viet Cong wanted to engage in harassment rather than permanent occupation, it could weaken both the government's authority to collect taxes and the landlords' access to their tenants. The result was that rent payments and "taxes" have been *lowest* in the unstable areas, and *highest* in the secure areas. In Dinh Tuong Province, for example, the Viet Cong kept landlords from collecting rents and charged a fee for keeping rent collectors out. In the stable government-held areas of An Giang, Ba Xuyen, and Long Binh provinces, on the other hand, rents are reportedly 40-50 per cent, and in parts of Bien Hoa Province they are even higher.

The lesson has not been lost on the Vietnamese farmers. They began to regard the government as a surrogate rent collector in spite of ordinances prohibiting the collection of back rents and taxes for areas under harassment by the Viet Cong. In Dinh Tuong, Bac Lieu, Gia Dinh and An Giang provinces, Saigon officials were observed performing the role of rent collector, following the troops as they advanced into contested areas. In some cases, they have kept as much as 30 per cent of the proceeds in exchange for this service. One veteran regional observer estimated that half of the government's Popular Forces in the countryside, working out of fortified positions, added "tax" and "rent" collections to their duties. In at least one case it was reported that the army itself engaged in this operation, with the officers democratically sharing the collections with the enlisted men.

There can be no doubt that in many parts of Viet Nam, if not throughout the country, peasants found they could exploit Viet Cong activity to strengthen their bargaining position with the landlord. It has been to their advantage to tolerate and even encourage small amounts of disorder in the hope of getting their rents reduced.

Like peasants everywhere, Vietnamese farmers have a special attachment to the land on which their ancestors are buried and their own livelihood depends. It is true that they are not clamoring for titles, and they treat contracts with cynicism bred of experience. But they almost always state, when asked, that they would like to own the farms they work.

Landlessness contributes to their feelings of restlessness. Middle-class and wealthy farmers who became refugees reported that Viet Cong oppression finally grew too heavy for them to bear, but it was the allied military activity that brought the landless peasant to a point where he was no longer willing to work the soil. In both cases, the result was the same: a depopulation of the countryside. But the reason is even more ominous: the wealthy refugees fled because they feared the Viet Cong, the poor because they feared the allies. Peasants loyal to the government have not been protected; if they remained on their lands, they faced insecurity, allied military activity, high rents and high risks, and Viet Cong oppression. These factors have combined to reduce peasant productivity as well as commitment. Viet Nam, a rice exporting country during most of its history, is now dependent upon food brought from the United States. Much land that was being farmed in 1963, even in the Delta region, has gone out of cultivation. The ultimate problem of the Vietnamese government is to convert peasant indifference into commitment, and in the process to establish the government's presence in the form of a local leadership serving a system it enthusiastically supports.

Land reform in this context is a political problem not amenable to a realistic solution by conventional administrative means. Redistribution of titles, issuance of rent contracts, and consolidation of holdings would probably take decades to accomplish, and while the results would gratify the Western desire for social equity and might gradually build up a peasant yeomanry in Viet Nam, there would be few short-range benefits capable of justifying the effort during wartime. Any real crash program would be hotly resented in Saigon, and it would be resisted locally by the province and district chiefs whose principal sources of support remain the landlords and other wealthy classes. Moreover, the task of recruiting and training deeds experts, surveyors, legal assistants, and the other administrative cadres required would clearly detract from the efficient performance of other, more urgent functions.

Hard-line proponents of land reform have therefore suggested that Americans themselves could perform these functions, working through the provincial offices of the U.S. CORDS (Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support), and receiving technical advice from a staff of experts in Saigon attached to the Agriculture Division of the AID mission. But this approach would amount to an enlargement of U.S. operational responsibility, and contribute little to Vietnamese national capabilities. It would imply that the mere issuance of titles would accomplish the desired political purposes in the countryside. It would leave little institutional basis for future development of local government, and it would not involve the Saigon government in rural welfare. Such proposals, in short, concentrate on land reform as an end in itself, and not as a means to the end of indigenous political development. What is needed is an institutional way for dealing with locally differentiated land tenure problems in a national context.

A better way to proceed would be to endow the villagers themselves with responsibility for land administration. Their councils could begin by exercising powers of adjudication over inheritance rights, contract violations, and boundary disputes as local leaders did in precolonial times stretching back into antiquity. They could also begin to establish principles for redistributing land to tenant occupants and amalgamating small or scattered holdings, at least in selected areas. Such a program could be implemented at once in the areas where local government had been elected. In the rest of Viet Nam—the confused no-man's-lands where there is no government—there would be at least the promise of local autonomy in land matters when stability was restored. This prospect would surely entice peasants to a more favorable view of the government. The peasants' interest in encouraging minor amounts of disorder would shift to an attitude favoring stability. They could begin to hope that their villages might follow the example of others in the secure areas that were able to take over responsibility for titles, contracts, and certificates of occupancy.

Obviously all the villages in South Viet Nam would not be able to act everywhere at once. Thus, to avoid widespread speculation it would be wise to "freeze" the present land uses by vesting all titles in the village councils as a temporary trust. Thereupon the existing councils could immediately issue temporary certificates or land-use permits, and prepare to reissue titles or register rent contracts later. This policy could be initiated even in areas where the Viet Cong were in political control. Village councils, at their own discretion, might confirm Viet Cong expropriations and request funds to compensate landlords for their losses. This approach would even create an opportunity for rehabilitating local Viet Cong leadership in the newly elected council if village sentiment was favorable to the positive elements of NLF reforms. The possibility of village council action would mean that the Vietnamese government's advance into Viet Cong areas would no longer foretell automatic reversion to an unsatisfactory prewar condition. The government would no longer be a rent collector. And whatever progress had taken place under NLF leadership could be confirmed.

Purists may object that the village councils in Viet Nam are dominated by landlords and other conservative elements unsympathetic to their peasant constituency. Such an argument ignores the promise of the electoral system: representatives who do not represent can be voted out of office.[3] In fact, local elections already held show more promise than many skeptics are inclined to believe, although the statistics given by the government obscure some of these political realities. Over 1,000 villages—about half the total in Viet Nam—have elected councils. Statistics do not show how many of these villages are parts of larger cities, but probably between six and seven hundred are rural. The new councils reflect rural sentiments reasonably well. Farmers constitute 57 per cent of the total number of councilors (including those elected in urban villages), as compared with 13.1 per cent who were already village and hamlet officials and 11 per cent who were merchants. Probably most of these councils are rather conservative, but even so the voters were quite selective in their choices: they turned away nearly a third of the former village and hamlet officials who were running for council seats. To challenge the councils' ability to represent the poorer elements in the society simply because many are conservative would be no more realistic in Viet Nam than it would be in the United States or Japan. The advantage of an electoral system is that as people become interested in the activities of their officials, they develop an interest in re-electing them to office or replacing them.

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[3] It also ignores the fact that mere changes in leadership without other changes in the political process are unlikely to produce much political development. See John D. Montgomery, "The Role of Induced Elite Change in Political Development," prepared for delivery at the 1961 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, September 6-9, 1961, reprinted in J. D. Montgomery and Arthur Smithies, editors, *Public Policy,* Volume XIII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

The mere election of village councils is only the first step in the development of local self-government. Governments must govern, and thus far in most places the new councils have been dormant, reflecting the traditional local posture of awaiting initiatives from above. The activation of these councils cannot be brought about by fiat; it will require the assumption of important operating responsibilities by them. Land tenure adjudication and administration is a logical place to begin.

Devolving land tenure matters upon village councils would represent a fundamental constitutional change in Viet Nam. Generating local capabilities of this order would continue to enrich the political life of the nation long after peace had been restored and the Americans had withdrawn. The changes might start by simple administrative arrangements; but as the rural population begins to make its presence known to the central government, an almost irreversible process of political evolution will have begun.

True believers in old-fashioned land reform may also object that the whole process is too complex for village leaders unacquainted with statute books and surveyors' transits. But the fact is that land matters are already well understood by them. Indeed, farm lands represent the one subject in which their competence is paramount. Local leaders can provide an administrative capability and a depth of local knowledge that Saigon could never bring to the subject. Many triumphant technicians who have demonstrated aerial photographs to village notables to show how science could help define the boundaries of their farm lands were somewhat crestfallen to find that even illiterates could sketch in fields and paths near which they had spent their lives. Registry deeds may be mislaid in provincial capitals or the national land offices, but most villagers can trace land ownership back for generations without sophisticated documentary evidence. Once Western advisers begin to consider local functional equivalents to Euro-American land procedures, a wide range of emergency political actions becomes possible.

II

But political development is not a problem in the rural areas alone, and if government responsibility for land use can be fragmented and handed over to the rural villages, a similar process might also provide a means of engaging the loyalties of the urban population.

The depopulated countryside in Viet Nam means overcrowded cities. Like many underdeveloped countries, Viet Nam is prematurely urbanized. Unlike many other countries, though, Viet Nam has the opportunity to make use of a comprehensive land reform program to deal with urban as well as rural problems. Saigon and the other major cities are swollen by refugees from the war, but they are still governed as if they were a collection of villages. Urban land tenure is, if anything, even more chaotic and uncontrolled than the rural patterns. Hundreds of thousands of farmers are living in cities. One estimate, perhaps no less reliable than most statistics about Viet Nam, places the urban population at above half of the total instead of the prewar figure of one-quarter; it is certainly not less than 35 per cent. On every side, it is obvious that peasants are being forced off their lands by war and threats; they are drawn to the cities by labor shortages generated by the American presence and stepped-up government and industrial activity; and in spite of the cities' squalor they are attracted to the easier and apparently more modern aspects of urban living.

These displaced farmers are living as squatters, their illegal occupancy tolerated much more generously by government officials than similar invasions of property rights in rural areas. In fact, this generosity removes private urban properties from the control of their owners. At the same time, the government holds urban public lands idle, hoarding them for possible future uses. Thus, neither the public nor the private sector can pretend to be planning rationally for future metropolitan development. Saigon is now the most densely populated city in the world; it has twice the density of Tokyo. There has been no industrial or long-term economic development to support this growth, and no municipal authority to plan for it. Urbanization caught the government completely by surprise. Saigon's population grew by one-third in a decade, and the six other autonomous cities have grown comparably. (See Table I.) Meanwhile, their boundaries have remained unchanged, their administration continues as it has for generations, and almost everywhere their available land has been put to the same patterns of irrational and chaotic use as in Saigon.

A suitable form of decentralization could help to solve urban as well as rural land problems. One place to begin would be to take advantage of the fact that cities in Viet Nam are still organized into hamlets and villages. Although these institutions seldom have any communal identity (in Nha Trang they do not even have a

TABLE I

POPULATION STATISTICS FOR AUTONOMOUS CITIES
1956-1967

City	*1956*	*1960*	*1964*	*1967*
Hue	93,236	103,870	103,930	140,000
Danang	99,851	104,800	148,600	237,000
Dalat	23,744	48,840	55,160	77,700
Cam Ranh	NA	NA	NA	33,500
Saigon	1,794,360	1,400,000	1,370,558	2,204,900
Vung Tau	5,800	NA	NA	42,100
Total population, South Viet Nam	12,366,000	14,072,000	14,354,000	16,591,600
Percentage, autonomous cities population to total population	16.3	11.8	11.7	16.5

Source: National Institute of Statistics

Note: A population study made in April 1967 by Patience Laurient gives the population of district and provincial capitals and autonomous cities as 6,560,068, or 40 per cent of the population. If other populous areas were added the urban count might reach well over 50 per cent.

name, but have to be identified by number), there are at least a few cases where a vigorous leadership has emerged in the urban villages. Unfortunately, however, this leadership has rarely received any encouragement from the metropolitan, provincial or national governments. The existing municipal bureaucracy, charged solely with its traditional administrative responsibilities, has ignored the growing problems of urbanization, just as the central and provincial governments, concerned with refugees only in the official resettlement programs, have ignored the plight of the millions of refugee-squatters in the cities. For want of adequate schooling in the cities, for example, literacy rates may actually be improving faster in rural areas than in urban ones.

Part of this indifference is deliberate. It is perhaps based on the hopeful theory that if conditions in the cities become bad enough, the squatters will gladly go home again when the war is over. The trouble with this theory is that in the meantime the cities are threatened with public unrest and with health epidemics. Moreover, at least half of Saigon's population is under twenty years of age; its youthful inhabitants will have had no real experience with rural life when the war is over. In the long run, unless Viet Nam differs from all other countries in this respect, the likelihood is that the squatters will not want to go back to the farms once they have seen "gay" Saigon.[4]

The dramatic impact the squatters have had on land use patterns in Saigon can be seen even better from aerial photographs than by tortuously threading one's way through streets blocked in by tin-roofed, wattle-sided shacks. Encroachments reduce many streets—Do Than Nhan, for example—to only half their original width, a loss of considerable significance in traffic-choked Saigon. One projected street to the port could not be built at all because of squatter encroachments, though the city already owned the land. The central government, too, is withholding large areas of urban property from public use. Military installations in Saigon even include parade grounds. Quite apart from the streets and the paddy lands in the Saigon city limits, the government holds 12.3 per cent of the total land area of the city—six times the amount used for industrial purposes and twenty-five times the amount put to commercial uses. (See Table II.) The potential expansion of the city is difficult to plan for: the most natural direction, along one side of the Bien Hoa highway, has been pre-empted by the military for most of its length. Vast stretches of valuable land are kept idle. A "no building" restriction prevails for 100 meters on each side of the road, resulting in uncontrolled and undesirable encroachments of the squatter type instead of substantial industrial investment.

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[4] For a study of factors contributing to urban migration and attitudes about returning to the country, see David A. DePuy, *A Pilot Survey of Rural-Urban Movement to Saigon* (McLean, Virginia: Human Sciences Research, Inc., July 1967).

TABLE II

LAND USES IN SAIGON
(as of February 1965)

	Hectares	*Percentage of Total*
Administration	355	6
Military	372	6.3
Industrial	125	2.1
Commercial	28	0.5
High Income Residential	333	5.6
Middle Income Residential	1,494	25.3
Low Income Residential	3,202	54.2
TOTAL	5,909	100.0

There is little likelihood that conditions will improve by themselves. The weight of government support is as heavily favorable to *squatters* in the city as it is to *landlords* in the countryside. The obvious political explanation for this dual favoritism may well be the correct one: urban landowners are frequently Chinese, French, Indian, or other foreign nationals (including repatriated North Vietnamese), while their rural counterparts are Vietnamese of the traditionally respected classes with close ties to the government. Squatter rights are now vaguely defined to make it impossible for property owners to evict their unwanted guests (the government is even expected to compensate squatters for homes built on public ways if they have to be demolished in order to restore the land to its intended use). The squatters are not all paupers: Several military officers recently built houses on public land which the city of Saigon had just allocated for a new school and defied eviction as effectively as the refugee squatters were doing elsewhere in the city. Where there is no planning and no land-use control, there is no incentive for property owners to improve their land or services to it and no disincentive from engaging in inefficient or wasteful land uses.

Some of the problems of premature urbanization could be confronted by devolving responsibilities upon local bodies similar to village councils. The ancient Vietnamese device of organizing cities into villages means that the elected councils might become more active in land affairs in urban areas as well. Saigon is legally a "province" with nine "districts" and fifty-six "villages" encompassing 710 "hamlets." There are two "villages" in Nha Trang and another two urban "villages" on its outskirts. Outside Saigon (and in some parts of Saigon as well), these villages have elected councils with organizational capabilities similar to those of their rural counterparts, and they could perform adjudicative functions over land matters if allowed to do so. They could bring property owners into these negotiations, for the first time involving them in community planning and offering them some assurance of community support. Existing local leadership is fully capable of discharging the roles of both planning and political mobilization. In the famous Eighth District of Saigon, the village councils, under the encouragement of a special Vietnamese forerunner of VISTA, have begun to function with weekly meetings to work out self-help projects, to subdivide the community's labor and financial contributions among the hamlets, and to develop general policies for land development. There are already impressive beginnings in the way of low-cost housing, health and educational facilities, and other physical infrastructure construction. Saigon's Hung Phu District has transformed itself in the course of only two years from chaotic squatter occupancy into attractive surroundings peopled by an enthusiastic citizenry.

This evidence suggests that the principles of decentralization proposed as a means of introducing a revolution of political participation in the countryside could be used in the cities to give the underprivileged squatters a sense of involvement in community affairs. This same process would assure property owners some continuity of possession, subject to their assumption of responsibility for much-needed improvements. What local option could do for tenants in rural areas it could do equally well for landlords in the cities.

III

Unfortunately there is little reason to believe that even after the lesson of the Tet Offensive and the opening of negotiations with Hanoi, the Vietnamese government would welcome such changes in its political processes. For the political inarticulateness of peasants is only one of the reasons why land tenure has not become a more visible issue in Viet Nam. Other powerful factors help to explain the Vietnamese caution. As already suggested, a "traditional" land reform program would be essentially impossible in Viet Nam because of the administrative weakness of the Vietnamese government. Moreover, the government does not really see the war as a reason for inaugurating a social revolution. Nor does it conceive of land reform as a political response to popular dissatisfaction. Rather it sees any such proposal as an initiative urged upon it by some of its American friends, on the one hand, or anticipated and even pre-empted by the Viet Cong, on the other. Its response to the first pressure is to argue that land reform has already been carried out, citing the Diem program of 1956-1961; to the second, it can offer little more than ideological irrelevancies and military force. Neither response is adequate, for underlying the resentments against the war there is a palpable and continuing sense of injustice in the countryside; and because the Viet Cong is presently exploiting this sense from its position of irresponsibility, it is denying the government the opportunity of improving its position with the peasant population.

If only drastic action can deal with peasant unrest, if this is indeed a time of fundamental constitutional change, and if an unorthodox approach is called for to accommodate the urban dimensions, then new initiatives are necessary. In the absence of any significant internal political forces working for social change, the initiative must come from the American side. For whether the government is to be dominated by military warlords or by civilian landlords, the peasants' voice is muted. The nature of the U.S. initiative, therefore, is of crucial importance. Yet the Vietnamese preference for legalistic solutions, and the American preference for technological ones, both ignore the requirements for institutional change in Viet Nam.

The American leadership is concerned with land reform not only because domestic pressures at home are forcing the Johnson Administration to take a "positive" view of the U.S. role in Viet Nam; not only because both President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey personally believe in land reform; and not even because such a posture might improve the American standing in world opinion. The real reason for the American concern is that if a successful program could be carried out, it might greatly improve the Vietnamese government's capacity to enlist the support of its people and ward off political decay.

On the Vietnamese side, the potential advantages of land reform are the same as in other parts of the world where the rural population is largely engaged in peasant agriculture. Social equity is essentially the same in Viet Nam as in Japan or Taiwan; and generating local political support, increasing agricultural productivity, encouraging rural commitment to the status quo in the hope of fostering stability, and deriving diplomatic benefits from the plaudits of sympathetic governments abroad, are all factors as weighty in Viet Nam as they have been in other parts of Asia, the Near East and Latin America.

U.S. pressures toward political development have been an important source of each major step taken since the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. It was an American signal that encouraged the military coup against Diem, and from that point forward, U.S. concern in Vietnamese politics escalated along with the war itself. Thereafter Americans nudged the Vietnamese to elect a constituent assembly, to draft and agree upon a constitution, to hold national elections for two legislative houses and a president, to perform a shotgun marriage of convenience between General Thieu and Marshal Ky, and to elect representative councils in over a thousand villages. The nudges continued in the post-inaugural period of the new government. The United States encouraged the Vietnamese to reduce corruption and to improve welfare services. It pushed for administrative reform and for more purposeful economic policies. The U.S. Army began to respond as well, sponsoring training and other opportunities for enlisted men, often over the objections of officers who preferred that only the privileged and educated should be trained for higher responsibilities. And there is increasing talk of merit promotion in the Vietnamese Army.

As the United States explores means of withdrawing from its operational role in Viet Nam and devotes its attention to problems of political settlement, it must consider means of using its resources to strengthen the political capabilities of any national government in Saigon. There are dangers in the use of American leverage on an insecure government that is sensitive to every hint of invasion of its sovereign prerogatives. But such influence as the United States will have as the fighting subsides should be used for essential, long-term purposes in harmony with its basic objectives in Southeast Asia. These purposes certainly include the rise of governments capable of responding to the needs of their own rural majorities. New funds will be needed to support the land redistribution and development policies proposed by local authorities. Some of the present landlords will have to be compensated for their properties. And in the cities, development loans may be needed for private property owners and neighborhood associations. Obviously these funds can come only from the United States, and this means that they could be issued contingent upon improvements in the structure of local self-government and in the national responses to local initiatives.

None of the proposed changes can reach their full political momentum unless the central Vietnamese government develops the capacity to accommodate new demands placed upon it from local sources. Giving it these capabilities will require new capital, increased receptivity to local initiatives, and effective administrative procedures for delegating responsibility.

These changes could be introduced by establishing a Land Development Fund to be administered by a joint U.S.-Vietnamese Board with authority to respond to initiatives from villages and cities. This board could be empowered to administer its programs outside the normal managerial framework of the government, to bypass provincial and district authorities in dealing with the local councils, and to make use of technicians borrowed from the national ministries.

The principal function of such a Joint Board would be to respond to initiatives from village councils and other local authorities, both rural and urban. A system of priorities could be used to determine which of the local initiatives would receive its financial and technical support. Among these priorities, the first might well be to support local projects that would promote efficient land use for farming, housing and commercial purposes. A second priority would be assigned to projects that would augment the income of the poor members of the community. A third priority would be for those activities that would improve the quality of community life in general.

A joint binational board is recommended because, working alone, neither the Vietnamese government nor the American mission can provide the information and the resources needed. The experience of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction on Taiwan is compelling evidence that two governments joined in a search for solutions to problems like those now confronting Viet Nam can produce imaginative new approaches. The procedures used for these purposes proved superior to those developed by either of the governments for dealing with conventional problems. Many (though not all) of JCRR's characteristics are transferrable.[5]

The ideal arrangement would permit local councils to apply for funds directly to the Joint Board without passing through the military channels represented by the present (and largely corrupt) district or province chiefs. District and province chiefs should not have review power over the applications themselves or control the releasing of funds or supplies. They should be limited to supervising the performance, post-auditing the use of supplies and equipment, and reporting any obstacles or difficulties encountered in the project implementation. Needless to say, since the province and district chiefs' surveillance would be paralleled by technical supervision from the project manager at the task force level, the opportunities for corruption would be severely limited, and yet actual administration would not completely bypass the district and province chiefs.

The American relationship to the Board's activities throughout should be responsive rather than coercive. In the first months, U.S. personnel now assigned to provincial and district offices should be encouraged to volunteer their services to village councils in preparing project descriptions; but as soon as possible the initiative should pass to the local leadership for requesting U.S. aid in both project design and the later management of approved projects. The Board, too, should be able to request technical assistance from both Vietnamese and American agencies, as appropriate, and from other allied nations and the Asian Development Bank.

The Joint Board should not be conceived as a permanent institution. Its funds ought to be programmed on a declining curve with the passage of time. As security improves, project management and maintenance should be gradually transferred to the ministries concerned. In the meantime, the operations of the Joint

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[5] See John D. Montgomery, Rufus B. Hughes and Raymond H. Davis, *Rural Improvement and Political Development, The JCRR Model* (Washington: American Society for Public Administration, 1966). Elsewhere I have discussed, with more reservations than I express here, the use of American aid leverage for the purpose of introducing reform in Viet Nam. *The Politics of Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 61-150, 246-254, 276-279.

Board in responding to local initiatives would not interfere with the routine conduct of ministerial operations in their respective fields. Some of the funds could be allocated in advance to various regions or populations on a formula basis, but at least as much should be used to assign priorities in accordance with national needs and to reward those local initiatives which show greatest promise.

The amount necessary to establish the Joint Land Development Board would be about $35,000,000. This sum would accommodate requests for $2,000 for each village which has already had an election, add an equal amount to be used for special local initiatives, and provide $30,000,000 for land redistribution and development demonstrations—one-tenth the estimated reimbursement cost of expropriating all lands above ten hectares as proposed in one American report. This estimate would permit the Joint Board to allocate funds for reimbursing landlords whose property seizures by the Viet Cong were confirmed by the village councils, and to finance other land redistribution on a demonstration basis. There is little doubt that these funds could be spent very usefully over a period of five years.

The proposal that a central agency should be empowered to respond directly to appeals from local units for support has been successfully followed not only in Taiwan but also in the rural works program of Pakistan. Both have succeeded eminently in their task of using external capital sources and internal technological innovation as a means of strengthening local loyalties and local institutional capabilities. Recent experience amply justifies confidence in the ability of individual Vietnamese leaders, once detached from the routines of the office, to respond to such extraordinary demands upon their imagination. But the American community needs to supply the initial impetus.

IV

America's ultimate purpose in sponsoring these reforms would be to make possible its own withdrawal without sacrificing the major purposes of its original involvement. To be sure, no one should look upon even the most favorable political developments in Viet Nam as a guarantee against eventual communist takeover. It might be possible to exclude the leadership of the National Liberation Front entirely from effective national power, and still leave the local cadres of the Viet Cong in place. Many of them regard themselves as career public servants, and in many cases their activities could be tolerated and perhaps encouraged, providing they can make themselves responsible to the local constituents. Indeed, their presence can serve as points of competition as local politicians compete for the loyalty of the village electorate. Accommodation with the Viet Cong could begin where they are most deeply entrenched, least ideological, and most likely to respond to overtures from Saigon—in the villages. This approach might be the best means of preventing complete control of the South from Hanoi.

One major difficulty in such an evolution is the attitude of the Saigon government and the leadership of the National Liberation Front (the one attitude they share in common is a strong desire for centralized authority). Both would recognize the fact that devolvement upon local authority of essential government functions, such as land policies, would introduce an irreversible revolutionary change. Once the political process is set in motion at local levels, it cannot be arrested except by the imposition of force.

Giving village councils jurisdiction over essentially local matters like land reform would not influence national politics much unless central institutions were prepared to treat the peasant as a source as well as an object of policy. The proposed Joint Board has the disadvantage of being outside the regular ministerial channels, but this weakness would be reduced if it could use regular government personnel in executing its programs. This sharing of resources would eventually make it possible to transfer improved extraordinary procedures into the basic administrative systems of the government.

The joint fund could be used for many purposes, but its first role should be to strengthen village institutions as a countervailing influence in areas of local concern now administered by a strongly centralized, but locally ineffective, government. The American participation in this Joint Board would be self-liquidating, but the institutional changes introduced during the joint period would be self-sustaining, especially as local political initiatives are released.

These proposals make one basic assumption about the nature of political development that is increasingly shared among political scientists. This is that no national institutions of political expression, decision and enforcement can satisfy the demands of modern government if large segments of the population are permanently excluded from participation in the political process or if they are exempted from the civic responsibilities of accepting and obeying laws and regulations. Both of these negative conditions now prevail in rural Viet Nam. The generation of political institutions with specific governing functions, a policymaking role, and enforcement capabilities at the local level will therefore contribute to long-term nation-building and political development at the center even though some immediate dissonance may arise in the process.

If the Saigon government is to achieve true national viability, the Vietnamese people cannot be left politically dormant.

MARINE RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE SPECTRUM OF CHOICE*

by Victor Basiuk

FOR the past two years, divergent tendencies have characterized marine science affairs. On the one hand, there have been a number of important developments which aroused great expectations. In June 1966, the President approved an act[1] establishing the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, chaired by the U.S. Vice President. Although the Council is not a permanent organization, its establishment elevated the consideration of ocean development to the highest echelons of the government, thus launching "a new national policy to intensify the study of the sea, and to convert to practical reality its inherent promise for man's benefit."[2] Four months later, in October 1966, another major piece of legislation came into effect, namely, the National Sea Grant College and Program Act, which was designed to develop skilled manpower and to promote ocean engineering research necessary for the exploitation of marine resources.[3] Industrial interest in this field grew, and companies in ocean-related activities began to think of expanding their operations in anticipation of increased government funds.

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[1] The Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act (P.L. 89-454), which came into effect on June 17, 1966.

[2] *Marine Science Affairs—A Year of Transition* (The First Report of the President to the Congress on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, February 1967), p. 9. (Hereafter referred to as *Marine Science Affairs, 1967*.)

P.L. 89-454 also created the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources (hereafter, Marine Science Commission), a sister institution of the National Marine Council. The Commission is composed of prominent private citizens (J. A. Stratton, Chairman of the Board of The Ford Foundation, is chairman), appointed by the President, and it has the responsibility for recommending a permanent governmental institution for marine affairs.

[3] This act (P.L. 89-688), signed by the President on October 15, 1966, is administered by the National Science Foundation. The original intent of the sponsors of the act was to earmark 10 per cent of the proceeds from leases of the U.S. continental shelf to support the purpose of this legislation, but the tie with the proceeds from the continental shelf was deleted. Requested appropriations for fiscal year 1969 under this act are $6 million.

Numerous articles appeared in popular magazines and trade publications referring to "the vast riches of the oceans," and oceanography became a glamor field on Wall Street.[4]

On the other hand, actual progress in marine development during the past two years has not matched these expectations. The first two annual reports of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development (hereafter, National Marine Council)[5] indicate an ordering of priorities and some constructive progress in a number of sectors, but they propose no bold moves and no truly major projects. The proposed expenditure for the nation's oceanology program for fiscal year 1969, which includes the activities of eleven departments with twenty-nine agencies, totals $516 million, up only about 15 per cent over fiscal year 1968 and 17 per cent over fiscal year 1967.[6] Even these relatively modest expenditures ran into difficulties in Congress, creating a threat that the actual appropriations for fiscal year 1969 will be reduced to about $400 million and spreading gloom among industrial and other supporters of ocean development.[7] While many companies have, as a result, begun to curtail their activities and defer plans, there is evidence that the industry itself failed to generate new ideas and come forward with worthwhile major projects warranting the support of the National Marine Council—despite government encouragement to private enterprise to take the initiative.[8]

What is the meaning of these divergent developments? Have the oceans been "oversold" to the public as a new frontier for America's national endeavor? Now that the federal executive, after years of debate, has committed itself to marine affairs in a comprehensive manner, is the expected promise of the oceans less than its advocates claimed? Or can the present lack of progress be explained by some temporary, short-range factors?

[4] See, e.g., "Is There A Gold Mine Out in the Ocean? Money in Underwater Engineering," *Business Week,* April 9, 1966, pp. 90 ff.; "New Frontiers for the United States: Untold Riches in the Sea," *U.S. News and World Report,* August 22, 1966, pp. 66-69; "Industry Investing Heavily in Oceanology," *Aerospace Technology,* September 25, 1967, pp. 44 ff.; "Wealth of the Sea," *Barron's,* December 25, 1967, p. 1.

[5] *Marine Science Affairs, 1967, op. cit.,* and *Marine Science Affairs—A Year of Plans and Progress, 1968.*

[6] *Marine Science Affairs, 1968,* pp. 18-20.

[7] See "A Discouraging Outlook," *Oceanology International,* November-December 1967, p. 11.

[8] See "Cutbacks and Lethargy," *Oceanology International,* September-October 1967, p. 15. Edward Wenk, Jr., the Executive Secretary of the Council, was quoted as decrying the lack of initiative and novel program proposals on the part of industry.

The "oceanographic community" advances short-range explanations. The budgetary squeeze due to the Viet Nam conflict has put a brake on ocean development. Planning for ocean development takes time, and the National Marine Council and the Marine Science Commission (the latter is expected to outline a national program for long-range exploitation of marine resources) are new institutions. Furthermore, a sound foundation created from small-scale and unspectacular work in marine affairs must be laid before major and dramatic programs can be advanced.

These arguments have considerable validity. Nor is there any reason to question the great promise of ocean potential and its contribution to meeting social needs.[9] What is lacking, however, is convincing evidence that the oceans justify a major allocation of national resources *now,* rather than several years from now, and that this would serve the nation's goals better than alternative uses of the money, even if hostilities in Viet Nam ceased. The present situation in marine affairs must be examined in terms of longer-range considerations.

I

National Endeavors and Criteria for Choice

Unless the rationale for achieving swift technological progress in a specific area is compelling on grounds of national interest (as in the case of the missile-nuclear program after the Soviets had made the first breakthrough), or is clearly beneficial in an economic sense (as in the case of computer technology for civilian use, where the U.S. government was spared the necessity for making major commitments because of the eagerness of private enterprise), the problem of choice and consideration of alternatives becomes a factor. The outer space program, supersonic commercial aircraft, anti-ballistic missile defense, and the technological features of Great Society programs are all competing for the nation's resources. As a candidate for a major national endeavor, marine resources development must survive this decision-making process. How, then, can we choose the alternatives most beneficial to society?

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[9] Although our knowledge of the ocean potential in the light of social needs is far from complete, a number of serious studies have appeared lately to shed light on this subject. Among these are the President's Science Advisory Committee, Panel on Oceanography, *Effective Use of the Sea* (Washington: GPO, 1966) and National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Oceanography (NASCO), *Oceanography 1966: Achievements and Opportunities* (Washington: NAS, 1967).

Two "pure" methods of selection can be distinguished. One, an essentially political method, relies solely on the interplay of the various interests concerned. It carries the danger that the influence of a constituency may be out of proportion to the real social value of the interest it represents. Conversely, a particular interest serving society as a whole may not have an articulate constituency.[10]

The other method is a strictly "rational" one in which the decision to choose a particular program is based on an "objective" evaluation of alternatives and their relative benefit to society. The problem is that we do not have a satisfactory tool of analysis to determine what constitutes the greatest benefit to society.[11] Decisions of this order of magnitude would require the inclusion of important value preferences and assumptions, which detracts considerably from the "objective" nature of the decision and introduces strong political undertones. While the decisions would be to a considerable extent political, they would not be subjected to the test of a democratic political process, involving the potential danger of abuse of power or costly mistakes.

In actual practice decisions are made by a compromise between these two methods. Even as our society recognizes the legitimacy of the claims of vested interests, it imposes on them a burden of proof that their claims are not raised narrowly at the expense of the nation, but for its benefit. Hence, the "rational" method is, to this extent, built into our political process and does not require specialized institutions with computers.

In a post-Viet Nam world, the United States may face four principal claimants on national resources: the Great Society programs, an anti-ballistic missile system, the outer space program, and a marine resources development program. These programs are competitive, but not necessarily mutually exclusive. There are a number of ways in which a marine resources development program could complement both the Great Society and the outer space programs.[12] However, the future of a national marine program ultimately depends on its own viability, which requires satisfying the double criteria: the political strength of its constituency[13] and the benefits which it can provide to the nation as a whole. Assessment of these benefits depends on a delineation of national policy alternatives in ocean development in terms of both the costs and benefits of a major marine development program.

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[10] A historical example of a lack of an articulate constituency is provided by the case of America's interest in upholding the balance of power in Europe during World War I, which later led to accusations that the United States' entry into the war was a right decision for a wrong reason. Cf. Edward H. Buehrig, *Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955), pp. 106-169, 269-275.

[11] Systems analysis perhaps comes closest to being such a tool, but it has significant limitations for this purpose. Cf. Fred S. Hoffman, "Systems Analysis and Social Policy," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York, December 27, 1967.

[12] Cf. *Marine Science Affairs, 1968,* pp. 15, 17-18.

Cost-Benefit Considerations in Marine Exploitation

In the broader sense of "cost" involving the values and interests of the nation as a whole, the costs of an ocean program might be considered "low" and the benefits "high," even if the strictly economic costs of the program were "high" in relation to economic return—provided it contributes substantially to national security, to political goals, or to other ends beneficial to the nation. Unlike programs for the exploration of outer space, ocean programs will provide distinct economic benefits. This argument has been the *raison d'être* of ocean development, the justification for the allocation of major funds to oceanology. The fault in the argument is not that it is completely wrong, but that it obscures the dual potential—economic and noneconomic—of oceanic programs. The mutual reinforcement of these benefits is perhaps the strongest asset of ocean programs as a potential instrument of public policy.

When the cost-effectiveness of ocean development is appraised in terms of the needs of the U.S. economy alone, the picture is not especially promising at this time because of the relative wealth of America's land-based resources and her ready access to raw materials abroad. It is more promising when sea-based resources are evaluated in terms of worldwide economic needs. However, what is needed to make these resources available to the deficient countries, including less developed regions and some highly advanced ones, such as Western Europe and Japan, is advanced marine technology and capital. The fact that the United States could be the leading supplier for both needs opens up an opportunity for cooperative projects for ocean development with selected nations, in which the United States would initially derive mainly political benefits. Later, as American land-based resources diminish and population increases, the incidence of benefits derived by the United States from such cooperative projects would shift from political to economic as technologies developed in such projects become available to meet America's own economic needs.[14] There are precedents for subsidizing future technologies: nuclear power and supersonic commercial aircraft. There is less precedent for doing so in situations, such as this one, where specific foreign policy benefits might also be gained through cooperative efforts to develop such technologies.

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[13] The constituency for a national marine program is far from negligible. Although oceanographers comprise a relatively small group within the scientific community, they have been quite active politically and influential in promoting the cause of marine science and development. (See Don K. Price, *The Scientific Estate* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965], pp. 209-213, *passim.*) Economic interests are substantial. The total offshore mineral production in the United States amounts to about $1.3 billion per year (from the continental shelf and slope). Offshore oil production, worldwide, amounts to about $5 billion per year, most of which is produced by U.S. companies. The U.S. Navy, the merchant marine, the fishing industry, the companies and individuals interested in offshore recreation, plus the growing segment of the American public which becomes fascinated by the adventure and geopolitical implications of ocean development are also actual or potential constituents of a national marine development program.

Cost-sharing in surveys and exploration can reduce total costs and be mutually beneficial. Economies of scale appear to be important in ocean exploitation. Joint regional programs may prove to be profitable in situations where ocean exploitation undertaken by individual companies would not be.[15] Such joint programs for ocean exploitation can be instrumental in bringing about important political as well as economic benefits. These political benefits might include the stabilization of certain less developed areas, the strengthening of political or military ties with selected nations, the alleviation of some "technological gaps" thus removing associated political problems, the "mellowing" of communist societies, and enhancing the viability of certain countries, geographic regions or international institutions. Ocean exploitation thus has the potential for creating unprecedented opportunities for functionalism as a force in international affairs—functionalism not as a semi-autonomous process bringing about political cohesiveness of the world and thereby eliminating wars,[16] but as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in the context of bilateral relationships, regional organizations, and the reinforcement of broad international trends.

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[14] Cf. my testimony in U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Special Subcommittee on Sea Grant Colleges, *Hearings on S. 2439,* 89th Congress, Second Session, May 2-5, 1966, pp. 240-241.

[15] While international consortia have not been regarded as a particularly successful form of business enterprise on land, private companies have resorted to multinational consortia in the South Pacific, the North Sea, and off the coast of Africa. Cf. A. Denis Clift, "North Sea Oil and Gas Exploration," *Oceanology International,* September-October 1967, pp. 29-31; Statement of Willard Bascom, in House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, *Interim Report on the United Nations and the Issue of Deep Sea Resources, Together with Hearings,* 90th Congress, First Session, December 17, 1967, pp. 125-127. (Hereafter cited as House of Representatives, *The U.N. and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources.*)

[16] Perhaps the most prominent exponent of this form of functionalism is David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London: National Peace Council, 1946).

Quite apart from the design of specific technical programs, the form of a future regime of the oceans can be a significant factor in either reducing or increasing the costs of ocean development. If, for instance, a part of the revenue from leasing the sea bed for exploitation is earmarked for marine research and development or for other services facilitating ocean exploitation, then individual programs would cost less and more rapid marine resources development would follow. Similarly, if a future regime of the oceans were to provide a high degree of security as to the rights of exploitation, then costs to private enterprise would decrease and a greater readiness to undertake ocean programs would follow. Conversely, uncertainty as to the rights of exploitation leads to higher costs to compensate for the risks involved.

Integrated national planning for marine research and development would involve a global assessment of economic demand for ocean-produced resources and would concentrate ocean-related research and development in the areas combining promise of technological breakthroughs with the satisfaction of urgent social needs. Social needs will have to be monitored on a continuous basis so as to provide guidance, to allow the necessary lead-time for mission-oriented research and development, and to determine the areas of basic research likely to create a fountain of applicable scientific knowledge.

In view of the increasing indications that the "spin-off" from military technology into the civilian economy is much less than abundant and cannot be taken for granted,[17] institutionalized coordination of and cooperation between civilian and military research and development could be an important factor in reducing costs. A relatively small readjustment in the design of a military research and development program might result in significant benefits to civilian programs.[18] Nor should one overlook the possibility of a "spin-off" in the opposite direction.

[17] See Richard R. Nelson, Merton J. Peck, and Edward D. Kolachek, *Technology, Economic Growth, and Public Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 84-85.

[18] The Department of Defense has recognized this possibility. In May 1967, John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, issued a policy statement indicating that defense agencies need not justify all their oceanology programs in purely military terms and that the Department of Defense will provide financial support to marine projects which are only partially military. See R. W. Niblock, "Greater DOD Ocean Role Hinted by Foster," *Technology Week*, May 22, 1967, p. 22.

America's ability to undertake the comprehensive and integrated effort needed to make marine development cost-effective will depend on the intelligent planning and coordination of activities ranging from a future regime of the oceans to specific decisions in marine research and development. The establishment of a competent planning body as the central component of a permanent national institution for ocean development is but one part of the task; it is of equal, if not greater, importance that sufficient authority be available to enforce the planning.

Foreign Policy and Marine Affairs

Some sectors of marine affairs fall primarily within the domestic sphere. These include harbor development, control of pollution, regulation of conflicting uses of American coastal areas, and the general stimulus to the American economy derived from the exploitation of marine resources. However, the major impact from ocean development will fall within the sphere of international affairs and hence is of concern to U.S. foreign policy.

In the first place, America's superiority in marine sciences and technologies and its access to capital provides U.S. foreign policy with an effective functional instrument. Second, in the long run, the geopolitical implications of marine resources development will produce a major change in the distribution of world power; it will strengthen the economic potential of some nations more than others, it will establish new strategic areas and introduce major changes in the direction of international trade, with concomitant political implications.[19] U.S. foreign policymakers will have to provide guidance in marine affairs to make sure that these developments serve the American national interest and the kind of world desired by the United States. Even though the major geopolitical impact of ocean development is predominantly long-range, it should be kept in mind that decisions which have been made or now need to be made will significantly influence the nature of that impact.[20]

Since the oceans do not belong to any particular nation, marine resources development involving the United States falls within the sphere of U.S. foreign policy. Even in the case of the continental shelf outside territorial waters—which now falls under national ownership—international problems will abound, since the waters above the shelf are international, as are, in many cases, the moving resources (such as fish) within these waters.

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[19] For a historical illustration of the geopolitical impact of marine technologies and their geopolitical implications for the future, see Victor Basiuk, "The Oceans—A New Frontier for America's Public Policy?," ORBIS, Summer 1966, pp. 509-512.

[20] One example of a major decision with far-reaching future geopolitical implications is the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, which came into force in 1964, whereupon vast areas were placed under the jurisdiction of coastal states

In designing policies and programs in marine resources development with respect to international relations, four approaches can be distinguished: a narrowly national or unilateral approach, a broadly international one, a regional approach, and a "mix" of the previous three.

National, International, and Regional Approaches to Marine Affairs

A narrowly national or unilateral approach to ocean development could involve a centralized, purposeful, "NASA-type" effort or the granting of a nearly free hand to private industry. In the former case the federal government would undertake exploration and R&D which as yet is unprofitable for industry, take initiative in planning development programs, encourage industry to participate in them, and control the output of ocean resources and the market effects on existing production, including that in less developed countries.[21] Alternatively, by granting industry a fairly free hand in ocean development, the government's function would be mainly confined to providing tax relief measures, financial assistance in research and development, and support of scientific oceanographic programs.

One of the advantages of either unilateral approach would be relative freedom from international decision-making and from the consequent likelihood of delay, compromise and ineffectiveness. Currently classified technologies could be more readily shared with U.S. private companies than would be the case under a multinational effort.

The liability of such an approach would be its costliness to the

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for the purpose of exploitation, thus, in effect, extending the states' territories. In the case of the United States, the addition amounted to about one-third of the nation's land surface. Cf. also *infra,* pp. 58-59. For the background of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, see Louis Henkin, *Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources,* a study prepared for the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, and published by the Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs, Columbia University, Monograph No. 1, May 1968, pp. 13-24.

[21] David B. Brooks pointed out that, in mining manganese nodules, there would be a sharp drop in price of manganese, nickel and cobalt, as the result of the large-scale output needed for such mining. Such a drop in price can seriously injure certain raw-material-producing, less developed nations. See his *Low Grade and Non-Conventional Sources of Manganese* (Washington: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1966), pp. 104-107.

United States since virtually all aspects of ocean development would have to be carried out by American capital and manpower. Narrowly national programs are also likely to trigger protective moves on the part of other nations which would impede access to many ocean areas. And in the absence of a national direction, coordination within the private enterprise community would probably be weak or nonexistent, thus increasing costs and slowing down ocean development.[22]

This narrowly national approach might seriously undermine international stability and be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests in other ways, perhaps leading to friction and conflict over ocean resources with the nations with which the United States normally has friendly relations, such as those of Western Europe. The structure of America's alliances may be weakened as may her political and economic ties. If ocean development is left to unregulated activities of private enterprise, their long-range geopolitical impact may run contrary to foreign policy and security interests of the United States. Overproduction of certain raw materials, injuring the economies of some less developed countries, is also likely to occur.

A broadly international approach to marine resources exploitation might lead to a major, comprehensive ocean program under the aegis of the United Nations or of a special body such as the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat) with the United States represented by an organization similar to Communications Satellite Corporation. However, the single most important problem with such an approach is that the international political climate is not ready for it and will not be for some time. Exploitation of resources of the oceans is too closely tied to considerations of national power since the results may determine which nations or geographic regions will rise in relative power and which will decline. An "ocean Comsat" would further complicate the problem since it would involve the transfer of potentially extensive powers bearing on foreign relations to an essentially semi-autonomous business corporation and international consortium not readily amenable to foreign policy guidance.[23]

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[22] Assuming the initiative comes from industry and that private enterprise will be virtually free to pursue its interests in the oceans, different forms of developmental effort might evolve. Conceivably, American private companies may enter into cartels or consortia with foreign companies (as oil companies now tend to do), thus reducing their risks and lowering costs. But this would mean abandoning a narrowly national effort in favor of a form of regional cooperation.

There are nevertheless certain categories of ocean programs, regulations and policies which could more appropriately be handled by the United Nations. One includes activities which promote long-range stability in the world, such as opportunities for less developed nations and worldwide legal regulations not significantly affecting the existing power relationships. Another category includes those worldwide activities requiring international agreement, as, for example, those concerning scientific cooperation, scientific data collection, and ocean pollution standards and regulations.[24] Aside from their scientific and economic benefits, these activities can serve a number of goals of U.S. foreign policy as functional instruments.

The most important advantage of the third alternative approach—a regional approach to marine development—is that it could strike an effective balance between a narrowly national and a broadly international approach. Programs reflecting this approach woud involve nations of selected geographic regions and be created in response to favorable economic, political, military and technological factors. Under this approach, unlike the broadly international one, it would be possible to select with whom to cooperate and how closely; in this way both the short- and long-range security interests of the United States as a great power could be served.[25]

A regional approach would decentralize many activities and regulations. Eventually, several regional programs could be established in such areas as the Northern Atlantic, Northern

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[23] This, at least, has been the experience with the Communications Satellite Corporation. According to Section 402 of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, the corporation should notify the Department of State whenever it enters into negotiations with "any international or foreign entity" and the Department of State "shall advise the corporation of relevant foreign policy considerations." Further, "the corporation shall keep the Department of State informed with respect to such considerations." These provisions, in effect, place the Department of State on the fringes of the formulation and execution of decisions which may have serious effect on U.S. foreign policy, and in actual practice the State Department has had difficulties in overseeing those foreign policy aspects which pertain to the activities of the Communications Satellite Corporation.

[24] It should be noted that a number of UN agencies are engaged in marine activities along some of these lines, although, at the present, they are limited and fragmented. See NASCO, *Oceanography 1966*, pp. 179-180.

[25] It is noteworthy that the Committee on Oceanography of the National Academy of Sciences came out with a strong endorsement of regional organizations as a form of oceanographic and marine resources development activities. This endorsement was advanced on grounds other than political. See *ibid.*, p. 182.

Pacific, Indian Ocean, Southern Atlantic and Southern Pacific. They could follow along existing politico-economic ties as would, for instance, a United States-European program and a United States-Latin American program. They could be open-ended, serving as an instrument of functionalism for such purposes as strengthening ties between or among certain nations or regions and facilitating integration or economic and political stabilization of selected regions.

Among the principal disadvantages of a regional approach is the complexity of implementation and long-range guidance. Actual experience in regional cooperation in marine affairs has been too limited to be sufficiently instructive.[26] Present legislation—such as anti-trust laws—would have to be reviewed in the light of the prospects for regional ocean development and the most desirable forms of business organization needed for this purpose. Because of the political implications of regional cooperation, decisions about inclusion and exclusion may be critical.

"Structured Mix" as a Marine Policy Objective

The principal advantage of the fourth alternative approach, a "mix" of the three discussed previously, is that marine resources development is a highly complex set of problems which cannot be readily strait-jacketed into any of the "single-type" alternatives. However, a "mix" could mean anything from a highly amorphous and confusing combination of independent national, regional and international programs, characterized by little or no overall purposiveness, to what may conveniently be called a "structured mix." A "structured mix" would consist of the most advantageous components of each of the other three alternatives, structured so that they reinforce each other's effectiveness. As the aggregate of the nation's policies and programs in marine affairs, the "mix" should not only support specific goals of American foreign policy, but should be designed with due regard for the future world order which that policy attempts to promote.

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[26] Regional cooperation in exploitation of marine mineral resources is as yet practically nonexistent, perhaps mainly because this field is so new and relatively undeveloped. There is some nongovernmental regional cooperation in the exploitation of oil and gas in the North Sea and in the South Pacific. In the field of fisheries, on the other hand, regional organization prevails, mainly because the resource itself (fish) is regionally located. Although the success of various regional commissions in fisheries has varied, the future of marine fisheries, according to some authorities, lies in a more systematic application of regional principles and considerations, and their incorporation in specific agreements. See James A. Crutchfield, "Marine Fisheries: A Problem of International Cooperation," *American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings,* May 1964, p. 215.

A structured mix might be based on the following considerations. If a regional approach appears to be the most advantageous single approach to marine resources development, it would be accepted as the predominant component in the structured mix. Regional programs can be loosely tied to the United Nations, and an international approach through that organization could provide a broad umbrella of legal principles and regulations for ocean development and sponsor programs in marine scientific cooperation, as distinguished from cooperation in marine development. The United Nations might also be an appropriate institution for *limited* specialized programs in marine exploitation, such as those aimed at assisting the less developed countries in solving their food problem.

On the other hand, there are activities where a national approach would be preferable to either a regional or an international one. This may be the case with respect to that part of the continental shelf whose resources, in accordance with the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, belong to the United States. National programs might be more appropriate in "buffer zones" if, for security reasons, such zones are established outside the national continental shelf[27] or around military installations in the deep ocean areas. Military installations themselves may provide an example of national property and institutions in areas beyond national jurisdiction which would have to be accommodated even under an international regime, if such is established.

What are our *real* choices among the four alternative approaches just sketched? The present form of policies and programs in marine affairs *is* a mix of national, regional and international elements. Some structuring of the mix is taking place, but its form has not as yet been adequately articulated. Thus, it is important to keep the three "single-type" alternatives in mind so that we can adequately appraise their advantages and disadvantages as components of the "mix," because the real spectrum of choice has to do with the kind of mixed approach that might best be developed as a matter of policy.

Assuming that a structured mix will have a predominant form, our choice narrows to one with a predominantly national or a predominantly regional approach, since the realities of contemporary international affairs would exclude as a viable alternative a structured mix with a predominantly international approach. In deciding between these alternatives, the choice essentially lies between a less complex and more readily implementable national model and a regional model which would require greater effort to design and implement, but would carry potentially more extensive political and economic benefits.

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[27] See the proposal by Louis Henkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47.

II

Regime of the Oceans: The Current Debate

The question of a future regime of the oceans has generated lately a great deal of interest in legal, academic and governmental circles. Conferences have been held and a number of articles and monographs have appeared debating the relative virtues of various alternatives, primarily with reference to the sea bed and subsoil of the deep ocean areas.[28] The subject has become a focus of attention in governmental circles since the Government of Malta in August 1967 proposed at the United Nations that the sea bed and the ocean floor be subjected to international jurisdiction and "preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes."[29]

In general, the several alternative proposals for a regime governing the sea bed beyond the continental shelf start from either a national or an international point of view. The former assumes that resources of the ocean bottom are *res nullius* and therefore subject to national appropriation, while the latter assumes that they are *res communis,* which would exclude permanent national appropriation of the sea bed outside the continental shelf.

The principal alternatives from a national point of view are based on the concepts of the "median line" and the "flag nation." The first would result in the division of the oceans by coastal states along the median lines between opposite shores.[30] The second would involve national appropriation by exploiters anywhere on the sea bed outside the limits of the continental shelf (yet to be firmly defined); the principle of homesteading would apply, with the individual governments providing protection to the acquisition rights of their nationals.[31] A modified form of the flag nation approach, bringing it closer to an international regime, suggests the establishment of regional recording agencies, with a central index in the UN Secretariat. Entrepreneurs would record their claims with their respective nations which, in turn, would record them with one of the regional registration agencies. The right of exploitation would be limited in terms of time and resources, and only a minimal fee would be paid to the international recording agency to defray administrative costs.[32]

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[28] For instance, the Law of the Sea Institute was organized at the University of Rhode Island in 1966; it has held a number of conferences, and the proceedings of one have been published as a book edited by Lewis M. Alexander, *The Law of the Sea* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1967). Various aspects of a future regime of the oceans were discussed in the forum of the Marine Technology Society; see *Exploiting the Ocean* (Transactions of the Second Annual MTS Conference, June 27-29, 1966), *passim.* In July 1967, the issue was discussed at the World Peace Through Law Conference, held in Geneva and attended by more than 2,000 lawyers from all over the world. The United Nations was urged to assume jurisdiction over deep ocean resources. See "U.N. Role is Urged for Ocean Riches," *The New York Times,* July 14, 1967.

[29] See the *note verbale* by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta, UN General Assembly, 22nd Session, A/6695, August 18, 1967. The action of Ambassador Pardo triggered a debate in the U.S. Congress, where a number of resolutions taking various positions on this subject were introduced. See, e.g., U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearing on S.J. Res. 111, S. Res. 172, and S. Res. 189,* 90th Congress, First Session, November 29, 1967 (hereafter referred to as U.S. Senate, *Hearing on S.J. Res. 111*), and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, *The U.N. and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources.*

The international approach essentially consists of one alternative: internationalization of the sea bed and its subsoil outside the limits of the national continental shelf and the establishment of an international agency, presumably under the aegis of the United Nations.[33] This agency would grant leases for the exploitation of minerals beyond the continental shelf, collect rent—to be used either for the general support of the United Nations or for a specialized purpose such as the development of the less developed countries—and provide protection for the rights of the entrepreneurs.

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[30] See Seymour S. Bernfeld, "Developing the Resources of the Sea—Security of Investment," *The International Lawyer,* October 1967, pp. 72-73.

[31] Cf. Northcutt Ely, "American Policy Options in the Development of Undersea Mineral Resources," *The International Lawyer,* January 1968, pp. 215-223. The flag nation concept as it might apply to exploitation of marine resources has not yet been sufficiently developed. Under some circumstances, national appropriation of the sea bed may not be involved, as in the case of a ship dredging manganese nodules. Another variant of the flag nation approach—leaning toward an international regime—might involve an explicit declaration by the state concerned that it extends protection to the activity of its nationals on the sea bed without appropriating the sea bed itself.

[32] L.F.E. Goldie, "The Geneva Conventions," in Alexander, *op. cit.,* pp. 280-283.

[33] One of the relatively early proposals for internationalization of the oceans was made by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace which, in its Seventeenth Report entitled *New Dimensions for the United Nations: The Problem of the Next Decade* (New York, May 1966), specifically proposed a United Nations agency to administer ocean resources. Francis T. Christy, Jr., who argues for an international agency on the basis that it would ensure economic efficiency of exploitation, does not insist on a UN agency, although he appears to favor it. See his "A Social Scientist Writes on Economic Criteria for Rules Governing the Exploitation of Deep Sea Minerals," *The International Lawyer,* January 1968, p. 240. The statement of Ambassador Arvid Pardo of November 1, 1967 in Committee I (UN Document A/C. 1/PV 1515 and 1516, November 1, 1967) advocates the creation of a "special agency" for the administration of the oceans; although this is not entirely clear from the statement, it would appear to be a specialized agency under the United Nations.

The advantages and disadvantages of these different proposals have been generously debated.[34] It is not clear at this time which alternative—or which combination of them—will ultimately be accepted. The median line approach does not appear to be a particularly strong contender at the present, yet the possibility of its application in the future cannot be completely ruled out.[35] If the prevalent sentiment in the U.S. Congress is an indication of what may or may not be agreed to in the international forum, the acceptance of a strongly international solution is not very likely either.[36] The American position in the United Nations has been rather general. It affirmed the spirit of President Johnson's statement of July 13, 1966 to the effect that "we must be careful to avoid a race to grab and hold the lands under the high seas" and that the oceans must "remain the legacy of all human beings." It urged further study of the problem, apparently expecting thereby to keep the various options open until a definite policy position is determined.[37] In the formulation of the U.S. position, political realities and the prevalent attitude among responsible participants in the current dialogue tend to exclude the extremes of both the national and international approaches, suggesting that there might be a middle-of-the-road accommodation between the two.

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[34] See, e.g., Giulio Pontecorvo, "The Law of the Sea," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* April 1967, pp. 47-48; Christy, *op. cit.,* pp. 232-242; Henkin, *op. cit.,* pp. 60-68.

[35] Cf. the testimony of Francis T. Christy, Jr., in House of Representatives, *The U.N. and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources,* pp. 89-90. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union are likely to support this approach since they would not be its major beneficiaries. On the other hand, the division of the North Sea in accordance with the median line principle creates an important precedent for its regional application, particularly with respect to the continental shelf. If applied to the deep sea areas, the median line approach is more likely to come into effect as the result of a failure to reach a general agreement on the regime of the oceans and as a practical application of the principles of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf rather than as a product of a deliberate consensus of the majority of nations.

[36] See House of Representatives, *The U.N. and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources,* pp. IR-5R, *passim,* and U.S. Senate, *Hearing on S.J. Res. 111,* pp. 1-7. The Subcommittee on International Organization and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs issued an interim report stating that "The subcommittee believes that it would be precipitate, unwise, and possibly injurious to the objectives which both the United States and the United Nations have in common, to reach a decision at this time regarding [the proposal to internationalize the sea bed and the ocean floor]." Senator Norris Cotton introduced a similar resolution in the Senate, while Senator Claiborne Pell's proposed Resolution 186 contained a draft treaty embodying a form of an international regime. The prevalent attitude on internationalization in both Houses, however, appears to be one of caution, if not opposition.

[37] See the statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg in Committee I of the United Nations (Press Release USUN-182, November 8, 1967). Among other things, Ambassador Goldberg proposed the establishment by the General Assembly of a Committee on the Oceans to consider all proposals placed before the Assembly on marine questions. (Instead, an *ad hoc* committee to study the peaceful uses of the sea bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction was subsequently established.) Cf. the testimony of Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of

Without advocating a particular regime of the oceans, the following two sections will consider, with particular reference to the American national interest, some aspects of the formulation of a future regime of the oceans that tend to be overlooked or underemphasized.

The United Nations, Demilitarization of the Deep Ocean Areas, and Possible Solutions

The Malta proposal for an international regime of the oceans is firmly linked to the provision that the deep sea floor is "used exclusively for peaceful purposes." In effect, this provision calls for demilitarization of the sea bed outside the national continental shelf. The tie between an international regime and demilitarization[38] is conceptually unsound and runs contrary to the present American policy inasmuch as it narrows rather than widens the options for a future regime of the oceans.

Reservation of the ocean floor to nonmilitary pursuits only is a problem of arms control and disarmament and is separate from, although not necessarily unrelated to, the establishment of a future regime of the oceans for marine resource exploitation. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which combined a general "regime" for the continent with disarmament provisions, does not offer a useful analogy. In that case arms control provisions were applied to a geographic area which was a virtual vacuum in a military sense.

State for International Organization Affairs, in U.S. Senate, *Hearing on S.J. Res. 111,* pp. 20-25. Stressing the complexity of the problem and the need for study and deliberation, Sisco concluded: "In such a situation we see great advantages in keeping open every desirable option." (p. 23.)

[38] It should be pointed out that the association between an international regime for the oceans and demilitarization of the sea bottom is not limited to Ambassador Pardo's proposal. All generally known proposals for an international regime and an international agency to regulate exploitation of the oceans either specifically advocate demilitarization or are silent on this subject. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (*New Dimensions for the United Nations,* p. 46) explicitly proposed a prohibition to use "the deep sea and the sea bed . . . as an environment in which to install or operate weapons." Francis Christy's earlier position on demilitarization of the oceans was associated with that of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, but his recent writings make no reference to demilitarization. Louis Henkin (*op. cit.*), who favors an international authority for the oceans, does not discuss its military implications. L.F.E. Goldie, in his modified flag nation approach, appears to be the only one who made a specific attempt to accommodate the military under an international institution by proposing that the military register their occupation of the ocean bottom. See Goldie in Alexander, *op. cit.,* pp. 283-284.

There was no particular interest on the part of the various nations concerned to extend their military influence into that area.[39] Military interests in the oceans have existed for centuries and have been protected through deployment of naval forces, and today military installations are present on the ocean bottom; both the mobile and stationary military elements are integrally related to each other and to the world balance of military power.[40] The spread of military operations on the ocean floor deserves attention as a part of the general arms control and disarmament effort: If we take it out of the context of general military problems and arms control and link it to the problem of a future regime of the oceans for marine resources exploitation, we seriously jeopardize the international alternative as a viable option. Even were these two distinct issues eventually separated, the years lost in debate might lead to a *de facto* acceptance of one of the other alternative regimes, because of the pressure of developing technology. This is not to say that an international regime of the oceans as an alternative is more advantageous to the United States than the others; it may well not be. But whatever the final decision, it should be made on the basis of a rational appraisal of alternatives and not because of a procedural default or because inaction resulted in certain options being "overtaken by events."

Even if certain kinds of weapons, such as those of mass destruction, are barred from the deep ocean floor, still other forms of military presence are likely to remain.[41] This raises the question of the compatibility between an international regime of the oceans and the existence of national military forces on the ocean floor. If an international regime authorized to collect revenue is established, it presumably would have rights of inspection and appraisal of the national property in the oceans in order to make sure that revenue is proportional to economic gains. Registration of the location of national property in the oceans would present a serious problem for the military, since much of the value of naval installations on the ocean bottom lies in their concealment.

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[39] For a general discussion of activities in Antarctica and the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty as they pertain to these activities, see L.M. Gould, "Antarctica—Continent of International Science," *Science,* December 31, 1965, pp. 1775-1781. The case of the Treaty Governing Exploration of Outer Space, which entered into force on October 10, 1967, was similar in the sense that space was a "vacuum" in terms of established military presence. It was somewhat dissimilar, however, in the sense that the military has some interest in outer space, but the advantages to moving into outer space appeared to be more than balanced by the disadvantages of countermoves by a potential enemy and the possible resulting escalation. Cf. the text of the treaty in *Department of State Bulletin,* December 26, 1966, pp. 953-955.

[40] Cf. the testimony of Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, in House of Representatives, *The U.N. and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources,* pp. 188-196. On p. 192, Frosch stated that "the Navy has used the sea bottom for many purposes for many years, and it is incorrect to assume that we are not using the sea bottom. Any attempt to deal with the sea bottom in a radical legal way would interfere with some national security enterprise." Later (p. 206) Frosch agreed with the statement of Representative D.B. Fascell to the effect that "many countries of the world are using the deep ocean bed and other parts of the ocean for military reasons." Cf. also Robert A. Frosch, "Military Uses of the Ocean," a paper presented at the Second Mershon-Carnegie Endowment Conference on Law, Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean, October 7, 1967, at Columbus, Ohio.

One solution might be to exempt the military from the need to bid for the ocean floor and from assessment, inspection and registration.[42] If, however, a nation so desired, it might record its military installations with an international agency. In accordance with the fundamental principles of an international regime, the ocean floor would be considered *res communis* and the establishment of a military installation on the ocean floor would not imply sovereignty or national appropriation.

In the short run, the vast span of the deep ocean floor can accommodate both the military's need for installations and the economic interests of nations in exploitation of ocean resources. In the medium to long run, however, problems are likely to arise. Some nations might claim certain sections of the ocean floor, whether they effectively use them for military purposes or not, thus hindering economic exploitation of the oceans. Alternatively, nations could establish military installations on the ocean floor; but if, in the process of ocean development, military installations were discovered and an international authority determined that they inhibited exploitation, the nation possessing the installation would be allowed to bid for the right to stay or move. To safeguard military security, a provision could be introduced for buffer zones of a certain width surrounding military installations; the right to exploit economic resources within these buffer zones would be reserved to companies of the same nationality as that of the military installation concerned.

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[41] As is true under the Treaty Governing Exploration of Outer Space (in particular, Article IV), "the use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes" would presumably be allowed. The same would pertain to the use of certain military equipment which might be viewed as compatible with "peaceful purposes," e.g., detection devices.

[42] The accordance of a special status to military forces is not new under international law. For instance, the UN Charter (Chapter XII, Article 82) provided for the designation of some trust territories as "strategic areas." The territories so designated were exempt from certain provisions of the UN Charter applicable to trust territories; in particular, some were closed to visits by UN missions.

Another solution to the military problem would be to require naval powers to pay revenue to the international authority for their deep ocean installations by a formula which would provide for a payment by each nation, without revealing the exact nature, extent and location of its installations. This approach would have a strong arbitrary element since it would require payments for occupation of the sea floor whose economic value would be largely unknown. Its principal advantage is that it might be politically acceptable to the less developed nations, since early payments to the international authority, small as they might be in the beginning, would not be contingent on the discovery of a military installation and on the willingness of an economic concern to bid for it.

Although these last two possible solutions involve payment of revenue to the international authority and do not infringe on the national security of the United States, they might, in the long run, inhibit an arms race at the ocean bottom, since, in addition to the costly expenditures for the installations, naval powers possessing deep ocean capability would have to pay revenue to the international authority. It is perhaps ironic that the only nations that might benefit economically from such a race would be the less developed countries—the group which is now most vocal for the preservation of the deep ocean floor for peaceful purposes—since most of the revenue is likely to be used for their development. This consideration merely emphasizes the need to deal with the problem of demilitarization of the deep ocean areas in a responsible manner as a part of the disarmament effort, and not as a part of the debate on a future regime of the oceans.

Policy Implications of Advancing Technology

Advancing marine technology has set in motion a great debate on a future regime of the deep sea floor. Yet the two urgent problems created by it have received only passing attention compared with concern about the future regime itself. These pertain to the geopolitical effect of marine technologies and the lack of a firm legal definition of the outer boundary of the continental shelf. They are intimately related and bear on the future regime of the oceans and the American national interest.

Under the terms of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, coastal states obtained sovereign rights for the purpose of exploitation of natural resources of the continental shelf to a depth of 200 meters (660 feet) or beyond, insofar as the available technology permits such exploitation. There is no agreement among legal authorities on how far the coastal states may thus extend their jurisdiction over the sea bed, provided the requisite technology exists; the most extreme interpretation claims jurisdiction to the median line separating the claim of the state on the opposite coast.[43] At present, exploitation of the continental shelf for oil does not exceed 166 meters (550 feet), and most of it is at considerably lesser depths. However, commercially profitable technological capability for drilling oil wells at the depth of 200 meters is currently available and exploitation at this depth and beyond is expected to begin in the very near future.[44]

American private companies have leased ocean areas beyond the 200-meter depth from foreign governments;[45] considering the available technology, exploitation at those depths will, presumably, follow the present exploration. Through American technology and capital, American private companies would thus be extending effective control over the sea bed on behalf of foreign nations and increasing their power potential. In the long run, the geopolitical impact of this development can be far-reaching, with major implications for U.S. foreign policy and national security.[46] Accordingly, the United States may have to regulate the direction of private investment or attempt to limit the extent of the national continental shelf, perhaps somewhere in the vicinity of the 200-meter isobath.

[43] See Henkin, *op. cit.,* pp. 17-21. In exploring the background of the convention and the intent of its draftees, Henkin reaches the conclusion that the interpretation extending jurisdiction indefinitely into the ocean is without foundation. On the other hand, he does point out that the lawyers drafting the convention did not want to tie themselves to the geological definition of the continental shelf (which roughly corresponds to the 200-meter isobath), but wanted to give all coastal states a shelf that would expand with advancing technology.

[44] This information was conveyed to the author in a personal conversation on January 18, 1968, by A.C. Smith, President, Ocean Systems, Inc., New York. Exploitation at the depth of 200 meters and beyond may not be very extensive in the near future, since large areas of the continental shelf at a depth lower than 200 meters have not yet been adequately explored. In terms of ocean depth, exploitation for oil is ahead of that for any mineral resource.

[45] See the testimony of Willard Bascom, President, Ocean Sciences and Engineering, Inc., in House of Representatives, *The U.N. and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources,* pp. 125, 132. Bascom stated that his company was doing exploration work in deep ocean areas.

[46] As an instance of technology acting as an independent factor (i.e., independent from a conscious will of the nation to employ or control technology as an instrument of policy in its own interests), this phenomenon is not new. Historically, there are many instances of technology having been freely transferred from one country to another, with resultant effects on international power and eventual detriment to the technology-transferring nation. British and American companies

If consistently carried out over a period of years, the first approach can be effective in meeting the interests of foreign policy and defense, though it carries the disadvantage of imposing restrictions on private enterprise. This would raise a problem for the U.S. government, since ocean development, to a considerable extent, depends on mutually satisfactory cooperation between the government and industry and sufficient incentives to induce industry to exploit ocean resources. Would the U.S. government be prepared to compensate a private company for potentially lower profits, if it diverts that company's investment from the offshore areas adjacent to a country whose long-range relations with the United States are judged uncertain at best, to another nation whose economic growth and extension of effective control over the sea bed might be clearly in the U.S. national interest? The conflict between long-range interests of the United States and short-range gains to be derived from a given investment may not be easy to resolve, and political pressure is likely to be brought to bear in favor of short-range advantages.

Confining the national continental shelf to a relatively narrow width would have the disadvantage of limiting the availability of various options for a future regime of the oceans. It would exclude the median line approach. It would diminish the possibility of acceptance of the flag nation approach involving national appropriation of the ocean floor, since coastal nations would be reluctant to agree to a treaty which would make it possible for a foreign state to establish its sovereignty within a hundred miles, or even, depending on the depth of the ocean in a given locality, up to the margin of its territorial waters. By accepting this alternative, the United States would be leaning in the direction of an international approach to the regime of the oceans beyond the shelf. At the same time, U.S. private investment would not be extending jurisdiction or effective control of foreign nations over the sea bed and American companies investing outside the firmly defined continental shelf would be free from the danger of nationalization. There would be no necessity for a tight regulation of the direction of investment by the U.S. government, thus pro-

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were instrumental in constructing the radio and telephone network in Japan in the 1920's; American private companies were providing technical assistance to the Soviet Union in the 1930's. The novelty of the present development is that it includes direct extension of jurisdiction and/or effective control over territory for a foreign state, with potential strategic consequences, while in the previous cases the transfer of technology contributed to power potential within firmly defined territorial boundaries.

viding more freedom for private enterprise. The need for *some* regulation would remain since American investments would have a long-range geopolitical impact[47] and completely unregulated investment might create potential hostages, thus imposing serious burdens on U.S. defense requirements.

It may already be too late to limit the national continental shelf by a depth in the vicinity of 200 meters. Private enterprise (American and foreign) has obtained leases on ocean areas abroad beyond the 200-meter depth and the U.S. Department of the Interior has granted leases in ocean areas up to 1,500 feet (454 meters) deep.[48] The Convention on the Continental Shelf cannot come up for revision until five years after its coming into effect, i.e., not until 1969. Actual exploitation beyond the 200-meter isobath is likely to start before that. Legally, it is not important how extensive this exploitation will be and where and whether it will actually start: There appears to be a degree of consensus among lawyers that a demonstrable technological capability for exploitation beyond the 200-meter depth available in any country would give corresponding jurisdiction over the continental shelf to all coastal nations in the world where similar geographic conditions permitting exploitation exist.[49] In the event of protracted debates over the revision of the Convention on the Continental Shelf and a deadlock in the United Nations over the issue of a future regime of the oceans for the next three or four years (both of which are conceivable possibilities), national appropriation of the sea bed can proceed quite far before it is halted.

What would this development mean for the United States? Would it seriously jeopardize the international alternative and open up the road for eventual national appropriation of the sea bed throughout the oceans, as implied in the discussion of the subject during the last session of the UN General Assembly?[50] A brief discussion of marine geology and the potential of technology is necessary to answer these questions.

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[47] The negative connotation of regulation over the direction of investment can be minimized through the initiative of the U.S. government in organizing regional programs, such as those discussed previously. Whatever geopolitical implications such programs would have, they would be in the U.S. national interest since this would be their *raison d'être* in the first place.

[48] These leases have been made to the Shell Oil Company off the coast of northern Oregon and northern California; they extend up to thirty-two miles from the shore and amount to 5,760 acres. See House of Representatives, *The U.N. and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources,* p. 164.

[49] Published literature on this subject is limited and the law has not been adequately developed to permit certainty. For a discussion of some legal considerations pertaining to the exploitability test, see Henkin, *op. cit.,* pp. 16-17, note 43.

[50] Cf. the statement of Ambassador Pardo of November 1, 1967, *op. cit.*

Despite variations in the structure of the ocean bottom and lack of unanimity on the matter among geologists, it is convenient to divide the mineral potential of the oceans into the continental shelf which extends to the depth of about 200 meters (660 feet), the continental slope, extending perhaps to 2,000 meters (6,600 feet) in depth, and the deep ocean basins from 2,000 meters to about 6,000 meters (19,800 feet).[51] Technological capability for commercial exploitation up to and including the 200-meter depth exists at this time. It has been predicted that commercial capability for extensive and prolonged engineering operations on continental slopes up to a depth of 3,000 feet (909 meters) is virtually assured in the next decade, while commercial deployment of vehicles and machines at 6,000 feet (1,818 meters) and beyond is not expected until sometime in 1980-1990.[52]

The advance of technology suggests that economic encroachment on the deep ocean areas proper will not start for another ten years or so; thus, the option for an international alternative of a future regime of the oceans is not directly jeopardized in the immediate future. What is at stake, however, is national appropriation of the continental slope, an area between the depth of 200 and 2,000 meters, which amounts to about 8.5 per cent of the ocean surface and is approximately 12 per cent larger than the surface of the already appropriated continental shelf up to the depth of 200 meters.[53] The question is whether it would be in the U.S. national interest to have the jurisdiction of coastal states extended over this area, to have it relegated to an international regime of the oceans along with the deep ocean basins, or to have it nationally appropriated in accordance with the flag nation approach. To be sure, legal boundaries do not have to follow geographic configurations; it is entirely conceivable to have the legal boundary between the national continental shelf and the deep ocean areas at any point on the continental slope, perhaps at the depth of 500 meters (1,650 feet) or 1,000 meters (3,300 feet). But whether a portion or the entire continental slope is involved, the need for a determination of policy is immediate. If it is decided that it is against U.S. national interest to have the continental slope appropriated by coastal states, then it might be advisable to take some measures before the Convention on the Continental Shelf becomes subject to revision in 1969.[54] If, however, it is considered to be advantageous for the United States to have the continental slope appropriated nationally, then inertia and the momentum of technology will bring this about.

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[51] Cf. the statement of Harold L. James, Chief Geologist, U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, in House of Representatives, *The U.N. and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources,* pp. 117-118.

[52] John P. Craven, "Sea Power and the Sea Bed," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* April 1966, pp. 48-49.

[53] The figures were computed from H. U. Sverdrup, M. J. Johnson, and R. H. Fleming, *The Oceans* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946), p. 21. (The figures for ocean surface include adjacent seas.) The depth of 2,000 meters would be reached, in the case of the continental United States, at a distance from the shoreline of from 20 to 300 miles, the average being perhaps 70 miles.

If a decision is made to limit the national continental shelf to a relatively narrow width and an international agreement is reached, a regime for the sea bed beyond the shelf becomes an urgent necessity, since technology will soon push beyond the shelf as thus defined. If the outer boundary is defined broadly (e.g., at the 1,000-meter isobath) or remains flexible, as it is now—thus opening up the entire continental slope for national appropriation—the time available for deliberation on a future regime of the deep ocean would be extended, perhaps up to ten years. But whether the continental shelf is defined narrowly or not at all, it is entirely possible that the United Nations may not be able to agree on an ocean regime ahead of the pressure of advancing marine technology, thus compelling the United States to make a unilateral decision with respect to American companies expanding into a geographic area of uncertain legal status.[55] What would be the options open to the United States under these circumstances? Considering the rapidly changing technology and the flux in marine affairs, any discussion of future options is hazardous at best. However, even if such options never materialize, their discussion might help to avoid potential pitfalls and reveal some guidance for policy. A future regime of the oceans will not in any case be just a product of a general agreement. It

[54] One possible way of taking an earlier action would be to seek a resolution in the UN General Assembly, stating that, after a certain date and subject to a final decision as determined by the conference on the revision of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, all exploitation of resources beyond a certain narrowly defined isobath (e.g., 200 or 250 meters) will not imply extension of national jurisdiction over the sea bed.

[55] If the outer boundary of the continental shelf is firmly defined, then the question would arise about the legal status of exploitation beyond that boundary. If the outer boundary of the continental shelf is not firmly defined and the debate on an ocean regime continues for some ten years, the then available technology would permit a "hop" in exploitation from the continental slope to mid-ocean ridges. Since such an act would not constitute adjacent exploitation, it could not be readily justified under the Convention on the Continental Shelf.

will be a product of policies, programs, agreements and other practices of states engaged in the use of the seas. Without agreements under the auspices of the United Nations, a regime for the oceans will have to be formulated outside it.

The United States would have the choice of appropriating deep ocean areas under the flag nation concept or authorizing exploitation by American companies as a matter of establishing jurisdiction over its nationals and providing them protection, but not including national appropriation of the ocean bottom.[56] A deliberate unilateral resort to the flag nation solution involving appropriation of the sea bed would be contrary to America's previously declared position of trying to avoid "a race to grab and hold the lands under the high seas." The second alternative, therefore, appears to be the more likely. Here the United States might provide for economic efficiency in ocean exploitation[57] through regional agreements since no such agreement would be available on a worldwide scale. Potential competition for the same areas would require a criterion for decision among competitors; this, probably, would result in the adoption of a bidding procedure, similar to the one applied to the continental shelf. The desire to avoid economic waste in the exploitation of ocean resources—waste which is induced by the free availability of resources, so well exemplified now in the case of fisheries—might provide an additional reason for the adoption of this procedure.

The national leasing of deep ocean areas would present a problem of how a nation could lease, and collect rent from, an area which is not a national domain. This problem could be ignored; if so, this should be done in full awareness of the possibility that such national leasing may eventually relapse into a variant of the flag nation solution, involving *de facto* national appropriation. It might be a convenient way of achieving national appropriation of the ocean bottom, if considered desirable. Alternatively, a certain percentage of the revenue derived from the leasing might be earmarked for an international authority, on the assumption that it would be established. A third solution would be to arrive at regional agreements designed to provide legitimacy to national leasing, with a percentage of revenue to be used for such matters as regional marine exploration or aid to the less developed nations. This would, in effect, result in a number of regional regimes which might last indefinitely or else provide a temporary steppingstone to an eventual worldwide regime. If a global regime is considered to be a desirable option, then its eventual realization could be facilitated through provisions in the initial regional agreement, earmarking some revenue for an international authority.

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[56] It must be recognized that no legal precedent for such action exists. In this case, just as in some other hypothetical examples suggested below, specific legal concepts would have to be developed to tie such policy moves with the existing body of law.

[57] Cf. Christy's discussion of economic efficiency in marine exploitation in *The International Lawyer, op. cit.,* p. 229.

The foregoing look into the crystal ball indicates a variety of avenues to a future regime of the oceans. Action in some directions will have to be undertaken as either a reinforcement of the action in others or as contingency planning, in case the principal thrust of policy fails. In any case, the type of a structured mix which the United States decides to pursue will not only strongly condition a future regime of the oceans, but will provide important leverage for its implementation. Accordingly, one cannot be viewed independently from the other.

The preceding discussion of hypothetical developments also suggests that the future regime of the oceans may result from an evolutionary process of development through various stages. It is essential to understand and provide appropriate links between one stage and another so as to make sure that each subsequent stage is a desirable one. Similarly, it is important to recognize, in a timely fashion, at which stage it is desirable to stop and for how long; and if a mistake in direction is made, how it can be corrected at the least cost.

III

Priority in Marine Policy and Programs

Assuming a rational approach to decision-making, priority among various technological policies and programs is determined on the basis of the relative benefits to the nation. Decision-making with respect to these priorities can be refined by distinguishing between technology acting as a dependent and as an independent variable.

When a particular technology—e.g., nuclear, outer space or marine—appears to be within reach and the government decides to undertake a program to develop and apply it for the benefit of the nation, we have a reasonably straightforward case of technology as a dependent or controlled variable. However, from the point of view of any particular nation, technology can, and almost always does, act as an independent variable. In the long run no single nation can have a monopoly over a particular technology. When other nations acquire it, and for whatever purpose, this will produce an impact, as an independent variable, on the first nation—unless the technology is deliberately transferred to other nations with an expectation of a particular effect, in which instance it would be a dependent (controlled) or "semi-dependent" variable. Also, when used by private individuals or organizations to achieve their own objectives (economic gain, pleasure, power), a technology produces an effect which may or may not be in the interest of the nation as a whole. Thus, for example, American private companies in legitimate pursuit of economic gain are extending the territory and power potential of foreign states, probably with little or no awareness of the long-range implications of this development for U.S. foreign policy and defense.[58]

In these terms, governmental decisions may initiate development and application of technology in the best interest of the nation, technology in this instance being a controlled variable; forestall the impact of marine technology as an independent variable which is injurious to the nation; or let technology acting as an independent variable take its course, if the development in question serves the interest of the nation as a whole.[59] In order to be rational, the acceptance of the third type of situation requires a keen awareness of the potential impact of technology and a deliberate decision not to forestall it, rather than simple indifference or a "wait and see" attitude.[60]

In reality, the three approaches intermingle, as may be seen in three policy matters which deserve high priority consideration. One is the need for a policy decision on the future of the continental slope. The basic question is whether or not it is in the U.S. national interest for technology to operate as an independent variable in the national appropriation of the continental slope. If not, and the national continental shelf is narrowly delineated, the problem of a future regime of the deep ocean would immediately rise in priority, because of the need to control the advancing marine technology beyond the shelf. The question then is whether such a regime can be established through international agreement or should be sought through unilateral or regional activity.

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[58] A third category of technology acting as an independent variable can be distinguished: Even if a state deliberately uses technology for a particular purpose, some of its impact cannot be foreseen; to that extent it acts as an independent variable. This category, however, is not quite on the same level with others, since it is a product of inadequate intellectual insight and not a distinctly separate way of interacting with other factors.

The discussion of technology as a dependent and independent variable has been derived from my book in progress, *Technological Change and the Balance of Power, 1870-*.

[59] The actions of the government in each of the three situations can be described in somewhat different terms. In the first, the government takes "voluntaristic advantage" of technology. In the second, it forestalls the "deterministic effect" of technology. In the third, it lets the "deterministic effect" of technology take its course.

[60] Individuals who advocate a "wait and see" approach are, in effect, advocating a position which allows technology to act as an independent variable. This is an entirely legitimate position, but it does raise the question whether vested interests are not concealed behind it and whether its advocacy reflects a truly rational choice and not a failure of vision and an abrogation of responsibility. Therefore, the burden of proof that the nation as a whole does benefit from the "wait and see" approach should be placed on its advocates.

The other two matters involve cooperative programs for exploitation of marine resources, in particular a U.S.-European program for the exploration and exploitation of resources of the North Atlantic Ocean and a cooperative program in marine development among the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

An important reason for the establishment of U.S.-European cooperation in the North Atlantic Ocean stems from the fact that the forthcoming technological capability for exploiting resources of the Atlantic Ocean will increase either conflict or cooperation in the relations between the United States and Western Europe. The chance for preservation of the status quo is very small and must be discounted. The choice here is between allowing technology to proceed as an independent (or "semi-dependent") variable from both sides of the Atlantic or to subject technology to joint control in pursuit of mutually advantageous economic and political goals.

Western Europe is seriously deficient in a number of mineral resources, in particular oil, ferroalloys, nonferrous metals, and certain chemicals, e.g., sulphur and phosphorus.[61] Europe is self-sufficient in food, but it is interested in the world food problem as it relates to economic assistance programs for the less developed countries. The resources of the North Atlantic Ocean have not been adequately explored and therefore are largely unknown, but present knowledge indicates promising resources.[62] However,

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[61] See J. F. Dewhurst, J. O. Coppock, and P. L. Yates, *Europe's Needs and Resources* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 623-634.

[62] In addition to production of fishmeal for nonhuman consumption (e.g., chicken-feed), which could be economically important, possible resources from the continental shelf include phosphorites, sulphur (from hydrogen sulphide), iron ore, sand, gravel, natural gas and oil. Oil is of particular importance to Europe: In 1967, the EEC countries produced only 5.6 per cent of the oil they consumed,

Europe is not as advanced in marine technology as is the United States, so there would be a definite advantage for the Europeans to cooperate with the Americans in developing the requisite technology and exploring the Atlantic Ocean.

Unlike Europe, whose choice in the development of marine resources is predominantly confined to the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas, the United States has the option of placing an emphasis on either the Atlantic or the Pacific oceans, or undertaking marine programs in both. However, a dispersal of effort in advanced marine technology, without any sense of direction, is not realistic. The advantages of a regional approach suggest the desirability of an initial emphasis on the Atlantic Ocean, where regional cooperation has the potential of bringing about major economic and political payoffs.[63]

If the United States undertakes a major regional ocean program elsewhere, the cost burden of the undertaking would fall predominantly on her, whereas in the Atlantic it can be shared with the nations that comprise the second largest industrial region in the world. The United States and Western Europe could pool their resources and technologies to help solve the food problem of the less developed countries through the exploitation of marine resources. U.S.-European cooperation in exploiting Atlantic Ocean resources could serve as a means of achieving greater cohesiveness within the Atlantic Community. Further, in view of the inchoate détente with the Soviet bloc, one cannot neglect the possibility of eventual cooperation in the Atlantic Ocean with East European countries and perhaps the Soviet Union. This diversion of attention to functional goals may prove helpful for an eventual solution of some internal European problems that hinge

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while the demand for oil is expected to increase from the present 42.5 per cent to perhaps as high as 57 per cent of the total energy consumption of Europe by 1980. (See "European Common Market Growth Patterns to 1980," *World Petroleum,* April 1967, p. 157.) However, the major promise of natural resources to Europe is likely to come from the deep ocean areas which have been entirely unexplored so far. Allowing for important exceptions, the continental shelf tends to reflect resources existing in the continental land mass; the deep ocean floor and substrata are, however, geologically independent from the continental land mass, and they may contain extensive deposits of minerals which are not available on the European continent.

[63] It is noteworthy that certain geographic factors favor the Atlantic for an early development effort: it is considerably smaller and much more shallow than the Pacific and hence is a more "manageable" ocean for a comprehensive program. The area of the Atlantic Ocean comprises only 58 per cent of that of the Pacific. The mean depth of the Atlantic is 3,332 meters (10,995 feet), as compared with 4,028 meters (13,292 feet) for the Pacific. The figures were taken or computed from Sverdrup *et al., op. cit.,* p. 15.

on East-West relationships.[64] To date, Europeans have not been particularly successful in providing an effective organizational framework for applying advanced technology on the large scale now required,[65] let alone on the scale suggested by the proposition that "economies of scale have reached the point in some fields where neither the United States nor Western Europe alone is big enough to exploit them."[66]

The actual implementation of such a program would, by necessity, cover a period of years and involve both successive and partially concurrent stages. The program could begin with a cooperative exploration effort, paralleled or followed by a mutual research and development activity. Exploitation programs, first confined to the continental shelf and slope, and eventually extended to the deep ocean, would be phased in as resources are discovered and the requisite technologies become available.

Cooperation between Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the United States in marine development might be the basis for a marine program different from the one just outlined. Whereas the Atlantic Program would be created in response to both potential gains through cooperation and avoidance of conflict, a Pacific Program would be based predominantly on potential gains through cooperation. The Atlantic Program can be envisioned as a bridge between the United States and Europe, but the Pacific Program can be more appropriately envisioned as a narrow highway, linking the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, branching out into ocean areas where promising resources are found, and leading in the direction of the less developed countries on the rimland of the Asian continent for the purpose of assisting them in their development. The Atlantic Program would concentrate on the development of advanced marine technologies, while the Pacific Program would apply available technology in an economically rewarding setting. The Pacific Program would be economically self-sustaining.

A rationale for the Pacific Program can be briefly summarized.

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[64] Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Framework of East-West Reconciliation," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1968, pp. 256-275.

[65] Cf. William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Prospects for Western Science and Technology," ORBIS, Fall 1965, pp. 574-577, and John Diebold, "Is the Gap Technological?," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1968, pp. 277-278, *passim.*

[66] Alfred C. Neal, "Economic Necessities and Atlantic Communities," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1967, p. 703. Neal refers to nuclear weapons development, anti-missile defense, space exploration and its offspring, communication satellites, and particle accelerators for advanced nuclear research.

Japan is the most advanced industrial free nation in East Asia. Marine resources have a great deal to offer for that nation's growth. Japan has had decades of experience in assimilating foreign science and technology and has the capacity to provide assistance to the free, less developed countries in their development efforts.[67]

An expanded role in ocean exploitation jointly with Japan and the United States would fit the present interests and policy of Australia and New Zealand. These nations want to maintain close ties with the United States for defense purposes and, at the same time, they are assiduously cultivating political and economic relations with noncommunist Asian countries through participation in various international institutions and through economic and technical assistance to the less developed countries of the region.[68] These ocean-oriented countries, by cooperating with the United States and Japan, would be able to engage in exploitation of ocean resources on a scale and with an effectiveness inconceivable if they acted alone.

The short- to medium-term benefits of such a program to the United States should not obscure the possibly even more important long-range implications. The South Pacific appears to be rich in offshore mineral resources, has a favorable climate, and is populated by energetic and educated people. With the growth of marine technologies, this region has the potential for becoming a major power center of world significance in fifty to seventy-five years. Such a development would have major implications for marine trade routes. It would alter the relative significance of Suez and Panama, and affect the political and strategic importance of countries in the Southern Hemisphere in general. It would be to America's advantage to participate in this development relatively early so as to influence the direction of technology's impact rather than to be confronted by it at a later date.

Conclusions

Present developments in marine affairs are highly complex. The fact that the United States is the most advanced nation in the world in marine technology does not guarantee that it will be the greatest beneficiary in the development of marine resources. The future appears to be different from the picture painted in recent debates in the United Nations: a world in which the highly advanced countries will be exclusive beneficiaries of marine development, occupying and appropriating huge areas of the world ocean in an effort to enhance their economic power and to strengthen them in their unsavory pastime of military rivalries. Neither technological factors nor political realities—where enlightened self-interest and humanitarian considerations are not completely unknown quantities—require us to accept the seeming inevitability of this picture. America's strength in marine technology can enhance, and already is enhancing, the actual or potential geopolitical interests of other nations, including some that are economically advanced and some that are not. This development, in turn, has far-reaching implications for the United States.

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[67] For details on the role of Japan within the context of U.S. foreign policy in the Far East, see William P. Bundy, "U.S.-Japanese Trends and Prospects," *Department of State Bulletin,* November 15, 1965, pp. 772-777.

[68] Cf. Donald Horne, "Australia Looks Around," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1966, pp. 450-456, and "Britain's Retreat from Asia," *The Round Table,* October 1967, pp. 357-361.

Farsighted planning of marine affairs must recognize that we operate in an environment consisting of national, international and regional elements. It is necessary to determine what functions in the future can best be performed at the national, regional and international levels; to relegate such functions to their appropriate levels; and to do so with a clear sense of the direction and goals for marine affairs and a capacity to forgo some short-term advantages for the sake of more fundamental long-range benefits. It is important to see the relationship between specific marine programs and policies and a future regime of the deep oceans. In particular, there should be a keen awareness of the function of such programs and policies as instrumental entities in molding the regime.

Even assuming liberalization of short-term budgetary constraints, the foregoing analysis does not suggest that marine development should necessarily receive top priority in the allocation of national resources. However, in evaluating marine development in competition with other claimants for national resources, the timing of the initial investment should be carefully considered. Unlike the national endeavor for the exploration of outer space with its initially expensive technologies, marine programs do not require large funds at the outset. For example, a U.S.-European program for the exploration and exploitation of the North Atlantic Ocean would be implemented in several stages. To launch the effort, a modest investment of resources would be sufficient. However, since the initiation of one stage might depend on the completion of another and since time-consuming negotiations with other nations are likely to be involved, an *early* modest start may be necessary to ensure that later stages are not unduly prolonged or jeopardized.

The future prospect for presently available options in marine affairs will be a key factor in the timing of programs and policies and in the intensity of their implementation. Because ocean development is still in a relatively early stage, the scope of opportunity for determining its future and the nation's role in it is reasonably broad. There may be no need to initiate a particular policy or program as long as options for implementing it are kept open. However, the range of choice may be narrowed rapidly by a determined developmental move in ocean exploitation by another major nation or a group of nations. Choice may even be constrained by a declaration of development intentions from abroad. In fact, the freedom of choice is being narrowed by advancing technology and by the activities of private enterprise, American and foreign, in marine development.

These considerations suggest that the United States must be prepared through her planning and capabilities to move rapidly with a policy announcement or a particular program proposal as soon as it becomes apparent that a desirable option is likely to be foreclosed. Thus, it is important to establish an institutionalized national capacity for continuous appraisal of the potential offered by the oceans and for effective and timely action to take advantage of this potential. The existence of such an institutional capability is the single most important factor in assuring to the United States the widest possible freedom of choice within the context of each given configuration of opportunities and constraints set by the ocean policies of different states, the available marine technology, economic demands, and the national and international political climate.

TOWARD A NEW KNOWLEDGE-BASE FOR MILITARY DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DURING INSURGENCIES*

by David C. Schwartz

RECENT years have witnessed a great proliferation in the number and type of development or nation-building responsibilities American military organizations have been asked to undertake all over the world. As we have acquired experience with the costs and risks of communist-supported "wars of national liberation," and have had to wrestle with the intricate interrelationships of military and political factors in insurgency (generally in an *ad hoc,* intuitive and inductive manner), increased stress has been placed both on these noncombat missions and on the need for informed doctrine to guide them. The principal purpose of this article is to provide a tentative assessment of the contribution recent scholarly research on revolution might make toward the identification, planning, conduct, evaluation and orchestration of military missions in civic action, psychological operations and general development efforts. A second objective is to suggest a "theory-to-policy" routine whereby new social science findings can be processed and utilized on a more timely, if not continuous, basis.

Neither the problems of military involvement in nation-building nor the required solutions of improved social science contributions to political-military policymaking are novel. "It is not new for soldiers to be nation-builders and establishers of governments. That has always been one of their roles."[1] The problems of improving social science contributions to military policymaking, too, have long been recognized and studied. Indeed, the mesh between military needs and social science knowledge on the very subjects to be reviewed here—internal war and nation-building assistance—has been widely recognized.

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[1] Ithiel de Sola Pool, *et al., Social Science and National Security* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1963), p. 9.

What is new is the global scale and the intensity of U.S. military development efforts, the time pressures and other constraints with which active or incipient insurgency confronts us (either as participants or advisers) and the fact that we "must now do these things with much less freedom to use the traditional instrumentalities of force."[2] What may also be new is the increasing power of the social sciences.

The problems, then, may not be wholly new—but we, i.e., policy-oriented social scientists, have now made them *our* problems. They are pressing, and there seem at least to be more of them. I shall conclude, moreover, that the social sciences now have more to contribute to the solution of these problems—and, in the light of previous scholarly appraisals (and some current military assessments), that is new.

IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL INSURGENCY THEATERS

As the physical characteristics of combat theaters affect the identification of combat missions, so the social, cultural and political "terrain" will have a vital impact on noncombat operations during insurgencies. Accordingly, it is important to determine the nations, subnational regions, groups and even person-types that are likely to be involved in future insurgencies. Obviously, too, such an ability to specify probable future insurgency theaters would constitute a breakthrough in "early warning of insurgency" and, therefore, in the lead-time for development mission-identification, priority, and resource allocation and planning. Of course, military and diplomatic assessments of potential theaters exist, but the bases on which these assessments rest can be improved as our understanding of the cause and character of insurgency improves. How have social scientists moved to facilitate such theater identifications?

Writing in 1963, Professor Harry Eckstein of Princeton University noted that much previous analysis of the preconditions of insurgency had focused on certain "structural" or objective aspects of societies which had proved vulnerable to internal war, while generally neglecting the "behavioral" aspects which represent men's psychological orientations toward those objective social conditions. The structural filters then in use were crude. It seemed that "almost any social condition could lead to internal war and that . . . the crucial thing to know is not the conditions found in pre-revolutionary societies but the orientations in terms of which such conditions are perceived and evaluated—or, more precisely, the interaction of conditions and orientations. . . ."[3]

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[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

Eckstein's lesson has been well learned: Virtually all of the recent scholarly research on revolution has sought to identify both the social conditions and the individual and group reactions that lead to civil strife. In a sense, these researches, taken together, have cast the problem into a series of Stimulus-Organization (organism) -Response models, where the socio-economic and political conditions of a nation are taken as the state of a system, and some critical event (sometimes external impact or propagation) is taken as the stimulus which arouses revolutionary responses on the part of predisposed individuals and groups. In a somewhat more sophisticated version, that of Chalmers Johnson's *Revolutionary Change*,[4] the orientations of individuals are taken into account in the description of the system state. Revolutions appear likely when the orientations necessary for the maintenance of existing conditions and institutions differ radically from the actual existing orientations. We shall return to this matter later to demonstrate how this approach may lead to a more precise and rigorous processual theory of insurgency.

But whatever its potential utility, there have also been great difficulties in applying Eckstein's advice. Behavioral data on the orientations of citizens to their government, for example, have been hard to come by. The direct acquisition of such data by the improving interview techniques of social science, as was planned for instance in Project Camelot, is impeded if not barred by the politically sensitive character of the materials which, in turn, results in the noncooperation of even friendly governments. Thus, short-run considerations have tended to deprive us of long-run gains. Direct data gathering is now going on in South Viet Nam; but if the systematic research on which development must properly be based is ignored until active insurgency is about to occur or has already occurred, then both the cost and the effectiveness of military development missions are likely to be deleteriously affected.

In the absence of direct contemporary data, social scientists have proposed a variety of theories about the social and psychological conditions under which revolutionary behavior is likely, and they have proceeded, with the use of simplifying assumptions and new techniques, to test these theories.

[3] Harry Eckstein in *ibid.*, pp. 102-148.
[4] (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

We know with some precision that the level of economic development is an important factor. Raymond Tanter has found a negative correlation (r=—.56, N=70) between gross national product per capita (GNP/CAP) and the number of revolutions that occurred in 1955-1960. He concludes that "those nations with a higher degree of economic development are less vulnerable to the illegal overthrow of their governments."[5] Is the whole of the developing world then to be viewed as a potential insurgency theater? Were this the case we should derive but little advantage from our knowledge, for the large number of new nations and great differences among developing regions would preclude detailed assignment of priorities or planning. We might be tempted to reason thus: If the most developed nations are less likely to have insurgencies, then the least developed nations may be most vulnerable. We know, however, that this is not the case. Revolutions tend to occur in relatively poor lands *when they are on the upgrade economically.*

Hence, scholars have reasoned that revolution may be less a response to some absolute level of development than to thwarted or uneven development. James C. Davies' hypothesis that revolutions occur when rapid reversals take place in developing nations has been validated in a study by Tanter and Milardsky,[6] who conclude that revolutions occur when low short-run expectations conflict with high long-run aspirations. Taking GNP/CAP (and its rate of change through time) as the operational measure of these variables, this study indicates that the theory works well for successful, noncolonial revolutions in Asia and the Middle East, but rather badly for Latin American experiences. Note that this study uses aggregate data (generally UN statistics) and assumes that the orientations of citizens and insurgents regularly relate to conditions measurable by GNP figures. It is principally useful for some theater identifications but less interesting for mission specification, for it fails to indicate the groups and person-types whose orientations are crucial. It does hold out the promise that, using objective data, we might continually monitor some danger-signals of impending insurgency.

For more precise theater identifications, a more detailed scheme for determining a nation's internal war potential seems necessary. Eckstein had proffered a formulation in which internal war potential is represented as a function of the factors making for insurgency (rapid and extensive social change, imbalancing mechanisms and insurgent resources) divided by those tending to impede or inhibit revolution (indigenous elite cohesion, elite resources, repressive behavior and social stabilizing mechanisms). In a study by Eckstein's associate, Professor Ted Gurr,[7] this formula is operationalized, and aggregate data measures are correlated with the likelihood and magnitude of revolutions. More important for the light it sheds on theater identification is the fact that the correlations were broken down by nation-types: region, technological development level, type of government (e.g., elitist, personalistic, democratic).

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[5] Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations," *Papers of the Peace Research Society,* Volume III (1965), pp. 159 ff.

[6] "A Theory of Revolution" (typescript, Northwestern University, 1966).

Although Gurr's model accounts, over the whole range of cases in the 1961-1963 period, for only 40 per cent of the variance in the dependent variables (likelihood and magnitude of revolution), it helps us to determine the factors to monitor for different system types. In the developed, democratic systems, revolution seems likely where discrimination against minority groups is matched by few and weak channels of peaceful protest. In Africa and Asia, and to a lesser degree in Latin America, a government's commitment to political change (and concomitant expenditures in these directions) seems to have been destabilizing.

Why should this be so? And when will development foster revolution? These are questions that go to the heart of U.S. military development efforts and much U.S. foreign policy generally. They are unlikely to be answered with reference to national data only, for they relate to the minds of men. These problems are too important for satisfaction with the simplifying assumptions necessary to the employment of aggregate data.

Political development is both the breakup of the constellation of needs, values and perceptions that have traditionally inhibited revolution and the creation of a new, more open but stable, nonviolent pattern of political orientations. Development operations, both military and civilian, are then to be conceived of as efforts to facilitate a peaceful transition; revolution is another means of modernizing a nation.

In the traditional society, politics is less salient to the individual, because statuses are more fixed, political aspirations are relatively low, orientations are frequently otherworldly, and men may not even expect to be able to understand a rational political world. Therefore, any imbalance between a government and the political values of the population is less disturbing.

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[7] *The Conditions of Civil Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph, 1967).

With political development, all these psychological conditions become untenable and change. The modern world is more politicized, more status mobile, more aspirant, more secular, more rationalized, and more intellectualized than were traditional societies. Then, too, modern governments tend to interpenetrate a greater number of social spheres, making themselves relevant to a greater number of political values. This may act as an "alienation multiplier," if socio-economic development fails.

Perhaps the key term here is "alienation." No revolution is made by more than a small fraction of the population, and no insurgency can be understood without reference to a potential leadership corps. Who is alienated and why? Whose expectations are at odds with aspirations? For whom is development so unsettling as to arouse violent responses?

Obviously, nations neither should nor will shun development. Equally clear is the fact that they (and we) cannot afford to be paralyzed at every development operation by the fear of revolutionary countereffects. To identify potential insurgency theaters, the observation of uneven development as measured by national data is but the beginning and not the end of analysis. The cognitive patterns of alienation are observable, and the process whereby men move from alienation toward predisposition to revolutionary activity can be discerned. Such observation is requisite both for theater and mission identification. But many present conceptions of development hinder the making of these observations.

The population of a nation might be reconceptualized in terms of its distribution of cognitive patterns. Groups that appear to be ethnically or geographically homogeneous may actually have a great diversity of cognitive patterns (and degrees of alienation) within them, and thus constitute not one, but several subpopulations for which different integrational symbols and development policies may be required. Conversely, groups that appear to be very different from each other, when looked at in terms of socio-economic factors, may actually be in quite similar cognitive conditions and hence constitute a single functional subpopulation.

Second, there is the matter of overextending or overselling development. Particularly with reference to chronically underdeveloped regions within a developing society, there is often the view that "anything we can do will be useful, will provide more than they now have." That may sometimes be true, but it may also raise aspirations above realistic levels. This comes down to walking the thin line between attempting too little and too much, between promising too little to produce positive identifications and overselling, with negative effects.

In all of this, there is the matter of "development style." A confident style of development can produce substantive results, whereas substantive programs are not always able to impute confidence and legitimacy. This is particularly true in the earlier stages of revolution. When, for example, an individual first perceives an imbalance between his values and his polity, he may search for an alternative within the ongoing political system on which to peg his hopes. The more there are reformist alternatives, the more people will find their aspirations tied to the center. When the only choice left open is between status quo elites and the insurgents, a greater percentage of the population is likely to become at least passively alienated. This suggests that the growth and proliferation of interest organizations should at least be tolerated, if not encouraged. However untidy this may seem to planners, such organizations constitute the vital intermediate associations that link men to the polity and that, by insulating both elites and nonelites, inhibit the conditions of alienation, isolation and revolution.

On the other hand, if forceful responses are to be employed, a confident, timely and discriminating use of force is indicated. The vacillating, fits-and-starts approach to violence produces the very perception of governmental inefficacy which induces initial alienation. Delays, moreover, may mean that the harsher, less discriminating force which activates passive alienation will have to be used later.

Thus, nations with rigid political systems (few, weak channels of protest and few loyal reform groups) embarked on oversold but uneven development programs without adequate conception of the need to mobilize and persuade identifiable population sectors (or to control these in the last resort) —these, social scientists would conclude, are the likely future battlegrounds of insurgency.

MISSION IDENTIFICATION: THE NEED FOR A PROCESSUAL THEORY OF INSURGENCY

These formulations may be useful for determining the likely future theaters of insurgency, but they provide only the most general kind of guidelines for the identification of military development missions. They suggest that (1) such missions should proceed from some coherent plan, so as to achieve even development; (2) the overall development plan should mesh promises with capabilities, so as neither to oversell nor to provide U.S. services which the indigenous government could not maintain; (3) the range of audiences or target populations for development should be clearly identified, so that, across the population, development operations can be mutually reinforcing (or at least not mutually interfering); and (4) development means the creation of new political roles—for to open the eyes and minds of men to the possibilities of change but close to them the political system through which change might be effected will create, not avert, violence.

In a sense, these guidelines may be helpful in ensuring that development does not itself produce or reinforce the revolutionary conditions it is designed to avert; they do not tell us how to use development to counter an illegitimate insurgency. Nor can they do so, for they are derived from some general formulations about the correlates of revolution rather than a precise understanding of the cause and course of insurgency. If we would cope with insurgency by changing conditions, we must know how the theater characteristics or conditions discussed above lead to insurgency. *Effective counterinsurgency requires a predictive theory of insurgency and is a manipulation of the variables in that theory. Military development operations during insurgency must, therefore, be theoretically guided.*

In the concluding section of this article, it will be shown that theory is not enough, and that we must construct a "theory-to-policy" routine enabling us to identify manipulable variables and those real-world operations which will effect such a manipulation. Here, I am saying that a theory of revolutionary behavior is a necessary (if insufficient) condition for identifying, planning, conducting, evaluating and orchestrating development operations during insurgencies. What kind of a theory might be useful for these purposes?

Any social policy is aimed at some crucial choicepoint in a social process. The Federal Reserve System raises or lowers the interest rate and can thereby affect the entire economy because the interest rate affects the willingness of people to invest, which affects the availability of credit, which affects new ventures. In so doing, the Federal Reserve System is operating on a processual theory of the economy. Note that the effectiveness of the policy depends first on the correctness of the psychological assumptions on which that theory rests; if interest rates did not affect investors' decisions (or did so in a manner misunderstood by economists) the policy would not achieve the desired result.

So it is with development programs during insurgencies, for revolutions—like all social processes—begin in the minds of men, and the theory on which development rests must account for the behavior of revolutionary men. The theater-identifying factors discussed above are the social conditions that engender and channel the psychological preconditions of revolutionary behavior.

Revolution as a social process is a series of changes, through time, in the state of a social system. These changes are produced by the collective behavior of men whose actions are explicable in psychological terms. The effects of that behavior change the system, and the changed system operates as stimulus and constraint for later behavior.

Conceiving of revolution as a process, i.e., aiming at a processual theory of revolution, has several advantages. First, a known, powerful form of analysis becomes operative. Second, basic choice-points in the revolutionary sequence become identifiable for policy purposes. Let us see how those two advantages accrue.

Process analysis requires that (1) initial and terminal states or stages be identified; (2) significant intermediate stages be specified; (3) conditions or behaviors within each stage or time period be explained; and (4) the rules by which transitions occur between the stages be stated. Once a given real instance of revolution is identified as corresponding to, let us say, stage two in the processual theory, then development efforts aimed at behaviors in stage two can be initiated and the conditions for moving to stage three can, in theory, be prevented from occurring.

If revolution is a process, one form of its explanation may be a series of conditional probabilistic statements of the following form: Given that a social system is in state "n," there exists a specifiable probability that it will move to state $n+1$ (under identifiable conditions), will move then to $n+2$ . . . to $n+n$. A precise description and comprehensive explanation of the cause of a modal form of insurgency, then, would be an equation in conditional probabilities where the combination of the probabilities was equal to the probability of the revolution (or other given end state). The advantage of such increased precision to development planning must be obvious.

Revolution is a process of decreasing social solidarity effected first by the withdrawal (among intellectuals and other citizens) of attention and legitimacy from the political system and later by the increasing polarization of the political community around two opposing, organized elites. The gross stages of this process are

(1) Initial Political Alienation: Withdrawal
(2) Formation of Revolutionary Organizations
(3) Appeals of the Revolutionary Organizations
(4) Revolutionary Coalition and Movement-Building
(5) Nonviolent Revolutionary Politics
(6) The Outbreak and Course of Revolutionary Violence

Stage 1: *Theory and Development Missions*

Men are likely to become at least passively alienated from their governments when (1) they perceive a gross incongruity between their own basic politically relevant values and those values the government seems to support; (2) they believe themselves to be ineffective in reforming the system or affecting the government in ways which would reduce this value conflict; (3) they sense that the government is presently unchangeable, i.e., that there exist no viable loyal alternatives to the present, conflictful governmental situation. Under these conditions, a pattern of mutually reinforcing frustration, anger, hostility, threat and tension is likely to arise, and men will withdraw their attention, affection, support and legitimization from their leaders.

Unless the conditions inducing this withdrawal are retarded or reversed, the political system may lose its vital solidarity and become vulnerable to any number of destabilizing forces. How can these conditions be affected by development efforts?

In any nation, the policies or structures of government may conflict with the fundamental values of some people. No government can be all things to all men. Development programs should be aimed at achieving conditions valued by the people. Priorities should be established with reference to the value preferences (value hierarchy) of the population. Moreover, giving the population a role to play in the selection and planning of development programs teaches them that they are not politically irrelevant or inefficacious. This is vital, for people who feel that they can influence the government will become reformers rather than revolutionaries—even if fundamental value conflicts do exist. This suggests that a good part of the task of identifying development missions can be achieved by the very people we wish to help.

The symbols used to publicize development should be "inclusivist" so that all groups can be reached by the mobilizing message. This leads to the perception that the system is open to the participation of all groups instead of being the exclusive province of the elite or the dominant majority.

The planning and conduct of development efforts, then, must be open to the involvement of (and might well seek to create) a multiplicity of loyal reform groups, thereby allowing potentially alienated persons to identify themselves with one of a number of peaceful alternatives.

Stage 2: Theory and Development Missions

If alienation is already widespread, revolutionary organizations are likely to form when alienated persons perceive (1) each other in significant numbers; (2) the necessity for group action to change the system; (3) the efficacy of a particular group; and (4) some compatibility of style, symbols and resources for the revolutionary organization.

It is important to view the development effort as a competitor to potential insurgent organizations. If widespread change is perceived to be more likely through development than through violence; if the symbols, styles and resources of developers are more appealing than alternative revolutionary organizations—then the conditions for establishing revolutionary cadres can be impeded.

Stage 3: Theory and Development Missions

If revolutionary organizations already exist, the goals of development programs must be (1) to reclaim the loyalties of the revolutionaries; (2) to reclaim the loyalties of the potential insurgents—the passively alienated; (3) to isolate the insurgents from the citizens and the passively alienated by reducing the attraction of revolutionary appeals.

Here, new theories can be most helpful. The revolutionary's psychological set has at least two vital elements. First, he perceives (and very much wants to perceive) a great difference between the central government and his movement, organization or cell. Second, he prefers the latter. If the psychological operations in support of the government insist that "yes, there is a great difference but the existing government is better," all that the insurgent may hear is "yes, there is a great difference." This reinforces his insurgent loyalties.

Many of today's development projects conducted during insurgency are aimed at the passively alienated peasants caught between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Being forced to pay taxes and to perform other functions for the revolutionaries, while not giving their allegiance to the revolution, may create in them what psychologists call "counter-attitudinal dissonance." Thus, people adopt attitudes they previously rejected because they have been forced, or have agreed, to act as if they believed them. When the counterinsurgents weaken or remove the stimulus by partly or completely protecting the native population from the revolutionaries, they often expect to recover peasant loyalties quickly. This would be a legitimate expectation if the peasant behavior had been simply fear-motivated. As it is not, but rather is driven by complex motivations, the response tendency extinguishes much more slowly.

Accordingly, emphasis on securing an area from insurgent military activity, without concomitant stress on development programs in the area, accomplishes little except temporary seizure of territory. Further research is urgently needed. We must know what effect coercive policies have on development programs in order to achieve a mixed strategy of development and control. Otherwise, we may be at cross-purposes with ourselves and undo with one program what we labor long and hard to accomplish with another. In this connection, it should be recalled that insurgency requires a collective identity. The issuance of I.D. cards or other control measures may serve to unite previously disparate population sectors.

To isolate the insurgent from potential bases of support requires a theory of the appeals of revolutionary organizations. To reiterate, alienation is posited to occur because of (1) value conflict, (2) personal political futility, and (3) system futility, creating threat and hostility. Accordingly, revolutionary propaganda will attract support if the organization is perceived to (1) be less futile than the government and other alternatives, (2) be less threatening than these, (3) explain the value conflict (intellectualize crises), and (4) prevent the more or less direct outplay of aggression and hostility (as on a scapegoat, for example).

These criteria should provide useful guidelines for assessing the likely impact of insurgent propaganda and for the development of counterinsurgent psychological operations, including especially the publicizing and mobilizing appeals of development programs.

Stage 4: *Theory and Development Missions*

If the revolutionary appeals are successful, two results obtain: (1) the infusion of new elements into the insurgent organization which may vie for, or affect the infighting of, top leadership; and (2) the creation of a new type of total dedication to the insurgent party. Development operations should seek to compete for relatively complete commitment early, for it is difficult to reclaim the totally dedicated insurgent. The coalition-building process of insurgencies needs further research if development programs are to be made relevant to this vital stage in revolution.

Stages 5 *and* 6: *The Payoff of Development*

The purposes of development are those of peaceful social change. When properly identified, planned, conducted and integrated, development operations can significantly strengthen a nation even during insurgencies. If a government retains the loyalty of its population and the solidarity of the society it serves, it can find a *modus vivendi* with anti-system elements and hence achieve a critical minimum of stability. Alternatively, even if violence takes place, the beneficial effects of development operations will significantly advantage the society, and the magnitude and duration of civil strife are likely to be reduced.

FROM POLITICAL THEORY TO DEVELOPMENT POLICY

The theoretical formulations set forth above are all tentative, all require further research validation. In the process, they are likely to be modified and improved. But the process of drawing policy conclusions from theory, of divining the real-world implications of theory, likewise requires improvement.

Policy research is identical in form to the ordinary validation study in social science—a policy assumption is an hypothesis, its supportive intellectual complex of formulations may be a theory —but it is not identical in content. To have explained a phenomenon is not to have identified an appropriate policy for problems related to that phenomenon. Moving from theory to policy in the planning of development programs seems, thus far, to have been based largely on creative intuition, but not to have adequately taken into account the developing political theory of revolutions.

The following intellectual operations seem necessary in the construction of an explicit "theory-to-policy" routine for the utilization of political theory in political-military development efforts. First, after some tentative predictive theory has been selected, assessments must be made as to which of the variables in the theory are amenable to policy manipulation. This requires research, probably some form of political-military gaming. Second, the postulation of alternative policies, whereby the manipulation of critical variables is to be attempted, is necessary. Third, the specification of criteria for the evaluation of the alternative policy proposals must be accomplished. Fourth, application of the criteria to the proposed policies and, finally, the evaluation and integration of the policies must be completed.

In all of this, the creative exercise of responsible decision-authority is crucial. Perhaps, however, the developing social sciences can contribute here—as in the explanation of insurgency—to provide and apply a much-needed new knowledge-base for political-military development operations during insurgencies.

BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: 1963-1967

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

THE first reaction of Englishmen to the collapse of the Brussels negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market in January 1963 was to recall other times of adversity in their long history.[1] Despite the Brussels debacle, British decision-makers and nongovernmental elites had continued to reappraise Britain's international commitments and foreign policy orientation. With the breakdown of the negotiations, Britain enlarged her permanent mission to the European Community and arranged for consultations with the Six Common Market countries on issues related to European economic integration.[2] In July 1963, she and the Six agreed to meet in quarterly sessions under the auspices of the Western European Union.[3] The British government looked to the reduction of tariffs in the then forthcoming Geneva trade negotiations, made possible by the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Finally, British officials suggested that Britain should strengthen her own economy and adopt domestic policies designed to assure expanding markets for exports. This, in turn, might increase her political influence abroad.[4]

British policy toward the European Community between 1963 and 1967 may be bracketed as follows: *Phase One:* 1963-1964—a period of markedly reduced interest in immediate Common Market membership as a result of the failure of the Brussels negotiations. *Phase Two:* 1965—a revival of interest first in the strengthening of trading links and subsequently in Common Market membership. *Phase Three:* 1966—a period of intensive study of the problems associated with EEC entry and exploration of the prospects for membership in probings with the Six. *Phase Four:* 1967—a period of intensive discussions with the EEC countries, capped by a decision to apply once again for membership.

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[1] Macmillan expressed this mood when, on January 29, he answered a question in the Commons about the Brussels negotiations: "If and when they come to an end, a situation will have been created which we shall deal with. I am convinced that we shall deal with that situation as we have always dealt with difficulties facing us. We shall face it, I believe, as a united country." Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 670, January 29, 1963, Col. 758.

[2] See statement by Edward Heath, Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 671, February 12, 1963, Cols. 1159-1160.

[3] See the report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by the Hon. Maurice Edelman, Rapporteur, *Great Britain, EFTA and the EEC,* Assembly of Western European Union, Eleventh Ordinary Session (First Part), Document 341, 1965. In a speech on June 5, 1963, Edward Heath proposed that WEU should be the power "in which to seek to develop closer European cooperation in defense and foreign policy."

[4] See, for example, Prime Minister Macmillan's statement to the House of Commons, Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 671, February 11, 1963, Col. 949.

Although Britain was not yet prepared in the first period (1963-1964) to undertake a new initiative toward the Common Market, British officials stressed their continuing interest not only in the European Community, but also in European political integration. Successive governments after 1963—Conservative and Labour—indicated that Britain wished to participate from the beginning in any new discussion of an integrated Europe.[5] By taking part in such negotiations Britain might exert an influence on the future shape of a politically united Europe which she had been denied by refusing to participate in the framing of the Rome Treaty that created the EEC.

I

The years following the collapse of the Brussels negotiations were a testing time for the European Community as well. In 1965-1966, the Commission found itself the object of intense French criticism. The dispute centered on conflicting views about the nature of supranationality within the EEC and, in particular, the position of the Commission, the strengthening of the European Parliament, and completion of regulations for Common Market farm policy. During the latter months of 1965 the future of the EEC seemed uncertain, since France had withdrawn from the deliberations of the Council of Ministers. The French opposed the efforts of the Commission to link the financing of the EEC agricultural policy to the strengthening of the European Parliament. According to the Commission proposal, levies collected on agricultural imports into the Common Market would have gone directly to the EEC to finance its agricultural policy. As a result, the European Community would have gained a major new source of revenue that would have lessened its financial dependence on member governments. Although France pressed for completion of the EEC farm policy, she was unwilling to link its financing, as the Commission wanted, to the strengthening of EEC institutions.[6] Nevertheless, the French government, like other member governments at the time of the Brussels negotiations, was not prepared to push its opposition to the point of destroying the Common Market. Before returning to the Council, France received agreement, in January 1966, that the agricultural regulations would be completed without linking such action to the strengthening of Community institutions. Moreover, France's partners agreed that, in preparing proposals for consideration by the Council, the Commission henceforth would "make the appropriate contacts with the governments of member states." The Council would seek to ensure that, in cases where majority decisions could be taken, solutions would be sought "that could be adopted by all members of the Council in respect of their mutual interests and those of the Community."[7]

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[5] R.A. Butler, while Foreign Secretary in the Conservative Government of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, declared at a meeting of the WEU Council in London that British participation at all stages in negotiations on European political integration would be of benefit. (The *Guardian* [Manchester], January 25, 1965.) Michael Stewart chose the occasion of his first major address, on February 11, 1965, after becoming Foreign Secretary in the Wilson Cabinet, to emphasize Britain's interest in European political integration: "It would not serve the cause of European and Atlantic unity if important decisions affecting the political future of Europe were taken by a restricted group. This is a matter on which the views of all European powers who support the aims of a united Europe, including any members of the European Free Trade Association who wish to participate, should be heard. We for our part have always expressed our wish to join from the outset in any talks aimed at political unity; and we regret that the latest proposals for such talks envisage the participation of the Six European Economic Community countries only." *The Labour Government and Europe,* mimeographed release by Labour Party Overseas Department.

In May 1966 the Six reached agreement on agricultural regulations. Ninety per cent of the revenues collected from levies on farm imports from third countries were to be paid to the EEC Fund for Agricultural Modernization and Guaranty. From this fund subsidies would be paid to Common Market countries for the modernization of their agriculture. Although France would be the chief beneficiary, the principle was established that the major part of levies on agricultural imports would be paid to the European Community, rather than to the member governments. This agreement represented a victory for the proponents of a strengthened European Community.

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[6] Explaining France's withdrawal from the work of the EEC Council, de Gaulle, in his press conference of September 9, 1965, declared: "In Brussels, on 30 June, our delegation came up against a serious stumbling-block concerning the five's definition of the financial regulation, as previously agreed upon. Shortly before, the Commission had suddenly abandoned its political discretion and formulated terms in connection with this financial regulation whereby it would have a budget of its own, possibly up to 20,000 million new francs [$4 billion], the states having made over into its hands the levies and customs receipts which would literally have made it a great independent financial power. And then those very states, having fed these enormous amounts to it at the expense of their taxpayers, would have no way of supervising it." Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, *Speeches and Press Conferences,* No. 228.

[7] Ambassade de France, *Arrangements Made in Luxembourg between the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Six on January 31, 1966* (French Affairs, No. 188).

During the Common Market crisis the idea of another British EEC bid gained currency. Reportedly, opponents of French policy in the Common Market, in particular Belgium and Germany, asked the British to commit themselves to the Rome Treaty.[8] Britain might not only emerge as the leader of the EEC Five, but might offer proof of the British commitment to an integrated Europe. At the very least, she could strengthen the Five in their conflict with France. These views were said to have the support of U.S. officials, who believed that Britain might be letting a unique and historic moment slip by.[9] Even de Gaulle, for reasons of his own, expressed interest in renewing at some future date the question of Britain's relationship with the Six.[10]

Although the temptation was not absent from British discussions, there was little inclination to exploit differences among the Six in order to enhance Britain's position in Europe. Such a strategy might revive latent Continental suspicion that Britain sought to exacerbate divisions within the European Community. Moreover, the British conception of a politically integrated Europe bore closer resemblance to that of de Gaulle than to the ideas of the proponents of greater supranationality against whom France was pitted. Finally, British policy at this time was designed to "build bridges" between the EEC and EFTA, rather than to drive wedges between France and other members of the European Community.

II

Such a policy is understandable, since the Labour Government elected in October 1964 was not "European" in orientation.[11] Although at the time of the Brussels negotiations Harold Wilson was not opposed in principle to Common Market membership, he criticized the Macmillan Cabinet for making its decision at a time when Britain was economically weak.[12] Wilson had stressed the importance of Labour's "five principles" (guarantees for domestic agriculture, safeguards for Commonwealth trade, agreements for EFTA trade, retention by Britain of her present freedom in the conduct of foreign relations and in the formulation of her social policies and economic planning, and free entry into Britain for products of less developed countries) as conditions that must be met before Britain could join the Common Market. By the autumn of 1962 he, like Hugh Gaitskell, was convinced that these conditions could not be met, and that the only option open to the Labour Party was to oppose Common Market membership on the terms emerging from the Brussels negotiations.[13] Although prepared to discuss with the Six the idea of political integration, the Wilson Cabinet, like the Conservative Government before the first Common Market application, turned to the European Free Trade Association as a device for reducing trade barriers between the Six and Seven. In other EFTA countries as well the idea of using EFTA to achieve a single market in Western Europe gained currency.[14]

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[8] *Financial Times* (London), December 29, 1965.

[9] *Ibid.*, November 16, 1965.

[10] Perhaps to blunt the campaign of his opponents for the French Presidency and to face down the proponents of supranationality in the European Community, de Gaulle declared in a television broadcast: "We must take up again what France proposed in 1961, and which did not succeed at first, that is to say, the organization of a growing political cooperation between the states of Western Europe. At that moment, it is very probable that, a bit sooner or a bit later, England will join us, and it will be quite natural. Of course, that Europe will not be supra-national!" Ian Davidson, "De Gaulle Treads the European Tightrope," *Financial Times* (London), December 29, 1965.

[11] The Cabinet included Patrick Gordon-Walker as Foreign Secretary; Denis Healey as Minister of Defense; James Callaghan as Chancellor of the Exchequer;

In a speech to the EFTA Ministerial Meeting in Vienna on

Douglas Jay as President of the Board of Trade; and George Brown as Deputy Prime Minister. Only Brown was strongly "European," while Healey and Jay had opposed British entry into the Common Market. Several months before the election, Wilson had attacked the British government for having been prepared to join the Common Market without proper regard for the interests of the Commonwealth. He challenged the government to offer a pledge not to consider "entry into the Common Market on any terms which would reduce Britain's existing freedom to trade with the Commonwealth." Wilson declared that "On behalf of my party, I give that pledge." Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 688, February 6, 1964, Cols. 1386-1391.

[12] Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 645, August 3, 1961, Cols. 1651-1667.

[13] Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 666, November 8, 1962, Cols. 1270-1285; Vol. 669, December 13, 1962, Cols. 658-675; Vol. 671, February 11, 1963, Cols. 961-979. See also Harold Wilson, *Purpose in Politics: Britain's Role in the Post Colonial World,* Selected Speeches by Harold Wilson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 95-162.

[14] See, for example, the statement of Dr. Jose Goncalo Corres Oliveira, Chairman of the EFTA Council, on the eve of the meeting of EFTA Ministers held in Lisbon on May 9-10, 1963: "I am certain that our determination to provide EFTA with the possible economic potential—not only by abolishing customs tariffs but also by cooperating in a close and rational manner with the view to giving adequate consideration to the agricultural, industrial, technical and financial problems on the solution of which the expansion of the member countries depends—will contribute both to the strengthening of EFTA and to the establishment of a single European market." *EFTA Reporter,* May 7, 1963. The EFTA countries are Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and Iceland.

May 24, 1965, Wilson called for the study of steps which might be taken to reduce differences between the Six and Seven. Although he had no detailed recommendations for the resolution of EFTA-EEC problems, he outlined several tentative proposals. A permanent standing consultative council, including representatives of EFTA and EEC, might be created. The Six and Seven might conduct special tariff negotiations for "European goods"—products traded more extensively in Western Europe than elsewhere in the world. The idea that the Six, as one economic unit, might join a new trading unit in which EFTA countries would participate as separate governments should be examined. This proposal bore great resemblance to the British free trade area proposal of 1957. According to Wilson, the EEC and EFTA should attempt to remove nontariff barriers to trade. Finally, the British Prime Minister urged that the problems of technological collaboration among EFTA countries should be explored.[15]

In the months following the return of the Labour Government to office Britain faced immediate economic problems, including a balance of payments crisis, which outweighed the British interest in EFTA. At the time of Britain's last balance of payments crisis in 1961, the British government had been preparing to announce its decision to apply for Common Market membership. This time, however, the government presented to Parliament a supplementary budget which included a temporary surcharge of 15 per cent on imports of manufactured goods irrespective of their source. Because the British surcharge included imports from other EFTA countries, Britain was criticized for having set back the freeing of trade in Western Europe. After a meeting on November 20, 1965, Britain's EFTA partners issued a statement expressing displeasure with the British trade restrictions as "inconsistent with the United Kingdom's obligation under the (EFTA) Convention and Association Agreement."[16]

The action of the Wilson Cabinet was indicative of the weakness of the British economy as compared with the economies of the EEC and other EFTA countries, and gave evidence of Britain's inability to undertake the commitments and withstand the economic rigors that might be necessary if she were to join the Common Market. Moreover, British policy illustrated the apparent insensitivity of the new Labour Government to the feelings of other Europeans on the issue of trade relationships in Europe.

[15] *Ibid.*, May 31, 1965.
[16] The *Times* (London), November 21, 1965.

By imposing the surcharge without obtaining prior agreement, Britain, the largest and most important member of EFTA, had shattered the feeling of trust within EFTA and aroused latent suspicions in Western Europe about the depth of the British commitment to European economic and political unity.

III

Whatever the effect of Britain's economic policies on the attitudes of her neighbors, the chronic economic problems facing her contributed to strengthening support within the Parliamentary Labour Party for Common Market membership. The economic crisis confirmed proponents of EEC entry in their conviction that Britain should apply again for membership and even increased their ranks. The election of 1964, moreover, contributed to the change in attitude within the party. A large proportion of the Labour Members of Parliament who won seats in the elections of 1964 and 1966 were under the age of forty and were university educated and "European" in outlook. They represented a rising "technocratic" group in Britain, from which the Labour Party had begun to draw substantial support. Like many others of their generation, background and training, they did not view the Common Market with the suspicion and hostility often manifested by older Labour Party members. Almost half of the sixty-six new Labour MP's elected in 1964 became members of the Labour Committee for Europe, whose objective was to promote support within the party for Common Market membership.[17]

At the same time the preconditions for EEC entry which Hugh Gaitskell, as Leader of the Party, had set forth in 1962 appeared to have less relevance in the light of changed circumstances. Especially after the return of Labour to office in 1964, there was a shift in the party's sentiment regarding the Commonwealth.[18] At the time of the Brussels negotiations, Labour spokesmen had stressed the importance of the Commonwealth as a link between developed and less developed nations. To party members the "multiracial" Commonwealth, in whose creation postwar Labour governments had played a major part, was the object of great pride. In contrast, not a few Conservatives had become disenchanted with the Commonwealth, especially in the period preceding Macmillan's announcement of the British EEC application. With the admission of new members, for the most part from Africa and Asia, the Commonwealth, rent with differences, no longer seemed to provide a major source of strength to Britain and therefore no longer warranted being the primary object of British attention.

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[17] "Edging towards Europe," *Socialist Commentary,* June 1966, p. 15. The Labour Committee for Europe was the successor to the Labour Common Market Committee, founded in 1961 by Labour "Europeans" to build support in their party for British EEC entry. The Labour Committee for Europe had as its president Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, who was also president of the Council of Europe. By 1967 it had among its membership 97 Members of Parliament. See *Labour Left: Journal of the Labour Committee for Europe,* January 1967.

[18] See Sam Silkin, M.P., "From Westminster to Europe," *Socialist Commentary,* September 1966, pp. 5-7; "Britain Faces Europe," *Socialist Commentary,* February 1967, pp. IV-X.

After 1964 Labour Party attitudes toward the Commonwealth began to resemble those found in the Conservative Party at the time of the first Common Market application. The Rhodesian question, including the unilateral declaration of independence by the government of Ian Smith in November 1965, and the India-Pakistan border conflict of August-September 1965 were indicative of disintegrative tendencies in the Commonwealth. In both crises Britain was severely limited in her ability to furnish leadership and to effect a settlement. In protest against Britain's vacillation in meeting their demands for action against Rhodesia, some African Commonwealth governments severed diplomatic relations with London and even threatened to leave the Commonwealth. As a result, the idea of the Commonwealth as an alternative to Common Market membership seemed attractive to fewer Englishmen, even within the Labour Party.

At the time of the Macmillan Cabinet's application, proponents of EEC membership had pointed to the rapid increase in British trade with other West European countries, in contrast to the decline in trade with the Commonwealth, as a percentage of total British commerce. As Table I illustrates, after the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations Britain's patterns of international trade continued to shift from the Commonwealth to Western Europe. Although proponents of Common Market membership had argued that if Britain remained outside the EEC she might lose markets in the Six, trade trends after the collapse of the negotiations did not substantiate this claim. Even if trade with the Six did not rise as rapidly as would have been the case had Britain joined the Common Market, there was nevertheless a marked increase in commerce between Britain and the EEC. Still, the economic arguments advocates of EEC entry had voiced at the time of the Brussels negotiations fell upon an increasingly receptive audience.

After 1963, many of the Commonwealth problems for which Britain had insisted on detailed solutions before entering the Common Market declined in importance. Not only did trade with Britain account for a diminishing percentage of their imports and exports, but Commonwealth countries began to make their own trading arrangements with the EEC.[19] Thus, the economic obstacles to Common Market membership posed by the Commonwealth became fewer in number.

TABLE I

UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

(Percentages)

	EXPORTS			*IMPORTS*		
	1961	*1965*	*1966*	*1961*	*1965*	*1966*
Commonwealth	35.5	28.4	25.9	35.5	29.8	27.6
EEC	16.7	19.1	19.0	15.4	17.8	18.5
EFTA	11.7	14.1	14.6	10.4	13.6	14.1
Other Europe (OEEC)	6.0	3.5	4.0	5.5	2.1	2.1
Total Western Europe	34.4	36.7	37.6	31.3	33.5	34.7

Sources:

Great Britain, Central Statistical Office, *Annual Abstract of Statistics* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office). Figures compiled from editions for 1961 and 1965.

Monthly Digest of Statistics, May 1967.

At the time of the Brussels negotiations, Labour opposition was based to a considerable extent on dislike for the political implications of the European Community. Britain, it was feared, might join a European Community in which nonsocialist governments held power in most member states. Gaitskell thought that a "federal" Europe would jeopardize the future of the Commonwealth. After the breakdown of the negotiations, Labour opposition on these grounds declined. Between 1963 and 1967 the Six showed little political cohesiveness, and for the foreseeable future the prospects for the creation of a "federal" Europe appeared dim. In joining the Common Market, Britain would not become part of an integrative institution with clearly defined and generally accepted political objectives. Membership would not place severe limitations on her independence of action in foreign policy.

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[19] In May 1966, Nigeria concluded an agreement for association with the Common Market. In 1967, the Six were engaged in negotiations for association with Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. See *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* May 12, 1966; *New York Times,* November 13, 1966, p. 16.

Moreover, within the Labour Party the idea, especially popular among the Labour Left at the time of the Brussels negotiations, that the Common Market represented a "right-wing," "capitalist" conspiracy designed to deprive Britain of her welfare state or to perpetuate East-West tensions, lost ground. More systematic study, as well as greater contact with Continental socialists, led party members to the realization that the economic and social welfare programs of Continental countries were not inferior to those of Britain. The efforts of France and other EEC countries to develop new links with Eastern Europe lessened Labour fears that the EEC might serve to perpetuate East-West divisions. In the Labour Party and elsewhere in Britain, there was a growing interest in the development of what was called a "wider Europe."[20] After the return of their party to office, several Labour M.P.'s formed the Wider Europe Group, which included people of various political orientations—Right and Left. Their objective was to study the implications of the Common Market for British domestic and foreign policy, the Commonwealth, and East-West issues.[21] The conclusion that Common Market membership was not necessarily incompatible with the building of a "Wider Europe" contributed to the rise of support for EEC entry in the Parliamentary Labour Party.

IV

At the time of the first British EEC application, Conservative Party spokesmen had emphasized the potential economic gains, although some Conservatives, including Macmillan himself, had spoken of the benefits to be derived from British participation in European political integration. Subsequently, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, as Conservative Party Leader, had expressed support for Common Market entry because of potential political gains. In February 1965 Home had called upon Britain to join fully in the strengthening of European political, military and economic integration, "since the three must go together."[22] The selection of Edward Heath as Party Leader in July 1965 contributed to an increase in Conservative interest in Common Market membership and especially in European political integration. Heath's assumption of the party leadership, together with a widely-shared belief that few other options remained open, led the party once again to press for EEC entry. However, the Conservatives' statements no longer gave such great emphasis as those of the Macmillan Government had to the likely economic benefits. Instead, to a far greater degree than the Labour Party, Conservatives stressed the potential political, technological and military gains from British participation in a larger European unit.

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[20] See, for example, *One Europe, Is It Possible?* (London: BBC Publications, 1966).

[21] See Eric Heffner, "A Wider Europe," *Socialist Commentary,* February 1967, pp. IX-XI.

Especially the younger members of the party began to advocate an integrated Europe, which would include Britain as a member, with a "European" foreign policy and even a European nuclear force.[23] Only such a deterrent might enable Europe to regain control over its own defense and assure the future growth of its advanced technology. Britain's nuclear capability and technological achievements might provide powerful bargaining levers "to build for Europe a defense which will be viable whatever the future may bring." Heath himself spoke of the need for "defense arrangements on a European scale, including Germany, with an Anglo-French arrangement in the nuclear field."[24]

Especially among the younger members after 1964, the Conservative Party experienced a growth in "Gaullist" sentiment.[25] Whereas the older generation of Conservative leaders, including Churchill, Eden and even Macmillan, had given priority to Britain's "special relationship" with the United States and to the preservation of links with the Commonwealth, the new generation of Conservatives saw their country's future as lying primarily with Europe. Britain should be freed of excessive reliance upon the United States. Only membership in a politically integrated Western Europe would enable her to become less dependent on the United States militarily and politically, and in key sectors of advanced technology. An integrated Western Europe might join eventually with the United States in the formation of an Atlantic Partnership. But such a Europe, by virtue of political, military and economic integration, would possess greater strength, and hence bargaining power, and independence.

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[22] Conservative Research Department, *Conservative Election Manifesto and Statements by Leading Conservatives on the Common Market since January 1965* (London, 1965).

[23] See, for example, the publication of the Monday Club entitled *A Europe of Nations: A Practical Policy for Britain* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1965). According to this statement prepared by the Cambridge University branch of the Monday Club, an organization of Young Conservatives: "With the U.S. herself vulnerable to nuclear annihilation Europe could not be sure that America would risk national suicide for her sake. The feeling has begun to grow that only a deterrent controlled from this continent will provide the ultimate guarantee against attack or nuclear blackmail. Even in Germany the feelings have been voiced that an Anglo-French guarantee might be more credible than America's because France and England are inevitably territorially involved in any attack on Germany." See also *Britain, Europe and the World* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1967), pp. 4-5; *Britain and Europe: Notes on Current Politics* (London: Conservative Research Department, 1967), pp. 18-19.

[24] Edward Heath, "West European Integration and East-West Relations," in "Western Europe and Eastern Europe: The Changing Relationship," *Adelphi Papers* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1967), pp. 34-35. For a similar proposal, see Lord Gladwyn, *The European Idea* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 77-78, 103-107. At the time he wrote this book, Lord Gladwyn was Chairman of the "European" organization, Britain in Europe. Also see Edward Beddington-Behrens, *Is There Any Choice? Britain Must Join Europe* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 103-106. Beddington-Behrens was Chairman of the British Council of the European Movement (formerly The United Kingdom Council of the European Movement).

In some Conservative minds the question of Britain's technological future was closely related to British entry into the European Community.[26] Britain could contribute to the building of a European technological base in some respects similar to that of the United States or the Soviet Union. If advanced technologies could be developed on the U.S. scale, Europe might build a more credible military capability. But Britain, according to some Conservatives, should insist on Common Market membership before agreeing to collaboration between her technologically advanced industries and those of other West European countries. By collaborating technologically with other European countries without first achieving EEC entry, she would give away one of her greatest remaining bargaining advantages.[27]

At the time of the Brussels negotiations the Macmillan Government had committed Britain in principle to the EEC farm policy. However, Britain and the Six were unable to reach accord on the timetable for adoption of the EEC system, since Britain sought a longer transitional period than the Six were willing to grant. After the selection of Heath as Party Leader, the Conservatives committed themselves, if returned to office, to basic changes in Britain's system of agricultural subsidization and in social services in order to reduce differences between the British and Continental systems.[28] By taking such action Britain might reduce in advance the obstacles to Common Market membership, and provide evidence of her "European" orientation.

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[25] The term "Gaullist" is used here to mean sentiment favoring the development of a Europe less dependent militarily and technologically upon the United States than is presently the case. It connotes also a willingness to give greater emphasis to relationships with other West European peoples than to the United States as regards economic and military affairs and political integration.

[26] Regarding Conservative views of the relationship between European technology and integration see, for example, *Action, Not Words: The New Conservative Program* (London: Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1966); such statements as "Britain must be part of a wider grouping if she is to exert her full influence in the world. British industry must have far bigger markets if it is to develop on the scale required in so many cases by modern technology." (*A Europe of Nations: A Practical Policy for Britain, op. cit.*, p. 17; Ben Patterson, *Britain and Europe* (London Conservative Central Office, 1967), pp. 7, 13; *Britain's Place in Europe* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1967), pp. 6-7; Sir Anthony Meyer, *A European Technological Community* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1966).

[27] See, for example, the April 1965 speech by Duncan Sandys: "In the long run, it is not satisfactory for us to put the resources of our most technologically

In both political parties interest in the European Community rose as British interest in extra-European commitments, especially east of Suez, waned. In its Defense White Paper of 1966 the government announced that it would "not undertake major operations of war except in cooperation with allies."[29] Nor would Britain "accept an obligation to provide another country with military assistance unless it is prepared to provide [Britain] with the facilities needed [by British forces] to make such assistance effective in time." She would make no effort to maintain defense facilities in an independent country "against its wishes." Although not without opposition, the Wilson Cabinet cut back drastically on the construction of naval craft which would have been needed to retain an independent British role east of Suez.[30] Instead, it decided to purchase F-111 aircraft from the United States in order to lengthen the life of the British nuclear force.[31] Britain's over-

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advanced industries into the European pool without having any say in the shaping of Europe's overall economic policies. We do not want to be investors with non-voting shares." *The Observer* (London), April 11, 1965, p. 3. See also Conservative Research Department, *Six Point Policy for Europe,* Summary of speech by Mr. Duncan Sandys, Church House, Westminster, April 28, 1965.

[28] See National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, *83rd Annual Conference,* Brighton, October 13 to 16, 1965, p. 26. See also *Putting Britain Right Ahead: A Statement of Conservative Aims* (London: Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1965) and *Action, Not Words: The New Conservative Program, op. cit.* In the latter statement, the Conservatives indicated that, in addition to making changes in social and agricultural policy, they would prepare for EEC entry "by relating the development of our new policies to those of the Common Market, wherever appropriate." (p. 10.)

[29] *Defense Review,* Statement on Defense issued in London, February 22, 1966. Official text released by British Information Services, New York.

[30] This decision led Christopher Mayhew, Minister for the Navy, to resign in protest from the Wilson Government. He declared that the Royal Navy must be provided with an aircraft carrier if Britain intended to retain a military presence east of Suez.

[31] In sweeping defense reductions in January 1968, Wilson announced that the British order for the F-111 would be canceled.

extension in aspiring to a major role outside Europe had been challenged by members of both major parties, as well as the Liberal Party.[32] In the press, it was suggested that successive British governments had striven to maintain expensive commitments especially in Asia; now in reduced circumstances, Britain should no longer act as though she were the leading "policeman of the world." Withdrawal from commitments east of Suez would make it possible to conserve scarce foreign exchange, release resources needed for the modernization of the economy, and enable Britain to assume a position of leadership in an integrated Europe.[33]

This reassessment of Britain's international political position was accompanied by a reconsideration of economic commitments and, in particular, the future of sterling as a reserve currency. Although the Wilson Government still strove to preserve sterling as one of the world's two major reserve currencies, there was discussion about the extent to which such a role for sterling imposed an unacceptable economic burden on Britain. None of the EEC countries bore such a burden, even though they had gold and dollar reserves far in excess of those available to Britain. Unless she strengthened her economic position Britain would be compelled to abandon her role as banker for the sterling area. It was suggested, however, that Common Market membership might enable her to obtain backing for sterling from the Six with their very considerable gold and dollar reserves.[34]

V

The first Common Market application had been preceded by the rise of support among elite groups in Britain—especially in the press, industry and the political parties. Just after the breakdown of negotiations, interest in the Common Market declined, although those opinion-influencing elites that had favored EEC entry retained a pro-European bias. Among proponents of European integration in the civil service, as well as in British industry, the press, and "European" groups, the view held sway that Britain was barred only temporarily, and should await another opportunity for joining the EEC.[35]

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[32] For a Liberal statement, see Stephen Holt, *New Steps to Europe* (London: Liberal Publications Department for the New Orbits Group, 1967), pp. 11-12.

[33] See, for example, *The Observer* (London), August 1, 1965; *The Economist*, February 27, 1965, pp. 862-863.

[34] See, for example, Holt, *op. cit.*, p. 10: "We can no longer afford to act as banker to the sterling area; some solution will have to be found, sooner or later, and the possibility of joining with our European partners in creating a new European reserve currency offers an excellent alternative." See also *Britain, Europe and the World, op. cit.*, p. 10.

With the end of the Brussels negotiations, "European" groups in Britain curtailed their activities. Organizations such as the Labour Committee for Europe, formed from the Labour Common Market Committee, and the group called Britain in Europe, which Federal Union had spawned, undertook educational programs designed to increase public awareness of the European Community rather than devoting themselves, as they had during the negotiations, to the dissemination of propaganda on behalf of EEC entry. By the end of 1965, however, the leaders of "European" organizations had decided to shift back to a more activist role. As interest in Common Market entry revived, the major "European" organizations undertook to build support for another British EEC bid, especially among Members of Parliament and within the constituency political parties and the trade union movement.

For the most part, the activists in these organizations, as had been the case several years earlier, were people under the age of forty with university educations. In educational background they did not differ, by and large, from M.P.'s elected to Parliament in 1964 and 1966, especially in the Labour Party. In fact, many of those active in "European" organizations were either Members of Parliament or holders of nonelective positions in Britain's political parties. They held varying conceptions of the kind of political integration Europe should achieve. However, there was among them a general consensus that, over the long run, Western Europe would evolve a form of political integration especially suited to its needs, i.e., differing profoundly from that of the United States or other extant political systems. Indicative of the growth of British interest in European political integration was the formation of a new "European" organization, the Campaign for European Political Unity, founded in June 1966, in support of which 150 Members of Parliament from all parties signed a declaration for European political unity.[36] This organization represented the first effort to form an interest group whose primary objective avowedly was the building of support for British membership in a politically integrated Europe.

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[35] Prime Minister Macmillan's assessment was characteristic of this view: "While it would be absurd not to recognize with our heads that Britain's entry is not capable of early realization, we should strive to keep the vision in our hearts." Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 671, February 11, 1963, Col. 961.

[36] The Declaration contained the following statement: "It should indeed be made clear that the Community which Britain would wish to join is one in which

Even before the Macmillan Government's announcement of the decision to apply for Common Market membership, substantial support had existed within British industry for such a step, and industrialists did not lose interest in the expansion of trade with Western Europe when negotiations failed. Instead, they made plans to establish subsidiaries on the Continent in order to avoid tariff discrimination against imports from outside the European Community. The continued growth of British exports to the Six after the breakdown of the negotiations confirmed those in technologically advanced industries, especially, in the belief that eventually Britain must join the Common Market. Although support for EEC entry was most pronounced among the larger and more competitive sectors of industry, it became fashionable among industrialists in general to favor Common Market membership. To oppose such a course of action was often tantamount to an admission of industrial inefficiency.

This rise of interest in EEC entry may be attributed at least in part to a growing concern about the eventual competitive position of British exports as the EEC progressed toward the completion of the customs union. In 1966, the Confederation of British Industry[37] embarked upon a major study of the implications of entry for various sectors of British industry, assessed as to costs, markets, competition, and the availability of labor and financial resources in Britain. The results of the study, published in December 1966 and January 1967, were not unexpected, given

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economic decisions in carefully defined areas are taken by a Council of Ministers by qualified majority voting on the proposals of an independent Commission, similar techniques being gradually adopted in the political sphere as well. Britain's long and unbroken parliamentary and legal tradition would also contribute to the system of democratic control, supported by a strengthened European Parliament and upheld by the European Court. Finally, Britain should make it clear that each step towards the creation of an economic and political community must be guided by the paramount need to create a united Western Europe within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance."

[37] The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) is the product of a merger in 1965 of the British Employers' Confederation, the Federation of British Industries, and the National Association of British Manufacturers. Its membership includes about 13,000 companies and more than 200 trade associations and employers' federations. Like the Trades Union Congress and the National Farmers Union, the CBI enjoys the right to consultation on a regular and continuing basis with the British government on issues of vital interest to its members. At the time of the Brussels negotiations and since, CBI officials have met with Cabinet members and civil servants concerned with problems of European integration.

the mood of leading British industrialists. The report urged Britain's EEC entry "as soon as possible."[38]

VI

In the months before and after the election of 1966, the Wilson Government was engaged in a review of its policy toward EEC entry. Although the Common Market was not a major issue in the election campaign, it did spark a debate between Conservative and Labour leaders. Heath accused the Labour Government of being "unbelievably smug and complacent about the European situation" and maintained that the Labour Party was "divided down the middle" on the question of Common Market membership. Heath's statements produced several responses from Labour leaders indicative of party differences on this issue. James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, accused Heath of being prepared to join the Common Market without any safeguards "for the position of the British housewife, farmer, Commonwealth, and EFTA."[39] Several other Labour candidates, including Barbara Castle and Douglas Jay, both of whom were noted for their anti-Common Market views, suggested that British entry would undermine the balance of payments, lessen the prospects for strengthening the economy, and render the British government powerless to engage in national economic planning.[40] The Liberal position was critical of both major parties. The leader of the Liberal Party, Jo Grimond, described Wilson's attitude toward EEC membership as that of a "man of many faces in different places," while suggesting that in their Common Market policy the Conservatives were "once again 10 years too late."[41]

During the British election campaign, the Western European Union Council met in London, and on March 16, 1966 issued a vaguely worded statement urging Britain to join the Common Market. Both the French representative, M. de Broglie, and M.

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[38] According to the CBI study: "(1) there would be a clear and progressive balance of advantage to British industry from membership of an enlarged European Economic Community, (2) the Treaty of Rome and the Community's method of operation are acceptable given reasonable transitional arrangements, (3) entry should be negotiated as soon as possible." ***Britain and Europe: An Industrial Appraisal,*** Volume 1 (London: Confederation of British Industry, December 1966), p. 2. ***Britain and Europe: Supporting Papers,*** Volume 2, was published in January 1967. In the preface to the first volume, the CBI acknowledged the need for further study to assess the potential impact of Common Market entry on specific sectors of British industry.

[39] ***Financial Times*** (London), March 18, 1966.

[40] ***Ibid.,*** March 18, 21, 1966.

[41] ***Ibid.,*** March 18, 1966.

Jean Rey, the member of the EEC Commission in charge of external relations of the Community, suggested that the obstacles to British entry, although they still existed, had diminished in importance since the Brussels negotiations.[42] In particular, de Broglie declared, the problems set forth in 1962 in the Labour Party's five conditions for Common Market entry were no longer so formidable. He noted that Commonwealth trading problems were of less importance than in 1962 and that a solution for the special case of New Zealand could be found. The interests of other EFTA countries could be accommodated if Britain joined the Common Market. Moreover, Britain, like France, could continue as an EEC member to plan her economy and preserve an independent foreign policy.

Coming as it did in the midst of the election campaign, this statement helped to revive the Common Market issue in British domestic politics. In his campaign speech in Bristol, Wilson revealed that the statement had removed one of the major obstacles to another British application. He attributed the change in French attitude which he perceived to policies his government had followed, especially in technological collaboration such as the building of the Anglo-French supersonic airliner, the Concorde. Whereas the Conservatives had not been frank with the French at the time of the Nassau Agreement, Labour had striven to remove de Gaulle's suspicion of British motives.[43] Although the Wilson Government was "ready for contacts, for informal discussions through the proper channels, for any probings that might be necessary to assess the kind of terms on which Britain might join the Common Market," Labour, unlike the Conservatives, would not surrender unconditionally to the Six. Labour would insist on Britain's freedom "to go on buying food and raw materials as we have done for 100 years, in the cheaper markets, in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other Commonwealth countries and not have this trade wrecked by the levies the Tories are so keen to impose."[44] Wilson accused the Conservatives of "rushing fences" in responding to the apparent modification of French opposition to another British bid implied in de Broglie's WEU speech.[45]

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[42] *Ibid.*, March 17, 1966.

[43] *Ibid.*, March 19, 1966.

[44] He suggested: "In 1963, when the present Conservative leader was negotiating for entry, Britain suffered an intolerable humiliation by the curt French refusal to allow Britain to join, even on the unacceptable terms the Conservative government was ready, even willing, to have imposed upon it." According to Wilson, the French veto resulted from the unwillingness of the Conservatives to inform de Gaulle of their proposed defense policy. "They failed to tell him that following the breakdown of the disastrous Tory Skybolt policy, they were about to go to the U.S. for Polaris submarines. It was the Nassau Agreement that slammed the door of the Common Market in Britain's face." *Ibid.*

After the election, the granting of special responsibility to George Brown for the coordination of British economic policy toward EFTA and the Common Market and the designation of George Thomson as Minister at the Foreign Office responsible for Britain's political relations with Western Europe were indicative of Wilson's growing interest in the European Community. The subsequent appointment of Brown as Foreign Secretary in August 1966 strengthened the "European" forces in the Cabinet.[46] Meanwhile, the policy review continued, and on November 10, 1966 Wilson announced to the Commons that "in the light of this review the Government has decided that a new high-level approach must now be made to see whether the conditions exist—or do not exist—for fruitful negotiations, and the basis on which such negotiations should take place."[47]

In public statements at the end of 1966, Wilson adopted much of the substance as well as the terminology of the British "Europeans," and thus took from the Conservatives one of their major issues. On November 14, he called for the creation of a European technological community to pool scientific and technological capabilities in order to reduce dependence on outside powers. "I can think of nothing," he declared, "that would make a greater reality of the whole European concept. And in this field of technological cooperation no one has more to contribute than Britain." According to government spokesmen, European technological collaboration was closely related to the question of British entry into the Common Market.[48]

In somewhat Gaullist terms, Wilson spoke of the need to build

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[45] To the obvious delight of his listeners, he declared: "Now, one encouraging gesture from the French Government and the Conservative leader rolls on his back like a spaniel." *Ibid.*

[46] Shortly after his appointment as Foreign Secretary, Brown declared: "I have a tremendous sense of the importance of the Commonwealth and the importance of maintaining it. On the other hand, I am absolutely persuaded, *as the Government as a whole is,* that we can be of greater use to the world, and to the Commonwealth, if we are among the leaders of the European Community of which we are historically a member." *The Observer* (London), August 14, 1966, p. 3. (Emphasis added.)

[47] He declared that the government had held a "deep and searching review" of Britain's relations with the EEC. "Every aspect of the Rome Treaty itself, decisions taken subsequent to its signature, and all the implications and consequences which might be expected to flow from EEC entry, have been examined in depth." Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 735, November 10, 1966, Cols. 1539-1540.

[48] *British Record,* Supplement to No. 18, November 30, 1966.

Europe into a "pillar of equal strength" with the United States.[49] After his conversion to Common Market membership, the theme of U.S. hegemony had come to occupy a place of considerable prominence in his statements. He argued that unless Western Europe formed a unit which included Britain and the Common Market Six, Europeans would be hard-pressed to meet American technological competition. Only greater unity could prevent Western Europe from falling under the technological and economic hegemony of the United States. The effort to reconcile Britain's long-standing friendship with the United States with her new-found interest in European integration was apparent when he declared in his address to the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, on January 23, 1967:

> Let no one here doubt Britain's loyalty to NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. But I have always said that that loyalty must never mean subservience. Still less must it mean an industrial helotry under which we in Europe produce only the conventional apparatus of a modern economy, while becoming dependent on American business for the sophisticated apparatus which will call the industrial tune in the seventies and eighties.[50]

After this speech in Strasbourg, Wilson went to Paris, where he set forth British policy and sounded out the French on another EEC application. In contrast to the period preceding the first application, when British officials visited the capitals of Commonwealth countries, the chief emphasis this time was on the likely response of EEC countries to another British bid. During the early months of 1967, Wilson and Brown visited the capital of each EEC country for consultations. In four of the Common Market members, they found strong support. In Paris, perhaps because of the French parliamentary elections scheduled to be held in March, de Gaulle was not prepared to state categorically his opposition to another application. Nevertheless, the French expressed concern about British economic problems, and, in particular, the position of sterling as a reserve currency.[51] Apparently, the British attempted to convince the French that Britain's economy had been strengthened and that the Wilson Government would not resort to devaluation in order to preserve the British competitive position. Moreover, the British were intent on converting the French to the idea that sterling should retain a role as an international reserve currency.[52] Although the talks failed to produce agreement, Wilson expressed the view that the French had been "extremely friendly and cordial."[53]

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[49] *New York Times,* December 2, 1966. [50] *Ibid.,* January 24, 1967.
[51] See *Le Monde* (Paris), January 26, 27, 1967.
[52] See *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* January 26, 1967.

The German economic interest clearly lay in British Common Market membership. Yet Wilson found the Germans reluctant to press Britain's case at the risk of jeopardizing the "special relationship" with France which the Kiesinger Government had striven to restore.[54] The discussions in Bonn were marred by the German reaction to a British statement about Germany's eastern frontier.[55] For another reason, however, the Germans had reservations about British EEC entry. With her accession to the Rome Treaty, Britain might replace Germany as the principal French ally in Western Europe. Collaboration in the development of advanced technology, the possibility of creating an Anglo-French nuclear force, and the prospect of agreement on major political issues might lead to a new Franco-British entente, isolating Germany.

The visits to the Common Market capitals completed, Wilson and his Cabinet evaluated their findings. Despite the obstacles encountered in Bonn and Paris, the Common Market policy was pressed. After a series of meetings with Cabinet members during the last week of April 1967, Wilson announced in the Commons on May 2 that Britain had "decided to make an application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome for membership of the European Economic Community and parallel applications for membership of the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom."[56]

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[53] After returning to London, Wilson described his Paris talks: "No relevant question was overlooked or made light of. Our hosts were impressed by our depth of purpose in everything we said and our desire to join the EEC. We did not ask the French government to answer yes or no, or put any particular questions to it. This is one of six visits and it was always understood that when our talks were over, the six governments would wish to consult together before taking a final decision." *European Community* (London), February 1967, p. 15.

[54] See the *Times* (London), February 14, 1967. Reportedly, Chancellor Kiesinger received French agreement to support German policies for "developing new political and economic links with communist countries, in Eastern Europe, in return for Bonn's acquiescence in French policy on Britain's admission to the Common Market." *The Observer* (London), February 19, 26, 1967.

[55] In response to a question put to him just before leaving London for his visit to Bonn, as to whether British policy on German reunification had changed to include recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as the eastern frontier of a reunified Germany, Brown replied: "Yes, in a way." This incident, which received wide coverage in the German press, dampened the atmosphere in which the talks on British Common Market relations were held. See, for example, the *Washington Post*, February 15, 1967; the *Times* (London), February 16, 1967.

[56] According to Wilson, the British government chose this moment for the application because "our discussions in the capitals of the Six have confirmed the validity of this approach in terms of the practical working of the Community and its institutions." Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 746, May 2, 1967, Col 310. Undoubtedly, the successful completion of the Kennedy

VII

Government studies undertaken in the spring and summer of 1966 to determine the feasibility and ascertain the cost of Common Market membership, the appointment of Brown as Foreign Secretary, and Wilson's own statements all provide evidence of the gradual shift in his position from one of noncommitment and even skepticism to support for membership. Certainly by the end of 1966 he had become convinced that British entry into the Common Market would contribute to an expansion in both industrial production and investment and thus benefit the British economy. Although in his estimation it was impossible to express in quantifiable terms the impact of EEC entry on the British economy, he believed that the European Community would provide a stimulus to businessmen to expand production, sales and plant capacity. Common Market membership would make it possible for Britain to exploit whatever advantages she presently possessed in advanced technology. In the absence of a European Community which included Britain, there would be little prospect even of maintaining her existing technological position.

According to his own statements, the political arguments on behalf of membership, however important the economic rationale, were "decisive." Politically united, Europe could play a role in international affairs which was no longer open to the individual nation-states of Western Europe. The issue was "whether it is going to be possible to build up Europe, as I think most Europeans understand it, with as a major objective the breaking down of tension between East and West." As to the specific institutional form European unity might assume, Wilson saw little prospect for the creation, in the foreseeable future, of a federal Europe.[57] Thus, he was convinced that the development of political integration on the basis of the existing nation-states was in keeping with Europe's mood. To this extent, his conceptions resembled

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Round negotiations just a few days earlier influenced Wilson's timing of the announcement. He had not wanted to reopen the Common Market issue at a time when the EEC, Britain and the United States had reached a critical stage in the trade negotiations. See the *Times* (London), May 3, 1967.

[57] He declared: "I still believe that for the immediately foreseeable future this country would not—any more than would most of the Community countries—contemplate a rapid move to a federal Europe. But it is also right to say—as the Foreign Secretary and I have said in Europe—that in all these matters we are prepared to accept the same obligations as our prospective Common Market colleagues—no more, no less." Address by Prime Minister Wilson to Parliamentary Labour Party, House of Commons, April 27, 1967; reprinted in *European Community* (London), May 1967, p. 16.

de Gaulle's ideas about European political unification, as well as those of his Conservative predecessors.

The detailed studies undertaken within the British government had led him to the conclusion that the obstacles to Common Market membership were no longer so formidable as they had seemed in 1962. According to Wilson, the essential British interests included: (1) the operation of the EEC agricultural policy, including its potential effect on the cost of living, the structure of British agriculture, and the balance of payments; (2) Commonwealth trade, including the future of New Zealand's trade and that of the sugar-producing Commonwealth countries.

Much of British farming, it was acknowledged, was competitive with that of the Six. If Britain joined the Common Market some British farmers, especially producers of cereals, might even benefit because of their greater efficiency in comparison with Continental counterparts. However, certain producers of beef cattle and much of Britain's horticultural farming might face severe adjustments, since subsidies accorded under the British system would no longer be available in an enlarged European Community.

The agricultural problems Britain faced were related not so much to the future of British farming as to the potential implications for other sectors of the economy of the change from Britain's farming policy to that of the EEC. It was generally acknowledged that food prices, for dairy products for example, would rise. In the official British view, after joining the Common Market Britain might be compelled to pay about $600 million per year in foreign exchange for agricultural imports, while retail prices for food could increase between 10 and 14 per cent.[58] Such increases might be offset by reductions in the prices of certain other products, including imported consumer goods, and by lowering taxes after the existing system of subsidy payments to farmers had ended. If living costs and outlays of foreign exchange for agricultural imports rose, Britain might face a balance of payments crisis shortly after joining unless steps were taken in advance to avert such a contingency. Moreover, people with fixed incomes, such as old age pensioners—a group of sizeable proportions in Britain—might face some hardship, since food costs

[58] Great Britain, *The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community* (London: HMSO, May 1967, Cmnd. 3274), p. 19. See also *New York Times*, November 11, 1966, p. 1. For a similar estimate of the likely effect of EEC membership on British food prices, see Confederation of British Industry, *op. cit.*, I, 15.

would consume a larger proportion of their budget than previously. Because Britain would be expected to import more foodstuffs from the EEC and less from other Commonwealth countries, EEC entry might precipitate a further decline in Commonwealth trade. In turn, sterling area members might withdraw deposits of funds from London. As a result, the position of sterling as a reserve currency might be weakened, with important consequences for the international monetary system.

For Britain, the financing of the EEC agricultural policy remained a problem of considerable importance. It was feared that the payment of funds from levies on agricultural imports to the European Community would impose a major burden on her balance of payments, and might increase the annual payments deficit by as much as £250 million after she had joined the EEC.[59] Of course, this figure might be offset by increases in British exports. Yet it was not possible to gauge the immediate effect of EEC entry on earnings from exports.

Despite the agricultural problems, by 1966 the National Farmers Union (NFU) had modified the position it held during the Brussels negotiations. It was now prepared to accept the EEC system of agricultural subsidization so long as the interests of British farming were safeguarded to the same extent as those of the Common Market Six. The EEC levy system would not be especially objectionable to the NFU, provided Britain could obtain from the EEC an annual review for agriculture comparable to that which British agriculture enjoyed under Britain's farming legislation.[60]

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[59] According to the British White Paper: "The application of the EEC's agricultural arrangements and financial regulations as they stand would impose an additional charge on the United Kingdom's balance of payments. This would arise in two ways. First, we would be paying full Community prices for imports of food from other members of the Community. Secondly, on the basis of the financial arrangements agreed for the present Community for 1967-1969, we would be a very substantial net contributor to the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund." *The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community, op. cit.*, p. 20.

[60] Under the Agricultural Act of 1947, the NFU presents to the British government each year a detailed study of farming incomes, prices of commodities, and other relevant data on British agriculture. After detailed bargaining, the government and the NFU reach agreement on the level of subsidization to be given to British farmers. If Britain joined the Common Market, the NFU would favor an annual review to determine the level of levies and pricing of agricultural commodities in the European Community. In a speech on July 26, 1966, Asher Winegarten, Chief Economist of the NFU, declared: "Production patterns would, of course, be affected if the United Kingdom were to become a member of an enlarged European Community. Problems would arise from the fact that the present Common Market agricultural policy differs substantially, in some respects, from our own. These problems would need to be met and resolved before entry.

The major remaining Commonwealth trading problem was that of New Zealand, which, of the Commonwealth countries, was most heavily dependent for her national livelihood on trade with Britain. Hence the British government felt obliged to assure that New Zealand, and to a lesser extent Canada and Australia, gained access to alternative markets should they be deprived of existing outlets in Britain for their exports.

The Macmillan Cabinet's pledge that Britain would not enter the EEC until satisfactory arrangements could be made for other EFTA members was also less important after 1963. British officials no longer held that British entry into the Common Market was contingent upon the achievement of satisfactory arrangements for other EFTA members.[61] At their Ministerial Meeting in May 1966, EFTA members modified their commitment not to work out arrangements separately with the Common Market. Instead, they agreed simply to "keep each other fully informed of their individual efforts and [to] remain in close consultation at all stages."[62] It was acknowledged that even if Britain did not join, other EFTA countries would make their own arrangements with the Six. For example, in 1965 Austria began discussions for association with the EEC. Denmark expressed interest in association or membership.

We believe that there are certain features of our system, such as the Annual Review concept and firm price assurances which could well be embodied in an agricultural policy for an enlarged Community. Agriculture will prove a major obstacle to our becoming a member of the EEC only if the Six fail to recognize that we are entitled to seek to safeguard our basic interests as they were to protect their interests when negotiating the Rome Treaty and the subsequent agricultural regulations under the Treaty." Asher Winegarten, *British Agriculture: The Way Ahead,* mimeographed release (London: National Farmers' Union, 1966).

[61] In a speech to the WEU Assembly on June 13, 1966, George Thomson declared: "Since 1962 neither Britain nor the Community have stood still. Some of the conditions then formulated no longer appear in the same light as difficult problems for negotiation. For example, the position of the EFTA neutrals is a much less formidable problem now than it seemed in 1962. Again, the Commonwealth problem seems likely to present fewer difficulties, since it is clear that the Community is willing to discuss association arrangements for those Commonwealth countries in Africa that wish to have them. However, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—80 per cent of whose exports to the United Kingdom are foodstuffs—still present serious problems." Western European Assembly, *Twelfth Ordinary Session* (First Part) Official Report, June 13, 1966, Document A-WEU (12) GR1. According to Thomson, another British "approach" to the EEC "must be in consultation with our EFTA partners." Quoted in *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* April 28, 1966.

[62] Communiqué issued at the end of the EFTA Ministerial Meeting, Bergen, Norway, May 13, 1966, *EFTA Reporter,* May 23, 1966.

VIII

Although Wilson enjoyed greater support for his Common Market bid than had the Macmillan Government, he still faced the active opposition of a vociferous minority within the Parliamentary Labour Party as well as his own Cabinet. Opposition remained especially strong among the Labour Left in the Commons. Indicative of backbench-opposition were the motions anti-Common Market Labour M.P.'s signed in the early months of 1967. In February, an "anti" motion, worded to attract broad support, received the signatures of more than half the Parliamentary Labour Party outside the Wilson Government.[63] Moreover, just before Wilson's May 8, 1967 announcement of the second Common Market application, a group of thirty-seven M.P.'s of the Labour Left tabled an amendment to the government's motion approving a decision to seek membership in the European Community.[64] Finally, seventy-four Labour M.P.'s had signed an anti-Common Market manifesto published in the left-wing newspaper, *Tribune,* on May 4, 1967.

Membership in the Labour Committee for Europe provides one indication of ministerial opinion on Common Market membership. Of a total of fifty-four ministers, only nineteen held membership in this committee.[65] Two members of the Wilson

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[63] The motion read: "That this House takes note of the exploratory nature of the visits to West European capitals by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

"Regrets the activities of those who have seized this occasion to intensify their demand that Her Majesty's Government should apply unconditionally for entry into the EEC;

"Deplores, in particular, the speeches in which the leader of the opposition has invited Her Majesty's Government to break its pledge to the electorate and to other peoples of the Commonwealth;

"And declares that Britain, in consultation with her EFTA partners, should be ready to enter the EEC only if essential British and Commonwealth interests can be safeguarded."

The *Times* (London), February 23, 1967, p. 12.

[64] This faction has as its chief supporters Emmanuel Shinwell, Michael Foot and Ian Mikardo. Until the spring of 1967 Shinwell had been chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party. Mikardo was a member of the party's National Executive Committee. Their motion read as follows: "That this House refuses to give its approval to Command Paper No. 3269 [setting out the government's decision to apply for Common Market membership] because it fails to affirm in explicit terms Her Majesty's Government's adherence to the conditions laid down by the Labour Party and reaffirmed in Labour's election manifesto, on which the United Kingdom should decide whether to apply to enter the European Economic Community." *Ibid,* May 9, 1967.

[65] See *Labour Left,* January, February 1967. Ninety-six Labour MP's and Labour Peers were listed as members of the Labour Committee for Europe. The *Times* (London), January 24, February 23, 1967.

Cabinet in particular—Fred Peart, Minister of Agriculture, and Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade—remained opponents of EEC entry. In fact, on February 15, 1967, while Wilson and Brown were in Bonn for discussions on Common Market membership, Jay had addressed a group of Labour Party backbenchers. He maintained that Britain, if she signed the Rome Treaty as it stood, would face a series of economic crises. Acceptance of the EEC agricultural policy would place great strain on the balance of payments; the freeing of capital movement would result in a net loss for Britain; increases in the cost of living, particularly food prices, and higher wages would raise the cost of exports and make British goods less competitive.[66] Opposition within the Labour Party to Wilson's Common Market policy, his support for the United States in Viet Nam, the prices-incomes policy, and cuts in defense spending led the Prime Minister, in early 1967, to admonish his ministerial colleagues and to threaten punishment of recalcitrant backbenchers.[67]

Although by 1967 the Conservative Party was far more united than had been the case in 1961, there remained a small anti-Common Market faction still led by Sir Derek Walker-Smith and Robin Turton. Just before Wilson's announcement of May 8, a Conservative anti-Common Market amendment to the government's motion calling for another EEC application attracted the signatures of twenty-two dissident Tories.[68] The arguments of Walker-Smith and his followers had not changed greatly, but their base of support within the Parliamentary Party had dwindled from about eighty Conservative backbenchers at the time of the Brussels negotiations.

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[66] The *Times* (London), February 16, 1967.

[67] In response to Jay, Wilson repeated what he termed "two long-standing principles governing ministerial conduct. The first is that Ministers must so order their affairs that no conflict arises, or appears to rise, between their private interests and their public duties. The second is that Ministers speaking on public occasions on matters of political controversy expound the views of the Government as a whole. I do not think that any further instructions are needed." For dissident backbenchers he reportedly had a harsher message: "All I say is 'watch it.' Every dog is allowed one bite, but a different view is taken of a dog that goes on biting all the time. If there are doubts that the dog is biting not because of the dictates of conscience but because he is considered vicious, then things happen to that dog. He may not get his license renewed when it falls due." *Ibid.,* February 21, March 3, 1967.

[68] Their amendment read as follows: "This Government regrets that Her Majesty's Government, having failed to inform the country of the estimated results of Britain's entry into the EEC, have nevertheless declared their intention of applying for entry, leaving substantial matters to be negotiated thereafter, and thereby causing anxiety to our partners in the Commonwealth and EFTA and creating the probability of injurious repercussions on British sovereignty and the rule of law, on the price of food, on the balance of payments and on the role of sterling in the world." *Ibid.,* May 5, 1967.

The voting that followed the Commons debate of May 8-10 furnished further evidence of the broadened parliamentary consensus on Common Market membership. The Wilson Cabinet's decision received 426 votes, with 62 votes against entry and more than 60 abstentions. Of those voting against the government, 36 came from the Labour side, with 51 Labour M.P.'s abstaining. Among the Labour votes against entry were those of seven parliamentary private secretaries, whom Wilson ordered dismissed from their jobs.

Especially in the period between 1964 and 1967 public support for Common Market membership had increased. In the months after the Wilson Government embraced the European cause, however, opinion appeared to have become divided once again, as at the time of the Brussels negotiations.[69] According to opinion polls, the decline in support was sharpest among Conservative voters. Seizure of the Common Market issue by Labour may have alienated Conservative voters, even though the Parliamentary Conservative Party remained more solidly in support of Wilson's Common Market bid than did the Parliamentary Labour Party. In the polarization of opinion organizations in favor of entry increased their activities.[70] At the same time organizations opposed to the Common Market bid, such as the Anti-Common Market League and the Keep Britain Out Campaign, reconstituted themselves and began to disseminate propaganda in support of their cause. Conceivably, the activities of such organizations, together with a greater understanding of the potential cost of Common Market membership, including increased food prices, contributed to the growth of domestic opposition. As in 1961-1963, Englishmen, although often prepared in principle to join the European Community, had second thoughts when they faced the need to reconcile the cost of membership with other interests and commitments.

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[69] According to polls conducted by National Opinion Polls Ltd., there was a sharp decline in popular support for Common Market membership between July 1966 and May 1967. In 1966, when asked "Do you think Britain should now try to enter the Common Market or not?," 62 per cent of the electorate favored such an attempt, 18 per cent were opposed, and 20 per cent registered "don't know." By April 1967, however, public support for the British government's Common Market policy had declined dramatically. In response to the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the Government's decision to try and join the Common Market?," 37 per cent expressed approval, 41 per cent were opposed, and 22 per cent responded "don't know." This compares with surveys conducted by the same organization in October 1961 and September 1962, when respectively 45.9 and 40.8 favored Common Market membership. National Opinion Polls, *Political Bulletin*, November 1961, October 1962, July 1966, November 1966, January 1967, May 1967.

[70] See, for example, the *Times* (London), February 23, 1967.

The case against membership contained essentially the same points put forward in the 1961-1963 period: that British sovereignty would be impaired; that Commonwealth and EFTA trade would suffer; that food prices to the British consumer would increase; that rapprochement between communist and noncommunist states would be rendered more difficult. But greater stress was now placed on the adverse impact of entry on the British balance of payments. It was recognized that both France and Germany had begun to establish new relationships, or to re-establish old ones, with East European countries; whereas in 1961-1963 the "rigid" foreign policies of France and the Federal Republic, for example on the Berlin issue, were deemed antithetical, especially by the Labour Left, to closer ties with East European countries, by 1967 the EEC itself came to be viewed as a barrier. By the end of the third stage of its transitional period, the European Community would have a common commercial policy and external tariff which would not be any more conducive to trade agreements with East European countries than with Commonwealth countries. According to Professor William Pickles of the London School of Economics and Political Science, who remained one of the most articulate opponents of Common Market membership, de Gaulle's alleged dislike for the Common Market was "not based solely on his contempt for supra-national institutions —which is unbounded—nor only on his hostility to the pro-Americanism of his EEC allies. It is due in part to his mistrust of the EEC as an obstacle to a possible East-West detente."[71]

IX

As at the time of the first British application, de Gaulle's critique of Britain's qualifications resembled to a considerable extent the misgivings about EEC entry voiced by Englishmen themselves. Although French officials insisted that there had not been, nor would there be, a political veto of the British application, [72] the primary concern was that before joining the Common Market Britain must solve her major economic problems, including domestic inflation and chronic balance of payments deficits, and must remove restrictions on the international flow of capital. The position of sterling as a reserve currency posed problems. According to de Gaulle, British entry into the Common Market was not compatible "with the state of the pound sterling as it has once again been brought to light by the devaluation [of November 1967]."[73] By placing immediate economic strains on Britain, Common Market membership might jeopardize the position of sterling as a reserve currency. Although the Six had the resources to underwrite the reserve position of sterling, the French opposed the assumption of such a burden either by France or the European Community.[74]

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[71] William Pickles, *Britain and Europe: How Much Has Changed?* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), p. 91. Restating the position he held in 1961-1963, Pickles wrote: "The important thing, surely, is that Britain should not at this stage of history be committed to a structure like the Treaty of Rome, still stiff with rigidities in spite of changes; still having as its only certainty for us the enormous political and economic price we should have to pay to get in; still (quoting Nora Beloff of *The Observer*) 'always on the brink of rupture . . . a strange coupling of commercial horse trading with ideological self-righteousness,' still run by and for peoples brought up in the tradition of written constitutions and multi-party systems, with all the consequences those things have on modes of thought and behavior and still, therefore—again in Miss Beloff's words—'so difficult for the British onlooker to grasp'." *Ibid.,* p. 118.

Aside from the future of sterling as a reserve currency, the French economic objections to British membership remained essentially unchanged. In his press conferences of May 16 and November 27, 1967, de Gaulle based his case on arguments similar to those contained in his press conference of January 14, 1963, except that he gave greater emphasis to Britain's economic problems. He was not yet convinced that Britain could accept the EEC agricultural policy without "exceptional and prolonged delays" and "upsetting the equilibrium" of the Common Market.

[72] See, for example, de Gaulle's press conference on May 16, 1967, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, *Speeches and Press Conferences,* May 16, 1967, p. 8.

[73] *Ibid.,* November 27, 1967. De Gaulle added: "In fact, parity and monetary solidarity are essential rules, essential conditions of the Common Market. They cannot be extended to our neighbors across the Channel unless some day the pound sterling appears in a completely new position so that its future value appears assured, it is freed from its character as a reserve currency, and the mortgage of Britain's sterling balance within the sterling area disappears."

[74] According to Article 108 of the Rome Treaty, any member of the EEC can call upon other signatories of the treaty for cooperative action in case of currency problems. France and other EEC members have expressed concern that they might be asked to provide major assistance to Britain because of the weakness of pound sterling. During his visit to Luxembourg on March 8, Wilson announced that Britain, as a member of the Common Market, would not request aid from other EEC countries in the event she faced a new sterling crisis arising from some "external" problem. (*New York Times,* March 10, 1967.) In the House of Commons on March 9, 1967, Wilson declared: "Our understanding was to the effect that we would not propose to invoke that part of the Article which talked about the type of currency involved, to deal with a situation where sterling might be in difficulties even though the balance of payments was all right, through actions in sterling balances or the wider aspects of sterling. We thought it right to give this undertaking." Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 742, March 9, 1967, Cols. 1754-1761.

Even if she were to "submit to the rules of the Six, then her balance of payments will be crushed by 'levies' and, on the other hand, she would be forced to raise the price of her food to the price level adopted by the continental countries, consequently to increase the wages of her workers, and thereby, to sell her goods all the more at a higher price and with more difficulty." For British officials this was a problem to which Britain and the Six must find a solution. To de Gaulle, the burden was upon Britain to solve this and other major economic problems before joining the Common Market, even though France had taken major steps toward economic reform after—not before—joining the European Community.

In addition to economic changes, Gaullist criteria for British membership included the development of a "European" outlook on issues of major international importance. According to de Gaulle: "The idea, the hope which, from the beginning, led the Six continental countries to unite tended without any doubt toward the formation of a unit which would be European in all respects, and, because of this would become capable not only of carrying its own weight in production and trade but also of acting one day politically by itself and for itself toward anyone." In his estimation, Britain did not yet place primary emphasis on "European" interests,[75] since the British retained a "special relationship" with the United States, as well as a "special commitment" in various parts of the world, which "distinguishes them from the continentals."

Undoubtedly, British opposition to the EEC policy at the time of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations in Geneva, the continued British presence "East of Suez," London's support for U.S. policy in Viet Nam, the eagerness of the British government for a nonproliferation treaty, and the similarity between British and U.S. policies, in contrast to French policy, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, did not enhance Britain's prospects for fulfilling Gaullist "European" criteria. In the case of the nonproliferation treaty, Britain faced once again a choice between "Europe" and her other interests, including the "special relationship" with the United States. By signing the treaty, she would reduce drastically her ability to collaborate with other European powers in the development of advanced weapons systems, and thus would forfeit one of her few bargaining advantages. Moreover, in adopting a policy similar to the United States, and at odds with French policy as well as sentiment in the German Federal Republic, Britain would stiffen opposition to her Common Market candidacy.

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[75] In his press conference of October 28, 1966, de Gaulle again alluded to the question of Britain as a "European" power. He declared: "Thus, in 1963, we were led to put an end to the negotiations that Britain opened in Brussels with a view to entering the organization; not, to be sure, that we despaired of ever seeing that great island people truly wed its destiny to that of the continent, but the fact is that it was not then in a position to apply the common rules and that it had just, in Nassau, sworn an allegiance outside of a Europe that would be a real Europe. But, by continuing fruitlessly, these negotiations were actually preventing the Six from building their Community." Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, *Speeches and Press Conferences,* October 28, 1966, p. 4.

Since 1963 Britain had not sufficiently transformed herself as to make possible Common Market membership without profoundly altering the European Community. British participation would have a major effect on the institutions of the Community.[76] Another Gaullist argument was that British Common Market membership would so strengthen the West European bloc as to force the East European communist states to revert to closer ties with the Soviet Union. This, in turn, would dampen the prospects for the attainment of the Gaullist objective of a European association of states embracing Eastern and Western Europe. Whatever the likely impact of British EEC entry on the cohesion of communist states, this contention was not fully consistent with the French argument that British admission would transform the European Community to an association with little cohesiveness.

If Britain was not yet sufficiently "European" to enter the Common Market without the "building of an entirely new edifice scrapping nearly all of that which has just been built," she had essentially two alternatives. As he had in January 1963, de Gaulle offered Britain a form of associate membership. The other alternative was for Britain to "wait until a certain internal and external evolution, of which Britain seems already to be showing signs, is eventually completed."[77]

X

Since the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations, Britain had undergone important internal and external change. Many of the problems then of importance no longer occupied either the framers of British Common Market policy or the staffs of the EEC Council and Commission in Brussels—yet a series of new problems had arisen. In 1963 little thought was given to the implications of Common Market membership for the British economy, the balance of payments, and the position of sterling as a reserve currency. Moreover, except in the field of defense, the question of a "European" outlook on issues of major international importance played a less prominent part in the French critique of Britain's qualifications for membership. Presumably, Britain's commitments "East of Suez," her support for U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, British policy on the nonproliferation treaty, and disagreement between Britain and the EEC during the Kennedy Round trade negotiations, were indicative of the inability of the British to adopt a "European" outlook.

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[76] According to de Gaulle, Britain's delegates would "represent the very substantial and very special mass of interests and of economic and political authorities of their own country," and "would be joined there immediately by the delegates of several of the states which now constitute with them the Free Trade Area (EFTA); it is obvious that the inspirations, dimensions and decisions of what is today the organization of the Six would give way to an inspiration, dimensions, and decisions that would be entirely different." *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[77] *Ibid.*

Yet in accepting a "European" position on such issues, Britain would have altered her policies to an extent not even demanded of the existing members of the European Community. In foreign policy and strategic doctrine, the "European" position of which de Gaulle spoke was essentially the French position, for by 1967 the Six had not evolved a consensus on these issues. Only in sectors falling within the purview of the EEC had the Six developed a common policy. The fact that in tariff negotiations with Britain and the United States they spoke with one voice was attributable to the existence of the European Community, within which they had developed a consensus on major commercial issues, as well as an interest in the preservation of the Community itself. As a member of the Common Market, Britain would participate in the so-called Community method of evolving a European position on economic issues. Although with her admission the development of a common European policy might be more difficult and cumbersome because of the need to reconcile additional interests, the obstacles would not be insurmountable. Implicit in the Gaullist argument was the assumption that once Britain had joined the Common Market, she would discontinue her effort to transform herself from a power with global interests, perspectives and commitments to a Europe-oriented nation. (Even the French President had acknowledged that, since the free trade proposal of 1957, Britain had begun to make this effort.) It may be argued that membership in the European Community would actually hasten the "Europeanization" of Britain.[78]

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[78] For a similar argument against British Common Market membership because of its potentially adverse effect on Anglo-American relations, see Lionel Gelber, *The Alliance of Necessity: Britain's Crisis, the New Europe, and American Interests* (New York: Stein and Day, 1966).

In response to French policy, the strategy of the Wilson Government was to present Common Market membership as inevitable, to suggest that although Britain's entry could be delayed, the British could not be permanently excluded.[79] Britain would attempt to meet French objections and, in doing so, strengthen support for British membership among France's EEC partners and thereby isolate the French. The British were determined to make a success of negotiations and, according to Wilson, to "carry them forward as quickly as lies within our power."

In its second bid for EEC membership, the British government enjoyed greater flexibility, politically and psychologically, if not economically, in meeting French objections to its candidacy, than at the time of the first application. By 1967 Common Market membership had widespread support within both major parties, as well as among other important British elites. Large numbers of Englishmen concluded that EEC entry offered the major remaining option if Britain was to modernize her economic system, develop new markets, assure for herself a position of importance in the discovery and development of advanced technologies, and find a new role in world politics. The challenge facing Britain was to convince the Six, and France in particular, that British Common Market membership was as much to their interest as the British government thought it was to Britain's interest.

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[79] See Wilson's speech in the Commons on May 8, 1967. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 746, May 8, 1967, Cols. 1061-1097.

THE STAKES IN VIET NAM

by Franz Michael

ONE of the most common and fallacious assumptions about the war in Viet Nam is that neither side can win it. From this assumption the conclusion is drawn that the only possible way to end the war is a compromise which can be obtained solely by negotiating with our opponent, who is believed to share this assumption. Negotiations to end the fighting may succeed; they are obviously a better way of concluding the war than a fight to the bitter end. But, with or without such negotiations, there are only two possible outcomes to the war. One is that the communist attempt to take over South Viet Nam is defeated; the other, that it eventually will succeed. One is our victory—whether gained in battle or by negotiations; the other is theirs—obtained by our military defeat or our political surrender. No negotiations, no talk about honorable peace, can affect these alternatives.

The reason why this basic issue is so little understood is the confusion about two fundamental concepts relating to the war in Viet Nam. We have been confused regarding the concept of "victory" in this kind of modern war, and we have little understanding of the strategy of so-called wars of national liberation with which we are confronted in Viet Nam and which affects the world balance between communism and the Free World. The two misconceptions are interrelated.

I

As to "victory," let us remember Korea. There the communists attempted to invade and conquer the South and were repulsed. This was our "victory," a victory not only of South Korea and the United Nations, but of all Free World nations.

The issue in Korea became confused because, at one time, we went beyond our original purpose by moving on to the Yalu River in an attempt to unify Korea under a noncommunist government. We were defeated in the sense that we finally abandoned the idea of unification and limited our aim to the original goal of defending the South. This goal we achieved. Communist propaganda claiming that Korea was a communist triumph has never been adequately countered, even in our own thinking. Whether the larger prize of Korean reunification could have been won is another question. As it was, the defeat of the communist attack against South Korea was a clear victory for the Free World.

Today, the communist goal in Viet Nam is the same as it was in Korea: to conquer the South. The defeat of the communist purpose will be our victory; their success will be our defeat, whatever formula is found to resolve the issue or save someone's face. There is no middle ground between communist takeover and communist defeat, *since communism, by creed, will not share power except as a temporary device for subversion and conquest.* It is for this reason that no true negotiations for a lasting compromise are feasible. We should know by now that "coalition" government is impossible with a dishonest partner.

The Western concept of coalition government assumes that the parties brought together have accepted the system and the rules of democratic procedure and compromise. From all of our practical experience and knowledge of communism, we must know that this is not the communist purpose. Past experiences with communism in Eastern Europe and elsewhere should have taught us that lesson. The failure of a "coalition" government in China after World War II should not be forgotten. For communists, a coalition government is but a means to move into the decisive positions of power which shortly enable them to take over. If it is necessary to demonstrate the application of this communist tactic in Viet Nam, one need only examine those communist documents and directives that have fallen into Allied hands. From a captured notebook taken from a member of a Viet Cong unit we learn: "What is important is that we must have tight control over the government, the workers and the peasants . . . to all appearances it will be a coalition government, but the real power will be in our hands and we will follow the Front's political program, the revolutionary line." To impose such a system on South Viet Nam would mark the end of the U.S. effort to build a viable noncommunist national state there.

This is clearly understood by our South Vietnamese allies. If we attempt to force them to accept a solution imposed by us and the communists, we will destroy the very structure we have helped to establish, even before the coalition is created. We can perhaps maintain a facade of compromise, but we will bring disaster to a large majority of the population which has resisted communism for more than two decades. As a people who have not lived under totalitarian rule, Americans find it difficult to grasp the full impact of terror which is a major weapon of communist "wars of national liberation." At a rate which proportionately in the United States would amount to 70,000 people killed yearly by *assassination,* the toll of local leadership, teachers, village elders, magistrates, monks and other social leaders has been shocking—yet it goes virtually unnoticed in the Free World, including the United States. The miracle is that there have been no important defections of units or leaders to the communist side and no breakdown of government despite years of terror and the latest onslaughts, the TET offensive and the indiscriminate rocket attacks on Saigon. The very fact that they continue to fight speaks for the Vietnamese determination to resist communist control. The suggestion by some American politicians and scholars that, to ease our consciences, we should help selected South Vietnamese leaders to escape in the event of a communist takeover demonstrates a failure to understand the attitude of most of the population and the size of the catastrophe that awaits the Vietnamese if the communists come to power. The very discussion by U.S. political leaders about a coalition with the Viet Cong is bound to undermine South Vietnamese morale and weaken our position. Any proposal for coalition government is at best a face-saving formula under which we deliver our allies to the enemy.

If we surrender South Viet Nam, we must also have no illusions about the effect of our weakness on the whole of Asia and eventually the rest of the world. A communist victory in this decisive test will not remove the communist danger; it will greatly increase it. It will be a communist victory—a victory for the strategy of wars of national liberation—and the impact will reach far beyond Viet Nam. We have to understand this strategy and find a way to combat it.

II

The strategy of national liberation movements is not new. Its architects were Lenin and Stalin. Its doctrinal basis was Lenin's theory of imperialism according to which the fight against the "imperialist powers" in the colonial and quasi-colonial agrarian countries was an attack against that "monopoly capitalism" which the "proletarian" revolutionaries fought from within. The twin strategies of "proletarian revolutions" and "wars of national liberation" had, then, the same target, monopoly capitalism, and the same goal, communist world revolution.

It was after World War I and the failure of the "proletarian revolution" to materialize in Central Europe that Lenin, and later Stalin, turned East to promote and organize in China and the Asian world this second communist strategy of "wars of national liberation." The phrase "the way to Paris leads via Peking," which has been ascribed to Lenin, popularized this shift to a strategy under which the conquest of the Afro-Asian agrarian countries would undermine the industrial countries of the West. The strategy of "wars of national liberation" has ever since formed the second half of the overall communist campaign for world revolution. Its primary role has only recently been reasserted by such communist leaders as the late Aidit of Indonesia and Lin Piao of China. It is this strategy that we face in Viet Nam.

To apply this strategy, Lenin and Stalin and their Soviet and Asian successors sought to exploit two revolutionary elements in the countries concerned. Since there was no proletariat to speak of, the communists pressed into the service of the world revolution the forces of peasant discontent and nationalism, doctrinally described as "anti-feudal" and "anti-imperialist" movements.

To the West, the nonproletarian aspects of the communist strategy have been confusing. It took time to recognize that Mao Tse-tung was not a "peasant leader." Even today, it is not always understood that the agrarian strategy in China came from Stalin and was not Mao's invention. For many who are unfamiliar with communist history and the recent planning and actions of Moscow, it is still harder to realize that Ho Chi-minh, one of the oldest Bolsheviks, a past Comintern figure and coworker with Borodin, is no more a nationalist than Mao was an agrarian reformer. This misjudgment of the war in Viet Nam by well-meaning Western writers today is as serious as was the misjudgment of communism in China after World War II.

One widespread myth holds that "wars of national liberation" are Peking's *specialité de la maison*. Their Soviet origin is no longer remembered; nor is the importance attached by Moscow today to this part of communist strategy fully understood. Yet it is for good reason that the main support of the war in Viet Nam comes from Moscow, not from Peking. As Lenin once turned East when the revolution in Germany did not come off, so today the activation of "wars of national liberation" (in the East) is a logical counterpart to the shift of communist strategy toward "peaceful coexistence" in the area of "proletarian revolution" (i.e., the West).

"Peaceful coexistence" as a communist strategy has, of course, been employed before. When Stalin was threatened by Nazi Germany and the German-Japanese-Italian pact, the world of the "imperialist powers" abruptly became the world of the "Western democracies": Stalin's "peaceful coexistence" and united front policy of the 1930's created hope in many Western minds that communism was disappearing from the Soviet Union. Hope that communism has changed drastically and no longer menaces the West has been engendered in the 1960's by a similar Soviet "peaceful coexistence" strategy.

Today's "peaceful coexistence" has a broader scope than it had in the 1930's. The advent of nuclear weapons forced the communists to abandon their concept of the "fatalistic inevitability" of world wars if they hoped to retain any doctrinal appeal. This in turn has enabled the communists to pose as the "camp of peace." Not only have they abjured the dictum of Marx and Lenin that wars in the capitalistic world were inevitable and advantageous to communism, but they have now also usurped the role of guardian of world peace against the imperialist "warmongers" of the industrial West. In assuming this new role, the communists have not abandoned the goal of world revolution or the use of violence in reaching it. Peaceful coexistence is strictly reserved to the problem of nuclear war—but it does not mean "peace," as we understand the term. Not only does political and ideological warfare continue, but war, except at the nuclear level, is not banned as a means of communist strategy. Revolutionary wars—that is, civil wars and, most of all, "wars of national liberation"—remain a legitimate instrument of communist strategy. They are, in the words of Khrushchev and his successors, "just wars," wars that deserve all possible support. On this there is no argument between Moscow and Peking; both have given full backing to Hanoi.

III

It is often contended today that since communism is no longer monolithic it is no longer a real threat. This is a non sequitur. A complex and multifaceted movement can be much more dangerous than a simple "monolithic" one, since the basic system, the main tenets of the doctrine, the final goals and the strategies remain the same.

This is not to say that there is no ferment within the communist world: the Hungarian rebellion, current restlessness in

Eastern Europe, and the crisis in China, are signs of the communist dilemma that may yet break the doctrine and its system. But the decentralization of strategy has eased the strain. Perhaps communism was never as monolithic as we often assumed. Even in Stalin's time the degree of centralization depended on the twists and turns of strategy. Unified direction was, of course, assured by the fact that there was only one "fatherland" of communism and that the security of the home base was a major communist objective. When the growing alignment between Nazi Germany and Japan threatened that base, the policy of united fronts and "peaceful coexistence" with the West required a lessening of emphasis on the Comintern and a greater autonomy for what were claimed to be national communist parties. In 1943 the Comintern was rather unceremoniously dissolved. In 1947, with the emergence of eleven fatherlands of communism and the Cold War, a new centralized communist organization, The Comintern, was created—albeit in a different form. This, in turn, was dissolved when in 1956 Khrushchev inaugurated a new "peaceful coexistence" policy.

The Soviet leadership has insisted that there is no longer a need for a center of the movement, that all communist parties are equal and independent, and that "proletarian internationalism" will be accomplished through a sort of osmosis—assisted where necessary by a little Soviet pressure. The Chinese communists, who are seeking to discredit Moscow's alleged revisionism and are stressing revolutionary violence, have claimed that Mao Tse-tung is the leader of the world communist movement.

If the conflict between Moscow and Peking has affected communist policy, the central issue has been the interrelationship of the two strategies. The Maoist group in China fully supports "national wars of liberation" and has denounced the strategy of peaceful coexistence as applied to the area of "proletarian revolution." In the words of Lin Piao, Mao's closest comrade-in-arms and heir apparent: "Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European countries, while the peoples' revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously." All support must be given to a relentless pursuit of "national liberation wars" that alone can bring down the capitalist world.

The Soviets have not been so provincial in outlook as the

Maoists, who ignore the grand strategy of Lenin and the present Soviet leaders, in which "wars of national liberation" remain related to an overall plan. For Moscow, the pressure exerted against the United States to abandon resistance to communist aggression in Viet Nam for the sake of promoting "peaceful coexistence" and détente has been designed to undermine our will to counter strategy number two. The tie-in between the military-political warfare of national liberation, as in Viet Nam, and the peaceful coexistence strategy of breaking down our will to resist has not been fully appreciated by the United States and its Western allies. Indeed, Viet Nam threatens rapidly to become the classic example of successful communist psychological warfare—not within that country but throughout the rest of the world.

If Western public opinion and many Western intellectual leaders, uneducated in the ways of communism, have not grasped this relationship, neither has the Maoist wing of the Chinese Communist Party. It has proved to be impatient and possibly unwilling or unable to understand the Soviet design. It has been contemptuous of the strategy of "peaceful coexistence," has ridiculed the Soviet assertion of support for Viet Nam, and has accused the Soviets of cooperation with imperialist America in selling out national liberation movements and world revolution in favor of accepting merely a share in world power.

Not all Chinese communist leaders have seen it this way. In 1965, when last-minute U.S. military intervention in South Viet Nam prevented a communist victory, the Soviets found it necessary to appeal for communist unity to revive the communist chance in Viet Nam. This appeal was not entirely ignored in communist China. Some of the Chinese party leaders, now purged or in disgrace, inclined toward reconciliation with Moscow. Sympathy for cooperation with Moscow also reappeared in the Chinese Army. The second in command, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of Staff and head of the Chinese communist secret police, echoed the Soviet call for unity on several occasions. He seemed to have a broader understanding of the interrelationship of the strategies of Moscow and Peking and of "peaceful coexistence" and "wars of national liberation" than had been demonstrated by the Maoist group. For Lo, the Sino-Soviet conflict—which he called a "debate" —had served its purpose in confusing the West and advancing the communist cause on the broadest front. In Lo's words:

> One aspect of the historic significance of the *debate* of the last few years between the two lines in the international Communist movement is that

> it has enabled Marxism-Leninism *to spread on an unprecedented scale* and has promoted the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the peoples' revolution *in every country.* (Emphasis added.)

No other communist has so clearly pointed to the overall advantage of directing two different but mutually helpful communist strategies from two different headquarters. Mao, of course, could not yield to the Soviet strategic outlook without relinquishing his claim to be the only true leader on the road to the communist future, a road which he asserted the Soviets had abandoned in their revisionist return to capitalism. Lo became a political zero after his flirtation with Moscow. Sometime in November 1965, two months after he made this last public statement, he disappeared and was not heard of again until he was publicly attacked and humiliated by Mao's Red Guards.

Even though the official Sino-Soviet exchange of accusations continued, a partial understanding must have been reached between Moscow and Peking around March 1966. Soviet arms to Viet Nam were again permitted to roll on the trains through China; the Soviet tanks that overran the outpost near Khesanh in February 1968 had been observed in transit through China.

IV

The United States faces in Viet Nam not just a local fight in another Southeast Asian country, but a confrontation with a world communist strategy in the larger battle between communist revolution and our concept of a free world. Every communist statement, whether it emanates from Moscow, Peking or Budapest, is directed against "imperialist" America as the main target. In communist strategic thinking, the war in Viet Nam is an integral part of the war against the industrial world of capitalism of which America is, in communist eyes, the leader. At stake, ultimately, is our national security and the freedom of the noncommunist world.

The fact of U.S. resistance in Viet Nam has hampered communist strategy and in many ways strengthened the Free World. The defeat of the communist putsch in Indonesia; the collapse of Sukarno's campaign against Malaysia; the strengthening of a free Asian community of countries through cooperation in the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and other recent intercountry agreements; the firm Indian stand vis-à-vis China and the outcome of recent major battles at the Tibetan border; Burma's willingness to stand up against Communist China; the continuing Laotian resistance; Prince Sihanouk's defiance of Peking; and even the recent defeats of communist efforts in Africa and South America—none of these developments can be fully understood in isolation from the U.S. stand in Viet Nam.

It has been said that U.S. forces are over-extended, but it should be clear from the map that a communist breakthrough in Viet Nam would greatly extend the frontier of defense for the Free World. Should the Vietnamese dike give way, the flood will threaten neighboring countries where the communists are already preparing the ground, as in Thailand, Cambodia, Malaya, or for that matter, in the Philippines, for more "wars of national liberation." The communists would be emboldened to step up operations in the whole Afro-Asian world. Most of all, the Indians, who by now realize how much Viet Nam has been their line of defense, will be threatened by a communist breakthrough in Southeast Asia that could easily be correlated with the communist advance in the Islamic world.

The 18th parallel is still the most narrow frontier that we can hope to defend unless we want to withdraw to fortress America, or, as Walter Lippmann suggests, draw the line at the white man's world of Australia and New Zealand—a peculiarly antiquated attitude in today's world.

Our opponents have a larger design into which the Viet Nam conflict fits. It can scarcely be accidental that the areas of Soviet-supported communist advance form two large pincer movements, each with its own central objective. One objective is India and the Middle East; the other, mainland China. The threat to India is similar to the one posed by the Axis powers in World War II, when Hitler's thrust toward the Suez and the Japanese campaign through Southeast Asia seemed to presage a linkup of the Axis powers in India. The threats to Burma and the tribal frontier area of India and the attack at the Himalayan frontier are, in actuality if not in design, a counterpoint to the new Soviet presence in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Of more immediate concern is the connection between recent communist aggressiveness in Korea and the war in Viet Nam. There has been extensive speculation as to the timing and meaning of the new attacks against South Korea, e.g., (the Pueblo crisis, the assassination attempt against President Park, infiltration of terrorists) and their relationship to the intensified efforts of the Vietnamese communists. At the very least, the new North Korean aggressiveness is designed to aggravate the U.S. dilemma of having to spread its military strength to cover widely separated fronts in Asia.

But one can also relate this move in Korea to the crucial developments in Communist China itself. The crisis in China today, provoked by Mao's attempt to reassert his leadership in China as well as in the communist world, has been directly affected by the successes and failures of communist strategy abroad. The U.S. stand in Viet Nam and the setbacks administered to communist revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa have exacerbated Mao's difficulties at home. The military takeover in China has swept that crisis to its moment of truth. Whether Maoism and its Hitlerian *Führerkult* will prevail or whether Mao will fail in his attempt to rebuild the communist structure in his image will be decided in the near future. The real issue, however, seems not to be that of a Maoist survival, which in the long run is highly doubtful, but the course to be taken by whatever military-political leadership eventually takes over. A communist victory in Viet Nam, backed by the Soviet Union, will leave little leeway for China's future leaders to assert their independence doctrinally or institutionally from the Moscow club. The recent North Korean actions have compounded the problem for the Chinese military, and their response has been surprisingly unenthusiastic. Looking at the two fronts in the Asian war in purely geographical terms, one can see the two arms of the second Kremlin pincer movement, directed not only against the U.S. position in East Asia from north to south, but also encircling with a bear hug the group of Chinese communist brothers quarreling among themselves. If the communists win in Viet Nam, those men who come out on top in China will have no place to go except back to the fold.

V

The outcome of the war in Viet Nam will thus have a decisive impact not only on the balance of power in Asia but on the course of our confrontation with the communist world. It will affect the issues of unity or division within communist ranks, the future role of "national liberation wars," and the credibility of longstanding U.S. pledges to help defend free peoples. It could lead to greater regional cooperation and strength in East Asia or to disarray and a feeling of hopelessness.

It is unfortunate that the emotional climate in the United States almost precludes a rational discussion of the stakes of the war. The label of "immoral war" has been used assertively by political leaders, columnists, newspaper editors and civic and social leaders without serious challenge and with no attempt even to analyze the moral issues involved—as if war itself, with its inevitable killing of the innocent, could ever be moral. And yet the central issue, properly understood, is the same as that of the fight for civil rights in this country. Anyone acquainted with totalitarianism should know that freedom remains indivisible. It is impossible to withdraw from world responsibility into neo-isolationism and hope to maintain at home the principles for which we are fighting both here and abroad.

FOREIGN POLICY AND RATIONALITY

by Stefan T. Possony

IN this sad period of protracted conflict, comic relief is a welcome distraction. My personal sense of humor is stimulated whenever I read that some of my political scientist colleagues are advocating "rational solutions" to international problems. Of course, I favor rational solutions and would like to see the scope of rationality in politics grow. I am even optimistic enough to believe that there has been some progress in this direction and that additional progress may be attainable.

Yet the primary task of rationality in politics is to understand and handle irrationality. This presupposes the basic insight that existential irrationality can only in small measure be influenced by rationality. Moreover, conflict situations usually are derived from irrational attitudes and virtually always from meta-rational objectives. We cannot in every case design a rational solution, even on paper, but if there were such a solution to a given problem or conflict, the rationality may apply only to a few of the life spheres—for example, to economics but not to power. In social reality the best rational solutions may not be practical because it takes too long before their meaning is understood by the relevant groups; and by this time the problem probably has changed. Those solutions which appear instantly plausible to the elite cannot always be implemented because of various time-lags and resource deficiencies. Finally, policies must be made in the absence of full information and often must be promulgated with great speed and without adequate time for research and reflection.

These technical limitations on political rationality must be clearly understood. Gaming techniques may help to understand a problem, but the reality is far too complex and uncertain to be "simulable" by a "model." By the time such a mental experiment has been completed and evaluated—it may take months or years—the premises and rules by which the game was played have long been overtaken by events. Since fast games must be very simple, they cannot yield much information. Although the two types of rationality overlap, practical political rationality must be qualitatively different from academic or scientific rationality.

CASE STUDIES

The Germans in World War I

In 1917 the Germans, fighting a losing war on several fronts, promoted a revolution in Russia. Without German help, Lenin probably would not have come to power, certainly not at the time or under the circumstances which attended the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. The Germans had long tried to achieve a separate peace but had run into opposition from the Tsar. By March 1917 the Tsar was gone. The democratic successor regime tried to continue the war, but by July it became apparent that Russia no longer could fight effectively. The Germans, clearly overrating the extent of Russia's residual strength, had deployed large forces on the Russian front. Whether in due time they might have been able to achieve a de facto armistice or a temporary peace in the absence of Lenin's coup is debatable, but it is fairly obvious that they did not need the Bolshevik Revolution to reduce their military commitment in the East.

After Lenin came to power, virtually all remaining first-line divisions were shipped from the East to the West. But the Germans no longer could win the war, let alone attain the war aims they had set for themselves after some earlier victories. The increasingly desperate situation called for a reformulation of German war aims, for a defensive strategy to husband military strength, and for a policy aiming at a compromise peace. Nothing of the sort was done.

It should have been evident that were Germany to foment a social revolution under the eyes of her own exhausted soldiers, such a revolution could engulf Germany herself. Yet the German government never gave much thought to what seemed to it a rather trivial proposition, namely, if the monarchies of Russia and Austria-Hungary fell, monarchy could not long survive in Germany. It was even more evident that the nationalist revolutions which the Germans were also promoting against Russia could destroy Austria-Hungary, Germany's strongest ally. The twin danger was recognized by mid-1917 in Vienna but was ridiculed at Berlin.

The German government, naive enough to believe that chaos could be quarantined, thought it would reap the advantage if for five to ten years chaos reigned in Russia. Moreover, it never laid plans for exploiting Russian anarchy. The relevant facts and probabilities were well understood by several astute observers, but rational decision-making in Germany was rendered impossible by the fear that moderation with respect to war aims would lead to demoralization of the armed forces and the population. In the end self-deception, despair and panic destroyed the rationality that remained among the decision-makers of the imperial regime.

After World War I, the victorious Western allies treated the new German government as though it had caused the war and looked upon German democracy as potentially hostile, similar to the regime it had superseded. Thus, their policy was to weaken rather than strengthen German democracy, which actually aspired to friendship with the West. This policy spawned Hitler. There was enough time and information to act in a rational manner, but the Western frame of mind could not produce rational policy. After World War II this mistake was not repeated, and for nearly twenty years German democracy was given a large measure of support. Still, the lesson has not been fully learned; there remains a grave danger that current American and West European policies will again set in motion catastrophic developments in Germany.

The Near Eastern War of 1967

The Near Eastern war of 1967 may be considered a paradigmatic lesson of irrationality. Its remote causes are found in European and Russian anti-semitism and the conviction of many Jews that they would not be safe until they possessed their own country. This conviction was, at least to some extent, grounded on dismal experiences but it also derived from potent irrational emotions such as religion, ethnocentricity, nationalism, and the territorial urge. Granting the pertinence of the desire for a homeland, the fact remains that the choice of location was based on irrational historical arguments and also on the belief that a Jewish homeland outside the Holy Land would not attract many settlers —even though most modern Jews are only nominally religious. In any event, the land chosen was inadequate in size and resources, and was claimed by other religious and ethnic groups which had acquired substantial and inalienable rights. Thus, while the purpose of the operation had been to avoid further strife, the founding of the Jewish state resulted in strong imperialist motivations both among the Jews and the Arabs.

This development could have been steered onto a more promising avenue. But it was aggravated by demagogic British promises, the imposition of an unworkable mandate status on Palestine, the weakness of the League of Nations, and unimaginative British policies, including the fact that the mandatory was administering far too many lands for the resources it possessed. There were ceaseless small conflicts, and when the British packed up and left after World War II, the Jews conquered the territory with military force. Thereupon the United Nations imposed an unworkable partition of Palestine. The small war increased in intensity.

No one, including the main powers and the United Nations, took adequate measures to solve the many vexatious and provocative problems, for example, the Arab refugees. The unsettled situation had a major impact on relations between the United States and Britain and the Arab countries, and between Israel and the USSR, resulting in war during 1956. Since that time, hostilities have continued, additional ones have emerged, and none has been liquidated. The Arabs boycotted Israel economically: Israeli ships could not enter Arab ports and the Suez Canal was closed to them. Many holy places, especially in Jerusalem, were inaccessible, and Egypt declared openly that it was in a state of war with Israel. All this involved flagrant violations of the UN Charter, but no alleviation or compromise proved possible: the UN was impotent, the British were disinterested, the United States had only a declaratory policy, and the USSR aim was to stir up trouble.

To illustrate American irrationality, one simple example will suffice. In the wake of the Lebanese crisis of 1958, President Eisenhower suggested to the United Nations that consideration be given to a regional water plan. The idea was to create resources to irrigate large tracts of arid land and to improve conditions of overcrowding and famine which are prevalent in the urban and agricultural areas of most Arab states. For all practical purposes this plan was torpedoed by the State Department, and no one has been able to cite any rational reason for this action. After the war in 1967, Lewis L. Strauss again submitted a technologically advanced regional water plan which was endorsed by General Eisenhower and many members of Congress. Yet the Johnson Administration showed no interest, and the bureaucracy remains opposed without ever having suggested even a minor constructive alternative.

The 1967 conflict resulted from a series of deliberate Soviet provocations, including the supplying of large quantities of weapons to Egypt and Syria. We need not conjecture what the real Soviet intent was—perhaps to foment a conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean to ease U.S. pressure in Viet Nam. The fact is that this crisis was developing for several months, and it was clear for several weeks that it would ultimately erupt in hostilities. Yet the United States took virtually no measures to prevent such a calamity, nor did any of our European allies. In the end, the Israelis struck preventively and thus avoided a protracted war and huge casualties. But the crisis opened the door to Soviet penetration into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and probably will prove to have been the prelude to a conflict about the oil deposits in the Persian Gulf area.

As a by-product, the closing of the Suez Canal turned out to be the last straw which broke the back of the British pound. For generations the United States has championed the cause of open international waterways, in particular, the Suez Canal. We supported Egypt when it nationalized the canal, but never insisted on a proper statute for this waterway. We did not ensure use of the canal by the Israelis. In 1967 we did nothing to ensure that the canal would be re-opened promptly, despite the fact that the U.S. and European economies require the use of the canal.

Whether we were preoccupied with other problems, whether we wanted to avoid an assertive policy and shunned a show of strength, or whether we simply did not understand the effects of the closure of the canal, need not concern us. The fact is that this policy was irrational and in contradiction to our rational and perennial policy on international waterways. Nor can it be said that the policy of selective arms deliveries to Israel, which we adopted after the war of 1967, was rational or even logical. In any event, the problem of Near Eastern security remains unsolved, and no one doubts that additional military confrontations will occur in the future.

In this connection, it should be pointed out that the insistence on solving problems of this sort through the United Nations is quite irrational, not because UN settlement would be necessarily undesirable, but because such settlements will not occur. The same observation about UN ineffectiveness applies to the other partitioned lands and divided nations, especially in view of the fact that the partitioning of Germany, by means of the Polish corridor and the "independence" of Danzig, was one of the root causes of World War II, and that most major crises since 1945 (Berlin, Korea, the Chinese offshore islands, two wars in Viet Nam, and two wars in Palestine) occurred in divided nations and states. The lesson is probably plain enough, but few people think anything can be done about such problems. Yet, the tested techniques and procedures through which such problems could be solved effectively and equitably are known in every chancery. But such knowledge does not result in rational decisions, partly because problems are "bundled" and there is no single rational solution to a set of disparate problems.

Charles de Gaulle

This case of "irrationality" is rather interesting because, despite what the American press says about him, de Gaulle has been one of the most rational statesmen of modern times. He proved this with his early evaluation of Nazi Germany, his proposals of 1936 for the modernization of the French army, his joining with Britain in 1940, and his reform of the French political system and, to a lesser extent, of the French economic structure. His insistence that France needs modern, i.e., nuclear weapons, is on a far higher level of rationality than the American predilection for nonproliferation. There is, of course, nothing wrong with the idea that one should take every precaution to keep nuclear weapons under control. But it is irrational to push a solution which, at best, may be applicable to a world where there is a minimum of crisis, and which, in the midst of an acute world conflict, fails to disarm the potential aggressor but weakens numerous defenders. Nor is agreed-upon nonproliferation a suitable technique for liquidating the current severe conflict. Moreover, under a regime of nonproliferation as presently envisaged, the world would be divided into two large empires, except perhaps for the toleration of two or three sub-empires. Power duopolies are most unstable and therefore incompatible with the notion which prompted the nonproliferation agreement in the first place.

But the crucial point is this: Suppose, within the Free World, no state other than the United States possesses modern arms. If then a nuclear attack or a relatively large number of simultaneous nonnuclear attacks were launched, the United States would have to assume the defense of all its allies and friends. Thus, it would dangerously overcommit itself and also carry the main burdens and risks of war. Accordingly, the United States has not offered any guarantees to those Free World countries with which it does not have alliance treaties, and it has been allowing the existing alliances to fall into decay. Yet, rather than pressing for the nonproliferation treaty, the United States should be looking for more practical security arrangements which, while erecting safeguards against the willful use of nuclear weapons, would associate the large resources of Europe and Japan for the defense of all. De Gaulle understands all this and will not sign the nonproliferation treaty. But he is not rational enough to present feasible alternatives; and he is so suspicious of the United States that almost on principle, he opposes *any* American policy.

It is irrational for the United States to denigrate nationalism in Europe while practicing it at home with respect to modern weaponry—which is the single most important element of sovereignty. Any rational strategy must start from the realization that nations which have accomplished their own statehood, and for centuries have been preserving their national independence, will continue to cherish independence. The West European nation-states and nations elsewhere on the globe will outlast present defense arrangements and political constellations. Any strategy will be irrational if it is predicated on the notion that the fully established nations, although they may enter into common markets and confederations, will abandon their sovereignty (i.e., allow foreigners to make life-or-death decisions for them), or on the notion that these nations will always retain their present alignments. Therefore, de Gaulle's interrelated premises, namely, that he must preserve French sovereignty, that there will be no United States of Europe but *une Europe des patries,* that France needs nuclear weapons, and that European possession of such weapons would strengthen the security of the United States, are entirely rational.

The conclusions he sometimes draws from these premises are a different matter. Thus, his *Europe des patries* includes *la Russie* and stretches to the Urals, the geographic frontier of Europe, according to the old textbooks. But "Russia" does not presently exist, the settlement areas of the Great Russians extend to Vladivostok, and the General appears to think that Byelo-Russians, Ukrainians, and even Georgians are "Russians." All this make-believe is compounded by de Gaulle's lofty decision to ignore ideology: he pretends that communism does not exist and implies that ideologies are mere words, while nations and national interests constitute the main reality. Perhaps this apparent "ignorance" may conceal a deliberate policy. Indeed, why should a towering figure like de Gaulle not try to persuade the Kremlin that there is no substance to communism and that Soviet leaders should instead worry about Russian national interests? In any event, who could teach the General?[1]

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[1] In May-June 1968, President de Gaulle rediscovered the threat of "totalitarian communism."

There is a Gaullist assumption which is even more perplexing, namely, that the Cold War is over and that the United States has won it. One of his advisers told me that World War III against the USSR was won by the United States and that World War IV against Communist China was beginning, in the course of which Europe and North America would become allies of "Russia." This premise contains several kernels of truth, but since these have been inflated beyond all reasonable proportions, the premise is wildly irrational. It amounts to basing policy addressed to the realities of the 1960's on an image of what the world might be in the 1980's. Exactly the same irrationality has affected policymakers in London and Washington where, for a time, it was believed the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was the watershed in the Cold War.

De Gaulle's conclusion that, because the United States already has won, U.S. power and influence must be weakened, and that the freedom of the European nations depends on a balance of power between the United States and the USSR is based on a misreading of Soviet and American policies and practices, respectively. De Gaulle's policies have weakened the security of all NATO members, including France, restimulated European disunity and paralysis, and slowed down economic integration. They may have prolonged the conflicts in Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean. These policies appear irrational if one assumes that the communist threat is continuing and growing, and that war must be deterred by building, without delay, a firmly knit and permanent alliance system. They are far less irrational if one assumes that, regardless of the communist threat, no such alliance system can be built; that the alliance as presently constituted is in part harmful to European security interests; and that the whole concept of NATO is born of uncertain "long-range" thinking, whereas successful practical politics must be carried out within a short time-frame allowing comprehension by *coup d'oeil*. It is obvious that before de Gaulle's various policies can be discussed intelligently, a meta-rational decision must be made about the time parameters that are to be considered.

De Gaulle has been critcized for his alleged commitment to French *grandeur* and for his self-adulation, both of which are irrational—except that his trouble-making did recreate French self-confidence and that French power and prestige have been growing. This growth may have been slowed or halted by the rebellion of May 1968, but this rebellion appears to have strengthened the regime. De Gaulle *did* command the allegiance of a vast majority. In any event, most other European nations still are looking for an "integrating tool" as effective as the de Gaulle charisma. Is it rational politics to use techniques of irrationality? There is no effective politics without such techniques —but how then can one expect rational results?

Gold

For centuries, statesmen, theoreticians, economic practitioners and authors have wasted millions of words to show that mankind's predilection for gold is irrational and that gold is not wealth. Gold is meant to be a yardstick and a safe title. The fact is that no one has yet come up with a better solution to protect mankind against manipulations of monetary value and against crooked practices by governments. "Rationally" speaking, it is possible to design a stable monetary system based exclusively on contract, i.e., paper. But it is equally rational to heed the historical experience that governments do not usually redeem their promises and that they can easily set aside the most carefully worded laws. There are, in fact, economic emergencies which are inevitably destabilizing, and there are dishonest governments which think nothing of debauching currencies for short-range political advantages.

Gold, in any event, has proved to be the only reasonably dependable form of money. Whether gold is a "fetish" or not, people insist on payment in gold, especially when they think that values are being manipulated. If the value of money declines, gold is hoarded. Now as before, gold is regarded as the only solid international currency and governments rapidly switch back to gold as soon as they fear their assets may be threatened. Whenever gold payments are curtailed or suspended, trade decreases, regardless of all anti-gold theories.

It is entirely rational to argue that because of changes, such as the widespread use of "check money" and the expansion of the economy, gold no longer can be used as coin money in domestic trade, and that international trade cannot be handled through direct gold payments on a transaction-for-transaction basis. There simply is not enough gold to handle the exchanges in a world economy with a global GNP of about two trillion dollars. (The world's gold treasure is about 60 billion dollars and the annual increment less than two billion dollars.) Therefore, the combination of gold with so-called world currencies, such as the dollar and the pound sterling, was rational. It was equally rational to establish a firm exchange rate between gold and these currencies and to effect international settlements through the central banking system. Yet it was irrational to embark upon economic policies which involve the gradual devaluation of the world currencies and to create a situation in which gold turns out to be the single cheapest commodity in the world, with the result that the production of gold is being priced out of business. Yet as prices rise—the inflation phenomenon is due to an irrational but apparently immutable economic urge—and as the volume of world trade grows, the shortage of gold is becoming increasingly acute.

Moreover, the United States has adopted a strategy of worldwide responsibilities which entails a steady loss of gold and therefore presupposes something like an inexhaustible gold treasure. Since, naturally, its gold assets are limited, the United States is confronted by the necessity of changing its strategy and already has begun to reduce its commitments at the Iron Curtain border in Central Europe, which remains potentially the most explosive area in the world. The U.S. gold shortage is, furthermore, aggravated by the war in Viet Nam and by the possibility that there will be additional limited wars.

This economic constraint has induced great reluctance to take measures necessary to protect the Persian Gulf area. Yet if the Arab states' oil deposits were to fall into Moscow's hands, the USSR would have a stranglehold over Europe and it might end up possessing a substantial portion of the world's gold.

The gold shortage, and additional economic difficulties that did not arise from an overdose of rationality, are forcing the British to evacuate their positions east of Suez without reaching an arrangement for replacement by the United States, similar to that of 1947 when Britain transferred her responsibility for Greece. In addition, the British have cancelled their orders for the FB-111 bomber, thus abandoning airpower and abetting the Soviet threat against Europe. They will pay a cancellation penalty of about 15 per cent. A few weeks earlier they had turned down requests by Spain, Portugal and South Africa for the purchase of military equipment, which in terms of gold would have financed at least one-half of the cancelled FB-111 order. This was done for purely ideological reasons, some of which were based on demonstrably wrong interpretations of the policies of those states. This British policy accorded the black African states high priority over British relations with South Africa and Western Europe, and even with the United States, for which there is no justification in terms of national and economic security. The British may be honest in their attitudes on so-called racialist policies, but in February 1968 they speedily adopted a racialist—and quite illegal—policy to stop the sudden influx of British subjects of Indian and Negro origin.

Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom plans to enter into a purchase or credit arrangement with South Africa for the purpose of acquiring an amount of gold substantial enough to avoid a protracted balance of payments crisis. This crisis has been predicted for years, even though in 1960 a conclave of America's foremost economists concluded that the danger was partly imaginary and could be handled easily. In any event, no effective measures were taken to prevent this crisis. The most obvious and easiest measure, which would have been an arrangement with South Africa, was ideologically "unacceptable." An equally obvious measure to improve gold mining technology and cut production costs was discounted, partly because of emotional opposition to mining with nuclear ("plowshare") techniques. There is at least $10 billion worth of gold available in the United States alone that could be mined at a cost well below $35.00 an ounce. The nuclear technique could cut production costs everywhere and could procure as much gold as we need. But before the United States will bestir itself, the chances are that the USSR will have used the plowshare technique to mine gold and enlarge its imports.

If production costs cannot be lowered, it would seem self-evident that the price of gold must be raised or else gold production must be subventioned. Suppose it becomes necessary to raise the price of gold. Such a step, unless one is willing to accept temporary economic chaos, presupposes close collaboration between the United States and the main gold-holding states, most of which are in Western Europe and are allied with the United States. International cooperation would be severely tested as soon as the various friendly states have to agree on whether they want to preserve monetary stability by retaining the pre-existing exchange rates or whether they are willing to upset stability in order to gain individual advantages. It must be remembered that many Europeans believe the dollar is overvalued and exchange rates must be altered. Even assuming that all gold-holding states aim to act rationally, the difficulty still remains that each government will keep its intentions a very dark secret and will be afraid to discuss the matter, for fear a leak about an intent to devaluate would initiate free-for-all speculation, liquidation and capital flight. The various governments, notably the finance ministers and central bank presidents, would risk their political life if they did not maneuver to avoid national loss and to achieve gain. There is no reliable method to assure beforehand that all will act in concert and that no one will betray the secret. On the contrary, the odds are high that several states will go their own way.

This risk requires that all states act independently; it means the problem probably cannot be solved rationally. There is hope that most states will be anxious to preserve stability. But there does not exist—even within a closely knit political alliance based on recognition of mutual interest—a procedure to *ensure* that monetary decisions of real gravity can be negotiated effectively. There simply is not enough mutual trust. Moreover, although there is a large area of common interest between Western allies and friends, there remain mutually exclusive interests, and each government, especially in monetary matters (and in questions of war-or-peace), tends to act in furtherance of its own interests rather than of the interests of the community as a whole. Whether this is adjudged to be rational depends on the weight that is attached to the single and to the joint interest, and to the domestic and the external risks. But there obviously are "competing rationalities" even in a problem that is, essentially, quantitative in nature.

The Necessities of Irrationality

General Reasons for Irrationality

Irrationality in politics has many different roots in addition to "false thinking," for example, lack of factual knowledge. Ignorance springs from many sources and cannot necessarily be cured by calling in the professors. It is not advisable for practical statesmen to rely too heavily on intellectuals because they lack three ingredients of political success: firmness of conviction (they change their ideas too often and too capriciously), sense of practicality, and personal loyalty to the man or the group for whom they are working.

There may be lack of data, or the data may not yet have been analyzed, or evaluations may be wrong. We may not know the demographic statistics of an area; we may misinterpret the fragmentary data we have; and the extrapolations may be unavoidably erroneous. There may be lack of research on topics which should be studied very thoroughly. For example, the intentions of the Nazi government were not properly researched, and between 1933 and 1939 decisions were based on a misreading of those intentions derived from superficial analysis.

After World War II much research was done on communist intentions, but much of that work was based on faulty methodology as well as on inadequate information. Specialists working on topics such as communism often get emotionally involved and frequently tailor findings to justify a given policy. Available data are used "selectively" because, for reasons that are rarely explicit, some are believed and others disbelieved. It also happens that the subject matter is overloaded with extraneous materials and that vital portions of the evidence, or entire sets of sources, are disregarded. The game of asserting that evidence is not adequate or that something has been proved beyond doubt can be played endlessly; e.g., "there is *really* no evidence the communists are pursuing their stated objectives"; or "it is *quite* clear now the Soviets have written off any resort to major war." In brief, political *parti-pris* regulates "research," and conclusions may be shaped by the pre-research prejudgments.

Even assuming that proper conclusions are properly arrived at, the findings are not always believed by the decision-makers, or they are inadvertently misinterpreted, or they are deliberately disregarded (a "calculated risk") because they cannot be reconciled with the policy that is being pursued.

It should be remembered that the information flow is blocked in conflict and war situations. The normal "fog of war" behind which the enemy is concealed is made denser by deception and double-deception. To see through such screens requires not only methodical thinking but also empathy. "Thinking with the enemy's mind," and correct intuitive deductions à la Sherlock Holmes are the true prerequisites of success in this business. But how can intuitions be validated?

Forecasting

Much of the relevant research leads to conclusions by analogy from the past to the future or to extrapolations to determine the probability of various future events. The future, of course, does not yet exist and, therefore, cannot be dealt with scientifically and rationally. Every single method of prediction is and necessarily remains unscientific (except in some natural sciences) and is at best an informed or probabilistic guess.

The scientific method helps to eliminate improbable events but the assignment of probability values reflects the researcher's thinking—this probability is subjective, not objective. Certain classes of events are predictable—people die and future aircraft will fly faster—but *when* will Mr. X leave this world, and precisely *when* will a *particular* speed be attained? Individual events, such as the life expectancy of a given politician or the trend of a particular technology, can be predicted in a probabilistic fashion, which means the prediction may prove to be wrong.[2] But the prediction of complex events is impossible. To illustrate: When does a poll predict who the next President will be? Certainly not before the candidates have been nominated. The predictions become firmer as the election approaches, *provided* there is a differential of several percentage points between the ratings of the candidates. But how does one predict today what the policy of the USSR will be in ten or twenty years? One cannot even know whether the USSR will still be in existence—or the American Republic, for that matter. Hence, to use predictions of this type is irrational and playful, not rational.

There is, however, a border line area of "warning" against unfolding events which may be compared with an early diagnosis of a typical disease, the development of which follows a repetitive course. But this is not "prediction": it is rather an interpretation of, and straightforward extrapolation from, "indicators" which are observable events. Or it may be the observation of a typical process in its initial phases.

It is often argued that policy must be based on, and be responsive to, long-range estimates. Leaving aside demographic forecasting—which appears to be feasible but actually has had a poor record—the requirement exists mainly with respect to weapons development. The logic is as follows: It takes about ten years to develop a really new weapon. Experience shows that the usefulness of a weapon lasts about ten to fifteen years after completion of development. Hence, to decide whether we accept a particular proposal for a new weapon, we must know whether twenty to twenty-five years from now we will need this weapon to defend ourselves against country A. Actually, we cannot know whether A will be hostile, and we do not need this knowledge. The decision can be made on the purely technological ground that this weapon constitutes the obvious and useful next step in the weapons cycle. Implicit is the presumption that weapons still will be needed: this is a pedestrian judgment of probability. Since it is legal practice to presume that a condition or status once shown to have existed continues to exist unless the contrary is proved, only the opposite judgment would require a strong argument. The risk attending the assumption that weapons will be needed is economic; the risk of the opposite assumption is destruction. Basically, the decision is technological and it is addressed to known, i.e., existent and mildly extrapolated, "feasibilities." The whole "mumbo-jumbo" about prediction is just a "sales pitch."

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[2] In 1917, the Germans had "first rate" intelligence about a fatal illness which supposedly had struck Russian Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky. As of this writing, Mr. Kerensky is still alive.

Events of the past can be identified and analyzed by scientific means. It is this foundation of information and interpretation on which all forecasting and all assumptions must be based. However, not all relevant features of past events are known. In some instances, we may know about an event but there may be inadequate documentation to understand how it happened. In other instances, the documentation may be false or deceptive. Information about events that happened thirty years ago is considerably better than that about current events, which are shrouded in fog, but inevitably old information has gaps and is difficult to confirm. If properly done, the analysis of complex historical and current data is very time-consuming. The time required for such analysis is considerably longer than the time the statesman has available to make decisions.

In the social sciences, the meaning of past events is never established once and for all time. Instead, interpretations—i.e., the assignment of significance weights to the various factors composing the event—depend on the experiences and viewpoints of the interpreters. "Objectivity" is a function of the distance of the interpreters from the event. As soon as the outstanding problems of the epoch change, the historical record is "reinterrogated" and reinterpreted. Hence, the predominant interpretations tend to vary as one generation follows the other. Entirely new interpretations may emerge, or majority and minority viewpoints may exchange places.[3]

Research and Bureaucracy

Interpretations and forecasts cannot be validated in a conclusive fashion but always retain elements of subjectivity. In the

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[3] The notion of a "consensus" when there are well-founded minority views is irrational, especially when the conformists do not understand the minority view and are unable to refute it.

"free market of ideas" interpretations compete with one another. The supposedly academic discussion easily becomes a political debate. This can happen in the natural sciences, and it is (unavowed) routine in the "policy sciences." Large-scale research requires numerous searchers who must be organized bureaucratically and who, unless they have been selected for conformity, split into "camps"; and they do ultimately split even if, at the moment of selection, they all agreed with one another.

It would be naive to assume that the split is merely one of viewpoints, and that politics *sensu proprio* play no role. In fact, researchers in "think tanks," realizing that "knowledge is power," do play political games. But real "deviation" and "factionalism" must be repressed lest the organization cannot function. Since most members of a bureaucracy are interested in their professional careers, conformism can be achieved easily, albeit temporarily. The bright individual knows that certain views are popular and others taboo. It is a matter of moral conscience if he dares uphold an unpopular view, and sometimes it is a matter of tactics to go along with views in which he does not believe. Those who make a fetish of honesty speedily run into trouble with their colleagues and superiors. Their chances of promotion are compromised; frequently they are shunted to other jobs; and, as a matter of routine, their heretical opinions are "pigeon-holed." However, research bureaucracies tend to dissolve after a few years because intellectual conformism stultifies and cannot be enforced.

Political bureaucracies, including intelligence services, cannot live with partisan competition taking place within their ranks. True, disputes are unavoidable and there is room—within limits—for minority views. But irreconcilable and basic differences preclude the dominion of rationality in organized research.

Bureaucratic research groups, including intelligence organizations, tend to settle their controversies on their own level—they must give the impression that they "solved" the problem. But this feat is usually accomplished through "semantics of compromise" by which unresolved divergencies are concealed.

In some instances, decision-makers like to receive a spectrum of opinions, while insisting, however, on the "best judgment," which is delivered by the majority. The majority view may have been tailored to humor the political prejudices of the decision-makers or, conversely, may be used to educate and convert them. Given the uncertainties of this business, it also happens that "estimates" are ordered by decision-makers to support their predetermined policies. This is easy because any bureaucracy, whether in a democratic or dictatorial state, reflects the political divisions of the outside world and includes advocates of different courses of action. But, basically, each bureaucracy represents a "line," and this line is not the end result of scientific and objective cogitations by serious thinkers.

By contrast, well-organized minorities have found it possible to get their views accepted in preference to the majority opinion. Such an event may or may not include logical persuasion. The main condition is that the decision-maker finds the minority view politically useful—he acts according to his "preference function," meaning he decides a-rationally or irrationally.

In general, a majestic stream of knowledge is made to flow from the intellectual sources up the mountain to the peaks of political power. But the modern Caesars consume only a little tap water into which they mix totally extraneous ingredients. It is not always a disaster when brain work gets lost: think of the extensive intellectual preparations that were made to implement the Morgenthau plan. Be that as it may, there is no reliable procedure through which "data" and "estimates" are effectively evaluated by the highest echelons of government. Much depends on "plausibility" which, in turn, is derived from preexisting judgments and simplifications. The process is aptly referred to as "rat race"; it is, actually, a rat race in a booby-trapped labyrinth. It is, at any rate, a poor method of conveying "scientific information."

Certainly, there are methods that could be applied to reduce the hazards in the production and dissemination of knowledge that is required for effective decision-making. But much depends on the psychology of the decision-makers themselves: the more autocratic they are, the more readily they impose their opinions. Much also depends on the sociological structure of the particular bureaucracy: the more dictatorial the organization, the greater the pressure for conformity. The validity of the scientific advice depends on the moral probity of the advisers and the research organizations: this precisely is the trouble, not because such probity cannot exist—it does exist—but because intellectual honesty cannot be proved like a mathematical theorem.

Intellectual Fashions

Even if the best procedures for fact-finding and evaluating, including up-to-date scientific methodology, were applied, basic difficulties in the production of reliable knowledge would appear. However much the partisans of methodology may dislike the point, there are "fashions" in methodology, and these fashions may be hard to resist. At one time, one particular method may be dominant, at another time another one. The various methodological approaches are rarely kept in balance, and the notion that each methodology must be used only within its proper sphere and be supplemented by other methodologies is not popular among the true believers in the myth of the one-panacea method.

There also are differences of opinion concerning the nature of "evidence" and "proof." With respect to future events, the pertinence of "indicators" can be debated endlessly. The legal concept that evidence is persuasive once it is beyond a "reasonable doubt" is subject to widely different interpretations. It is easy to demolish a perfectly reasonable case by asking for ever more stringent proof and by pursuing the matter into the most remote details, the recognition of which is beyond the most efficient research organization, which like an intelligence service, is looking in from the outside. Normally, for example, a photograph of a missile launcher would be accepted as evidence that there is a missile firing pad at that particular location. So long as no missile is seen, it can be argued, however, that perhaps the nature of the installation has been misinterpreted—and there are many installations whose purpose cannot be determined conclusively by outsiders. This sort of skepticism is not unwarranted because the pad may be a dummy. But suppose a missile is seen: in this case numerous questions can be raised about its exact performance characteristics. Ultimately, it can be argued that the information is fragmentary, that perhaps this missile is a dummy, too, or could not do the job for which it was designed. Such skepticism is useful when it leads to more intensive investigation and guards against hasty conclusions, but it can also result in the rejection or downgrading of perfectly good evidence. The legal rule is that the doubt must not be "flimsy, fanciful, fictitious doubt" which could be raised about "anything and everything"; it must be based on the preponderance of the evidence; and the doubt "must be of a type that would cause one to hesitate when confronted with the 'graver transactions of life' or the 'important affairs of life'."

The present fad is to call for statistical evidence. This is legitimate when there are enough numbers (or cases) to make statistics applicable and if the numerical information is reasonably reliable.

But the nature of a phenomenon can also be determined through the intensive analysis of a single event. Since political-strategic (or historical) events are essentially "unique," although they incorporate repetitive features, and since good strategy involves doing the unexpected or improbable, i.e., the unique, the statistical approach can be dangerous. To anticipate what a foreign leader will do in a given situation, contemporary statistical-experimental psychology does not help much, nor does "depth psychology," and the most painstaking description of a "behavior pattern" does not suffice unless there also is "understanding" of the man's overall "psychology." Unfortunately, such understanding cannot be communicated to those who have no "feel" for it. One does not know beforehand what the best insights are, and those best insights tend to be disregarded.

Decision-makers and Public Opinion

Many decision-makers assume the gravest responsibilities for the security of their nation, and for that matter, the security of foreign nations, without ever having been trained properly in how to evaluate political information, how to use and run the various fact-finding and planning organizations, and how to make strategic decisions and avoid mistakes. (Strategic leadership is qualitatively different from running a large business corporation.) Decision-making requires prior on-the-job-training, which means years must elapse before the decision-maker is really ready to act in an intelligent manner. Conversely, if the decision-maker stays in his job too long, he tends to interpret the present by analogy with the past. He loses his flexibility and becomes repetitive, hence his reactions can easily be anticipated by hostile outside observers.

All these difficulties are compounded when decisions must be made in a hurry and when there is little time to weigh the merits of alternative courses of action.

Within the American context, there is a noticeable trend, at all levels of decision-making, toward wishful thinking, hopefulness, and even utopianism, and also a tendency to interpret foreign statesmen as though they were Americans and motivated like American decision-makers. There is, therefore, a strong inclination to disbelieve and underrate threats, to assume that certain choices would not be made because we would not make them, to believe that more time is available than actually may be the case, and to minimize the will and singleness of purpose of dedicated hostile forces. In fact, there often is an obsessive doubt that anyone can be so stupid as to become an aggressor and a tendency to interpret the ravings of persons like Hitler or Mao Tse-tung as "mere propaganda."

Political constraints also inhibit proper decision-making. In an ideologically-oriented dictatorship necessary decisions may be rejected because they do not conform to the creed. In a democracy that feeds on a flood of rhetoric on the good life, politicians want to be re-elected; hence, the desire to satisfy economic interests usually takes precedence over costly and unpopular security measures. This may be rationalized by the thought that conflict requires high national morale and that such morale will not exist unless the people are satisfied. Actually, the argument is not entirely fanciful and careful balancing between various needs and tasks is required. But such balancing and choosing of priorities is a matter of instinct or art, and, except in a very rudimentary way, is not susceptible to rational decision-making.

Very often public opinion does not tolerate rational decision-making. In 1937 President Roosevelt understood that Hitler was preparing for aggression and in a celebrated speech called for "quarantining the aggressor." The public remained unimpressed and unwilling to support a policy aimed at preventing a world war. Today public opinion in several Arab countries has been inflamed to such a point that a rational settlement of Near Eastern problems is now impossible, even if the leaders responsible for spreading that mental infection were replaced by more moderate types. Nor was American public opinion in 1967 ready to support a policy of peace preservation in the Mediterranean, probably because it was felt Viet Nam was trouble enough. But even if the United States had known how to handle the situation, there would not have been time to enlist public support both at home and abroad. In order to build such support, policies must be planned far in advance, before their need is obvious or "provable." No democratic government is going to exert itself on a contingent problem when such exertion would be economically and militarily risky—perhaps if we wait long enough and ignore the problem, it will go away. It took Pearl Harbor to overcome the public's irrationality; but Pearl Harbor itself became the origin of new irrationality which bedeviled the conduct of the war.

Games and Gaming

By and large, the concept of rational action is modeled after a move in a game, e.g., chess. If one wishes to allow for lack of knowledge, a model may be found in card games. Such models are pertinent because many economic and military decisions must be made in a methodical manner and according to certain rules. But there is a type of action, specifically combat and "trickery," which does not fit this pattern at all. Such actions are by nature "irrational."

Rational action is predictable because it is tied to constraints and logical considerations. Yet, because it is more easily predicted, it may prove ineffective. Irrational action may prove to be successful precisely because it was not expected. Naturally, except for feints which are successful more often than the theoreticians recognize, irrational action must still be feasible. But feasibility can be calculated in different ways. The most astounding victories were won because the victor did something the vanquished considered infeasible; and the vanquished force usually was run by a group dedicated to the scientific-methodical approach (e.g., Prussia 1806, France 1940). The great upsets in history often involved the "irrational" defeat of a stronger by a weaker force, an improbable event. The "stronger" forces often were defeated because they believed that the rules, as they had defined them, could not be broken.

The very essence of political and, above all, of strategic decisions is to take risks. To some extent, risks can be calculated and it is customary to talk about "calculated risks," which usually means a decision-maker knows that the particular decision he is making may be rather dubious but he is making it anyway. Semantic usage is uncertain whether, of two alternate courses of action, the one with the higher or the lesser risk should be balanced against the "stake." The less risky course, because it is more predictable by the opponent, may in fact entail greater risks. (This circular situation is the basis of double deception.) Thus, the calculus of risk is at best fraught with uncertainties. Cautious (i.e., "rational") strategies rarely work in war, and when they do it is because they have been implemented by bold tactics. In strategy, the most reckless course of action—"calculated madness"—often pays off best. Hence the "model" should not be that of a game but of a gamble, a *va banque* gamble at that.

We may construe a rationality of recklessness that is derived from the assumption that the opponent can be surprised and cannot react in time. This involves a conviction that the hostile intelligence service remains in ignorance of the planned move.

But how does one really know this? This assumption is not provable, hence it is a-rational. Incidentally, the military leader, in planning his reckless move, does not usually disclose the secret to a large staff, lest it be compromised. Yet if the planning is done by only a handful of overworked men, the main techniques of organized rationality are suspended and, to a large extent, intuition takes over.

Any course of action, including a surprise blow, involves large numbers of people, equipment, resources, and many subdecisions. Still, concealment and deception remain possible; these techniques, too, have benefited from modern technology. It will not do to say that computers offer protection against surprise. The computer does a better job at integrating a whole mass of data than a human collective working without that tool. Nevertheless, the data fed into the computer are incomplete, simplified, and only partly correct, and the computation may have been poorly programmed. The data and formula were selected by fallible human brains and reflect convictions and commitments to certain courses of action. In many instances it is possible to manipulate the data in such a way that a desired result will come out; the computerized result then serves merely to validate decisions made beforehand in the customary rational-irrational manner. Unforeseen and drastic changes in the situation may call for instantaneous action. It takes time, however, to reprogram the computers, and it would be dangerous and irrational to use computations derived from data proved invalid.

War gaming is a good method to cut down the area of ignorance and irrationality. Games allow "visualization" of an operational task, often bring out details that otherwise would have been overlooked, stimulate new ideas, and provide good training for staffs and commanders. By playing the same game several times in succession, a useful substitute for historical evidence can be produced. But the results of war games are not "valid" evidence or forecasts, and the usefulness of the exercise depends significantly on the decisions by the umpires. The umpires may be selected for conformism or nonconformism: they are inevitably assigned by the "establishment," and reflect its thinking and interpretation of the enemy's action pattern. Thus, war gaming may be little more than a sophisticated form of "circular reasoning." The game usually is played by low-level staff members and it tends to be an anonymous exercise. Only rarely do experienced and responsible commanders take a hand in such games. In any event, top-level decision-makers have little patience to practice war games, and merely use the gaming results as additional information, according to the normal unsatisfactory procedures regulating the flow of knowledge. Thus, the war gaming technique is potentially useful, but also potentially dangerous.

MULTIPLE RATIONALITIES

It is a mistake to assume there is only *one* rationality. Rationality is not an ultimate "given" but is derived from values which, though they are, singly, subject to rational discourse, are hierarchically ordered: the precise hierarchy is a matter of subjective or social choice. These choices, in turn, are rooted in personality. They may change, largely because of the impact of extra-rational experiences. The functional rationality of a person who puts glory and "immortality" at the apex of the value pyramid differs substantially from the rationality of a group which considers material well-being or physical survival as the highest value. There is no rational method by which different pyramids can be merged into a new pyramid of compromise that would be acceptable to several groups of believers in incompatible values.

Objectively speaking, the value of life is far greater in a small population where, as in Israel, almost every person counts, than in a society where millions of people cannot be used properly and are a drag on resources.

The poor think differently from the rich and each can make a convincing case for his particular rationality. The same is true of the frustrated who differ from the happy, of women who differ from men, of the young who differ from the old.

The rationality of a big state differs from that of a small state. The same is true of big and small nations, of young, dynamic and aggressive socio-political systems as distinguished from declining and defensive systems, of societies committed to religion (or ideologies or esthetics) as distinguished from societies interested in trade or conquest. The rationality of a particular government could be quite different from that of preceding or succeeding governments, all of whom may define national interest in their own peculiar way, despite the fact that all are running the same nation.

It could be shown in detail why the rationality of the USSR differs from that of the United States, not just because one is communist and the other capitalist, but also because the USSR is multi-ethnic in structure, whereas the United States, on the whole, is a nation-state, because each stands at a different stage of development, and because each has a different geography and a different type of population in terms of quality, initiative, skill, efficiency, discipline, endurance, and the like. Certainly, there are broad areas where differing rationalities can be reconciled but, as Pascal pointed out, there *is* a different truth on each side of the Pyrenees.

At any given time in history, the leading states line up according to the *Zeitgeist,* the convictions that are typical of the times and were born three or more generations earlier. Intellectually, the *Zeitgeist* is quite useless and damaging, but it cannot be wished away. The phenomenon now engulfs the globe but each major nation has its own version; most of these versions are irreconcilable until the *Zeitgeist* changes.

The conviction that a state or a group has been entrusted with a historical "mission"—and this is not always a fanciful notion—easily congeals into an imperialist attitude, especially if the imperialist policy also accords with economic interest. If there are several imperialisms, conflict is unavoidable, and the matter is decided by force. But what does one do when the far more rational notion of self-contained nation-states clashes with the equally rational notion of a supranational state, in which there may be less independence and particularism but a better chance for economic progress, cultural cross-fertilization, and mutual security? In terms of 1914, it is just as easy to uphold the rationality of Serbian nationalism which aimed at the destruction of Austria-Hungary, as to support the self-preservation of Austria-Hungary against disruptive nationalisms. If the rationality of the nation-state is accepted, Hitler cannot be criticized for having tried to collect all Germans under one roof—except that the Germans did not need one single state, whose establishment required the destruction of other states and the abandonment of the European balance of power. Thus, if we disregard the fact that Hitler used the nation-state concept as a deception to conceal his plans for hegemony, the problem was not that the nation-state was an irrational objective, but that this *one* rational concept had to be balanced against other and *contradictory* rational concepts. Such balancing was not feasible through rational arguments, but had to be decided by nonrational means such as the elusive quality known as "tact."

Whenever contesting states can present persuasive legal and rational arguments for their case, and whenever the two cases are rationally irreconcilable—which is a normal occurrence—the contest must be decided by an extra-rational authority like the International Court, or else by the "sword" which, throughout the Middle Ages, was expected to execute the judgment of God. A conflict of ideology may fade away as the *Zeitgeist* changes; but it cannot be composed by rational means, because each side can only think within its own ideological framework. Keep in mind that ideology is by definition partly false and irrational. In brief, there is no single "truth function." La Rochefoucauld was right: "Truth does not do so much good in the world, as its appearance does evil."

RATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The theory according to which political decisions should and could be made rationally overlooks the fact that decisions are made by politicians and statesmen and that these types of people are not fundamentally different from ordinary mortals. Their IQ mean probably is above that of the population, but their "knowledge" is average, and their morality often is below average. These men have at their disposal a large apparatus which provides them with high quality current information, but not much insight. If they had such insight, they would be contemplative intellectuals and not active statesmen. The top career politician can be expected to make better choices than the fellow running a grocery store or the widow buying stock from a broker who is persuasive but not very honest. But the problems posed to the leaders are more difficult to solve. It is often forgotten that much of the time available to presidents, prime ministers and cabinet members is taken up by routine functions, ceremonies, preparation of routine legislation, public relations, and the like, and very little is devoted to the study of difficult problems involving life-or-death challenges.

The notion that the main decisions are made at the top is partly mythical because most decisions are prepared and predetermined by anonymous staffs. The typical procedure is to present the facts bearing on the problem, indicate alternative courses of actions, and submit recommendations. The procedure is time-consuming, easily subject to manipulation, and as weak or as strong as the information, evaluations, imagination and honesty that go into the recommendations. Moreover, the lower staffs act within their own sphere of responsibility without knowing exactly what is happening at the higher levels.

It is pure theory to assume that the "top," because it is the receptacle of pertinent and "full" information, has the broadest overview of all pressing problems. In reality, the "top" is a bottleneck and the larger the government and the greater its responsibilities, the more of a bottleneck it is. The sad truth of the matter is that the upper echelon of government acts on highly selective information, and makes its evaluations and choices partly in response to criteria that are irrelevant to a given problem. This is in the nature of government, because resources are too scarce to allow rational solutions of problems. But "power corrupts," and because of corruption, be it economic, political, intellectual, or moral in nature, decisions are made that are optimal from the decision-maker's personal viewpoint.

Little attention is given to the frequent occurrence of "maneuvers" in the lower echelons which, often enough, escalate into plots and conspiracies to impose a particular policy. Sometimes the intent is constructive and in the national interest, and it may be directed at minimizing the damage done by an incompetent and corrupt leader. But sometimes the intent may be to hurt the government, the regime or the nation. Provocations may be perpetrated by infiltrators or persons who, for one reason or the other, are interested in provoking a crisis or even a war, and who sometimes favor the enemy or may be under his discipline. Those who deny those hazards are ignorant of history.

At this point the unmentionable must be mentioned, namely, the mental health of many of history's outstanding decision-makers. It must be recognized that those who choose the profession of politics and climb to the pinnacle of power through the standard techniques of winning elections and gaining party leadership, or organizing coups and revolutions, usually are not addicted to study and contemplation but are characterized by propensity for action, strong will, readiness to take risks, power urges, enjoyment of struggle, cunning, insensitivity, egotism, and lack of inhibition and modesty. They cannot be saints or philosophers but must be manipulators. They are inclined to "shoot first and ask questions later" or, in any event, to talk first and later find the rationale for their statements. Such men often operate under the dominance of simple ideas, tend to whip up public emotions which may carry them along and to which they themselves may fall prey, and necessarily act on the *functional* rationality of preserving and augmenting personal power, even if this entails conflict with the interests of the state and society over which they preside. They are like a captain of a freighter whose prime purpose is to weather a storm and avoid a shoal, and who does not care whether the ship's owner is making money on the stock market or whether the nation's trade balance is favorable.

In the normal course of affairs, politicians and statesmen are bound to commit mistakes, regardless of the quality of their intellectual preparation. But they rarely acknowledge these mistakes, because they cannot really do so without losing influence. As they weave a net of rationalization and pretense, their thinking loses contact with reality and thus becomes irrational. Often such irrationality may be curbed by the rationality of collaborators and staffs, but persons who possess great prestige and, therefore, enormous self-confidence, cannot easily be influenced, especially when they are growing older and more stubborn.

This sort of irrationality is embedded in the normal processes of government, but frequently the key decision-makers are also afflicted by mental and psychological troubles. It is characteristic of power-holders that they hate and hold grudges against many people; they also tend to be beset by fears. Hatreds and anxieties affect judgment, as does a tendency to exhibitionism, which is also a typical professional affliction.

Beyond all this, political leaders have been known to suffer from neuroses and psychoses. Some were merely "disturbed," others were psycho-pathological personalities, and quite a few suffered from illnesses affecting mental capacities and from organic brain diseases, including tertiary syphilis and senility. There also are conditions like a *folie à plusieurs*. Lastly, power may arouse criminal instincts or may have been attained through crime, ranging from thievery via sadism to murder. Persons guilty of criminal offenses, even though they may enjoy immunity, must adopt a rationality of protection which in the case of Stalin, for example, took the form of mass "purges" (i.e., murders).

ACTIVE AND REACTIVE RATIONALITY

One scheme of political rationality would run as follows: observe — analyze — anticipate — act to guard against anticipated threats or exploit anticipated opportunities. In this scheme the emphasis is on anticipation, and the plan of action corresponds to the expected events. But what can be done if the anticipations are highly uncertain? Successful strategists, both in the political and military spheres, have not wasted much time consulting the oracles but have concentrated on action to maximize their control over the future and to disorient their "anticipating" opponents. They opted, in short, for initiative instead of anticipation, and they inclined to the practical conclusion that boldness in conceiving the action, audacity in execution, and stubbornness in sticking to a chosen course of action are more promising of success than protracted research, careful weighing of pros and cons, and frequent changes of course to conform to the latest brainstorms. Napoleon's formula was: "On s'engage et puis on voit."

Initiative in the conduct of affairs, that is, a commitment to voluntarism rather than rationality, does not exclude periods of inactivity, or of observation, research, anticipation or even rational decisions whenever these are feasible. But it must be realized that various types of action require different scientific methods. In economics and technology, systems analysis on a probabilistic basis is entirely proper: although an optimal solution may not be found, good solutions can be discovered. In strategy the intentions of the enemy must be assessed. But this cannot be done by natural science methods seeking "conclusive" proof or proof at statistically defined high "levels of confidence." Problems of this sort are best handled by the procedures and rules of evidence customary in a court of law. Political decisions must be based on an understanding of the historical dimensions of the problem to which they are addressed.

The key point is that rationality, in all its forms, manifestations and applications, must be regarded as a handmaiden to political-strategic intuition and initiative. True, intuitive leadership often is characterized by wrong intuitions and irrational initiatives. But effective leaders combine clear thinking with strong will. Their intuitions are correct, and their initiatives are metarational, *not* irrational—*this* is the secret of their success. And because leadership is not only a profession but also a talent, or a matter of genius, it is *beyond* prescription and planning, and far *beyond* scientific methodology.

Perhaps the difference can be illustrated by a simple example: an anatomist may teach a wrestler about anatomy, observation of a future opponent may instruct him, a trainer may show him effective holds, weight-lifting may give him strength, and sparring partners may enlarge his range of experience and toughen his endurance. But the wrestler must absorb and integrate all this knowledge into know-how, and in the ring he must be able to use skills spontaneously and intuitively, even in moments when he is only half-conscious. In the end he wins because of his strength and speed, his ability to outmaneuver and outlast the opponent, and his capacity to absorb punishment and to recuperate. Knowledge is important; fast thinking, the intuitive sizing up of the opponent, and feigning are more important. But what could be called the wrestler's sado-masochistic capability is decisive.

CONCLUSION

It is quite erroneous to visualize a government as though it were composed of college professors engaged in dialectic conversations about rational courses of action. Though they are well trained in academic (and irrational) power struggles, college professors are usually not apt to reach the upper rungs of political power. If they do, they tend to be bad administrators and worse strategists, and they certainly are not free from irrationality or neurosis. Government must be inspired by knowledge, but scientism in strategy and policy paralyzes the will—which can be deadly.

In the last analysis, the question of rationality versus irrationality applies only to intelligent and thoroughly educated people; it does not cover people with poor education and medium intelligence who all too often manage to accede to positions of great power. Hence, the famous dictum by Pope Julius III (also attributed to the Swedish chancellor Axel Oxenstierna) is still as valid today as it always has been: "Learn, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed." Or as President Garfield put it: "God reigns, and the government at Washington lives."

Is change, or better, is progress possible? Perhaps, but first it is necessary to recognize the facts as they really are.

THE ARMS RACE IN THE THIRD WORLD

by F. O. Miksche

WHILE the countries of Western Europe talk hopefully about peaceful coexistence and the Atlantic Pact slowly disintegrates, a gigantic struggle is spreading across the globe, creating a new division of wealth and establishing new spheres of influence in the wake of decolonization. It is closely associated with a worldwide arms race that scarcely contributes to the relaxation of international tensions.

Nothing better demonstrates the massive and explosive character of this developing conflict than this comparison: The Second World War, held to be the most terrible and burdensome conflagration of all time, devoured an average of $180 billion annually; today mankind squanders $156 billion each year to assure what it imagines to be its "security." The Atlantic nations spend $95 billion; the Warsaw Pact nations, $35 billion;[1] the Third World nations (including China and India), $21 billion; and Australia, South Africa, Latin America, Sweden, Switzerland and other neutral states, $5 billion. The size of Third World military budgets is double the total economic aid given by the West.[2] On the average, undernourished Asian peoples spend 5.9 per cent of their national income for "defense" purposes, a figure that rises to 11.6 per cent for the Arab states.

Imports of war matériel by Third World countries amount to $1.2 billion per year—not including free deliveries by the United States to South Viet Nam or by the USSR to Cuba and North Viet Nam. But the military equipment furnished for this sum has a real value of $3 to $4 billion, because arms are sold to Third World nations under a pricing system that differs from the one existing among Western countries. After they have been in service for a few years, "obsolete" tanks and aircraft from NATO armies are sold in Asia or Africa for as little as one-tenth of their original cost.

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[1] The U.S. defense budget totals $73.1 billion, including atomic and space research and the conflict in Viet Nam, the latter estimated at $24 billion. The other NATO nations are spending $22.117 billion a year on security. The USSR defense budget is running at $30 billion a year, including atomic and space research. (In terms of "Western" purchasing power, this is the equivalent of $50 billion.) The other Warsaw Pact countries spend $5.248 billion on security.

[2] In 1966 Western countries granted the Third World states $6.466 billion in economic aid, in addition to private aid totaling $3.426 billion.

It is frightening to note in this respect that Western armies alone will phase out before 1970 some 7,000 tanks and 1,200 aircraft. Who will receive these? Some states in the Third World will even buy "retired" military hardware in order to sell it to other countries at a profit. Despite a formal prohibition, tanks and aircraft delivered by the German Bundeswehr to Iran in 1966 were transshipped to Pakistan, contributing to heightened tension between that country and India.

Eager to keep up appearances, communist bloc countries supply arms to revolutionary movements, but only in exceptional cases is this done directly. Normally, they are passed on by way of intermediaries. Thus, the majority of weapons sent to the guerrillas in the Congo or in Latin American countries comes from Egypt, Algeria and Cuba.

The United States, leader among the exporters of military equipment, annually supplies some sixty countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America with items worth $450 million. Of this sum $300 million falls under military aid programs and consists of matériel furnished to the purchasing state without charge or for a small fraction of its original cost. The armaments exports of Great Britain, which are more nearly commercial in character, total $150 million per year. France specializes in exports of high technical performance items—aircraft, light tanks, ships, electronic equipment—and the volume of its sales exceeds $200 million annually.

In comparison to this total of $800 million per year for the three major Western powers, the states of the Warsaw Pact export to the Third World about $400 million worth of military hardware. We must remember, however, that the true value of these communist bloc items is at least one-third greater than the list price, and the costs of production in the countries of the East are much less than those of the West because of cheaper labor, a less sophisticated product, and larger production runs. When it comes to exporting war matériel, the Soviets are much less generous than is generally believed. With the exception of Cuba and North Viet Nam, the deliveries are made on a strictly commercial basis, and the long-term credits given by Moscow must be repaid by shipments of raw materials and sometimes even in the currency of the purchasing country. Some states, such as Morocco, Iran, Indonesia, India and Pakistan, buy their military hardware from both the East and the West in the hope that, by playing one side off against the other, they can safeguard their independence.

II

The arms race in the Third World began about 1955 when the USSR, with its newly acquired nuclear power status, began the political infiltration of regions of the globe that hitherto had been outside the sphere of Russian influence. The Soviets were aware that arms shipments permit the acquisition of political influence at relatively low cost, in part because the recipients become debtors. This dependence is accentuated if the matériel in question is of a highly technical nature—e.g., airplanes, electronic equipment, air-defense weapons and tanks. The upkeep of such equipment requires regular supplies of replacement parts, while its proper functioning and effective use call for a large number of specialists whose training provides an opportunity for a certain amount of ideological penetration.

The principal Soviet clients have been countries whose strategic importance is evident: Indonesia, Cuba, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and especially since 1964, North Viet Nam.[3] Following the agreements reached in 1956 between Moscow and Djakarta, Indonesia obtained military goods worth a total of $1.2 billion: one heavy cruiser, eight destroyers, twelve submarines, twelve motor torpedo boats, 120 combat and transport aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, tanks, and a large quantity of small arms. But the fall of Sukarno thwarted the Soviet attempt to use Indonesia to secure a foothold on the south flank of Asia. The states of the Warsaw Pact continue to maintain some 3,000 military advisers in Cuba, the headquarters of communist subversive warfare in Latin America. In order to insure the security of this island fortress, Moscow has given Havana fifty-two patrol boats and other small craft, 200 airplanes, 300 tanks, and a large quantity of air-defense weapons.

Soviet military aid to North Viet Nam during the period 1955-1964 averaged $3.5 million annually. Credits granted to Hanoi for military purposes rose sharply in 1966 to $700 million and are estimated at $800 million for 1967. On the strength of the agreement concluded on September 24, 1967 between Moscow and Hanoi, the volume of this aid will reach one billion dollars in

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[3] Relatively modest amounts of Soviet military aid have been furnished to certain African countries, including Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan and Nigeria, and several Asian countries—India, Pakistan, Cambodia and Laos.

1968. Since 1965, the government of Hanoi has been host to some 2,000 Soviet instructors and has received large quantities of ground-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, 200 planes, 100 tanks, nine missile-equipped patrol boats of the "Komar" class, heavy howitzers, trucks and many small arms.

The total amount of Soviet aid to North Viet Nam in the period 1964-1967 can be estimated at about $2 billion, while the U.S. effort in South Viet Nam consumes more than that each month. From these facts, one can deduce that the USSR, despite the oft-repeated declarations of its leading officials, is not eager to bring about a quick settlement of the conflict. The advantages that accrue to Moscow from having powerful U.S. forces bogged down in Southeast Asia are obtained at a very modest price. And because of this conflict Washington is much less concerned with Europe and the Near East, precisely those areas where Moscow is currently extending its influence.

The result is that the arms race in the Mediterranean basin and the Arab world becomes disquieting for Western Europe. Tsarist Russia long ago considered this region an essential objective of its expansionist policy. It is not surprising, therefore, that since 1955 the Soviets have focused their efforts on Egypt, the strategic pivot of Europe, Africa, and Asia, while enlarging their influence in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and even Somalia, that is to say, on the shores of the Indian Ocean.

As soon as the Suez Canal is cleared we can expect to see the Soviet fleet penetrate into the Red Sea and make some moves toward Aden and the Persian Gulf, the source of the oil which Europe needs. Especially since the Tashkent conference in January 1966, the Soviet efforts at infiltration of the Indian subcontinent and Iran by means of military and economic aid have been clearly directed to the goal of establishing a Soviet presence between the eastern Mediterranean and the Bay of Bengal. Moscow's declaration that the Indians should fill the vacuum left by the British must be seen in the light of this Soviet goal. Can one seriously believe that sprawling India with its enormous weaknesses will be able to accomplish such a task? Rather, is Moscow not striving to install itself as successor to the British in order to make use of the Indian subcontinent as a springboard toward Southeast Asia?

In the course of the Middle East crisis of 1967 Israel's 800 tanks and 300 aircraft confronted about 1,750 tanks and 730 airplanes from the military forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Of these three armies, only the Jordanian was equipped with British and American matériel. Eighty per cent of the losses—900 tanks and 380 aircraft—suffered by the Arabs during the lightning war of last June has been replaced by the Soviets. At the same time they have delivered fifty airplanes, thirty-six tanks, and numerous ground-to-air missiles to Algeria, as well as fighter and transport aircraft to Iraq. In order to protect itself against Egypt, Saudi Arabia has procured thirty-seven aircraft worth a total of $20 million from Great Britain and some $100 million worth of military equipment from the United States.

The resolution of the Middle East crisis is unlikely to be hastened by shipping in more weapons from outside. However, despite the Arab defeat, Moscow continues to pursue its policy of providing arms to Cairo and Damascus, as well as to Algeria, whose ambitions menace both Tunisia and Morocco. Plunging deeply into the Sahara in the direction of Black Africa, Algeria also constitutes an important bridgehead near the western entrance to the Mediterranean, at Gibraltar. Tunisia has very weak armed forces, and Morocco's modern military equipment does not begin to compare with that of Algeria.

III

Soviet arms shipments to Third World countries that are in no way threatened by Western powers but occupy important strategic positions on the globe prove that the aim of Moscow is not merely to maintain the status quo. By contrast, the U.S. arms policy seeks only to counterbalance the military aid coming from Moscow, while maintaining or re-establishing the local balance of power between hostile neighbors. Soviet shipments have a clearly offensive character because their volume goes beyond the needs of a defensive posture. Far from diminishing the risks of war, this policy multiplies them.

The arms race in the Third World, which had its origins in the immediate post-World War II period when some countries acquired surplus military equipment, began in earnest in 1955 as a quantitative competition. After 1960 it became qualitative. The sale of modern combat aircraft to states whose population subsists in large measure on free American wheat obliges their threatened neighbors in turn to protect themselves with a costly system of electronic air defense—for example, Saudi Arabia's system has cost $230 million. Such accumulations of modern weapons in certain explosive parts of the globe are dangerous because there is no possibility of control over them: no one knows when, where or against whom they will be used. This situation raises a serious threat to world peace. In addition, this military assistance, which is more costly than all the economic assistance given to underdeveloped countries, inevitably provokes not only waste but also political tensions that are detrimental to the economic and social progress so greatly needed in these areas.

Given the lack of the moderating influence that could be exercised by a Europe that is aware of its community-in-fate, politically unified and militarily integrated, only an agreement between the two superpowers can put an end to such a paradoxical situation. As long as this dangerous game continues, as long as these arms shipments are designed to stir up or exacerbate crises which permit the Soviets to fish in troubled waters, the West would be naive indeed to believe in the reality of a détente.

ARMS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD*

by John H. Hoagland

AN examination of local military conflicts in the developing world since World War II reveals one predominant but scarcely surprising fact—that the weapons with which these wars have been fought, and which to varying degrees have shaped the strategy and outcome of battle, were obtained from sources outside the countries involved. Even in the aggregate, the military capabilities of the developing countries are small in comparison with those of the major powers. To provide some sort of perspective, it is useful to remember that six countries, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Communist China, account for about 85 per cent of the world's military expenditures; the remaining countries, about 130 in number, account for only about 15 per cent.

Yet, in spite of their limitations, the military capabilities of the developing countries pose important problems for international security. In a period of delicately balanced strategic deterrence between East and West, local military preparations and conflicts have become a frequent source of international tension. For what they have felt to be compelling political and economic reasons, the major powers have been willing to supply large quantities of weapons to the developing countries and occasionally to enter their conflicts directly. In the same period, the developing world has been a storm center of ideological competition and a rising sense of nationalism, both of which have led to a greatly increased demand for modern weapons.

For the foreseeable future, and certainly throughout the 1970's, the developing countries will continue to be largely dependent on industrial states for the supply of military hardware and technology. To understand why and how their military forces may change in the next decade, it is therefore necessary to understand the process by which weapons and military technology are transferred. In order to gain some insights into the variety of channels through which hardware and technology are diffused, three categories of weapons have been selected for discussion here: small arms, jet aircraft, and ballistic missiles. The characteristic patterns of international transfer relevant to all classes of weaponry should emerge from this detailed examination of the two ends of the weapons spectrum, even though several other important categories, such as artillery, tanks, naval vessels and air defense missiles, are either omitted or mentioned only briefly. Finally, the article discusses the motives underlying this traffic in arms and technology and identifies some of its probable impacts on regional and international security.

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SMALL ARMS

A realistic look at the diffusion process must be a broad one. It must deal not only with obvious and well-publicized cases such as the Middle Eastern or South Asian interstate competitions to procure major armaments. It must also deal with the more obscure areas of the arms traffic, especially the transfer of light weapons—automatic rifles, submachine guns, small mortars—with which some of the most disturbing conflicts in the developing countries have been fought, and which promise to be of considerable importance for many years to come. Unlike the larger weapons, small arms can be obtained from a multitude of sources, including private traders, and their movement in relatively small numbers from country to country is easily concealed. Nevertheless, the bulk of the small arms traffic to developing countries since World War II has consisted of large-scale transfers, normally involving hundreds of thousands of weapons in a single transaction, under military aid agreements. Connected with this point are the related facts that small arms, once introduced into the world inventory, are likely to remain there for a long time and to change hands rapidly, in ways totally unforeseen by the supplying power.[1]

An example of the way small arms may change ownership in surprising ways, finding uses that are diametrically opposed to the supplier's intentions, is the path taken by weapons from Belgium and the United States, via Cuba, to the insurgents now fighting in

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[1] With regard to their longevity, available evidence indicates that in the 1963-1965 Cyprus dispute the Turkish Cypriotes were probably armed in part with Mauser bolt-action rifles which the Turkish Army had purchased in large quantities from Germany between 1890 and 1905.

Venezuela. During 1959, its first year in power, the Castro government appealed to numerous sources for arms to equip its growing national army. It was eventually successful in purchasing from Fabrique Nationale of Belgium 65,000 standard NATO rifles, 1,000 Uzi submachine guns made in Belgium under Israeli license, and 200 machine guns, all representing the then current level of technology in small arms. In addition, when Castro came to power, he acquired a large arsenal of weapons that the United States had been supplying to the Batista regime throughout the 1950's under a military assistance pact, with the intention of bolstering the Cuban national forces against threats to internal security.

As the new Cuban army grew in size, it became increasingly important to locate a reliable large-scale supplier. By mid-1960, Soviet and Czech arms, including 125,000 automatic rifles, 10,000 submachine guns, and hundreds of field weapons, began arriving in Cuba. As the army standardized on Soviet weapons, both the Belgian and U.S. arms were gradually rendered surplus. Within a short time, they found uses in Venezuela which neither the United States nor Belgium would have considered appropriate at the time of their initial transfer. An arms cache discovered in Venezuela in 1963, intended for use by communist insurgents, consisted of automatic rifles made by Fabrique Nationale, Uzi submachine guns, 60mm mortars made in the United States and identified as having been given to the Batista government, as well as U.S. bazookas and recoilless rifles.

This is not an isolated case. To mention one other example, military assistance from the Soviet Union to Egypt probably brought on the retirement of the approximately 100,000 Lee Enfield rifles supplied to the Egyptian Army prior to the British Military Mission's departure in 1949. Some of these British weapons have undoubtedly found their way by now to other parts of Africa (Somalia may be using them in its dispute with Ethiopia), and their potential for future mischief is considerable.

One of the difficulties in attempting to impose any effective control over the small arms traffic is suggested by the fact that there are probably no more than a thousand insurgents in all of Latin America at the present time—roughly 350 each in Colombia and Venezuela, 200 in Guatemala, and about 100 in Bolivia. Since comparatively few weapons are needed to support their operations, a great many sources, both governmental and private, are capable of supplying adequate quantities of arms and ammunition if they are willing to run the attending risks. The Cuban government, for example, is apparently capable of supporting several clandestine insurgencies simultaneously, although it would be hard pressed to supply the small arms necessary for one of the sides in even a diminutive interstate war. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out emphatically that a country such as Cuba is capable of supporting these adventures only because it has previously received massive shipments of small arms from the major powers.

If the insurgents are fortunate enough to be able to operate from privileged sanctuaries in a neighboring country, their actions may be conducted on a much larger scale, in larger units and with less secrecy, using heavier and often more modern firepower. Accordingly, the patterns of arms supply may be substantially different. One striking example is the Greek insurgency of 1946 to 1949, in which the Greek communist forces operated in large numbers from bases in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, where they received arms, ammunition and other logistical support in a relatively open and methodical way. An insurgent force of nearly 20,000 was put in the field, armed with rifles, submachine guns, and even with heavier weapons such as mortars, recoilless rifles and artillery. These heavier weapons demand more intensive logistical support, particularly in the supply of ammunition. Sanctuaries in a neighboring country may enable a determined supplier to provide heavier and more modern firepower to the insurgents. A current example can be found in South Viet Nam, where the insurgents have occasionally used 140mm artillery rockets to attack U.S. military installations.

The regular forces of national governments in the developing countries have most often been equipped with small arms obtained as part of an overall military assistance agreement. In all of these cases, international attention has focused mainly on the more sophisticated weapons included in the agreement. In the case of Egypt, the Soviet transfer of medium bombers, jet fighters and tanks has been well publicized; but the hundreds of thousands of Soviet small arms included in the agreement have gone comparatively unnoticed, even though their influence on regional stability may be felt for years to come, in many different countries, where their introduction even in small numbers will in turn prompt large buildups by the opposing forces.

Any military force in the developing world, whether regular or irregular, must establish a dependable and uninterrupted source of supply of ammunition, spare parts and replacements for the weapons in its inventory; as Pakistan can testify, it is sometimes easier to acquire the weapons than it is to store up enough ammunition for a prolonged conflict. Consequently, a few nations have for some time been producing their own small arms and ammunition. To the extent that more countries follow suit, the world's sources of supply will multiply, and the arms market will be even more accommodating than it is today. India manufactures not only small arms, but also artillery, tanks and aircraft, usually on the basis of imported designs or foreign licenses. Before World War II, Britain assisted India in building several ordnance factories for the production of British-designed small arms such as the *Lee Enfield rifle, Vickers Berthier machine gun and Bren gun.* The rifles and submachine guns now being produced in these Indian arsenals are essentially Indian modifications of British designs. India has also established production of a Vickers-designed tank, designated the Vijayanta. At present most of the parts are still made in Britain and shipped to India, but before 1970, 80 per cent of the manufacture is to be carried out in India. Similarly, Israel has been working toward self-sufficiency in the production of small arms and battlefield weapons and their ammunition. She has obtained licensing agreements from Belgium for the domestic production of the NATO 7.62mm automatic rifle and, in addition, produces her own flame throwers, 81mm mortars, and 92mm bazookas.

It is not possible to estimate with any confidence the size of the international traffic in small arms. The numbers of rifles, machine guns, and other light weapons transferred outside the major alliances since World War II might lie anywhere between ten million and fifty million. It is also difficult to gauge the effects of this traffic on the security and stability of the developing world. Some basic questions remain unanswered and deserve a major research effort. What is the approximate world inventory, even within wide tolerances, of military small arms? How is the ownership distributed? What are the rates of replenishment and attrition of the world inventory? How rapidly are the supply sources proliferating? To what extent have the most important insurgencies, particularly those which invoked major-power participation, been initiated with weapons made available, directly or indirectly, by the major powers? What are the genuine long-term effects on regional security of large-scale transfers of rifles and automatic weapons to developing countries as part of a military assistance agreement? What is the probability that they will be used in unforeseen ways?

The effort to answer questions of this kind is just as important to the developing countries as it is to the larger nations. The technology of small arms is now improving rapidly under the impetus of renewed major-power interest in conventional forces. Man-transportable artillery rockets and recoilless rifles, wire-guided anti-tank weapons, portable flame throwers, as well as equipment such as night weapon sights and target locators of various kinds, will inevitably find their way into the developing world, consigned both to regulars and insurgents—and much sooner than we may expect. Answers to some of the above questions will provide at least some capability to predict what the more critical forms of transfer may be.

JET COMBAT AIRCRAFT

In contrast with the lack of data on transfers of small arms (as well as battlefield weapons and artillery), a great deal is known about transfers of larger weapons from the industrial to the developing nations. For several reasons, transfers of tanks, aircraft and naval vessels attract considerable publicity. To varying degrees, these larger weapons extend the range, speed and scale of potential conflict, bringing wider areas under the threat of their firepower and calling for more complex analysis of opposing strategies. Unlike the diffusion of small arms, their transfers occur almost exclusively between established governments (with a few notable exceptions, such as the armed Magister jet trainer under control of the Katanga mercenaries or the B-26's recently used by the Nigerian separatists).

The decision to supply or receive modern aircraft is normally made at a high governmental level. The high cost of sophisticated systems, the many security aspects surrounding the technology they represent, and the need for policy decisions regarding the political and economic impacts of the transfers, almost inevitably require government participation in the negotiation. In some of the more heated regional arms races, notably in the Middle East, the spiraling buildup of combat aircraft has been the focal point of the competition, around which all other military preparations are clustered.

Four suppliers—the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom and France—have accounted for about 98 per cent of all jet combat aircraft shipped to the developing world since the end of World War II, a total of over 5,000, including at least 500 bombers. According to available data, the breakdown, as of 1966, was about as follows: Soviet Union, 1,870; United States, 1,540; United Kingdom, 1,280; France, 420.

In addition, several other nations have strong existing or future potentials as sources of military jet aircraft for the developing world. Important among these are Sweden, West Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia and Communist China. Their export potentials do not, however, match those of the four main suppliers.

A striking case study of the competitive supply of aircraft by the Great Powers to regional adversaries is provided by the history of the Israeli-Egyptian military buildup from 1955 to the present.[2] Egypt signed its first military assistance agreement with the USSR in 1955. In the course of an extremely rapid transfer of military equipment, she received nearly 200 Soviet MIG-15 and MIG-17 jet fighters and Il-28 tactical bombers. This sudden destabilization of the regional balance was undoubtedly one factor contributing to the British-French-Israeli pre-emption of October 1956, in which an estimated 50 per cent of the Egyptian aircraft inventory was lost. Following the cessation of hostilities, the Soviet Union responded quickly with new arms supplies to Egypt. Within six months, an additional 100 MIG-17 fighters and more than 50 I1-28 bombers had been delivered. In 1961 and 1962 there were shipments of about 100 MIG-19 fighters. From 1962 to 1966, about 130 supersonic MIG-21's, including 40 to 50 MIG-21D all-weather fighters, were sent to Egypt. In this same period, about 25 Tu-16 intermediate-range bombers, capable of delivering a 10,000-pound bomb load, were added to the Egyptian inventory by the Soviet Union, marking a radical departure from what had, until then, apparently been a tacit restriction by the major powers on the range and payload of combat aircraft exported to the developing world.

A similar buildup was underway in Israel, drawing primarily on the support of France. Since 1956, France has sold to Israel about 80 Mystere and Super-Mystere subsonic fighters, 72 Mirage III supersonic fighters armed with air-to-air missiles, about 50 Ouragan fighter bombers, and about 25 Vautour fighter bombers. In addition, Israel has between 60 and 100 Magister jet trainers and ground support fighters, many of which were built in Israel under French license.

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[2] For a detailed analysis of this case, see John H. Hoagland and John B. Teeple, "Regional Stability and Weapons Transfer: The Middle Eastern Case," ORBIS, Fall 1965, pp. 714-728.

Clearly, these are large and costly air forces—costly not only in monetary terms but in absorbing the energies of some of the most competent people in the countries involved. It is important, therefore, to ask what security they have provided to either country or to the region generally.

For obvious military reasons the airpower of one side must be matched, at least qualitatively, by the other. For this reason, competing buildups in airpower tend to occur in an upward-spiraling pattern. Yet the net gain in security, if a relative balance of power is maintained, may be negligible. Furthermore, the strategies imposed by the possession of highly effective offensive aircraft, based on highly vulnerable airfields, may be especially unstable, favoring the use of surprise attack. Even more basic, however, is the question of how the influx of aircraft, tanks and other large weapons affects the perceptions of the national leadership. The experience of the Middle East in 1967 and Kashmir in 1965 indicates that the possession of a vast armory may give the leadership unwarranted confidence in its ability to initiate and win a war. The experience of the Suez war of 1956 may further indicate that a rapid military buildup by one party can stimulate a pre-emptive attack by other parties.

Conversely, it should be noted that sovereign nations must have the means of assuring the sovereignty of their airspace. In the coming era of supersonic transports and a steady increase in the volume of jet transportation, the developing nations are more likely than ever to demand high-performance jet fighters and interceptors to police their national airspace, unless satisfactory international arrangements are made to obviate this requirement.

It can also be argued that the possession of modern combat aircraft gives developing countries a greater range of expression, an ability to communicate degrees of intention and to make shows of force to the adversary, which conventional ground forces could not provide. It seems likely, for example, that the Turkish Air Force, by carrying out sorties over Cyprus in 1964, was able to communicate Turkey's most serious concern about the Cyprus situation to the Greeks and to convince them of her readiness to intervene with troops if it did not improve. In some cases, then, the limited commitment of airpower across national borders may serve as a substitute for attack by ground forces, with all the potential for escalation that would involve; but it is far more likely, as the Egyptian air strikes against Yemen indicate, that such uses of airpower simply tend to downgrade the whole concept of sovereign and inviolate national borders.

What can be said about future trends in the transfer of sophisticated jet aircraft to the developing world? Of growing importance is the question of retransfer—that is, the second or later international transfer of combat aircraft following their initial export from the country of manufacture. During the twenty years from 1945 to 1965, retransfers represented only about one per cent of all the jet combat aircraft transferred to the developing countries. Since 1965, the number has been increasing rapidly. West Germany alone has, in the last four years, disposed of at least the following surplus aircraft: F-84's to Turkey and F-86's to Greece and Turkey; 90 Canadian-built F-86's to Iran; French-built Magisters to Nigeria; 40 Fiat G.91's to Portugal; and over 50 U.S.-built F-86's to Venezuela. Obviously, the continuing re-equipment of air forces around the world is beginning to create a relatively large surplus of jet fighters and bombers, aircraft whose longevity is impressive. It would be useful, in the German case, to identify the economic pressures and motivations underlying these exports—for example, their relationship to additional imports of military equipment from the United States.

To counteract their overdependence on outside suppliers for spare parts and maintenance, some of the more advanced developing countries either have established licensed production of foreign aircraft on their soil or have attempted to design and develop their own combat aircraft. In recent years, the Egyptian government has attempted to develop its own supersonic fighter-bomber, the HA-300. The HA-300 design came into being shortly after World War II, when Willi Messerschmitt of Germany became associated with Hispano Aviacion of Spain. When the Spanish government decided, in the late 1950's, to cancel the project, an agreement was reached with the Egyptian government to transfer the entire program to the aircraft plant at Helwan, Egypt. German, Spanish and Egyptian technical personnel and factory workers were employed, and an Austrian aeronautical engineer became head of the project. The Egyptian experience has demonstrated how difficult it is for a less-industrialized country to mount such an effort without large quantities of outside support, thereby defeating the program's main purpose. It became necessary to set up recruiting and procurement activities in Switzerland in order to obtain qualified personnel, technology and material from Western Europe to keep the program moving forward. Even with considerable outside participation, the project has met with little success. When the German government in recent years began pressuring its personnel to return home, the HA-300 program encountered progressively greater administrative and technical difficulties. In spite of the fact that European aircraft companies contributed the use of test facilities and technical assistance, the lack of a broad domestic technical and industrial base has apparently proved insurmountable. Dependence on external assistance was perhaps most strikingly illustrated in 1966, when an entire fuselage section of the HA-300 was shipped to England for testing of the pressurization and air conditioning systems.

Even in India, whose aircraft industry is well established, the attempt to develop indigenous high-performance combat aircraft has been for the most part unsuccessful. In the mid-1950's, the wartime chief designer of Focke-Wulfe emigrated to India and led a design team made up mainly of German engineers in the preliminary development of a supersonic all-weather fighter, designated the HF-24. The effort has progressed at a much slower pace than corresponding programs in the industrial countries, and there have been continuous, difficult, and to date unsuccessful negotiations with other major powers such as the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, to obtain a suitable power plant for the HF-24. Even for less complicated parts and subsystems—for example cockpit canopies or flight controls—the participation of foreign suppliers has been an essential element. Although the HF-24 program has resulted in the manufacture of several subsonic pre-production versions of the aircraft, it has not succeeded in its main purpose of providing a wholly independent capability.

Licensed production, on the other hand, appears to be a compromise solution in that it provides at least a slight amount of domestic control over the source of supply. A current example is the establishment of licensed production in India of the Soviet MIG-21 fighter. Under the terms of an agreement reached in 1964, the Soviet Union has assisted Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. in the establishment of three separate manufacturing complexes, one each for the airframes, engines and electronics. The USSR has supplied production equipment for the plants, as well as personnel to supervise their installation. As in most instances of licensed production, India will first assemble MIG-21 aircraft that have been produced in the USSR and then gradually assume more of the responsibility for subassembly and the actual fabrication of parts. Prior to the current program, India manufactured large numbers of British jet fighters under license, including the Vickers Vampire and Folland Gnat. Successful licensed production efforts have also been undertaken in Israel, which manufactures the French Potez Magister jet trainer under license, and in South Africa, where Atlas Aircraft Corporation is establishing licensed production of the Italian Macchi MB.326 jet trainer. In August 1967, the Israelis took the unusual step of purchasing an entire U.S. aircraft manufacturing firm, in order to move its production facilities to Israel.

Although licensed production assures the availability of spare parts and undoubtedy helps to raise the level of domestic industrial technology, it has also proved to be extremely costly, difficult and time-consuming. Even within a single U.S. aircraft company, the initial unit cost of manufacture at a second facility is much higher than at the original source. The rate at which costs at the second source approximate those of the primary source depends to a great extent on the skill and experience of personnel. When that source is a different country, all of the various management, industrial and technical problems are multiplied greatly.

Therefore, although licensed production programs may slowly become more important in the advanced developing countries, such as India, the sale of completed aircraft will almost certainly continue to be the predominant form of transfer to the developing world.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Early in 1966, it was reported in the American press that Israel had entered into an agreement with France to purchase a large number of French ballistic missiles. The report was immediately and convincingly denied, both in Paris and Tel Aviv. French spokesmen were also quoted as saying, however, that the French government would not object if French private companies were to cooperate with Israel in rocket research and development. In particular, Israel appeared to be interested in developing a two-stage vehicle based on the Topaze, a research rocket which had contributed to the French ballistic missile program. The exchange of statements illustrates two interesting points which, at least for the present, remain valid. The first is that the direct transfer to a developing country by a major power of complete and ready-to-operate offensive ballistic missile systems is an extremely sensitive matter, virtually certain to stir up strong political reactions. The second is that the transfer of technology to support an ostensibly indigenous effort may rouse less opposition because many of the details can be held secret and because the results are not immediately apparent.

The process of ballistic missile diffusion is just beginning, and it is not likely to advance rapidly. The problems encountered by Egypt, similar to problems in its aircraft development, illustrate the complexities. The story is so familiar that it scarcely needs recounting in detail.[3] It is useful merely to point out that, beginning in about 1960, the Egyptian government recruited rocket designers in West Germany and elsewhere, and brought them together at a missile complex in Heliopolis. By 1962, there were over 250 West German rocket experts and technicians in Egypt, along with a total labor force of about 1,000. The development of three different liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, somewhat reminiscent in their configuration of the V-2 missiles, was undertaken. The largest of these was to be a two-stage missile capable of propelling a warhead of 2,000 pounds across a distance of about 500 miles.

The first publicly-announced test flights of Egyptian missiles occurred in July 1962. Shortly thereafter, the two smaller of these missiles, of 200-mile and 325-mile range respectively, were displayed in the annual Revolution Day parade in Cairo. President Nasser claimed at that time that both were in quantity production, but a few months later one of the German technicians was reported as saying that it would be several years before the rockets were ready for military use.

It is obvious that the perfection of an effective ballistic weapon system has remained beyond the capabilities of a limited design team operating under adverse circumstances. However, the initiation even of a technically unpromising effort involving ballistic missiles has enough political potency to create strong repercussions. The Israelis' program of terrorism against the German personnel, as well as their political pressures on West Germany to recall its scientists, are sufficient evidence of the political implications of ballistic missile procurement. Furthermore, the cost to Egypt was clearly enormous in exchange for what it received. Some of the senior personnel are said to have been paid over $100,000 annually for their consulting services on the program. Similarly, the prices paid for equipment and materials procured in Europe were obviously inflated.

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[3] For more detailed accounts, see Hoagland and Teeple, *op. cit.,* and Lewis A. Frank, "Nasser's Missile Program," ORBIS, Fall 1967, p. 753.

In total, the Egyptian experience appears to indicate that developing countries will be faced with almost insurmountable difficulties if they attempt to develop effective ballistic missile systems on a relatively autonomous basis. Without becoming involved in too much analytical detail, it is worthwhile to consider the broad requirements for developing and producing a 500-nautical-mile ballistic missile, the kind of vehicle that might be of interest to Middle Eastern nations. In a modern industrial country with a well-developed aerospace industry, the development and production of such a missile would require approximately 10,000 experienced workers, including about 2,500 engineers. At this level of effort, the project from preliminary design through deployment would be accomplished in about a six-to-eight-year cycle. The total cost of development, production and deployment of a force of fifty missiles would be about $500 million over the eight-year period. Available evidence from aircraft experience indicates that the cost in a developing country would be substantially higher because of dependence on outside suppliers and difficulties in program management.

It is this kind of calculation, added to the uncertainties of trying to undertake such a program without the necessary domestic industrial base, that may lead some developing countries either to seek the procurement of complete missile systems from abroad or to carry out what would be, in effect, only a domestic façade for a foreign-executed program. Rough calculations indicate, for example, that if a country such as Israel were to draw on an experienced missile-producing country such as France, it could effect reductions in the time and resources cited above amounting to about 30 per cent of total program manpower, 50 per cent of scientific manpower, 20 to 30 per cent of total program cost, and about a two-year shortening of the program cycle. These savings could be achieved by acquiring production licenses or direct procurement of guidance and control packages, cooperative adaptation of existing French rocket motors, and the use of French ranges for the test program.

By 1970, there will be five countries capable of supplying complete ballistic missile systems and about ten additional national suppliers of subsystems embracing guidance and control, propulsion or aerodynamics. By 1975 it seems likely that there will be as many as eight suppliers of complete systems and eleven additional suppliers of subsystems. Although it is difficult to predict much farther into the future, by 1980 there could be as many as sixteen suppliers of complete systems and twelve additional suppliers of subsystems. (See Table I.) This expansion will result not only from military programs, but also from the increase in space activities throughout the world. Japan, for example, has already supplied sounding rockets to Yugoslavia, Indonesia and other countries. As the number of potential missile suppliers grows, the bargaining power of potential recipients will increase, and the enforcement of controls over missile diffusion, in

TABLE I

POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS OF MISSILE SYSTEMS AND SUBSYSTEMS

Period	*Systems*	*Subsystems*	
1965-1970	United States USSR France United Kingdom China	United States USSR France United Kingdom China United Arab Republic West Germany Japan	Italy Canada East Germany Australia Sweden Switzerland Israel
1970-1975	*Above plus* United Arab Republic Japan Israel	*Above plus* Netherlands Belgium Czechoslovakia India	
1975-1980	*Above plus* West Germany Italy Canada East Germany Australia Sweden Switzerland Netherlands	*Above plus* South Africa Poland Norway Yugoslavia Pakistan Indonesia Argentina Brazil Chile	

the unlikely event that controls are attempted, will grow steadily more difficult.

Although no one knows exactly what may be the ultimate effects of ballistic missile diffusion to the developing countries, at least some possible effects can be identified. Because the cost of the fully-deployed system is so great, it may demand the selection of targets whose value is commensurate with the cost of the system, such as cities or large economic complexes. Missile procurement is virtually certain to stimulate interest in weapons powerful enough to destroy large and valuable targets. In addition, the introduction of ballistic missiles into regional environments will almost certainly introduce new and unfamiliar strategic considerations among adversaries which could, at least initially, produce marked instabilities.

It is pertinent to note that the end of a local interstate war usually marks an important take-off point for the next round of an arms race. The termination of fighting in the Palestine war (1948), Suez (1956), the Sino-Indian war (1962) and Kashmir (1965) marked the beginning of a major step-up in arms procurement by one or both sides involved in these conflicts. In each case, there were important changes in the quantity and quality of weapons procured, accompanied in some cases by changes in supplier alignments (e.g., Pakistan-China). The reasons are obvious. After combat experience, better assessments can be made about the performance of different types of weapons, and there is also a pressing need for re-equipment due to use and attrition. Furthermore, in the wake of the crisis, the leadership is particularly responsive to military requests. The next round of the Middle Eastern arms race could possibly include, on both sides, a more determined effort to procure ballistic missiles and more efficient warheads, perhaps involving a change of suppliers. Egyptian attempts to develop missiles have been inadequate. Although the experience has been so discouraging that Egypt may abandon the effort, an alternative course would be to look for a new, determined and reliable national supplier of missile or warhead technology, to replace the difficult and haphazard process of hiring individual technical personnel under separate contracts.

CONCLUSION

Why do major powers supply arms to the developing world? Certain economic motivations are apparent. The desire to sell surplus equipment, to assure orderly and sustained production runs, and to help the national balance of payments, have all been important factors. But far more compelling, particularly to the competing superpowers, have been the political motives associated with the Cold War and the encounter of ideologies.

The West has, on balance, made more efforts to restrain and control the flow of arms into the developing world than is generally realized. Transfers have often been made for what seemed in the West to be the right reasons—protecting a legally constituted government from subversion and disorder, or trying to maintain some kind of stable military balance between states in a region. But even when the motives seem acceptable, the results may be unpredictable, as some of the preceding cases have indicated. When all of the different motivations have been examined and are understood—even accepted in some instances as valid—what remains is an increasingly complicated and dangerous process which in many aspects is not in the long-term interests either of the developing world or the major powers.

In the case of interstate wars, one ironic fact deserves a great deal of consideration, because it calls into question the whole rationale of the arms traffic. It is that, when hostilities finally break out in an interstate conflict, the same major powers which made the conflict possible have almost invariably joined in common appeals for a cease-fire. In the Horn of Africa, even though the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in competitive buildups of Somalian and Ethiopian forces, they joined in a direct appeal in 1964 to bring the fighting to an end. Similarly, the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union worked urgently for a cease-fire in the Kashmir dispute of 1965. In many such conflicts there are grounds for suspicion that the influx of weapons from a major power provided the aggressor with the confidence he needed to start the fighting.

There are no easy answers to the question of how to control the international traffic in armaments, and the prognosis is not especially hopeful. The Soviet Union, which since 1955 has tended to set the pace of the traffic, shows every sign of continuing its present course. In spite of setbacks both in Indonesia and Egypt, the Soviets have given ample evidence recently, in their resupply of equipment to Egypt and in the hasty introduction of weapons into the Nigerian conflict, that they are not ready to abandon arms exports as an instrument of their national policy toward the developing world. In part, it may simply be that, once a bureaucracy has been developed in Moscow (or for that matter in Washington) to handle this type of transaction, the momentum of the activity becomes sufficient justification for its continuance. An additional sign is that Soviet logistical capabilities to support this type of activity, in the form of airlift and sealift, have improved dramatically in the last few years and appear to portend more extensive Soviet arms exports in the future.

For a long time to come, sovereign nations will still need arms. The beginning of wisdom will be the recognition by all parties, in the East, the West, and the developing world, that a greater international effort is needed to measure the scope of the arms traffic and calculate its present and possible future effects on international security.

Initiatives of various kinds to investigate international arms transfers have been made from time to time. In November 1965 the Maltese delegation to the United Nations placed a draft resolution before the General Assembly which called for the UN to establish "a general and effective system of publicity to transfers between states, whether by way of trade or otherwise, of arms, ammunition and implements of war." This constructive resolution was defeated at least partly because the delegates were tired and needed a recess. It certainly deserves a second chance in the Assembly. In the Maltese draft resolution, it was recalled that the League of Nations had published a *Yearbook on the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War* for many years. Similarly, in June 1967 the President of the United States proposed an arms registration system, under UN auspices, for all weapons shipped to the Middle East. Probably underlying both of these proposals was the assumption that publication of transfers would, in itself, constitute a partial deterrent to the traffic. But the value of publication could also go much further.

A more intensive public or private international effort to assemble a base of information on arms transfers, even if it were not totally reliable, would inevitably result in a better understanding of the traffic in arms. Until more professionals in the fields of defense, strategy and arms control become better acquainted with the details of the problem, it will not be possible to confirm or deny, by analysis, the intuitive suspicion now shared by many hardheaded and practical observers that the international arms traffic represents a net loss in international security.

One suspects, for example, that weapons occasionally do precipitate conflicts; that the traffic in arms provides a tacit but clear major-power endorsement of military conflict and competition in the developing world; that the large-scale import of military hardware or technology is producing, in the developing countries, effects of a social, political and economic nature that no one really understands; and finally, that a tone is being set in the conduct of international relations that may some day react adversely on the major powers themselves.

When more professionals, in a greater number of countries, can be provided with more complete information about the international arms traffic, then it may be possible to find better ways than we have so far discovered to improve the stability, prosperity and security of the developing world.

PROTEST ON THE RIGHT: THE NPD IN RECENT GERMAN POLITICS

by Paula Sutter Fichtner

GERMAN local elections on April 28, 1968 in Baden-Württemberg demonstrated beyond a doubt the continued political appeal of the Federal Republic's latest right-wing party, the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD). Having won between 10 and 15 per cent of the votes in the thirty-eight electoral districts of the southwestern province, the NPD matched and even surpassed its victories of the past two years. Despite the numerous former Nazis who are members of the organization, German and American commentators do not regard the successes of the NPD as symptomatic of rising pro-fascist sentiment in Germany. Rather they see its drawing power as indicative of German discontent with a domestic coalition which leaves no room for genuine parliamentary opposition, with economic uncertainty and a generally stagnant foreign policy, and finally, with the increasingly strident activism of the indigenous student "New Left."[1] That the strength of the party resides in its capacity to serve as a voice for the German protest ballot was strikingly confirmed by a *New York Times* report of September 26, 1967 that the NPD's membership rolls are shrinking even as the percentage of its votes gradually increases.

The present West German political situation affords unique opportunities for the crystallization of new forms of extremism. Konrad Adenauer avoided coalitions of the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democrats in the hope that a strong second party in the German parliament would discourage radicalism on either the Left or Right. The growth of a German "New Left" parallel to the NPD on the Right would indicate that in these matters the late Chancellor was an astute judge of his countrymen.[2]

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[1] See, e.g., Fritz Richert, *Die Nationale Welle* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1966), pp. 170-171; Erwin Scheuch, "Kommt eine Welle von rechts?," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), May 11, 1966, p. 6; Klaus Epstein, "The Current West German Scene," *Modern Age,* XI, No. 2 (1967), p. 163; Klaus Liepelt, "Anhänger der neuen Rechtspartei: ein Beitrag zur Diskussion über das Wählerreservoir der NPD," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* VIII, No. 2 (1967), pp. 250, 256.

[2] Richard Hiscocks, *The Adenauer Era* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966), p. 99.

Though the NPD as yet has issued no concrete party platform, it has in its manifesto, *Politik in unserer Zeit: das Manifest der NPD mit Erläuterungen,* and its newspaper, the *Deutsche Nachrichten,* produced enough official statements to indicate the general themes and directions of its thinking. Indeed, the party has achieved with a remarkable degree of consistency a synthesis of nationalism and conservatism while at the same time remaining within the bounds of legality, a combination that many parties of the German Right have either striven for in vain since World War II, or, by virtue of their programs, have not attempted.

For the past twenty-odd years, the German Right has been able to agree on many basic ideas. Intense nationalism and bitter opposition to communism, both as a philosophical position and system of territorial domination, have repeatedly characterized many of its programs. Along with these tenets, the rightist groups have consistently expressed strong reservations about the abilities of parliamentary government to carry on the business of state and have displayed a correspondingly positive attitude toward extensive executive powers. Despite these important fundamental similarities, however, the German Right has suffered from crippling fissures, partly self-induced and partly generated from outside sources.

Because of their limited appeal to only one narrow group and its interests, the highly nationalistic refugee parties, such as the *Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (BHE)—renamed in 1952 the *Gesamtdeutsches Block* (GB)—were unable to survive as major organizations once the reason for their existence had been removed. The generosity of Adenauer's legislation in 1951-1952, which compensated refugees for loss of land and property and made it possible for many of them to enter the West German civil service at positions equivalent to those they had left, took much of the sting out of their economic grievances. When some of their leaders were absorbed into the CDU, their entire organizational structure was badly shaken. Through its provisions forbidding anti-parliamentary agitation, the German Constitution, the "Basic Law," has also had a significant role in curbing rightist activities. The openly Nazi *Sozialistische Reichspartei* was banned on these grounds in 1952.[3]

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[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 101-103. For a comprehensive survey of the organizations, platforms and history of the German Right, 1945-1963, see the recently published work by Kurt P. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945,* two volumes (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1967).

Perhaps the most significant controversy occupying the German Right since 1945, however, has been whether its various groups should place a higher priority on matters pertaining to the recovery of territories lost to Germany during the war and reunification with the East Zone, or on a kind of domestic conservatism dedicated to preserving certain economic, social and political practices. The former alternative had the advantage of wide appeal but the dangerous consequence of unavoidable conflict with the NATO allies; the latter was admittedly safer but had limited political attractiveness. The NPD has grown out of this conflict and has attempted to resolve it.

II

The history of the party can be traced back to one of the largest of the German conservative organizations, the *Deutsche Partei,* which was founded in 1946. The *Deutsche Partei* found its main support among peasants, on the one hand, and small businessmen and artisans who make up that uniquely German institution, the *Mittelstand,* which has traditionally been opposed to both big business and big labor. The question of whether to emphasize the conservative or national theme continually plagued the organization. In 1955, it opted for the conservative line, but in 1960 it lost strength through the switch of five of its parliamentary representatives to the CDU. It thereupon merged in 1961 with the largely refugee *Gesamtdeutsches Block* into the *Gesamtdeutsche Partei,* thus producing a new political constellation with both a national and a conservative character. The new group made numerous attempts to contact the highly nationalistic *Deutsche Reichspartei,* an offshoot of the proscribed *Sozialistische Reichspartei,* about cooperation in elections and even possible fusion. Nothing came of these until 1964 when the NPD was formed, drawing in members from all of the aforementioned parties, many other nationalist and conservative groups, and a surprisingly high percentage of young people who had engaged in no previous form of political activity.[4]

The NPD has avoided some of the worst tactical and doctrinal errors of its forerunners. Unlike the *Sozialistische Reichspartei,* it has skirted open conflict with the "Basic Law" by publicly professing support of it; it has eschewed the terminological mistakes of one of its immediate predecessors, the *Deutsche Reichspartei*, by not calling for the re-establishment of the German *Reich*.[5] Like most parties of the German Right, however, its political philosophy stems from its analysis of the relationship between the German *Volk* (people) and the state. Dr. Ernst Anrich, who comes closest to being the party's official ideologue on questions of conservative doctrine, has described the state as an organism inherent in and emerging naturally from the *Volk* as the latter's vehicle of political expression.[6] Since the *Volk* is by its very essence an indivisible whole, any forms of sovereignty that fragment it are unnatural and hostile. The division of Germany into two zones is such an imperfect form of political organization, institutionalizing as it does the incongruence of one *Volk* but two states.

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[4] Hermann Meyn, *Die Deutsche Partei* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1965), pp. 31, 32 (note 1), 39, 44-45, 47, 54, 74, 108-109; Tauber, *op. cit.,* I, 885-891.

Deeply anti-Marxist, the NPD could not accept communist rule over a united Germany under any circumstances. Thus, the Bonn government, if only by default, is the one regime that could rule Germany were unification ever to be realized. The NPD is convinced, however, that the present political structure in West Germany is incapable of providing the leadership to achieve this consolidation, let alone to direct a single German state. According to the NPD, Bonn has by both its actions and its refusals to act in domestic and international affairs encouraged a fracturing of national life even in West Germany.

In its criticism of contemporary political affairs in the Federal Republic, the party does not reject constitutional government as it has been formulated in the "Basic Law." To do so would bring almost certain prohibition. It has some suggestions for amending the structure of executive power, specifically for strengthening the role of the President, and in general it wishes to see a more "forceful conduct of government." However, most of its ideas concern changes of policy that would require little rewriting of the "Basic Law." What its leaders desire from the Bonn government is a program designed to encourage German independence from "foreign interests" represented by the allied occupation powers, NATO, and the Common Market, all of which they feel have deliberately conspired to keep Germany in a secondary position among European states. They view Bonn's inability to deal with certain disturbing conditions within West Germany as the result of the regime's internationalist course since the Republic was founded. The consequence of this policy has been an eroding of the German national purpose and sense of unity.[7]

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[5] Wilhelm Mommsen, editor, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme* (Munich: Isar, 1960), I, 760.

[6] Richert, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45. On the question of *Volk* and state in German history see George Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).

They see Germany as the victim of two arch-villains, international communism, represented by the Soviet Union, and "Western democracy" led by the United States. The coalition of the CDU and SPD (Social Democrats) has markedly intensified their suspicion of the Bonn government, since they now believe the Marxist-dominated SPD to be in a position where it can sell West Germany as well as the East Zone down the river to the Soviet Union. Any effort made by the coalition to normalize relations with the East bloc, not to mention something as significant as recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line, borders on outright treachery.[8]

Their anti-Americanism is more complex. Their basic objection to "Western democracy" is that up to the present it has been devoid of German "national content"; moreover, it has proven itself capable of supporting a wide variety of ideas, even Marxism, few of which do anything to further German interests. They believe that their aims would find sympathy among the American Right—they praise Herbert Hoover's encomium of nationalism at the 1952 Republican National Convention, for example, as a stimulus to self-government. Beyond this segment of American political life, however, they regard the American scene with the same suspicion and outright distaste that they do the Soviet one.[9]

The NPD tries its utmost to find evidence of Soviet-American collusion against Germany, thereby attempting by implication to minimize the differences between communism and democracy. It looks on recent discussions between American and Soviet representatives concerning nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as a thinly-veiled effort of the Great Powers to prevent Germany from developing any significant atomic potential. They compare this aim to the integration of German forces into NATO, which was, in their eyes, primarily intended to check the resurgence of

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[7] *Politik* (the NPD Manifesto), pp. 5, 11; *Deutsche Nachrichten* (Hannover) (hereafter cited as *DN*), July 14, 1967, p. 1, and August 11, 1967, p. 5. Heribert Kohl, "Die 'Deutschen Nachrichten,'" *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* VIII, No. 2 (1967), pp. 272-292, offers a thorough and perceptive analysis of the history, contents and style of this newspaper.

[8] *Politik,* pp. 15-16, 35; *DN,* July 7, 1967, p. 1, and July 14, 1967, p. 6.

[9] *DN,* August 25, 1967, p. 3; July 21, 1967, p. 12; June 9, 1967, p. 10.

German military might. Furthermore, they feel that if Germany is denied access to any kind of nuclear information through the nonproliferation treaty, her scholars and technicians working in the field will emigrate, leaving German research at a humiliatingly low level of accomplishment. The pact is appraised as a logical extension of the Morgenthau Plan, formulated in the United States at the end of World War II, to convert Germany into an agricultural backwater.[10]

Nor do they wish to see the Bonn government committed to one side, Soviet or American. The NPD advised German neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967, and strongly criticized the Kiesinger cabinet for sending gas masks and trucks to the Israelis, whom it regards as direct clients of the United States. It is convinced that association with Washington in one of the United States' numerous foreign involvements might drag Germany into others, a condition which the party deems to be potentially injurious to German interests in Europe. Accordingly, taking a strong pro-Israeli and therefore pro-U.S. stand might have sucked Germany into a war with the Soviet Union which could have made the German position in Europe even more difficult. The party in any case has little faith in America's ability to manage widely-flung foreign interests since she seems incapable of solving her own domestic problems, as demonstrated by last summer's ghetto rioting.[11]

If the party has any model for action on the international scene outside of Germany, this is French President Charles de Gaulle. NPD members regard the general as an apostle of freedom for Europe from what they call the "pan-ideas" of Americanism and Bolshevism, and they repeatedly echo his "Europe for Europeans" slogan. They applauded his support of French-Canadian separatism, equating that problem with those of the East Germans and even the South Tyrolese in Italy, all of whom, according to the NPD, are laboring under regimes inimical to their national development.[12]

De Gaulle has provided a kind of negative inspiration for their military notions as well. The impairment of NATO, due to French withdrawal as well as certain actions of the Americans and British, buttresses their argument that such an international organization might well be incapable of defending Germany.

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[10] *DN,* August 18, 1967, pp. 1, 3; July 21, 1967, p. 7.

[11] *DN,* July 14, 1967, p. 2; August 11, 1967, p. 2.

[12] *DN,* July 21, 1967, p. 7; August 11, 1967, p. 2.

They propose to substitute a mobile defense force with an independent German general staff, though they do not rule out cooperation with other European military forces. In any case, they regard the present *Bundeswehr* as incapable of doing this job; in their opinion the *Bundeswehr* is infected with an overdose of civilian administration, general lack of discipline, and an absence of national concern. This last accusation has been fostered by a passage in the army's *Information for the Troops* which states that "justice, freedom, truth, and morality are above the fatherland."[13]

III

However, the NPD's strongest indictment of foreign influences and the active or tacit support of these by the West German government concerns internal affairs. All of its utterances on domestic policy aim toward reviving what it considers to be Germany's flagging prestige in the company of independent nations. For example, the party calls for a health program that will enable Germany to recover from the still-perceptible effects of World War II and allow her to maintain her place as an industrial leader and a *Kulturstaat.* Its demand for conservation measures to keep areas in the countryside free from commercial and manufacturing establishments is based on its desire to fix a more vivid notion of homeland and countryside in the minds of the German people.[14]

Party officials' wishes for a more resolute and independent Germany also form the foundation for their economic notions. It is in this area that their conservatism most emphatically reinforces their nationalism. Regarding a debt-ridden national government as a brake on any active foreign policy, they ask for certain changes of direction in German economic practices which will encourage this new independence. Like many German conservatives before them, they view an extensive and prosperous peasantry and *Mittelstand* as the basis of a sound economy. They urge protection of these groups from the combined threats of giant business and "foreign interests," by which they mean everything from non-German capital to non-German business practices, both of which for the most part originate in the United States.[15]

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[13] *Politik,* p. 34; *DN,* July 21, 1967, pp. 1-3; August 11, 1967, p. 3; July 7, 1967, p. 3.

[14] *Politik,* pp. 7, 23; *DN,* July 7, 1967, p. 7.

[15] *Politik,* p. 6; *DN,* September 1, 1967, p. 2; July 21, 1967, p. 4.

Their unwavering support of the *Mittelstand* stems from their conviction that the self-employed handworker, small factory owner or businessman spreads habits of independence and a consciousness of individuality throughout the population. They protest that Bonn's policies, nurturing industrial and commercial concentration through permitting such practices as price cutting, are ruinous to the *Mittelstand.* The government is thereby alienating from the state that very class which is supposed to strengthen it. They object to the gradual destruction of small private enterprise as leading to a kind of industrial collectivization, Marxist in everything but name, and to greater national indebtedness, since the state must now take care of these economically dispossessed groups in the form of subventions and welfare legislation. Summer 1967 discussions in the Kiesinger administration on the need to curb government spending due to the economic recession of the past year added considerable conviction to NPD arguments. The party is acutely concerned with what it claims is the financial overcommitment of the German government and wishes to curb spending on such things as war reparations, foreign aid and, above all, a military establishment deemed useless in its present form. Its paper, *Deutsche Nachrichten,* is quick to remind readers of the former catastrophes to which government indebtedness led —in obvious reference to the savage inflation experienced by the Germans following World War I.[16]

Suggested reforms for this situation are the traditional one of tariff protection, plus emphasis on currency stability and more strictly regulated marketing practices to check the unfair competition of big industry. Spokesmen observe that since other countries erect customs barriers to protect their domestic industries and markets, there is no reason why Germany should not do so as well. Such a move would have the advantage of lessening Germany's dependence on foreign sources of supply and markets; the latter, they say, proved themselves to be untrustworthy by turning their backs on German goods in 1931-1932.[17] Their prime example of a German industry which in the long run can only further German independence but is now in need of protection, is coal. The Bonn regime has been making systematic efforts to shut down unprofitable mining establishments as the country gradually converts to such fuels as petroleum and natural gas. The recent Near East crisis and its attendant threat of interrupted oil deliveries gave the NPD ample cause to reiterate the dangers of excessive dependence on foreign sources of supply and unconcern for domestic ones.

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[16] *Politik,* p. 14; *DN,* July 28, 1967, p. 4; July 7, 1967, p. 4; July 21, 1967, p. 9; June 9, 1967, p. 2.

[17] *DN,* July 7, 1967, p. 4; July 21, 1967, p. 4; August 4, 1967, p. 4; June 9, 1967, p. 4.

The party is equally bitter when it sees German industry victimized by the government's efforts to smooth relations with Eastern Europe. When these gestures take the form of trade agreements which entail importing at low prices certain goods that West Germany already possesses in abundance, the market for the German product at home invariably suffers.[18] The NPD employs a sharp eye and complaining tongue to observe and report such occurrences.

Another preoccupation is the German peasantry. The NPD considers a bountiful agriculture not only a cornerstone of German freedom from foreign sources of supply but also an important factor in the struggle against worldwide communism. In its view, hunger makes Marxists. Officials criticize German involvement in the Common Market for the disadvantageous competitive position in which they claim the German peasantry finds itself. The party maintains that the German peasant has much higher production costs than his French, Dutch or Italian counterpart and demands that the West German government, through stricter regulation of domestic market prices, do something to rectify this situation. Occasionally the *Deutsche Nachrichten* only hints at the drawbacks of German participation in the Common Market, rather than offering outright criticism of it. The issue of July 14, 1967, for example, carried an article bearing the headline "Major European Shortage of Beef and Veal Expected," which observed that West European countries outside the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association would feel the effects of this shortage less severely.[19]

The party reserves some of its most barbed and occasionally vitriolic criticism for West German cultural and intellectual affairs. Unlike some earlier German conservative groups, the NPD cannot be called obscurantist. It is a strong supporter of education and research, regarding success in these fields as one more way by which Germany can regain her lost prestige and free herself from foreign domination. Leaders sometimes berate the federal government for not providing adequate financial assistance in these endeavors.[20] The intellectual developments they deplore are those which they consider foisted upon West Germany by the allied occupation, particularly the American "re-education" program which they call the "intellectual-educational side of the Morgenthau Plan." Within the framework of this program such writers as Franz Kafka, Bert Brecht and Günther Grass, along with historians such as Golo Mann and Eugen Kogon, have been able to flourish, bringing with them "ambivalence, alienation . . . and denial of all standards of values. . . ." The NPD sees West Germany now in a "life and death struggle" for its national being against these ideas and the system that supports them.

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[18] *DN,* July 7, 1967, p. 1; September 1, 1967, p. 11; August 4, 1967, p. 1.
[19] *Politik,* pp. 7, 17-18, 21; *DN,* July 28, 1967, p. 4; July 14, 1967, p. 4.

This destruction of traditional values through the process of "re-education" in general, and its specific products, for example the iconoclastic Grass, have prevented Germany from reconstructing an acceptable national ethical code out of the rubble left by National Socialism. Re-education has provided no substitute for older norms other than what the NPD regards as a kind of individual anarchy, best shown by the German "New Left." While NPD members do not support a return to National Socialism, they see contemporary German intellectual life perpetuating this undermining of all standards, thus weakening German national identity to the point where the nation continues to be victimized by "foreign interests."[21]

They neglect no opportunity to criticize German public information media, treating the latter's origins under allied licenses as *prima facie* evidence of their hostility to German national interests. In the NPD's view, the press, radio and television have never escaped from occupation control in the Soviet Zone; similarly, in the Federal Republic the pro-allied Bonn government dominates public organs of information by virtue of its official position. Furthermore, what the party regards as the communist-oriented West German Left is thought to have a greater public voice than the Right. It is to this influence that the NPD attributes the results of a poll recently reported in the *Deutsche Nachrichten*. To the question of what the name of the Soviet Zone should be, 38 per cent of those asked replied "East Germany," while a depressingly small 25 per cent, from the party's outlook, remembered that the true East German territory was now administered by Poland, and "rightly" answered "Middle

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[20] *Politik*, pp. 25-26; *DN*, August 18, 1967, p. 4.
[21] *Politik*, p. 28; *DN*, July 14, 1967, p. 9.

Germany."[22] The party also seizes eagerly upon evidence of communist domination of foreign public media such as the BBC to explain any anti-German sentiments detected in that quarter.[23]

Though the NPD sees communism as its ultimate enemy, it views "Western democracy" introduced by American "re-education" as the handmaiden of the Marxists, encouraging Germans to be far more critical of Nazism than of Soviet tyranny. The party regards the German "New Left" which displays all the anti-authoritarian and anarchistic qualities of its American double as the latest result of "re-education."

Areas of German artistic endeavor also show unfortunate symptoms of American influence or provide avenues for further penetration by it. A modern art exhibit held in Munich last summer, encompassing well over one thousand items, displayed a few pieces of Pop-art which prompted the comment in the *Deutsche Nachrichten* that the new American import had considerably strengthened the "depiction of perversion and pornography in modernism. . . ." The opening of Arthur Kopit's *Oh Dad, poor Dad* gave rise to NPD speculations on the evil effect that American "Momism" could have on the German family structure.[24]

The worst consequence of "re-education" is thought to have been the creation of a climate of exaggerated criticism toward things German among the intellectuals which has further divided the country. The NPD bemoans the high position accorded Bert Brecht among prominent writers for the German theater. They see Brecht and his imitators constantly parading before the public eye a communist-oriented *Weltanschauung* diametrically opposed to that of the average German citizen. They deplore the fact that the average citizen in question is usually depicted by leading writers as a cultural primitive, further alienating citizen and intellectual from one another.[25]

IV

To counteract these tendencies and to heal some of the rents in the fabric of German national consciousness, the NPD embraces as one of its most important tasks a re-education program of its own. By this it intends to present to the German people and particularly its youth what the party regards as the more positive aspects of German life and, above all, a true picture of German history. Party personnel attack the problem from several angles. They approve of government subvention of films taken from "normal" lives rather than the "abnormal" ones so favored by current avant-garde cinema. They wish to publicize some of the better aspects of German traditions which they believe have been unfairly treated in German information media. In the opinion of the NPD a recent telecast on Prussia and Prussians displayed only negative stereotypes of the province and its inhabitants—hypermilitarism and hyperdiscipline—without mentioning the great cultural figures who graced Berlin and other cities, and the religious toleration for which the kings of Prussia were noted.[26]

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[22] *Politik,* p. 31; *DN,* June 9, 1967, pp. 2, 10.

[23] *DN,* July 28, 1967, p. 6.

[24] *DN,* June 9, 1967, p. 3; July 21, 1967, p. 2; August 4, 1967, p. 7; July 14, 1967, p. 8.

[25] *DN,* June 9, 1967, p. 8.

The burden of their revisionism, however, lies in the area of World War II and National Socialism. In this connection, they see German youth receiving a picture of their parents as war criminals, at least by implication, which only exacerbates the natural generation gap and divides the German people among themselves more than ever. While the NPD admits that such things as war crimes took place, it emphasizes that these were committed by only a limited number of Germans. It is not uncritical of Hitler, but feels that the anti-Nazism encouraged by the United States, the government of the Federal Republic and left-oriented German intellectuals has distorted the view held by the German citizen toward his recent past. It resents the decision reached last summer by the Kiesinger Government to abolish any terminal date in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes, for it claims that keeping alive this kind of guilt complex among the German people will keep them politically passive forever.[27]

The party has two brands of offensive on the historical front. One is to point out hypocrisy and ethical misdemeanors in what it sees to be the sources of anti-German propaganda. Thus, it noted with satisfaction manifestations of racism in England where people were "supposedly all opposed to this idea" when propounded by Hitler or Verwoerd of South Africa. In taking note of the recent censure in the U.S. Senate of Thomas J. Dodd, a former prosecutor at the Nürnberg trials, the *Deutsche Nachrichten* sarcastically suggested that the senator be made "Minister of Re-education" in the Federal Republic, since his ethical standards seemed to qualify him for the position. The citing of the Nürnberg hearings as precedent by "Jewish Physician and Army Captain Howard Levy" in his trial in the spring of 1967 was recorded in the newspaper with the observation that Americans were now beginning to ask whether or not the Nürnberg procedure was working to their disadvantage.[28]

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[26] *Politik,* p. 33; *DN,* July 14, 1967, pp. 6-7.

[27] *Politik,* p. 33; *DN,* June 9, 1967, p. 2; July 21, 1967, p. 8; September 1, 1967, p. 1.

The other mode of attack is that of finding moral flaws in reasons generally given for anti-Germanism, particularly regarding German treatment of Poles, Czechs and Jews during World War II. Here the party motto might well read *tu quoque.* On the Polish question, the *Deutsche Nachrichten* carried an extensive series in the summer of 1967 describing plans for a preventive war against Germany designed by Marshal Jozef Pilsudski and his circle in 1933. Subsequent articles enumerated the anti-German activities and reprisals suffered by the German minority at the hands of the Poles from the 1920's to 1945. The NPD feels that these aspects of German-Polish relations should receive publicity —particularly in Germany itself—equal to that given German atrocities committed against Poland. The approach to the Czechs is identical. The *Deutsche Nachrichten* deplored a broadcast in England on June 25, 1967 which commemorated the victims of Lidice but left unmentioned the Sudeten Germans who were "robbed, tortured or driven from their homelands in revenge for Lidice." The party asks why a monument could be constructed at Dachau in memory of those who died there without a corresponding structure being erected to memorialize "Sudeten Germans who were victims of Czech terror."[29]

The 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict gave the NPD the opportunity to carry this argument to the Jews as well in an effort to counter what it sees as myopic philo-Semitism in Germany. The party has made no openly anti-Jewish statements, though its publications rarely fail to mention either Jews or Israel in other than a pejorative context. While admitting that the Jews had been treated unjustly in Germany and Europe, the NPD points out that the Jews themselves had created, and were in the process of multiplying, Arab refugees who were now in the same position as millions of Germans, driven from their homes as a consequence of World War II. The occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem, in the eyes of the NPD, should bring home to Germans who accuse their fellow Germans of crimes against Jews that, when it comes to war, Jews are no better than anyone else.[30]

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[28] *DN,* June 9, 1967, pp. 1, 6; August 4, 1967, p. 3; July 7, 1967, p. 6.

[29] *DN,* June 9, 1967, pp. 5, 7; July 21, 1967, p. 5; July 14, 1967, pp. 3, 5; July 7, 1967, p. 5.

V

Thus, it is out of this mixture of injured and frustrated nationalism and defensive conservatism that the NPD has constituted itself. It presents little in the way of a specific program other than the general directions of policy already outlined. At present this would seem to be more of a strength than a weakness. Its lack of any real platform leaves the party free to criticize the present regime without the danger of the ruling coalition absorbing a major portion of its ideas—a way in which several parties of the German Right have been emasculated since 1945. The absence of a program also prevents the NPD from being tied down to a specific set of measures that might become obsolete—another cause for the collapse of German right-wing parties in the past. In any case, with the CDU-SPD coalition in power and still commanding overwhelming support from the German voters, there is no real pressure on the NPD to formulate its ideas more concretely since there is little chance that they could be implemented.

What the NPD would produce, were it called upon to form some kind of a specific political program, remains open to speculation. While the party certainly can be said to represent a wide spectrum of the German Right, it possesses nowhere near the comprehensiveness of the CDU or SPD. One of the great strengths of Nazism was the broad appeal of its economic program, something not present in NPD thinking up to this time. Rather, by its opposition to both big labor and big commerce, the NPD seems to rule two major segments of the German national economy out of its concern. One suspects that the party might be more tolerant of big industry were the latter to be more German-oriented and less internationally-minded. The *Deutsche Nachrichten* eulogized the late Alfried Krupp as an industrialist representative of an older generation who cultivated a kind of paternal relationship with his employees rather than the purely business one that is typical of the post-1945 *Wirtschaftswunder*.[31] The fact that the NPD has seized upon the troubles of the ailing German coal industry indicates that the party is not blind to the political use to which industrial discontent could be put.

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[30] *DN*, June 9, 1967, p. 2; July 14, 1967, p. 3.

[31] *DN*, August 4, 1967, p. 4.

The party's future accomplishments depend almost exclusively on the actions of the Bonn regime in the economic sphere, where a marked slowdown has occurred over the past year, and on the international scene, where the present government has been a far more willing follower than leader. As long as the CDU-SPD coalition shows few dramatic changes in policy, it seems likely that extremism on both Left and Right will be somewhat louder in West Germany than it has been in the recent past. For those who are willing to attribute the ills of the Federal Republic to a lack of national consciousness and to economic practices incompatible with specifically German interests, the NPD will be a convenient political haven.

McNAMARA'S ABM POLICY, 1961-1967

by Benson D. Adams

ON September 18, 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announced that the United States intended to begin deployment of a thin anti-ballistic missile defense system (Sentinel) designed to thwart the emerging (1970-1973) Chinese nuclear threat. Significantly, but not unexpectedly, the ABM deployment was a response to the Chinese and not the Soviet military-technological threat. In subsequent weeks the Administration went to great lengths to emphasize to the Soviets and its own allies that the Sentinel deployment was intended to counter only the Chinese. Opposition to this deployment decision has come from a number of groups and individuals who contend against any ABM deployment, as well as from those who believe any deployment is impracticable unless it can counter the more immediate and sophisticated threat from the Soviet Union.*

Behind this decision to deploy an ABM system lie ten years of political controversy, much of which is hidden in a labyrinth of technical, strategic and military considerations. During the first four years of the dispute, the protagonists were concerned with technical uncertainties over the feasibility and practicality of the Nike-Zeus system. Since 1961 Secretary McNamara, as the chief architect of the nation's defense policy, had been struggling with crucial political and strategic implications, as well as technical problems, surrounding the ABM issue.

I

Considerable insight about U.S. defense policy can be gained from a study of the ABM issue since 1961, when McNamara testified that Nike-Zeus was entering the advanced testing stage. The advantages of Zeus, according to the Secretary, included the following points:

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*EDITOR'S NOTE: At the time this article went to press, in early June, Congressional opponents of the thin Sentinel ABM system sought in vain to eliminate its deployment, as part of the cutback of $6 billion in federal expenditures agreed to by the President and Congressional leaders in exchange for an income tax surcharge. They reasoned that the Sentinel system is ineffective and would antagonize the Soviet Union, whose ABM deployment is viewed now as less "offensive" than it appeared a year ago. They also asserted that the Chinese threat, to which the Sentinel is ostensibly addressed, will not emerge as soon as originally feared.

> Successful development may force an aggressor to expend additional resources to increase his ICBM force. It would also make accurate estimates of our defensive capabilities more difficult for a potential enemy and complicate the achievement of a successful attack. Furthermore, the protection that it would provide, even if for only a portion of our population, would be better than none at all.[1]

Despite these advantages, McNamara questioned the validity of beginning production of Nike-Zeus since

> There is still considerable uncertainty as to its technical feasibility and, even if successfully developed, there are many serious operating problems yet to be solved. The system itself is vulnerable to ballistic missile attack, and its effectiveness could be degraded by the use of more sophisticated ICBM's screened by multiple decoys. Saturation of the target is another possibility, as ICBM's become easier and cheaper to produce in coming years. Finally, it is a very expensive system in relation to the degree of protection that it can furnish.[2]

For these reasons, McNamara decided to continue the Zeus R&D effort but not to initiate production or deployment of the system. He warned that if the system were deployed before it was fully developed, the expenditure of funds for the procurement of facilities and production of materials could be largely wasted should changes have to be made in its design during the final stages of development.[3] The technical uncertainty surrounding Zeus was whether it could discriminate between real warheads and decoys.[4] If this problem could not be solved satisfactorily, the system would not be effective.

Congressman Phil Weaver (R-Neb.) asked McNamara whether he would change his position against deployment if there were evidence that the Soviets were deploying an ABM system. McNamara replied: "I do not believe it would affect my recommendation in any way because I have assumed that we must take account of the possibility that they will have such a system."[5] He admitted that the credibility of the U.S. deterrent would be enhanced if the Soviets could be led to think that we had an effective system: we could encourage them to think this way by our efforts to develop and deploy an ABM system.[6] This point about the role played in a deterrent situation by communications regarding weapons systems was well understood by McNamara. He used such communications as a critical element of U.S. ABM policy in subsequent years.

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[1] U.S. Congress, House, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962,* Part 3, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, pp. 16-17. (Hereafter cited as *House Defense Appropriations 1962.* Hearings for subsequent years are cited in a similar manner with the appropriate year.)

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 17.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 43.

[4] At this date decoy and "penaid" (penetration aid) technology was in its infancy. An additional problem McNamara cited was the inability to harden the Zeus radars and launching system.

[5] *House Defense Appropriations 1962,* p. 112.

II

In 1962 Secretary McNamara identified the ABM problem in the broader context of U.S. strategic defensive tasks. Of the six tasks he listed, four required top priority attention and were related to ICBM defense: (1) improving the certainty and timeliness of the ICBM-attack warning system; (2) setting up an active defense against ICBM's; (3) strengthening defenses against submarine-launched missiles; and (4) providing, to the extent possible, fallout protection for the U.S. people.[7] For the first time he identified the civil defense program (fallout shelters) with the ABM problem: the deployment of Zeus was made contingent on a shelter program.[8]

In his 1962 testimony McNamara also revealed that a difference of opinion existed between himself and the Army over the system's capabilities and the Army's desire to begin procurement.[9] The Secretary felt that the search for an ABM system was of vital importance to our security and should continue beyond the almost one billion dollars that had already been spent, but he was convinced that Zeus was not the answer to the problem. Even though full-scale tests of the Zeus system were to be carried out in the spring of 1962 in the Pacific to determine the feasibility of an ABM, McNamara cautioned that these tests were not being conducted under combat conditions and hence their outcome would have no bearing on his decision against deployment.[10]

In addition to the technical deficiencies of the system and his predetermined opinion of the worth of the 1962 Zeus tests, McNamara mentioned one other detrimental factor: the prohibitive estimate of $10-14 billion to complete development and deployment.[11]

Dr. Harold Brown, Director of DDR&E (research and engineering), shed additional light on the decision not to commit Zeus to production. He advised that testing was proceeding satisfactorily, but that there were a number of questions about Zeus' ultimate value as a weapon system.[12] At the same time he stated that once one is in the ABM business, one does not get out of it, even if it is difficult to find a satisfactory solution. In fact, "even if we think it will never be satisfactory we should continue. We have to go ahead with such a program." By developing one system, testing it and incorporating the new improvements, we obtain "data, whether or not Nike-Zeus is ever used, as to possible deployments of other systems." The major obstacle to the Nike-Zeus, Brown said, was the decoy discrimination problem. When questioned about Soviet ABM efforts, he explained that the Soviets had quite a large effort, somewhat in excess of our own.[13]

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[6] *Loc. cit.*

[7] *House Defense Appropriations 1963*, Part 2, p. 43.

[8] *Loc. cit.*

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 256-258. At the same time a decision to resume nuclear testing was being considered, and McNamara stated that a good deal could be learned about ABM systems in general from these tests. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

Even though officials were awaiting the summer Pacific tests of Zeus, there appeared to be a consensus in the Administration that Zeus would not be able to cope with the ICBM threat in the latter half of the decade. "[A] 100 per cent effective system of military defense against ICBM's and submarine launched missiles is technically impossible," McNamara cautioned. "At least during the period 1963 through 1967 we will have to rely for our survival on a combination of military and civil defense measures."[14]

After the tests were evaluated, Defense Department decision-makers found themselves in a position to improve the ABM system in four major areas[15] and then to proceed with missile defense along one of three alternatives:

(1) Continued development and testing of the present Nike-Zeus system, and the separate development of an advanced radar.
(2) Development of an improved ABM system by further work in the four areas mentioned above (see footnote 15), and deployment of a system that would initially incorporate part of the proposed improvements.
(3) Development of a more advanced system, to be known as Nike-X, incorporating the Sprint missiles and advanced radars, and postponement of a decision on ABM deployment.[16]

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[12] *House Defense Appropriations 1963,* Part 5, p. 85.

[13] *Loc. cit.*

[14] U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, *Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1963,* 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962, p. 206.

[15] The four major areas were: (1) development of a radar that could simultaneously acquire, evaluate and track large numbers of targets; (2) reduction of the minimum altitude at which interception would occur; (3) development of a high acceleration missile; (4) use of the discrimination radar as a target track radar.

[16] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2440* (Appropriations Authorization), No. 4, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, p. 324.

The alternative chosen was to reorient the Zeus program which became known as the Nike-X, to ask for $450 million for Nike-X development, and in the meantime to continue Zeus testing and the Project Defender program.

III

More and more, strategic weapons requirements as discussed in Secretary McNamara's Annual Posture Statements reflected an attempt to reconcile military forces with the missions and overall defense policy of the United States. While discussing the possibility of a Counterforce strategy being adopted by the United States, McNamara said in his 1963 Posture Statement, "the major mission of the Strategic Retaliatory Forces is to deter war by their capability to destroy the enemy's war-making potential, including not only his nuclear strike forces and military installations, but also his urban society, if necessary."[17]

He discussed the steps and methods involved in determining the numbers and types of weapon delivery systems required to carry out the strategic forces mission under a variety of conditions. In any analysis, he said, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to the size and character of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces now and in the future. This uncertainty, coupled with the long lead-times necessary to procure strategic weapons, necessitates planning U.S. force programs well in advance, as well as anticipating those of the enemy. Such a forecast is highly conjectural, particularly since it deals with items beyond the production and deployment lead-times of the Soviets. "Therefore, we are, in effect, attempting to anticipate production and deployment decisions which our opponents, themselves, may not yet have made."[18]

With this as background, and the decision to proceed with Nike-X development already made, McNamara explained his reasoning in delaying the production and deployment of an ABM system. An ABM system deployed now, he said, might reduce U.S. casualties in the case of a "small" or "medium" Soviet attack on our urban areas. It would complicate the design of and tactics for the attacker's offensive weapons. But there are even better reasons why we should *not* proceed with actual deployment of a system: (1) we still have a great deal to learn about re-entry phenomena and techniques for discriminating between real warheads and decoys; and (2) we also have a great deal to learn about the effects of a nuclear detonation from one of our intercepting missiles on other elements of the defensive system. Given these considerations, McNamara emphasized that

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[17] U.S. Department of Defense, *Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1964-1968 Defense Program and 1964 Defense Budget* (mimeo.), January 30, 1963, p. 28. (Hereafter cited as *1963 Annual Posture Statement.* Posture statements for subsequent years are cited in a similar manner with the appropriate year.) McNamara had alluded to the possibility of a Counterforce strategy in his celebrated Ann Arbor Commencement Address in 1962.

[18] *Loc. cit.*

> the effectiveness of an active ballistic missile defense system in saving lives depends in large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defense system. Indeed, in the absence of adequate fallout shelters, an active defense [ABM] might not significantly increase the proportion of the population surviving an all-out nuclear attack. For this reason, the very austere civil defense program recommended by the President . . . , should be given priority over any major additions to the active defenses.[19]

Responding to a question by Representative Daniel J. Flood (D-Pa.) concerning the Zeus deployment, McNamara claimed that if the Administration had pushed ahead with Zeus in 1960-1961, a system would have been deployed which would not have granted adequate protection against the Soviet threat that the Defense Department saw developing in the 1964-1968 period.

As in the past, McNamara was forced to justify to members of the House Appropriations Committee his decision not to deploy Nike-Zeus. This time he resorted to a device which was to hold him in good stead in the coming years. Arguing from his assumptions and his hypothetical alternatives, he was able to rationalize his favored choice, i.e., to continue the development of Nike-X but not to produce it. While the committee was considering the system's growth potential, McNamara summed up his argument by saying that the committee should address itself to the degree of protection that either the Nike-X or Nike-Zeus could give. By postulating a variety of Soviet missile threat levels and making certain assumptions about decoys and Soviet targeting doctrine, he showed the degree to which Nike-Zeus or Nike-X might protect the country.[20] In his opinion, his examples provided insufficient evidence of the Nike-X's effectiveness under the stated circumstances to warrant its deployment.

General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed with McNamara's contention that if Zeus were not deployed there was a greater likelihood that a better system would become available, and thus make Zeus obsolete. However, as

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

[20] *House Defense Appropriations 1964,* Part 1, pp. 432-434.

Taylor saw it, the solution was to put Zeus into production immediately so the United States would at least have one ABM system operational. Taylor, recognizing the advantages of working for a better system, contended that by deploying Zeus two steps forward would have been taken:

> One, we would now be learning by doing; and . . . we would have had a technological triumph over the Soviets. Some day there will be a great ballyhoo that the Soviets have an anti-ballistic missile and we do not. The claim may be largely sham and propaganda, but we face that possibility of a cold war defeat.[21]

In describing the relationship of the ABM program to civil defense, McNamara discussed the fact that any ABM program demanded a complementary civil defense program "because there will be such a huge amount of fallout generated by our own anti-ICBM system and the incoming warheads of the strike that it would be foolhardy to spend funds of this magnitude without accompanying it with a civil defense program." He reiterated that the ABM system was irrevocably linked to civil defense: "I personally will never recommend an anti-ICBM program unless a fallout program does accompany it. I believe that even if we do not have an anti-ICBM program, we nonetheless should proceed with the fallout shelter program." McNamara reassured the committee that the Administration's policy was to continue further development of an ABM even though the current decision was not to deploy it.[22]

Dr. Brown elaborated upon the need for fallout shelters by emphasizing that the enemy could detonate weapons outside or upwind from the defended target and allow the wind to carry them over the defended site. Shelters were also necessary to protect the defended population from the detonation of both offensive and defensive warheads. If interception could be made to take place at higher altitudes, then there would be less danger from fallout. Conversely, if missile defense guidance were improved so that accuracy was increased, smaller defensive warheads could be used, which would also reduce the amount of fallout and consequently the importance of shelters. In any event, the real fallout danger comes from the exploding ICBM warhead.[23] One of today's "kill mechanisms" achieves destruction of an incoming warhead not by blast or heat, but by using electromagnetic energy, such as x-rays, to neutralize or incapacitate the warhead. This method of destruction, developed as the result of knowledge gained during atmospheric nuclear testing and later by underground tests, significantly reduces the amount of fallout normally associated with an ABM atmospheric burst.

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[21] *Ibid.*, p. 435.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 438-439, 450.
[23] *Ibid.*, Part 5, pp. 8-9. See also pp. 166-169.

The Test Ban Hearings provided an extremely valuable source of technical information and insight into the ABM problem, especially the problem of blackout (i.e., the use of nuclear weapons to disrupt and blind detection, acquisition and tracking radars) and high altitude weapons effect. Secretary McNamara's testimony during these hearings revealed the peculiar political nature of the ABM affair and some of the motivation behind his later decisions regarding Nike-X. During the previous six months, before the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, McNamara had stated that a great deal of knowledge was still needed about the effect of nuclear detonations in the atmosphere; that indeed this knowledge could only be obtained by high altitude testing. But, testifying on behalf of the Test Ban Treaty, McNamara said that we had gained sufficient knowledge and data from prior atmospheric nuclear tests to allow us to design an ABM around the blackout problem. Any additional ABM problems associated with nuclear testing could be solved by testing underground.[24] To make his position stronger McNamara cited the Army's insistence as far back as 1958 that Nike-Zeus would work. Yet when the Army wanted to deploy the system, McNamara claimed that there were too many technical problems to be solved and that it would be a mistake to follow the Army's advice.[25] Thus, it appeared that whenever it suited his needs, McNamara was willing to say the system would work; when the question of producing and deploying it arose, he would argue that it would not work.

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[24] U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,* 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, pp. 103-104, 114-115, 137-138, 158-163, 165-166, 173-175, 193-195, 198. (Hereafter cited as *Test Ban Hearings.*) It should be remembered that only a few U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests were relevant to the U.S. ABM program—the three Argus shots of 1958, the Teak and Orange shots of 1958, and the 1962 Starfish, Bluegill Triple Prime and Kingfish shots. (See Rex Pay, "U.S. ABM Would Imperil Test Ban Treaty," *Technology Week,* March 20, 1967, pp. 20-21.) No atmospheric nuclear tests were carried out after the twenty-eight tests in the 1962 Pacific series, and none was carried out in 1963. (See James McBride, *The Test Ban Treaty* [Chicago: Regnery, 1967], p. 27.) McNamara believed that sufficient knowledge had been gained in these tests to allow the United States to develop an ABM. This is a rather startling conclusion in the face of the technical testimony offered during the Test Ban Hearings of 1963 and during the Appropriation Hearings of 1962 and 1963 when McNamara asserted that there were too many technical difficulties to be surmounted in order to develop an effective ABM.

[25] *Test Ban Hearings,* p. 137.

In answer to a question put to him by Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.), McNamara acknowledged that in the event of a treaty prohibiting atmospheric testing, there would be no chance to test the entire system to determine if it would work.[26] While insisting that an ABM could be developed, given the present state of knowledge, he admitted that the Soviets had gained considerable data about ABM development in their 1961-1962 tests and that they could deploy a better system than Nike-Zeus.[27]

The confusion in U.S. ABM policy is nowhere more evident than in these Test Ban Hearings. McNamara found himself confronted with the fact that in the fall of 1962 he had admitted that the Soviets had begun deployment of an ABM system; in the hearings he denied it. Also, during the Test Ban Hearings he asked for $450 million to continue development of Nike-X in FY 1964—a request in direct contrast to the President's statement that an ABM system could not be developed and was beyond us at this time.[28] In the end, McNamara's insistence that the proposed test ban treaty would not affect ABM development was in substantial disagreement with the views of a number of scientists, including Drs. Edward Teller and John S. Foster, Jr., the latter now Director of DDR&E.

Not unexpectedly, other Administration witnesses echoed the Secretary's position that the central difficulties of ABM development are generally outside the warhead problem and involve either radars, reaction speed, missile speed, traffic handling capacity, or capacity for decoy discrimination.[29] Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out that systems such as radar, guidance, and missile development could be developed without inhibition by the treaty.[30] The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Glenn Seaborg, stated that the AEC could develop the necessary ABM warheads through underground testing; in fact he stated that there were a number of warheads already available for the ABM.[31] Seaborg felt that both the United States and the Soviet Union were at about the same point in developing an ABM.

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[26] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

[27] The kind of testing under discussion was that of shooting a live Zeus to intercept a live ICBM in an environment already subjected to nuclear explosions.

[28] "Text of President's News Conference on August 1, 1963," *Washington Post*, August 1, 1963, p. A12.

[29] *Test Ban Hearings*, p. 104.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

Therefore, he supported the treaty because of its other advantages and "in recognition of the fact that we are not in a disadvantageous position with respect to the ABM—and that we will not get into a more disadvantageous position with respect to the ABM as a result of the treaty."[32] General Taylor, who as early as 1958 had favored deploying an ABM[33] and who in 1963 was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that "in the anti-ballistic missile field, development of the U.S. system does not depend on atmospheric testing and hence this treaty will not significantly influence any imbalance that may exist."[34]

Taylor, like Rusk, McNamara and Seaborg, used exactly the same argument and almost the same language to state that the problem with the ABM was not in warhead development. While this is partly true, the warhead, the blackout problem, plus the effects of high altitude weapons detonations on other nuclear warheads and defensive systems, are interrelated. U.S. developments in recent years have substantiated the point that we do not have sufficient data for determining positively the effect of nuclear weapons on other weapons in the atmosphere. Successful development of an ABM may indeed require breaking the Test Ban Treaty, for the treaty does not allow testing the components in the atmosphere—a step which is necessary to ascertain the effect of various factors on ABM development.

These hearings demonstrate a great deal of inconsistency between the Administration's position on the treaty and its stand on the ABM. Every witness said, in almost the same language, that the warhead is not the problem and that an ABM can be developed, but that more knowledge is needed about high altitude weapons effects and blackout. Yet before, during and after the hearings, the participants in the ABM debate have admitted that the ABM and atmospheric nuclear testing are inseparable. Despite these facts, it was concluded that the treaty would not affect the ABM, even if the Soviets had gained more knowledge about high altitude phenomena from their 1961-1962 tests than we did in 1962. In fact, General Taylor said that

> both sides could achieve an anti-ballistic missile, but one with less desirable characteristics than would be the case if additional atmospheric tests were conducted. . . . under this treaty, both sides could make about the same technical progress in the ABM field, although the Soviets may possess some information not available to the United States.[35]

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[32] *Ibid.*, p. 244.
[33] *House Defense Appropriations 1964*, p. 434.
[34] *Test Ban Hearings*, p. 273.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 377.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the treaty with some safeguards, testifying that no political pressure was put on them to accept this treaty, although as General LeMay pointed out, "I think we were all caught a little bit by surprise at the seriousness of the Administration trying to get a treaty signed."[36]

It appears reasonable to conclude that despite the misgivings and conflict over the ABM, the Administration considered development of an ABM subordinate to the politically more important and attractive issue of a Test Ban Treaty.

While certain members of Congress and the Army favored deploying the system because they felt it could do the job assigned it, the Administration throughout the Appropriation and Authorization Hearings since 1961 has consistently argued for postponing deployment because a number of technical questions and problems remained to be answered about Zeus and the ABM system's overall feasibility against a sophisticated attack. Yet when the possibility of reaching an accord with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing appeared possible, the Administration was the first to declare that an ABM could be developed—even though the technical questions raised earlier about its feasibility remained unanswered and were likely to remain so if such a treaty were approved. Forgotten in these proceedings was the fact that the whole reason for the U.S. resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing in 1962 was the fear, testified to by many during these hearings, that the Soviets had gained considerable knowledge (which testimony likewise confirmed) about ABM development in their own tests, and may have surpassed the United States in knowledge about ABM's. It is inconceivable that the U.S. desire in 1967-1968 to discuss a missile defense moratorium with the Soviets stems from the belief that we are ahead of the Soviets in this field and desire to freeze our lead. Yet this reasoning applied to the Soviet decision to conclude the Test Ban Treaty: they adjudged themselves to be ahead in knowledge of high altitude nuclear weapons effect and desired to preserve their lead. In fact, while the United States conducted only about thirty atmosphere tests in 1962, the Soviets conducted more than one hundred.[37]

While little of this explains the Administration's reluctance to deploy an ABM system, it does indicate that no matter how important a missile defense was before 1963, the moment a nuclear test ban became a feasible objective, the search for an effective

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 382.

[37] McBride, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

ABM was subordinated to this overriding goal. Before the Test Ban Treaty, the search for an ABM was viewed as restricted by almost insurmountable technological difficulties; once the prospect for securing a test ban appeared real, arguments were advanced that it was possible at the same time to develop an ABM capability. Moreover, during the campaign to ratify the Test Ban Treaty, testing in the atmosphere for ABM development was considered less important than it had been eighteen months earlier when it caused the United States to resume its own testing program. Yet in this time period the United States detonated in the atmosphere only three of twenty-eight weapons which were deemed relevant to ABM development—not to mention that a nuclear warhead was never placed on Zeus and tested against an ICBM, while the Soviets were reported to have destroyed two ICBM's with one high altitude detonation. The Administration appeared to believe that ABM development and deployment would be harmful to the future improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations, and that U.S. security would be enhanced more by closer ties with the USSR than by new strategic weapons like the ABM.

IV

In his 1964 Posture Statement to Congress, McNamara described the various strategic alternatives open to the United States from a Finite Deterrent to a full first- and second-strike Counterforce capability, and went on to warn that, regardless of the force level created by the United States and even under the most favorable circumstances, a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers would do enormous damage to both sides. He concluded that a Damage Limiting Strategy was the most practical and effective one. U.S. forces would have to be large enough to insure the destruction of the social structures and warmaking capabilities of the Soviet Union and China, while limiting damage to the United States and her allies.[38]

As in past years, McNamara said that some serious technical, strategic and economic problems remained to be solved before an effective ABM system could be deployed. The continued testing of Nike-Zeus and Nike-X components permitted the conclusion that at least a partial defense against ICBM's would be attainable within the next several years.[39] Until this testing information became available in 1965, a decision to deploy the system would be premature and would only result in delays and increased costs. Contending that the effectiveness of the system would have to be demonstrated because of its high cost, McNamara argued that there were other appropriate defensive measures to limit damage which could be taken in conjunction with an ABM deployment. He noted that Nike-X would be relatively effective against a small to moderate missile attack, but against a large, sophisticated Soviet attack the system would have to be expanded at a cost considerably higher than would be the cost to the Soviets of assuring the penetration of their missiles. More importantly, without shelters the effectiveness of the ABM system would be severely reduced; indeed, an active defense alone might not significantly increase the proportion of the population that could survive an all-out nuclear attack.[40] McNamara described the relationship between shelters and ABM's:

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[38] *1964 Annual Posture Statement,* pp. 31-32.

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 52.

> The effectiveness of the Nike-X system against attacks employing decoys would vary with the altitude at which the incoming warheads must be engaged. The lower the altitude, the better the chance of discrimination, but the greater the chance that the weapon might be detonated before it is intercepted. But, the lower the altitude at which the weapon is detonated, the higher the blast and thermal effects on the ground for any given yield. Thus, to the extent that we can protect the population against the blast and heat of a nuclear explosion, we can wait longer before engaging an enemy missile and can thus be surer that we engage the warhead, not a decoy.[41]

He felt that by the end of 1964 a decision could be made to deploy Nike-X, initially at a cost of $16 billion.[42] The major problem continued to be the Nike-X's discrimination capability, and he felt that further testing information was required before putting it into production.

Dr. Brown, the technical adviser who had much to do with the reorientation of the Nike-Zeus to Nike-X, spoke optimistically at these Senate Hearings about the possibility of developing an effective missile defense system.[43] Yet he concluded that "the decision on Nike-X will not be made, or should not be made, merely on the basis of technical capability. That is, even though the system does what we say it will do, that does not mean necessarily that we should deploy this system."[44]

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[40] *Loc. cit.*

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[42] U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Appropriations, 1965,* Part I, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, p. 45.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 385.

This appears to be the first public Administration statement that nontechnical factors would enter into the ultimate decision to deploy Nike-X. These nontechnical considerations include (1) the selection of areas to be defended; (2) the enactment of a civil defense program; (3) the assessment whether such a deployment would have a "provocative" effect upon a possible adversary; and (4) the assessment whether the Soviet ICBM threat is sufficient to warrant the cost of deploying an ABM system rather than increasing the number of U.S. ICBM's. The last two items seemed destined to play a predominant role in any ABM deployment decision in light of the following statement by Secretary McNamara:

> As the arms race continues and the weapons multiply and become more swift and deadly, the possibility of a global catastrophe, either by miscalculation or design, becomes ever more real. More armaments, whether offensive or defensive, cannot solve this dilemma. We are approaching an era when it will become increasingly improbable that either side could destroy a sufficiently large portion of the other's strategic nuclear force, either by surprise or otherwise, to preclude a devastating retaliatory blow. This may result in mutual deterrence, but it is still a grim prospect. It underscores the need for a renewed effort to find some way, if not to eliminate these deadly weapons completely, then at least to slow down or halt their further accumulation, and to create institutional arrangements which would reduce the need for either side to resort to their immediate use in moments of acute international tension.[45]

Had Nike-X become the vehicle for achieving such an arrangement?

V

In McNamara's 1965 Posture Statement he introduced the concept of Assured Destruction/Damage Limitation. He pointed out that if the United States and the Soviet Union had the same general strategic objectives, i.e., deterrence of the other, then the U.S. Assured Destruction problem was the Soviets' Damage Limiting problem. Since the ABM question was but one aspect of the entire U.S. strategic retaliatory force structure, understanding the ABM issue in 1965-1966 depended on comprehending the ever more complex strategic principles.

First, once the Assured Destruction forces were provided for, then the Damage Limiting forces could be considered. Certain

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 397.
[45] *1963 Annual Posture Statement,* p. 27.

basic qualifications apply to the latter forces, because it is impossible to provide anything approaching perfect protection for the American population. No matter how large U.S. general nuclear war forces might be, Soviet strategic offensive forces and targeting doctrine would largely determine the damage and population losses of the United States. The Soviets have within their technical and economic means the capability to inflict upon the United States an intolerable level of fatalities, even if we deploy an active defense.[46]

Second, since the Soviets could inflict severe damage on the United States with bombers, submarine-launched missiles and ICBM's, a strong defense against only one form of attack would have limited value. "A meaningful capability to limit the damage of a determined enemy attack, therefore, requires an integrated, balanced combination of strategic offensive forces, area defense forces, terminal defense forces and passive defenses."[47]

Third, for any given level of enemy offensive capability, successive additions to each of the various U.S. strategic systems has a diminishing marginal value.[48]

In effect these principles tell us that every weapon system competes with every other weapon system to determine which combination will insure an optimal Assured Destruction/Damage Limitation force. In practical terms, the defensive Nike-X must compete against the offensive ICBM weapon on a cost-effectiveness basis to determine whether the high cost of Nike-X warrants its deployment, or whether its mission can be accomplished more cheaply by a larger number of ICBM's. Moreover, if Nike-X should be deployed, to its actual cost must be added the cost of strengthening bomber defenses and anti-submarine warfare forces (ASW), in order to prevent the enemy from avoiding the strong defensive position and attacking the weaker one. The rationality of structuring U.S. forces in this manner is complicated by the necessity of taking into account a wide variety of strategic, operational and technical uncertainties.

Using his analytic technique of presenting various options, McNamara reached a number of conclusions about the strategic force structure he was proposing for the country. One cautioned that if the attackers launch their first strike against urban areas, U.S. fatalities could not be reduced below 80 million, no matter

[46] *1965 Annual Posture Statement,* p. 39.
[47] *Ibid.,* p. 40.
[48] *Loc. cit.*

what passive or active defenses are deployed.[49] To justify his continued reluctance to commit the Nike-X to production and deployment, McNamara examined the threat faced by U.S. strategic forces and compared Nike-X to the other elements of the Damage Limiting strategy. His judgment against deploying Nike-X (aside from the technical problems) was based in large part on the need to build an optimal Assured Destruction/Damage Limitation capability. In his reasoning, the United States has an ABM weapon which will work to "some degree" but does not contribute significantly to the Damage Limitation mission, while more ICBM's at less cost would enhance the Damage Limitation force. Hence, at this point the Nike-X is not ready to become a part of an optimal mix of strategic forces.

When the Army again recommended production of Nike-X, using already appropriated funds, McNamara argued against it because

> the development work has not progressed to the point where the system has been fully tested, and if we begin to lay out the production process and long lead time tooling before development is completed, almost surely we will have to go back and revise the production process and redesign the tooling as the design changes are introduced into the system. I think it would be unwise to initiate production with fiscal 1966 funds even if we had already decided to deploy it. We are not really in a position to decide that at the present time. I think that decision could be better made in fiscal 1967, and therefore, for both reasons I think it would be unwise to include procurement funds for that system in the fiscal 1966 budget. For example, we would require quite a different system for the expected less sophisticated Chinese threat than we would for the Soviet threat. For the Soviet threat we need a much higher capability at a given point and therefore would deploy this system at fewer points.[50]

Under questioning by Representative George H. Mahon (D-Texas), McNamara asserted that even if we deployed the present ABM system we would still suffer 80 million casualties in a nuclear attack. If we deployed a much more effective system than the present Nike-X, he would expect the Soviets to construe this as an aggressive move and to increase their expenditures (for ICBM's and probably for an ABM system).[51] This is why the ABM is viewed as destabilizing and provocative. The U.S. deployment of an ABM system followed by a Soviet response is what McNamara referred to in his San Francisco speech of September 18, 1967 as the action-reaction phenomenon.

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[50] *House Defense Appropriations 1966,* Part 3, p. 355.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 356.

While discussing the cost of Nike-X and its limited contribution to defense, McNamara again illustrated its relation to civil defense. Since one cannot expect to destroy all incoming warheads, fallout shelters are necessary to supplement the Nike-X. He used the following examples: A Soviet attack in 1970 would result in 100 to 150 million fatalities if nothing had been done to protect or defend the population. If $5 billion had been spent on defense, 20 million people could be saved, although at least 80 to 100 million would still perish. If an additional $20 billion had been spent for a full Nike-X deployment, an additional 10 million people could be saved. In other words, does it pay to invest $20 billion to save 10 million people when upwards of 75 million are still going to perish? As he pointed out, if spending $20 billion meant the difference between no fatalities and 10 million the cost would be justified. While an ABM deployment against a Soviet threat was ruled out, McNamara hinted at the possibility of deploying Nike-X against a primitive Chinese threat.[52]

Dr. Brown supplied some additional insight into the Nike-X program:

> Because of the future uncertainties of the level and sophistication of the possible attacks which we may face, we have been working very hard in the Nike-X program on a design concept representing the maximum flexibility in our choice of capability and the corresponding cost.
>
> We propose in fiscal year 1966 to concentrate on the "building block" concept of Nike-X to permit maximum flexibility in deployment options against various threats, including those less than a massive all out attack by a sophisticated opponent.[53]

Brown explained during the House Armed Services Hearings the real nature of the cost-effectiveness argument presented earlier by NcNamara.

> At low U.S. casualty levels the exchange ratio—number of dollars expended by the defense per dollar expended by the offense—is unfavorable to the defense—for example, the ratio is approximately 4 to 1 at a (deleted) U.S. casualty level. That is, to maintain the capability to limit U.S. casualties to less than (deleted) with Nike-X, the United States

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[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358. An interesting note on the Administration's position is found on page 890, where General McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff, stated that until some of the Nike-X's technical problems have been solved, it should not be deployed. He also believed this was the opinion of the JCS. Yet on page 397 General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said that he recommended to DOD the deployment of the Nike-X, but that a contrary decision was made. This may indicate that the Joint Chiefs were not unanimous on the question of ABM deployment.

[53] *Ibid.*, Part 5, p. 7.

would have to spend about four times as much on defense to limit damage as the Soviets would have to spend on ICBM's to create damage. At higher casualty levels, the exchange ratio shifts toward the defense (deleted).[54]

When presenting his Posture Statement before the combined Senate Armed Forces and Appropriations Committees, Secretary McNamara indicated what he considered to be the six overriding defense issues of Fiscal Year 1966. Four of these were related specifically to Strategic Defensive Forces, while two affected the Offense Forces. Of the four defensive issues, two were related to missile defense, namely, Nike-X funding and shelters. When asked by Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.) whether he was giving more emphasis this year than in years past to defense forces, McNamara replied: ". . . without question, offensive capability or what I will call capability for assuring the destruction of the Soviet Union is far and away the most important requirement we have to meet."[55]

In fact, McNamara was never sure what action the United States should ultimately take regarding strategic defensive ABM systems.[56] He relegated defense to a subordinate role compared to that of offense. As long as he remained at the Defense Department helm the U.S. deterrent toward the Soviet Union relied on offensive retaliatory power rather than a mix of offensive and defensive forces. In effect, this meant that U.S. security was based on a deterrent strategy rather than a war-waging or war-winning strategy.

In the search for an optimum deterrent, should the United States consider a combination of offensive and defensive systems rather than solely an Assured Destruction capability which rests on the ability of a minimum number of *offensive* vehicles to survive a nuclear attack and then to be launched in retaliation? So long as evidence exists that the Soviets are developing an ABM system (they obviously assume it will work), we must anticipate that they will have some capability to reduce the number of Assured Destruction forces thrown at them and consequently to limit damage to the USSR. If, as McNamara says, Assured Destruction and Damage Limitation are the opposite sides of the coin for the United States and the Soviet Union, and the latter develops the first effective ABM system, the United States will have lessened her Damage Limiting potential. In an era when calculated nuclear war looks more and more remote, the United States must still limit her vulnerability because of its important effect on relations with allies and enemies, especially in circumstances of low-intensity conflict, crisis or limited war, as in Viet Nam. Viewed in this light, one can surmise that the U.S. decision to postpone deploying an ABM against the USSR is based on political-diplomatic rather than on economic and technological grounds.

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[54] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016,* No. 7, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 551.

[55] U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Appropriations, 1966,* Part I, 89th Congress, 1st Session, p. 229.

[56] *Ibid.,* p. 230.

VI

In his Posture Statement to the House Armed Services Committee in 1966, Secretary McNamara elaborated on the role of the Damage Limiting Forces, using the analytic technique of describing various alternative force postures to meet varying Soviet threats. On the basis of this and other analyses of the Damage Limiting program in relation to the Soviet nuclear threat, he reached several conclusions relevant to the ABM problem. These are quoted in their entirety below:

> 1. Against likely Soviet postures for the 1970's, appropriate mixes of Damage Limiting measures could effect substantial reductions in the maximum damage the Soviets could inflict, but only at substantial additional cost to the U.S. over and above that required for Assured Destruction. Even so, against a massive and sophisticated Soviet surprise attack on civil targets, there would be little hope of reducing fatalities below 50 or more millions.
> 2. An efficient Damage Limiting effort against the kinds of postures which the Soviets could achieve in the 1970's would require a mix of measures, including a full Civil Defense Fallout Shelter Program, ballistic missile defenses, anti-submarine (SLBM) defense, an improved bomber defense. Against a very rapid build-up of Soviet missile forces based in hard silos, additional U.S. missile payload might have to be added.
> 3. An ABM system employing long range exoatmospheric interceptors in addition to lower altitude interceptors could complicate even a sophisticated attacker's ballistic missile penetration problem. It could also improve overall system performance compared to an equal cost system employing lower altitude interceptors only. However, this conclusion is based on a preliminary analysis and there are still many unresolved questions about the design and performance of a system employing both exoatmospheric and low altitude interceptors.
> 4. The entire problem of the extent and kind of efforts we should make to limit damage is dominated by the great uncertainties about Soviet responses to those efforts. How far we should go in hedging against these uncertainties is one of the most difficult judgments which have to be made.

> Analytical techniques can focus the issue but no mechanical rule can substitute for such judgments. Accordingly, we should not now commit ourselves to a particular level of Damage Limitation against the Soviet threat—first, because our deterrent makes general nuclear war unlikely, and second, because attempting to assure with confidence against all reasonably likely levels and types of attack is very costly, and even then the results are uncertain. Our choices should be responsive to projections based upon the observed development of the Soviet threat and our evolving knowledge of the technical capabilities of our own forces.[57]

Besides the Soviet threat, McNamara claimed that the Nth country threat must be taken seriously, especially from China. Against the Chinese threat a moderately priced defense appeared promising.

> . . . the development and deployment [by the Chinese] of even a small force of ICBM's might seem attractive to them as a token, but still highly visible, threat to the U.S., designed to undermine our military prestige and the credibility of any guarantee which we might offer to friendly countries. The prospect of an effective U.S. defense against such a force might not only be able to negate that threat, but might possibly weaken the incentives to produce and deploy such weapons altogether.[58]

If the United States deployed some form of the Nike-X system against such a Chinese threat, McNamara seemed confident that not just a few cities, but the entire nation could be protected against the type of ICBM attack the Chinese might be able to launch in the next decade. A limited Nike-X system could later be augmented to increase its effectiveness against larger or more sophisticated threats—by adding more long-range Zeus interceptor missiles, improving the radars, or increasing the number of cities with terminal defenses. Consequently, "on the basis of our present knowledge of Chinese Communist nuclear progress, no deployment decision need be made now. However, the development of the essential components should be pressed forward vigorously."[59] Elaborating on the decision against deployment, he said:

> Considering all of the uncertainties involved, including the nature and consequences of the Soviet reaction, the technical problems yet to be solved and the great cost of such deployment, I do not believe that a decision should be made now to undertake an all-out Damage Limiting effort against the Soviet threat.[60]

To support his decision McNamara pointed out that in three of the last five years he had asked Congress for a full fallout shelter program, but every time Congress had turned him down. Without a shelter program Nike-X could be completely negated. In addition, even if the shelter program were approved, he would still be hesitant to recommend deploying Nike-X unless other defensive measures were taken, e.g., an improved bomber defense, in order to provide a balanced strategic force. And if all of these requirements were met, he *still* would not approve producing and deploying Nike-X, because the Soviets at relatively little expense could offset this defensive measure by adding to their offense.[61]

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[57] *1966 Annual Posture Statement,* pp. 55-56.

[58] *Ibid.,* p. 56.

[59] *Ibid.,* p. 58.

[60] *Ibid.,* p. 70.

Despite all the recommendations and programs, McNamara continued to insist that he would never sanction an ABM deployment against the Soviet threat because (1) the Soviets can offset the threat at a cost cheaper to them than to us; (2) it would cost $25-30 billion to deploy; and (3) we would still suffer upwards of 50 million fatalities. Yet he continued to fund the development effort at an annual $500- to $600-million level because of the knowledge it provides for developing penetration aids and advancing the state-of-the-art in defensive systems.

> It is possible that we will discover some technology or achieve the performance characteristics in some system that will so protect us as to warrant deployment, or the situation may change in some presently unforeseen way so as to make its deployment desirable.[62]

VII

The conflict surrounding the ABM has intensified during the last several years, putting more and more pressure on the Johnson Administration to deploy it. The major cause of the conflict is the Soviet buildup in strategic weaponry, both in ICBM's and the deployment of an ABM system. The U.S. intelligence community has been aware of these Soviet programs for several years. Why, then, has the Administration refrained from deploying Nike-X?

It is reasonable to assume that from 1963 to 1965 technical problems plagued the Nike-X program. Some of them were apparently overcome sufficiently to allow deployment of Nike-X against the future Chinese threat. Further, there is little doubt, if one is prepared to accept the Administration's assumptions, that the system contains many cost-effectiveness flaws in comparison with other Damage Limiting programs. No doubt, too, the lack of an adequate shelter program drastically reduces the efficiency of Nike-X. On the other hand, military forces also have a political function. In fact, the whole concept of deterrence is based on the political resolve to use nuclear forces under certain conditions. The deployment of an ABM system enhances the political value of the deterrent: for example, by creating doubt in Soviet minds about how effective their ICBM's would be against an ABM system. By forcing the Soviets to target more missiles against each U.S. ABM-defended site, Washington increases the Soviet cost of penetrating the continental United States. Soviet strategic calculations and planning also become less exact and more risky.

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[61] *House Defense Appropriations 1967*, p. 88.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 115. In 1967 McNamara introduced a new argument against deploying the Nike-X by contending that developments in missile defense technology could make Nike-X obsolete before it was operational, even if the decision to deploy it were made immediately.

The radar and missile breakthroughs of 1965-1966, along with the building block concept, permit an initial deployment of an area (light) Nike-X defense system, to which additional sections (terminal) or more area defense could be added. While the Administration admits this possibility, a decision to deploy even a light system was put off until late 1967 because the Defense Department believes that plenty of time exists before the United States must react to the Chinese ICBM threat. More likely, the Administration fears that *any* deployment is bound to have an adverse effect on Soviet strategic thinking and actions, since an ABM system in place could shoot down Soviet ICBM's just as readily as Chinese missiles. Had the Soviets not deployed an ABM system, the true reasoning behind the Administration's reluctance to sanction deployment would probably not have been revealed.

However, the Soviets did deploy an ABM system. The initial U.S. reaction was to accelerate efforts to ensure penetration capability and to call for a halt in the deployment of a Soviet ABM system and the development of a U.S. ABM system, in order to prevent another costly spiral in the arms race.[63] Reflecting the Administration's reluctance to embark on a fullscale ABM program, Dean Rusk cautioned that "we would regret very much the lifting of the arms race to an entirely new plateau of expenditures."[64] The net effect on such a race would result in new expenditures for developing defensive systems and improving offensive ones, with no perceptible increase of security for the other side.

[63] *New York Times,* December 16, 1966, p. 20.

[64] "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 21," *op. cit.,* p. 43.

In his State of the Union Message in January 1967, President Johnson announced a decision to seek an accord with the Soviets to halt ABM deployment, a measure which he thought would be in the mutual interest of both countries.

> We have the solemn duty to slow down the arms race between us, if that is at all possible, in both conventional and nuclear weapons and defenses. And I thought we were making some progress in that direction the first few months I was in office. And I realized that any additional race would impose on our peoples, and on all mankind, for that matter, additional waste of resources with no gain in security to either side.[65]

The Soviet action has greatly increased the pressure on the President to begin deploying the Nike-X system. However, pending negotiations with the Soviets, a decision will continue to be deferred. A number of factors point to the possibility of an ABM accord with the Soviets. One of these is the Soviet ICBM buildup which, in terms of deliverable megatonnage, could erase the present U.S. superiority. Additionally, evidence indicates that the Soviets have hardened a large portion of their ICBM force, patterning it after the U.S. Assured Destruction Force. The Soviet Union, therefore, appears less committed to a First Strike strategy. This, in turn, supports the belief that mutual deterrence has really arrived since both sides now possess invulnerable Second Strike forces.

The rationale of the political motivation to limit the deployment of ABM systems became clearer in McNamara's 1967 Posture Statement. While recalling that our Assured Destruction mission is the Soviets' Damage Limitation mission, he argued:

> It is this interaction between our strategic forces programs and those of the Soviet Union which leads us to believe that there is a mutuality of interests in limiting the deployment of anti-missile defense systems. If our assumption that the Soviets are also striving to achieve [an] Assured Destruction capability is correct, and I am convinced that it is, then in all probability all that we would accomplish by deploying ABM systems against one another would be to increase greatly our respective defense expenditures, without any gain in real security for either side.[66]

Did the earlier reluctance to deploy an ABM system stem from this political motivation to slow down the arms race, even though it meant that the United States had to take the initial unilateral step? The rationale behind the 1967 testimony was not developed during the preceding year: the idea had been aired on three occasions by former government officials as far back as 1964 and at several Pugwash meetings—although it evidently did not impress the Soviets.[67]

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[65] Text of President Johnson's State of the Union Message, *New York Times*, January 11, 1967, p. 16.

[66] *1967 Annual Posture Statement, op. cit.*, p. 40.

VIII

Even when the decision was announced that the United States planned to deploy an ABM system against the emerging Chinese missile threat, McNamara qualified this decision by saying that "our decision to go ahead with the *limited* ABM deployment in no way indicates that we feel an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces is any the less urgent or desirable."[68] It is clear that the Johnson Administration has chosen to deal with the real and immediate strategic threat from the Soviet Union as a political problem insofar as the ABM is concerned—although new strategic offensive systems like Poseidon, MIRV and Minuteman III programs are being accelerated. At the same time, it treats the nonexistent Chinese ICBM force as the major challenge to U.S. ABM defense. The United States maintains that offensive power is cheaper and more reliable in offsetting Soviet defensive power. Moreover, by informing the Soviets that this ABM system is not designed to affect Soviet forces, the Administration has served notice that it does not intend to pursue a war-waging or war-winning deterrent strategy based on superiority, but rather a strategy of mutual deterrence based on parity of forces.

Evidence of this abounds in McNamara's speech of September 18, 1967 to the editors of United Press International, in which he announced the decision to begin an anti-Chinese ABM deployment. McNamara described U.S. policy as one of maintaining superiority over our enemies so that they might never achieve a credible first strike. However, he cautioned that even with our current superiority of three to one, the Soviets could still absorb a U.S. first strike, retaliate and destroy our society. Since U.S. strategic concepts and force structures are based on the assumption that the United States never intends to strike first, a description of U.S. superiority measured in these terms is fallacious.

Continuing, McNamara argued that our present superiority was due more to misinformation than to planning, which he says "is a significant illustration of the intrinsic dynamics of the nuclear arms race." Because we could not fathom Soviet intentions in 1961 when they had a small ICBM force but the technological and industrial capacity to enlarge that force, the U.S. government embarked on a massive solid-fuel ICBM building program. "Thus in the course of hedging against what was then only a theoretically possible Soviet buildup, we took decisions which have resulted in our current superiority in numbers of warheads and deliverable megatons." Had the United States possessed more information about Soviet intentions and strategic force structure, we would not have needed as large a strategic offensive force as we now have. Moreover, according to McNamara, this U.S. action must have influenced Soviet nuclear strategy to the extent that they are now developing a hardened Assured Destruction capability. Indeed, it appears that, under McNamara's policy, the United States never desired to maintain its nuclear superiority against the Soviets. To have developed an ABM system in 1965-1967 would have been contrary to this policy. The ABM, thus, has become a means for communicating intentions:

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[67] Secretary McNamara discussed the problem of arms races and proposed a solution in his 1963 testimony, quoted above on p. 213. The three officials were Jerome Wiesner, Freeman Dyson and Roswell Gilpatric, writing in the October 1964 *Scientific American,* the June 1964 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* and the April 1964 *Foreign Affairs,* respectively.

[68] "Text of McNamara's Speech on Anti-China Missile Defense and U.S. Nuclear Strategy," *New York Times,* September 19, 1967, p. 19.

> What is essential to understand here is that the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans.
>
> Whatever be their intentions, whatever be our intentions, actions—or even realistically potential actions—on either side relating to the buildup of nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side.
>
> It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race.
>
> Now, in strategic nuclear weaponry, the arms race involves a particular irony. Unlike any other era in military history, today a substantial numerical superiority of weapons does not effectively translate into political control or diplomatic leverage.
>
> While thermonuclear power is almost inconceivably awesome, and represents virtually unlimited potential destructiveness, it has proven to be a limited diplomatic instrument. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it is at one and the same time, an all powerful weapon—and a very inadequate weapon.[69]

The logic and reasoning of McNamara's speech and the political-technical developments of the past seven years of the ABM program strongly suggest that the attempt to prevent the "action-reaction phenomenon" of an arms race from occurring has been a major component of U.S. foreign and military policy. It is the

[69] *Ibid.*

primary reason why the ABM has never been deployed against the Soviet threat. The Administration hoped that, despite Soviet efforts to improve their Assured Destruction and Damage Limiting forces, the U.S. ability to penetrate and maintain a credible Assured Destruction capability would obviate the need for a "destabilizing" weapon like the ABM, while still providing a credible deterrent. If this U.S. policy proved successful, a race in armaments and military technology could be averted.

All signs from 1965 to the present make it quite clear that every decision to withhold Nike-X production was a holding action designed to forestall the present situation, i.e., Soviet deployment of an ABM system. The effort failed because the Soviets did not cooperate.

COUNTERINSURGENCY: LESSONS FROM THE EARLY CHINESE AND JAPANESE EXPERIENCE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS

by Ray C. Hillam

THE idea of guerrilla warfare is not new, but its application by the communists in underdeveloped areas, particularly in Asia, has presented new and complex problems to the West. Since World War II, insurgents have won victories in China and North Viet Nam, and have presented serious problems in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and Thailand. South Viet Nam currently provides an excellent example of how the guerrilla insurgent is able to fight effectively despite apparently insurmountable odds posed by a numerically superior and better armed counterinsurgent force.

The strategy used by modern insurgents is largely that developed by Mao Tse-tung at Chingkanshan in the late 1920's, and then tested and revised through years of experience against the Chinese Nationalists and the Japanese invaders during the 1930's and 1940's.[1] These strategies were ultimately successful in China and have had a varying range of applicability in Southeast Asia.

Both the Chinese Nationalists and the Japanese devised military, economic and political strategies to deal with the insurgents. The purpose of this article is to describe the fundamental elements of these strategies, show the reasons for their success or failure, and bring the lessons learned into context with current problems of counterinsurgency.[2]

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[1] This strategy is discussed by Mao in his treatise, *On the Protracted War* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960). It may be summed up in the famous four-line slogan of the communist guerrillas: "Enemy advances, we retreat. Enemy halts, we harass. Enemy tires, we attack. Enemy retreats, we pursue."

[2] I am indebted to Lord Lindsay of Birker who provided useful advice and background information for this study in our conversations over the past few years. Lord Lindsay had firsthand experience in observing insurgency and counterinsurgency in rural China.

Since the Japanese were foreign invaders, the question arises whether the term "insurgent" should be applied to the communists. As the communists were engaged in not only fighting the Japanese but also planning the conquest of China and the overthrow of the existing social order, the term retains its usefulness.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS

The Chinese Nationalist government was the first to have broad experience with an effective and comprehensive guerrilla strategy under communist leadership. During the late 1920's and early 1930's, while the Kuomintang under Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek was consolidating its control of the major parts of China, the communists were developing peasant organizations in the rural areas. Although Mao Tse-tung was not yet head of the Communist Party, his ideas of peasant organization and guerrilla warfare were being utilized in several areas where soviets had been organized, particularly in the mountains of Kiangsi where his guerrilla insurgents had strong bases from which they gradually expanded into other provinces.[3] (See Map I.) These soviet areas were a threat to the Nationalists' goal of unifying China and, until 1937, the elimination of the communist menace was given top priority by the Nationalist government, even above that of restraining the Japanese in Manchuria and North China.

Military Strategy

In 1930 the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist government called for "the complete extermination of the Communist armies and the reoccupation of the sovietized areas."[4] The Nationalists felt that with superior numbers, armaments and communications, they could march into an area and annihilate the enemy force. This strategy played into the hands of the insurgents, who could easily defeat these conventional tactics with mobility, intelligence, and efficiency of organization. During the first three "Encirclement Campaigns," which were carried out between November 1930 and September 1931, the Nationalist troops repeatedly advanced deep into insurgent areas, only to be shattered by the more mobile guerrillas. In these campaigns the communists were able to capture large amounts of equipment as well as to discourage and wear down the morale of the Nationalist forces. For example, in the third campaign when a Nationalist force of 300,000 men, 200 artillery pieces, and 100 airplanes, under Chiang's personal command, drove straight into communist territory in separate columns, the communists responded with a

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[3] Soviet districts, in addition to Kiangsi, were located in the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, Anhui, Szechuan and Shensi. For a discussion of these bases by a communist source, see Ho Kan-chih, *The History of the Modern Chinese Revolution* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1962), pp. 192-207.

[4] Harold M. Vinacke, *A History of the Far East in Modern Times* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1939), p. 452.

MAP I

COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN CHINA 1930-1937


MONGOLIA
Chahar
MANCHURIA
Jehol
Ninghsia
Suiyuan
Kansu
KOREA
Hopei
Kokonor
Shansi
Shantung
Shensi
Kiangsu
Honan
Anhwei
Hsikang
Szechuan
Hupen
Chekiang
Kweichow
Kiangsi
BURMA
Hunan
Fukien
Yunnan
Kwangsi
Kwangtung
TAIWAN
INDO CHINA
RLL

Denotes Communist Controlled Areas ▨
Denotes the Long March of the Chinese Communists ←
Denotes the Routes of the 4th Front Army ← ← ←

force of approximately 30,000 men and attacked five different columns in five different days. The communists used a small force to distract the enemy, surrounded and decimated an unsuspecting and extended unit, then made a forced night march and surrounded and decimated another unsuspecting unit, using the night and rough terrain to full advantage.[5] The repeated failures of the Nationalists to drive the guerrillas from their stronghold and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria took pressure off the insurgents. While Nationalist attention was diverted, the insurgents used the time to further expand their "liberated" areas. The defeat of the Nationalists in these campaigns resulted in mass captures and destruction of some of their best fighting forces and was considered by Chiang to be "the greatest humiliation in his life."[6]

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[5] I am indebted to Lt. Colonel William W. Whitson who provided me with useful information about the Nationalist campaigns during our discussions in Taiwan in 1966. Whitson has researched Chinese Nationalist sources while in Taiwan with the Foreign Area Specialist Training Program and as a MAAG project officer.

The fourth campaign, however, was significantly different.[7] In August and September 1933 a school for senior officers was held in Lushan, Kiangsi, to discuss the mistakes in the earlier campaigns and to devise a new strategy. With the help of German advisers, new and more effective military, political and economic strategies were developed. In military strategy, the Nationalists effected four main changes. First, the objective was changed from the immediate destruction of enemy forces to the occupation of strategic lines, points and areas. The lines were to be fortified and serve as bases of communication and defense. Second, speed was abandoned in favor of caution. For instance, marches ended at three o'clock in the afternoon so that defense fortifications could be erected before nightfall. Third, secure defenses were constructed, resulting in economy of force and a concentration of reserves which could rapidly go to the assistance of any threatened position. Finally, once a fortified line had been completed, a combination of conventional and counterguerrilla tactics was used to drive out the guerrillas in the surrounding area.

This strategy was much like the Chinese game of *wei ch'i* in which the enemy is surrounded and dissipated. In July 1933 the Nationalists began building forts around the communist base areas. Instead of storming enemy areas, they built a circle of forts interconnected by ditches and obstacles to prevent insurgent penetration, and gradually decreased the size of the circle. When communist activity had been eliminated within an area, new points, lines and forts would be established, thereby tightening the noose around the guerrillas. Since the communists had few heavy weapons, they were unable to destroy the well-constructed forts, and the troops inside could withstand attacks until reinforcements arrived. No troops were exposed outside the network of roads and fortifications, thus denying the communists the possibility of

[6] Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 186.

[7] Both Whitson and Snow call this the fifth campaign. Other authors refer to it as the fourth campaign.

pursuing their favorite strategy of isolating, attacking en masse, and destroying. By early 1934 nearly 3,000 forts had been constructed and the Nationalists were advancing steadily. In Mao's words, the guerrillas were reduced to "moving backward and forward between the enemy's main forces and his chain of blockhouses . . . ," which led to a kind of passivity, the guerrillas retaining no initiative.[8] Mao's forces had little choice but to resort to positional warfare, and in this they were sorely outmatched by superior Nationalist manpower and equipment. By late 1934 the military position of the communists was untenable.

Economic Strategy

With the tight defenses provided by the forts and better communications resulting from new roads, the Nationalists were in position to apply extreme economic pressure. An economic blockade and scorched-earth policy denied the communists the material support necessary to maintain their military effort. Forests, which were being used for cover, were destroyed. In some areas, such as in southern Hunan, entire districts were cleared of inhabitants, buildings, and all sources of material support.[9] Airplanes were used, not to bomb guerrilla forces, but to attack economic resources and frighten those who supported the insurgents.

The communists' bases were almost totally agricultural, so they had to rely on outside support for manufactured goods except a few simple products they could make themselves. The blockade prevented them from obtaining necessary items and resulted in the demoralization of the peasants and insurgents.[10]

The economic blockade was one of the most effective measures against the insurgents in the Kiangsi Soviet; along with the military pressure, it forced the communists to abandon their base areas and flee on the Long March to Northern China.[11]

Political Strategy

The Nationalist government gradually realized that the communists could not be dealt with as mere "bandits" but should be viewed as revolutionary insurgents who relied on conditions in the countryside to win support from the peasants. In order to solve the problems the insurgents fed upon, the government attempted a series of reform programs to win the support of the peasants in areas where insurgency was taking place. In 1930 a land reform law was enacted which restricted rents, limited landholdings, and gave peasants greater assurance that they would have security of tenure. Loan societies and cooperatives were organized to improve the living conditions of the peasant and to increase production—by 1933, 6,632 of these societies had been organized. This number doubled in 1934, and had grown to 26,224 by 1935.[12]

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[8] Snow, *loc. cit.* Also see Ho, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-368.

[9] Frederick V. Field, "Recent Anti-Communist Campaign in China," *Far Eastern Survey*, August 14, 1935, p. 124.

[10] Evidence of economic hardship was revealed when Nationalist occupation forces discovered that the Kiangsi insurgents had been obtaining their salt supply by steaming potassium nitrate (saltpeter) from the mud bricks used in the construction of buildings.

[11] Field, *loc. cit.*

In order to maintain rural support in guerrilla-infested areas, the peasants in these areas were given special privileges. They received more favorable loans than other peasant groups, and special relief funds were made available to the poorer peasants. Rural welfare centers were established to provide shelter, clothing, food, medicine and other necessities. Some peasants were given seeds and tools without any compensation being required by the government. In the reoccupied areas of Kiangsi, credit-type cooperative societies were set up on a large scale.[13]

In the effort to reoccupy the sovietized areas, the people in and near the communist strongholds were organized and trained to resist or to fight the insurgents. Self-defense corps and militia became an important aspect of the rural reorganization and mobilization campaign. Many peasants were required to take several weeks of political indoctrination and military training. At the same time, surrender inducements were offered to the insurgents. Those who defected were promised amnesty and a position in the government, or some other advantage, as well as cash payments, which they received during a six-month "re-education course."[14]

The Nationalist government greatly increased its intelligence operations against the communist underground to the point where it was able to expose and even win over many communists. The underground was penetrated sufficiently to halt attempted political assassinations and other acts of terror.

Another interesting facet of the Nationalist political strategy

[12] Of the 1935 societies and cooperatives, 58.8% were credit cooperatives, 16.7% were for multiple purposes, 8.9% were for production, 8.7% for marketing, 4.1% for utilization, and 2.8% for purchasing. See Frederick V. Field, "Chinese Reconstruction in Practice," *Far Eastern Survey,* December 19, 1936, p. 267.

[13] Randal Gould, "Cleaning Up After Communists," *Asia,* April 1935, p. 338.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 340.

was the restoration in rural insurgent areas of the *pao chia* system, which had been used as a means of peasant control during several dynasties in imperial China. This system had four administrative levels: *chia* (10 families), *pao* (10 *chia* or 100 families), *hsiang* (town) and *hsien* (county). In each unit, each member was responsible for the conduct of all other members.[15] This elaborate structure was reinstituted for the purpose of curbing communist power in the rural areas and strengthening the regime's control of the population. For example, at the *chia* level, the people were organized into "mutual assurance units" which guaranteed each other's allegiance to the regime. If one family failed in its duty to support the government, the others were held responsible. This sometimes backfired when families compromised by a communist in the household fled to communist areas in fear of government repression. On the whole, however, the program was successful in controlling the population.

Although the *pao chia* system seemed undemocratic in its encouragement of households to spy on one another, Chiang K'ai-shek argued that it was basic to the development of democracy. He viewed the *hsien* as a local political unit for future self-government. Once the *pao chia* system was thoroughly implemented, the magistrate in charge of the *hsien* was no longer to be appointed by the provincial government but would be elected by the people.[16]

An integral part of the Nationalist effort to reorganize and mobilize the rural areas was the promotion of strong nationalist programs. One nationwide program, characteristic of these efforts, was the "New Life Movement." One observer described it as a program "designed to tighten the moral temper of the people and to instill into the modern Chinese, especially the youth, pride in the classical, cultural heritage" of China.[17]

This "new nationalism" was a combination of Confucian ethics and modern philosophy—an appeal to Chinese chauvinism. Rules of conduct were prescribed to strengthen the moral fiber of the people and develop their allegiance to the regime.[18] Books, pamphlets and tracts were published and distributed to those who could read; radio was used to communicate with officials commissioned to agitate and propagandize the peasants in the rural communities.

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[15] Martin C. Yang, *A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shantung Province* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 244.

[16] *Idem.* See also Chang Chi-yun, "The Prospects for Chinese Democracy," *Political Science Quarterly,* September 1945, pp. 381-382.

[17] Frederick V. Field, "The Call to Reconstruction in China," *Far Eastern Survey,* December 2, 1936, p. 256.

[18] Some of the prescribed rules of conduct were: do not make any sounds while chewing or drinking; clothes should be clean; clothes should be buttoned; all clothes should be made with native material; keep lavatory clean; do not make big

The youth were the principal target of the Nationalist propaganda program. A new school curriculum, new student organizations, and a youth corps were organized and controlled by the regime. Chiang's "cultural" campaign to revitalize the "glorious past" sometimes led to negative measures, such as the suppression of "liberalism" among students, teachers and editors. Bookstores selling "progressive books" were closed. Educators were ordered to teach acceptance of the "new nationalism" or be deprived of their food ration, perhaps even be dismissed.

The principal instrument for promotion of the "New Life Movement" and the suppression of anti-government tendencies was the Revolutionary League, often referred to as the "blue shirts." The League attempted to build the image of Chiang as a "savior and son of heaven" and to identify his image with modern China. Chiang was reported to have said of the League:

> People call us Blue Shirts or terrorists. That is nothing. The important problem to be solved is how to create a new revolutionary atmosphere, so as to lead the revolutionary masses . . . . to save China from destruction we must revive our national spirit. . . . Our organization should take responsibility for this fundamental cure-revival of our national spirit.[19]

Though many of these political programs were sound in concept, most of them failed. Land reform was never thoroughly applied, except in areas where the communists had already liquidated the landlords. Halfhearted officials ignored the programs, and in many areas they were dropped completely. The *pao chia* system, rather than encouraging democracy as Chiang had claimed, tended to hinder its development: while it may have been effective against the communists, it did little to win meaningful peasant support.

Successes and Failures of Nationalist Counterinsurgency

The Nationalist tactics of the fourth campaign did achieve some success. Militarily, the communists were encircled, blockaded, and driven from the Kiangsi base. The use of forts and fortified lines

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noises while on train or steamer; have a plan before working; do not read indecent books or look at indecent pictures; mixed bathing or wading is not allowed; do not eat from common bowls; do not smoke in public. See Gould, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

[19] William Burton, "Chiang's Secret Blood Brothers," *Asia*, May 1936, p. 309.

prevented the guerrillas from making devastating hit-and-run attacks and also cut them off from their main sources of supply. Land and air attacks against the insurgents were directed not necessarily toward immediate victory, but toward weakening the guerrillas so that the noose could be gradually tightened. Such tactics were expensive and required many troops, but they were generally effective. It is significant to note that the Nationalist military victory in Kiangsi was so thorough that the communists did not attempt to revive insurgency in their former base—even after the resumption of the Civil War in 1946.

Economic and political strategy also contributed to the Nationalist victory in Kiangsi. The economic blockade was successfully enforced by the system of forts, and the insurgents were thereby denied many of the resources they needed. A measure of success was also achieved by the land reforms carried out in areas recaptured from the insurgents, the *pao chia* system, the surrender inducements, and the "new nationalism" program.

However, the Nationalists failed to follow up on their military victory in Kiangsi, and the communists, after making the Long March to the caves of Yenan, were able to re-establish themselves. Later, the Nationalists attempted a blockade of the Yenan base, but this campaign was called off in 1937 because of Japanese military activity in North China.

Even more important than the ultimate military failure were the economic and political failures. Land reform and peasant organization programs were effected only in areas recaptured from the communists and not throughout China. The Nationalist efforts at social control, particularly in the rural areas, were unimpressive, and were unable to mobilize sufficient rural support for the regime. Their programs consisted basically of stopgap measures rather than sweeping reforms. They did not move fast enough with their promises of the good life or the implementation of proposed reforms. This lack of political effort enabled the communists to appeal to the peasants and re-establish themselves during the war of resistance against Japan. For the Nationalists, it should be said that a substantial part of the responsibility for their failures must be borne by the Japanese. The Nationalists were fighting two wars, and as the Japanese became the greater enemy they had to give more attention to fighting the invaders and less to solving their own internal problems. For this reason they were not able to implement intended reforms fully or to carry on full-scale military activities against the communists.

During the war of resistance against Japan, the Nationalist conventional forces retreated before the Japanese while the communist insurgents remained behind Japanese lines organizing and planning for both the defeat of Japan and the conquest of China. With the withdrawal of the Nationalist forces and the establishment of the Japanese occupation, the task of counterinsurgency operations against the communists fell to the Japanese.

THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE

The overall Japanese strategy in China between 1937 and 1945 was threefold: first, to control key cities, communications facilities and transportation lines; second, to restrict Chinese resistance to the far west; and third, to annihilate the insurgents operating in Northern and Central China.[20] (See Map II.) The concern here is with the third objective. Counterinsurgency operations were not new to the Japanese; they had fought against insurgents in Taiwan in the late 1890's, in Korea in the early 1900's, and against guerrilla remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's Manchurian army in the early 1930's. Even so, it is evident that they still were not prepared to carry out effective counterinsurgency operations within China until some time after the war broke out. On the other hand, the communists had years of insurgency experience and at least a full year after the China Incident of 1937 to prepare for anti-Japanese guerrilla activities.

Military Strategy

Japanese military operations against the guerrillas took place in both North and Central China. Unfortunately, the terrain in insurgent areas of North China was rugged and not conducive to counterinsurgency operations. There were few good roads, making penetration of the area difficult. In Central China, although the terrain was flat and more suited for counterinsurgent efforts, large amounts of rainfall and numerous rivers and canals limited transportation for the most part to boats.

The initial strategy of the Japanese was mainly defensive. They pursued an opposite strategy from the communists, who sought control of cities and transportation lines by controlling the countryside. To guard the railway and communication lines, the Japanese built a network of blockhouses and observation towers. The fortifications along the Nanking-Manchuria railway line consisted of dikes ten feet high on both sides of the tracks and a moat

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[20] Edgar Snow, "China and the World War," *Asia,* July 1941, p. 341.

Map II

CHINA 1937-1945


OUTER MONGOLIA
Hsinking
Chihfeng
Mukden
Paotow
Kalgan
Tatung
Peiping
Tientsin
Chefoo
Yellow River
Taiyuan
Yenan
Tsinan
Tsingtao
Lanchow
Kaifeng
Suchow
Paochi
Sian
Nanking
Shanghai
Chengtu
Yangtze River
Hankow
Wuhu
Hangchow
Chungking
Kinhwa
Ipin
Changsha
Nanchang
Hengyang
Kweiyang
Foochow
Tushan
Kunming
Kweilin
Amoy
Si River
Liuchow
Canton
Swatow
Nanning
Hongkong
FORMOSA
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
Areas of Communist Insurgency ▨
Farthest Japanese Advance 1945
HAINAN
RLL

on the far side of each dike. Where roads crossed the tracks, they constructed barbed wire gates which were opened in the daytime and closed at night. In the event of an attack, the observers could obtain help.[21] The aim was to control the means of transportation, to reduce the scope of insurgent activity, and to induce the insurgents to attack the fortified and closely interconnected points of defense.

However, the defensive strategy was not satisfactory for several reasons. Unlike the Nationalists, who gained success by encircling the guerrillas and then gradually closing the circle, the Japanese merely constructed forts and defended them. These forts were too dispersed to contain insurgent penetration effectively, and many of them were manned by puppet Chinese troops who secretly sympathized with the insurgents and often aided them. Also, corrupt Japanese officials assigned to counterinsurgency operations could be bribed by the insurgents.

Therefore, the Japanese turned to several types of offensive strategies. Essentially, they relied on five techniques at different times and in different areas.[22] One of these, which was employed largely in 1938-1939, was a quick but limited pursuit of an insurgent force. The Japanese realized that the Chinese guerrilla strategy was one of retreating before a superior force into areas where pursuit was difficult. Once there, the guerrillas would disperse and reassemble for the purpose of attacking an overextended and numerically inferior unit of the pursuing force. The Japanese were also aware that the communists always returned to consolidate their revolutionary bases and that, therefore, they (the Japanese) should attack quickly and immediately withdraw from the area. Then, when the insurgents returned to consolidate, the Japanese could follow through with further strikes in hope of surprising the guerrillas. The counterinsurgents also used air attacks to drive base area headquarters underground and to cause confusion. During the confusion, highly mobile forces could surround the area and attempt to cut off and annihilate the guerrillas.

A second and more extreme measure utilized largely after 1940 was the "mopping-up" technique. This consisted of devastating the countryside, burning the villages and killing almost everyone within the guerrilla-infested area.[23] It also required speed and mobility. Its consequences were severe as described by an insurgent leader, Chu Teh:

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[21] John Gotte, *Japan Fights for Asia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943), pp. 110-115.

[22] Ho, *op. cit.*, pp. 392-399.

[23] An example of the serious destruction could be seen in 1942 in the district west of Peking in which two-thirds of the houses had been destroyed and there were large areas in which every village had been burned to the ground. See Lawrence K. Rosinger, *China's Crisis* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 212.

> Wherever the enemy [Japanese] set foot, he carried out burnings and killings, attempting to create a "no-man's land" so as to eliminate the conditions necessary for the existence of our army. Moreover, the Japanese invaders constantly employed about one hundred thousand troops to conduct repeated "mopping-up" campaigns, each of which lasted as long as three or four months. This gave rise to an extremely serious situation, particularly as famine broke out at that time in various places throughout North China and both the army and the people were reduced to eating tree-leaves and grass roots. As a result, the situation was further aggravated.[24]

A third technique was called village-combing. Mainly applied in Central China, it consisted of fencing off guerrilla-infested areas with tall bamboo or timber fences. Many of the fences were hundreds of miles in length. After an area was encircled by fences, the Japanese would methodically search for insurgents. Since the guerrillas were almost indistinguishable from the local populace, the system required paid informants, an elaborate police apparatus, and some degree of popular support, as well as thorough registration and identification procedures.[25]

A fourth approach, utilized mainly during 1939, was called the "silkworm nibbling" technique. It was much like Chiang K'ai-shek's fourth campaign against the communists in 1934. The Japanese encircled the guerrilla base areas with blockhouses, entrenchments and blockade walls. If the villages could not be controlled through a strict census, they were destroyed. The purpose was to occupy or destroy base areas and at the same time not to overextend forces. As they advanced, they consolidated their position and avoided isolation of any of their forces. This technique required more manpower than the Japanese could employ, so only a few areas were cleared of guerrilla activity.

The fifth approach, which was perhaps the most creative and successful, called for the resettling of hundreds of thousands of people in new areas and villages that could be adequately controlled. This was done on a comprehensive scale in Manchuria and in parts of Northern China. Since the Japanese found that it was impossible to ferret out the guerrillas from the population, it seemed logical to attempt to isolate the civilian population physically from the guerrillas by "draining the water" and leaving the "fish."[26] In Manchuria, the Japanese resettled nearly five million peasants, one-sixth of the total population, into walled villages. The peasants were also registered and given identification cards which were checked periodically. Anyone caught without a pass was reprimanded or punished, and anyone caught outside the village after curfew was dealt with as a guerrilla.[27] Most anti-Japanese sources interpreted the "protective" villages as little more than concentration camps. The Japanese, on the other hand, claimed that the people "flocked to the villages, not only for the security they offered but also for various other reasons, such as the opportunity for community life and cooperation for mutual welfare."[28] The Chinese may not have cared for the villages, but at least they were provided with some measure of protection from intimidation and terror by both the guerrillas and the Japanese.

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[24] Chu Teh, *On the Battlefronts of the Liberated Areas* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1952), p. 21.

[25] Ho, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

[26] Mao's writings compare the guerrilla to a fish and the rural villagers to the ocean. Just as the fish relies on the ocean for existence, so does the guerrilla rely on the rural peasants.

Economic Strategy

Part of the initial defensive strategy of the Japanese was based on their assumption that the peasants in the countryside would be forced into submission because of dependency on the cities for the sale of their goods. By controlling the cities, the Japanese could then register the peasants and control their movements; in this manner the guerrillas could be more easily isolated.

The Japanese built extensive fortifications, blockhouses, and observation towers with searchlights to control the passage of people and goods between the countryside and cities. Village and city censuses were taken, and households were periodically checked not only to make sure no guerrillas were living among the people, but also to ration food so that no surplus would be available to the guerrillas. In effect, an economic embargo against the guerrillas was attempted.[29]

As the Japanese took the offensive militarily they continued their economic measures. The burning of villages and resources was designed to place economic pressure on the insurgents and to assist the military strategy of isolating and suppressing them.

Political Strategy

The Japanese understood the attitude of many Asians and hoped to exploit their anti-colonial feelings. Like the communists, they used anti-colonial themes in an attempt to win the support of the people. Their general theme "Asia for Asians" enabled them to pose as being anti-Western. They also exploited anti-Soviet feelings then existing among many Chinese by constantly maintaining that they were in China to fight against Soviet communism.[30]

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[27] A. T. Bisson, "Aikawa Asks for Fifty Million," *Amerasia*, March 1938, p. 9.

[28] Y. Nagano, "Comments on Manchurian Protective Villages," *Amerasia*, January 1939, p. 550. Nagano cites the Official Promulgation of the Japanese Department of Civil Affairs on December 3, 1934, in rebuttal to Bisson's attack on the Japanese protective village system.

[29] Gotte, *loc. cit.* Monthly reports on the economic blockade of guerrilla areas are available in a Japanese government publication entitled *China Army Classification Great Daily Record* (*Riku shi mitsu dai nikki*), published by the Japanese Ministry of War, period 1940-1944.

Edgar Snow noted that the Japanese political effort was potent because it did not ignore Chinese culture. It embraced the Chinese culture as part of the Japanese tradition. Confucianism, for instance, was potentially an ideal instrument for class control because of its system of loyalties, particularly with reference to the state.[31] The Japanese also sent Buddhist priests as part of their political effort. These priests mingled with their counterparts in China, and in some cases befriended them and won their confidence. Often, Buddhist temples became centers for Japanese cultural propaganda.[32]

The intellectuals, youth, and even primary school children, were also objects of Japanese propaganda.[33] Japanese professors and intellectuals were sent to lecture in Chinese schools. In occupied areas, the Japanese revised the curriculum and selected faculty sympathetic to their objectives.

Another political move by the Japanese was the effort to recruit Chinese leaders and political figures to work for them. In Northern China, they were unsuccessful in recruiting former warlord Wu Pei-fu, and the nonentities they eventually recruited were far less than satisfactory. In Central China, however, they could delegate to the Wang Ching-wei puppet government in Nanking the political aspects of counterinsurgency, thereby freeing many Japanese troops for military operations in the North. The puppet regime conducted the everyday affairs of government and even introduced some political reforms. It was responsible for administering the Japanese version of the *pao chia* system in the areas, called Model Peace Zones, wrested from guerrilla control.[34] The communists tried to disrupt these zones by propaganda and by attempting to thwart registration of the people, but they had only limited success.

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[30] See Sheldon C. Manefee, "Japan's Psychological War," *Social Forces,* May 1943, pp. 425-436.

[31] Snow, "Japan Imposes Her Culture," *Asia,* April 1935, p. 330.

[32] W. M. C. Johnstone, "Is Japan Winning Occupied China?," *Asia,* November 1942, p. 66. In a similar effort the Japanese sent Japanese Christians among the Chinese Christians.

[33] Typical propaganda themes were: (1) a picture of a Japanese soldier and a Chinese shaking hands—obviously very happy as they stand on a picture of a smiling world; (2) a picture of a Japanese soldier giving Chinese peasants real food while a guerrilla is offering them only a picture of food—an approach of actual vs. illusory prosperity. See W. M. C. Johnstone, "Chinese Children Get Japanese Propaganda," *Asia,* November 1938, p. 660.

Japanese Success and Failure

Although Japanese counterinsurgency was ultimately a failure, it did have periods of success. The Japanese made military gains against the insurgents between 1940 and 1943. The drastic strategies of burning, fencing and resettling were somewhat effective. While the Nationalists had relied on a strong blockade and a gradual encirclement as their sole military technique, the Japanese, lacking sufficient manpower, developed the five counterinsurgency techniques discussed above.

Economically, the Japanese were able to induce famine and hardship on many of the insurgents. Also, the plan to ration food to deny the insurgents access to any surplus was a sound idea and would have been effective if it could have been fully implemented. The Nationalists were able to enforce their blockade because their forts were close together and the lines were well guarded. The Japanese forts were too dispersed and were not well defended, so the blockade worked in only a few areas.

Politically, the Japanese had limited success. They were able to induce some Chinese to work for them, such as the Wang Ching-wei puppet government in Nanking. The Model Peace Zones were effective against communist penetration, as were the walled villages and resettlement program in Manchuria. While the Nationalists had appealed to the Chinese culture in their political strategy against the communists, the Japanese appealed to the similarity between Chinese and Japanese culture, to the idea of "Asia for Asians," and to anti-communism.

The Japanese failed militarily for several reasons. First, they lacked the manpower needed to carry out their military strategies. This problem was further complicated by the drain of quality personnel from the counterinsurgency effort to meet the increased demands of the war in the Pacific. Second, their reliance on Chinese puppet troops to carry out counterinsurgency warfare proved to be a mistake. The puppet troops often aided the insurgents and contributed to the Japanese failure.

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[34] This *pao chia* system was different in structure from the Nationalist system but served exactly the same purpose of imposing joint responsibility for conduct among the members of families, clans and villages.

Economically, the communists were able to counter Japanese pressure with pressure of their own. By controlling the countryside they were able to deny to the Japanese the provisions they needed, and repeatedly slipped through the dispersed forts and lines to attack Japanese food and supply stores. They also hindered the Japanese in the collection of taxes, selling of goods, and in circulating Japanese currency.[35]

The greatest Japanese failure was in the political area. Any success of their political programs was largely undermined by the atrocities committed by troops who extorted from the villages, raped, tortured, plundered and killed—all of which helped to alienate the Chinese people. These experiences transformed the meaning of "Asia for Asians" to "Asia for the Japanese."[36] The Japanese were obviously replacing Western imperialism with their own. Their crude and senseless behavior led one observer to suggest that the Japanese might have successfully conquered North China by simply shooting a few hundred Japanese officers.[37] Another observer felt that had they been less "medieval" in their conduct, they might have been able to exploit their political devices more effectively.[38]

Some of the methods used by the Japanese to annihilate the communist insurgents also worked against them. Often, they resorted to the wholesale destruction of villages and the shooting of hostages. Some villages were burned as many as four times during a single campaign. In the spring of 1939 the Japanese announced that they would burn the village nearest any section of railroad track that was attacked. They also published an order declaring that all males between twelve and forty in these villages would be executed on the assumption that they had aided the insurgents.[39] This is in sharp contrast to the Nationalist program which offered amnesty to insurgents who would surrender. Such measures, taken against the civilian population, played into the hands of the communists. The more the Japanese suppressed the people, the more the people were willing to endanger their lives to support the communists: The more the communists attacked, the greater the Japanese suppression and alienation of the civilian population. With the increasing alienation of the population, the Japanese gradually became engulfed in a sea of hostile opposition.[40]

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[35] Haldore Hanson, "Comment and Correspondence," *Pacific Affairs,* March 1939, p. 185.

[36] Manefee, *op. cit.,* p. 434.

[37] O. M. Green, *The Story of China's Revolution* (London: Hutchinson, 1945), p. 152.

[38] Lin Yutang, "The Four Year War in Review," *Asia,* July 1941, pp. 333-335.

[39] Cited by Lawrence K. Rosinger, "Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile War," *Pacific Affairs,* September 1939, pp. 263-277.

The Japanese had almost no effective political program to compete with those of the communists. The communist insurgent civilian administration won communist and noncommunist support alike by avoiding doctrinaire communist policies; rather, it utilized reformist policies which appeared to benefit the populace.[41]

CONCLUSIONS

Three basic lessons emerge from the counterinsurgency experience of the Chinese Nationalists and Japanese. First, the enemy insurgent must be understood by the counterinsurgent. Second, the counterinsurgent should focus on the goal of isolating the insurgent. Third, a comprehensive strategy, based on the goal of isolation and the resources of the counterinsurgent, must be thoroughly implemented.

Understanding the Insurgent

Communist insurgency in China, because of its political character, was unlike the peasant revolts and banditry of the past. The insurgency received its political injection from Mao Tse-tung, whose contribution was to pull together many previously unrelated and unstudied techniques of Chinese insurgency into a Marxist-Leninist operational pattern, using a peasant rather than a proletarian base. The central task of Mao's insurgent strategy was to seize political power in China through persuasion, manipulation, and finally, armed force. "Our principle," said Mao, "is that the Party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the Party—with the gun at our disposal we can build a powerful army and also mobilize the masses." Mao made it very clear that the war he was waging was political in nature and was managed by the Communist Party.

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[40] This strategy of the communists is discussed by Lin Piao in his famous speech, "Long Live Victory in the People's War," delivered in Peking and published in *Red Flag,* September 3, 1965. Particularly note the section entitled "Rely on the Peasantry, Establish the Rural Bases."

[41] According to Lin, "Our Party's internal work course in the United Front was the direction of uniting and struggling. This is to say, to unite all the classes and strata against Japan, to seize those temporary allies whom we were afraid would vacillate, to take a suitable policy toward adjusting the mutual relationship between the various anti-Japanese classes and strata, thus enabling them to suitably resist Japan—this was the central duty. . . ." See Lin's speech on the "people's war," Section (3) entitled "Line and Policy in Correctly Carrying on a United Front."

While Chiang K'ai-shek may have understood the political goals and strategy of his adversary, his initial response was directed toward "extermination" of the communist insurgents through a conventional military strategy. Perhaps Chiang was misled by his own propaganda and believed he was pursuing "bandits" who would rely on "bandit" forms of resistance. After several military defeats he acquired a better understanding of the nature of his adversary which led him not only to alter his military strategy but to develop political and economic programs designed to supplement the efforts of his armed forces.

The Japanese, like the Nationalists, underestimated the power of rurally supported guerrillas. Their "strategic enclaves" and "search and destroy" tactics, characteristic of initial Japanese military policy, failed to annihilate the insurgents. After months of repeated failures, Japanese occupation authorities eventually devised programs to improve their efficiency in suppressing communist insurgents but, as with the Nationalists, their newly devised strategies failed partly because they were too little and too late. Both the Nationalist Chinese and Japanese experiences clearly demonstrate that before an effective counterinsurgency strategy can be carried out, the character and nature of the insurgent movement must be thoroughly understood.

Isolation of the Insurgent

Any solution to insurgency requires the establishment of concrete and realistic goals. Often, counterinsurgents either fail to clarify their goals or pursue unrealistic goals. The Nationalists, in their initial "crusade" against the insurgents, were preoccupied with the notion of "extermination" and overlooked the intermediate and more realistic goal of isolation. After a series of military defeats they redefined their goal as one of enemy encirclement and isolation; this proved successful in forcing the insurgents to flee their stronghold.

The Japanese goal of securing cities, transportation facilities and lines of communication was concrete but unrealistic. They assumed they could immobilize the insurgents by subordinating rural China to the cities, the reverse of Mao's strategy. Given the reality that China was more than 90 per cent rural and that the peasants were not fully reliant on the cities for their needs, the Japanese goal was ill-conceived. In some areas, however, the Japanese later turned to the more realistic goal of isolating the insurgents, and in this they were more successful.

The counterinsurgent must assume that the insurgents can be rarely, if ever, eliminated but rather must be controlled or reduced to ineffectiveness. Killing leaders or destroying guerrilla forces does not result in the elimination of the insurgency. Successful counterinsurgency comes through a consistent isolation of both armed and unarmed insurgents.

Comprehensive Counterinsurgency Strategy

The ultimate failure of the Nationalists and Japanese stemmed mainly from the lack of a comprehensive strategy designed to isolate the insurgents. The "blitzkrieg" approach of Chiang during the first three campaigns, the "enclave" strategy of the Japanese, and the "search and destroy" technique of both proved counterproductive. Only when the "gradualist" approach of the Nationalists and the "nibbling" strategy of the Japanese were adopted did their military strategies become effective. While these "secure and hold" techniques required time and patience, they proved to be the most efficient military method of isolating the insurgents.

There is no quick remedy for insurgent communism. Impatience often leads to overextension and plays into the hands of the insurgents. Speed in most cases should be replaced with caution. This is particularly important if the movement is independent and deeply rooted, as were the communists in China. At the same time, the counterinsurgent must assume the initiative, constantly exerting pressure on the insurgent.

The techniques of social control, rural construction, and a wide variety of political and economic programs are vital to "secure and hold" military strategy. Population control and food denial were specific programs which helped the Japanese to isolate the insurgents. Their resettlement program in Manchuria, while an extreme measure, further illustrates how supplementary programs contribute to the goal of isolation. It is control rather than destruction that must be achieved.

In retaking insurgent-controlled areas, it is important to replace the mobilization machinery of the enemy with a reliable and competent political-administrative apparatus. For optimum results, the counterinsurgent must consolidate his base of support before he expands to other areas. Though the counterinsurgent does not require overwhelming popular support for his programs, he must have public deference of a magnitude sufficient to disrupt the enemy's political base.

The counterinsurgent, if receiving foreign assistance, must have an effective program for countering insurgent propaganda, particularly when there is a strong anti-foreign sentiment in the areas in which the struggle is occurring. For example, the Nationalists lost some support from the population when the communists were able to label them as "running dogs of the imperialists."

Knowledge of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency will not necessarily provide a panacea for present and future insurgencies, since each insurgency is based on a different set of conditions. Nevertheless, it is universally required that the insurgents be understood, that concrete and realistic counterinsurgency goals be established, and that a comprehensive strategy be developed and implemented to isolate the insurgents. These are the fundamental lessons to be learned from the experiences of the Chinese Nationalists and the Japanese.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY AND THE SAAR DISPUTE, 1949-1955

by Walter R. Craddock

DURING the years 1946-1948 the United States and Great Britain gave provisional backing to the French policy in the Saar. That policy aimed at the political separation of the Saar from Germany, the integration of the territory into the French monetary and customs system, and the establishment of an autonomous Saar government under French political tutelage. The French program quickly became endangered by the establishment in 1949 of the West German Federal Republic. The latter in succeeding years steadily undermined the French position in the Saar until it collapsed in the aftermath of the October 23, 1955 referendum.

What role did the United States and Great Britain play in this Franco-German quarrel? In his authoritative study of the Saar dispute, Jacques Freymond asserts that the British and American governments "did not deviate from the attitude they had adopted in 1947. From then until the plebiscite of 1955 they continued to support France and they officially rejected attempts on the part of Germany to re-open the question of the Saar's status. . . ."[1] Freymond hastens to add, however, that they gave their support with waning enthusiasm:

> The demands of France and her attempts to give permanence to a status which the governments accepted as provisional met with an increasingly lukewarm response in London and in Washington. They did not officially go back on the commitments they had made, but they let it be more and more clearly known that they would be glad to see an amicable settlement between France and Germany in the interests of Europe.
>
> The change of attitude was gradual, even subtle, but it was nonetheless evident. . . .[2]

It is the contention of this article, based largely on information derived from unpublished confidential sources,[3] that Freymond errs, so far as the United States is concerned, only by understating the case. These sources indicate that American diplomacy on the Saar question went beyond the ambivalence of public official support of and private disenchantment with French policy: At times it undercut the French and assisted the German cause.

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[1] Jacques Freymond, *The Saar Conflict, 1945-1955* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 302.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 303.

[3] These were made available to me through the assistance of the late E. Taylor Parks of the Historical Division, Department of State.

I

The United States had from the beginning taken a cool attitude toward a program that suspiciously recalled the futile interwar effort to place the Saar under the cloak of the League of Nations regime. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes rebuffed the initial French proposals for a special Saar regime in 1945.[4] If he and his successor, George C. Marshall, relented during the next two years, it was largely to purchase French support on other pressing German and European issues that were driving the Western powers and Soviet Russia apart. Furthermore, when the French despaired of obtaining Four Power agreement on their Saar designs because of implacable Soviet opposition, and when they proceeded unilaterally in 1947 to establish a Franco-Saar economic union and an autonomous Saar government, they encountered a considerable undercurrent of Anglo-American disapproval. In particular, the introduction of the franc into the Saar in November 1947 elicited a heated U.S. response.[5] The United States nevertheless accepted the new *de facto* status of the territory in a Berlin tripartite accord of February 1948 recognizing German-Saar commerce as international commerce.[6]

At the Moscow Conference in April 1947, Secretary of State Marshall had attached two important reservations to U.S. support of French plans for the Saar: a final settlement must await the formal German peace treaty, and the political autonomy of the Saar and "the right of its people to manage their local affairs should be carefully safeguarded."[7] These reservations emphasized the provisional and precarious nature of the *de facto* settlement effected in 1947: it was subject to the future whims of the peace negotiators and of the Saarlanders. At the time, the significance of these two reservations was not understood. The British and Americans as well as the French assumed that the *de facto* Saar settlement would continue to be acceptable to the Saarlanders and would be incorporated into the eventual peace treaty. Marshall's reservations nevertheless gave the Germans the legal and moral cudgels for opposing French efforts to harden the provisional settlement and to outlaw future nationalist political parties in the territory demanding reunion with Germany. Marshall's reservations also gave London and Washington the loopholes through which they could retreat from their reluctant promises to support the French. From the French point of view the Anglo-American pledges proved a poor bargain. In return for these ambiguous assurances the French cooperated in the formation of the new West German Federal Republic, and the latter proceeded ironically to challenge French hegemony in the Saar.

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[4] Accounts of Saar diplomacy in the years 1945-1948 may be found in Freymond, *op. cit.;* Laing Gray Cowan, *France and the Saar, 1680-1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950); and my own unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Saar Problem in Franco-German Relations, 1945-1955" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1960).

[5] Confidential source.

[6] "Accords franco-anglo-américains sur le Charbon de l'Allemagne occidentale," *La Documentation française,* Notes et Études documentaires, No. 855, Textes diplomatiques, XLIII (March 19, 1948), pp. 7-8; *New York Times,* February 21, 1948, p. 2. General Clay's instructions reflected the American wish that the Saar frontiers be reduced to their 1919 limits (beyond which the French had expanded them in 1946-1947) but apparently he did not press this matter in the Berlin negotiations.

[7] Margaret Carlyle, editor, *Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1948* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 464-465.

Moreover, the French found themselves after 1949 pursuing contradictory policies toward the new West German state. On the one hand, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman desired to cement Franco-German friendship as the foundation for a new Europe. On the other, his compatriots still feared the old enemy and remembered the wrongs of the past. Schuman was under strong pressure to consolidate the *de facto* Saar settlement to assure France of her share of reparations and more importantly to enable France to balance the German industrial potential. This was essential, the French backers of the existing settlement contended, to establish the basis of a healthy partnership with the new West German regime.[8]

Accordingly, Schuman endeavored to strengthen the existing Saar settlement in the years 1949-1950 on two fronts. He sought to obtain international recognition of the Saar government through its admission to international organizations so that the new West German regime would have no claim to represent the Saar. In particular, he sought and successfully obtained associate membership for the Saar in the Council of Europe. He also negotiated new bilateral conventions with the Saar government designed to transform the unilaterally-imposed arrangements of 1947-1948 into formal contractual agreements receiving the free approval of the Saar regime. Each of these moves provoked sharp German protests and Anglo-American displeasure.

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[8] In his *Memoirs* Konrad Adenauer indicates that Schuman told him confidentially in October 1948 that "France regarded the return of the Saar to Germany as possible. France's main concern was the securing of her economic interests. . . ." (*Memoirs, 1945-53,* translated by Beate Ruhm von Oppen [Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966], p. 233.) Adenauer possibly interpreted Schuman's remarks too optimistically, but they hardly seem out of character with the general trend of Schuman's policy. In any case, domestic and Foreign Ministry pressures led Schuman to defend the French position in the Saar after Adenauer became Chancellor.

In July 1949, just as the Germans were entering the final phase of parliamentary elections, Schuman announced his support for Saar admission to the Council of Europe.[9] Dr. Kurt Schumacher and his Social Democrats responded by opposing German membership if the Saar were admitted.[10] Leaders of the Free Democrats and Christian Democrats hastened to show themselves equally patriotic in affirming that the Saar was German. U.S. diplomats, fearful that the dispute might kindle new flames of German nationalism and suspecting that the French were trying to prejudice future peace treaty decisions, wished to postpone action on Saar membership in the Council until after the admission of West Germany[11]—when the issue could probably be forgotten. The British were also initially unsympathetic to Saar admission.

Schuman overcame his allies' objections at a Foreign Ministers' Conference in November 1949. The Foreign Ministers as well as a Consultative Assembly committee of the Council of Europe pronounced in favor of associate membership for both West Germany and the Saar. U.S. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson insisted that Saar admission should not prejudice future peace treaty decisions on the fate of the territory.[12] The new West German Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, was displeased that the French had linked the questions of German and Saar admission, but he chose not to make this a pretext for rejecting German membership.[13] The Council of Europe waited until the following spring before extending formal invitations for membership to West Germany and the Saar.

In January 1950 the French and Saar governments announced their intentions to negotiate new conventions redefining their relationships. This news aroused wounded outcries from the

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[9] *Journal officiel de la République française,* Débats de l'Assemblée nationale (July 9, 1949), p. 4489.

[10] The *Times* (London), July 23, 1949, p. 3; *New York Times,* July 24, 1949, p. 20.

[11] Confidential source.

[12] *New York Times,* November 10, 1949, p. 1; *Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy,* January 1950, p. 32.

[13] *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* January 19, 1950, p. 3.

Germans. Members of the ruling coalition joined the opposition Social Democrats in condemning the Franco-Saar discussions as a transparent effort to strengthen the *de facto* settlement in advance of a peace treaty. Chancellor Adenauer bluntly raised the issue with Schuman during the latter's first official visit to Bonn on January 15, 1950. Schuman asserted that West Germany had no claim to concern itself with Saar affairs. He tried, with little success, to reassure the Germans that the new agreements would be subject to review in the peace treaty.[14]

The Germans hoped for friendly Anglo-American intervention, but at first received little encouragement. Washington and London, to be sure, felt that Franco-Saar negotiations were unnecessary and ill-timed. On the other hand, the steady stream of German demands for the relaxation of occupation policies in recent months had taxed their patience. Both capitals hastened to reaffirm their provisional support of French policy in the Saar.[15] Acheson's statement to the press on January 18 even implied that it was U.S. policy to support the French viewpoint at the peace treaty, and he denied that the negotiation of a new French lease of the Saar mines (a principal topic of the Franco-Saar discussions) would be prejudicial to the peace terms. He further cautioned the Germans not to pretend they had no responsibility for the war or its consequences.[16]

Notwithstanding Acheson's statement, Adenauer continued, with increasing success, to seek American mediation. The Chancellor warned High Commissioner John J. McCloy that a one-sided settlement of the Saar problem might undermine his pro-Western government and endanger German participation in the Council of Europe. He tried to enlist U.S. support for his idea of an international authority for the Saar and Lorraine regions.[17] The U.S. High Commission urged the Chancellor to exert his influence to calm German emotions. He was assured that the United States considered the question of ownership of the Saar mines a matter to be settled only at the peace conference, and that the United States had no other position on this question.[18] This assurance implied an open-minded attitude, and it probably gave the Chancellor considerable comfort. Yet, it was inconsistent with Acheson's statement of January 18 and more especially with a subsequent American note to the Quai d'Orsay explaining the Secretary's remarks. This note stated the unequivocal intention of the United States to support in peace negotiations the French program for the Saar, i.e., political separation from Germany and economic attachment to France. Although this pledge of support went beyond the past statements by Byrnes and Marshall which had been limited to pledges of *provisional* support pending a peace treaty, the note cautioned that the American undertaking did not constitute a blank check for any French actions in the meantime.[19] Expressing doubt that ownership of the mines could be vested in the Saar government as proposed by the French, the note advised that the French plans for a fifty-year lease of the Saar mines be made the subject of tripartite discussions among the three Western powers. Lastly, it was emphasized that unilateral decisions could impede the fundamental goal of associating the Federal Republic with the Western nations. Major decisions on the Saar should preferably be reached on a quadripartite basis with the participation of the Federal Republic.[20]

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[14] *Le Monde* (Paris), January 22-23, 1950, p. 2; *Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy, loc. cit.*

[15] A British Foreign Office spokesman issued such a statement on January 17. *New York Times*, January 18, 1950, p. 7.

[16] "The Future Position of the Saar," Document 225-Appendix, Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Sixth Ordinary Session (1954), pp. 60-61.

[17] McCloy responded favorably to this proposal. *Le Monde*, January 22-23, 1950, p. 2; January 24, 1950, p. 1.

[18] Confidential source; *New York Times*, January 27, 1950, p. 4.

American support for the French expressed in such terms could be described as ambiguous at best. The note implied a U.S. veto over any French measures to consolidate the *de facto* Saar settlement. Thus, a familiar pattern was being established: The United States was righteously proclaiming its loyalty to previous commitments to the French, and yet it was simultaneously endeavoring to hold their Saar program in a suspended state with no changes permitted except those which received the assent of the three Western powers plus Germany. Under these conditions, such changes would come only at the sacrifice of French interests. Conversely, German efforts to undermine French domination over the Saar prior to the peace treaty should be viewed with sympathetic understanding. In short, the United States was adopting a double standard. It was having nightmares in which Adenauer's coalition always collapsed and a neutralist or nationalistic Germany took its place; to protect Adenauer (who proved in fact to be quite durable) the Bonn regime should be granted every reasonable concession—and the French should generously pay a price. In contrast, the fortunes of the unstable Centrist coalitions in France seem not to have worried Washington unduly. It either took France for granted or not very seriously at all—until first the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) and later the Gaullist Fifth Republic shattered this complacency.

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[19] Acheson similarly reassured Adenauer in January 1950 that American support of the existing Saar arrangements did not give France *carte blanche* until the peace treaty. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, p. 241.

[20] Confidential source.

Schuman rebuffed the American proposal for tripartite conversations on the mines. He nonetheless kept London and Washington informed on the progress of the Franco-Saar negotiations during February 1950, and advance copies of the agreements were duly communicated to both capitals. The United States desired that the agreements contain clauses specifically subjecting them to the peace treaty decisions. It also wanted to eliminate the fifty-year terms from the mines and railway conventions. The French agreed to limit the railway accord to a duration of twenty-five years, but initially refused to include reservations concerning the peace treaty on the ground that they were unnecessary. The United States thereupon informed Paris that the new agreements would be regarded as provisional whether or not they so stated.[21] In a gesture of appeasement, the French revised the mines convention to underscore its provisional nature.

II

On March 3, 1950, the French and Saar governments formally signed a General Convention, a Convention on the Application of the Economic Union, a Mines Convention, a Railways Convention, and several lesser accords.[22] These agreements elicited angry outbursts in West Germany. Governmental and opposition forces alleged that the accords amounted to a disguised French annexation of the Saar. Adenauer himself protested the conventions in a March 4 press conference. He deftly tried again to involve the United States and Britain in the controversy. By likening French seizures of German territory in the West to the Soviet-Polish amputations of the German East, he implied a basic Western inconsistency on the two matters. He shrewdly cited a Department of State publication[23] to defend his view that the Saar was legally a part of the French Zone of Occupation without a real claim to independence. Warning that the agreements "severely damaged"

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] The agreements are printed in *La Documentation française,* Notes et Études documentaires, Nos. 1292, 1310, Textes diplomatiques, LXXXVIII and XCI (March 7 and April 8, 1950).

[23] "The Present Status of the Saar," *Documents and State Papers of the Department of State,* I (1948-1949), p. 445.

German faith in the Western powers, he would no longer guarantee German entry into the Council of Europe.[24]

Although Quai d'Orsay officials brusquely denied the right of the West Germans to meddle in Saar affairs, Schuman tried to soothe German feelings by emphasizing the provisional nature of the conventions.[25] Britain and the United States again disappointed the Germans who were hoping for their intervention. A British Foreign Office spokesman warned the Germans not to use the Council of Europe as a means of bargaining on the Saar.[26] Adenauer quickly had second thoughts. In a letter of March 23 to the Allied High Commission stating his terms for German entry into the Council, he asked merely that Saar membership be provisional until the peace treaty.[27] The Western powers readily granted an assurance to this effect, and Adenauer had little difficulty securing Bundestag approval of German membership in June 1950. In the meantime relations between Paris and Bonn had noticeably improved following Schuman's proposal of May 9 for a European coal and steel community. Western diplomats could hope that the Saar dispute would lose its sharpness as European unity advanced.

Nevertheless, the Franco-German tensions of early 1950 had worried the United States. The latter resolved not to tolerate new French moves sponsoring Saar admission to international organizations. In March 1950 Washington had urged the Quai d'Orsay not to undertake such initiatives lest German entry into the Council of Europe be endangered.[28] After the Bundestag action in June, the French formulated plans to sponsor Saar membership in the International Labor Organization and other world specialized agencies. Although the United States promptly indicated objections to Saar membership in the ILO, France renewed its sponsorship in late 1950. Since West Germany was soon to be admitted, France was anxious to secure the simultaneous entry of the Saar.[29]

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[24] Adenauer's remarks are printed in *La Documentation française,* Bulletin quotidien de Presse étrangère, No. 1521 (March 7, 1950), pp. 1-3.

[25] *New York Times,* March 7, 1950, p. 4, and March 11, 1950, p. 4; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* VII (1948-1950), p. 10621; *Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy,* March 1950, p. 33.

[26] *New York Times,* March 7, 1950, p. 4; *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* March 9, 1950, p. 2.

[27] *Europa Archiv,* Fünftes Jahr (1950), p. 3130. Adenauer insisted on this "gesture" as necessary to win majority Bundestag support for Council of Europe membership. *Memoirs,* pp. 250-255.

[28] Confidential source.

[29] *Ibid.*

This question led to consultations between the United States and Britain for the purpose of reaching a joint policy. In these discussions, Washington declared that it did not share the French view that the Saar should evolve toward a permanent status in step with the Federal Republic—as though the two entities were of the same class. The United States preferred on the contrary that Saar participation in international organizations be limited to observers attached to the French delegations. It suggested a joint warning to France that the two powers were not obligated to advance French aims in the Saar any further, and that they would oppose any new Saar applications for membership in international organizations.[30] The Department of State suggested that the French should re-examine their long-range policy to facilitate a settlement in accordance with the Saarlanders' wishes and with European cooperation. American thinking was thus drifting toward the later program of a "European solution." Yet the United States was in no hurry for a new settlement. As one American communication to London explained, it was preferable to concentrate on the more urgent problem of German rearmament while postponing decisions on the Saar, for if the Saar dispute surged to the foreground, the United States would face the painful dilemma of having to side with either France or Germany.[31]

That American diplomats should worry about making such a choice is eloquent testimony of the change in their attitude since 1948. Instead of supporting the French in accordance with the pledges of Byrnes and Marshall, the United States was moving to a position of virtual neutrality—or even to one of potential hostility to France, if Washington should believe it necessary to side with Germany. Such an American posture inevitably strengthened the West German hand.

The proposal of a joint Anglo-American warning to the French apparently met with little British enthusiasm. London was willing to oppose Saar admission only to those international organizations in which the Federal Republic was not represented.[32] Washington proceeded unilaterally to warn Paris in February 1951 that it would oppose full membership for the Saar in the ILO. In the following April, Washington likewise expressed its hostility to

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[30] *Ibid.*

[31] Department of State Airgram to London, December 28, 1950, *Documents on the Saar,* I (prepared by Policy Reports Secretary, Office of Executive Secretary, Bad Godesberg-Mehlem, 1951), p. 106.

[32] Confidential source.

Saar membership in the World Meteorological Organization.[33] France then abandoned its plans to sponsor Saar admission to these and other world specialized agencies.

The problem threatened nevertheless to flare forth again in the case of the newly emerging European communities. In April 1951, Schuman and Adenauer chose to avoid a confrontation on the Saar in the negotiation of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty. While reserving the positions of their respective governments, they accepted provisional representation of the Saar in the Community through the French delegation.[34] Schuman's timidity on this occasion—which may have been influenced by the aforementioned American warnings—angered many of his countrymen and especially High Commissioner Gilbert Grandval, chief architect of the French policy in the Saar. Was this possibly the appropriate time to force a showdown with Germany, to compel it to accept the existing Saar arrangement? Further, did Schuman err tactically by not calling at the beginning for a Saar settlement as a condition for establishing the proposed European Defense Community? If, instead of temporizing, the French had indicated at once the high price their partners must pay for German rearmament, American illusions might have been dispelled at once and the long demoralizing impasse on the EDC Treaty might have been avoided.

In May 1951 a new crisis erupted when the Saar Minister-President Johannes Hoffmann—at Schuman's instigation—dissolved the pro-German Democratic Party of the Saar (DPS).[35] The Germans quickly denounced the police-state methods of the Saar regime and its French protectors. Adenauer protested in a note of May 29 to the Allied High Commission.[36] Reports circulated in June that the Chancellor planned to ask the United States and Great Britain to withdraw their support from France on the ground that the European situation had altered radically since 1947. If Adenauer had such intentions, he was dissuaded by McCloy. The latter nevertheless informed the Chancellor that Washington was contemplating a joint Anglo-American approach to France on behalf of a new Saar settlement.[37] This knowledge probably lay behind Adenauer's prophecy in the Bundestag on July 6 that the Saar problem would be solved in the "not very distant future" in the way the Germans wanted.[38]

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[33] *Documents on the Saar,* I, 106-107.

[34] The Schuman-Adenauer exchange of letters of April 18, 1951 is published in Decree No. 52-993 of August 20, 1952, *Journal officiel,* Lois et Décrets (1952), p. 8795.

[35] Schuman's letter of May 9 to Hoffmann invited the latter to take whatever measures he deemed necessary against the DPS. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* VIII (1950-1952), p. 11510.

[36] *Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages,* 1. Wahlperiode, Band 7 (May 30, 1951), pp. 5664ff.

The suppression of the DPS in May occurred shortly after Paris had received new U.S. admonitions to act with caution on Saar affairs so that they would not become a major issue in West German politics. Incensed that its advice had been ignored, Washington dispatched a curt note to Paris emphasizing that the suppression of the DPS was exactly the kind of action which must be avoided: It rendered Adenauer's position more difficult and jeopardized Bundestag support for the ECSC Treaty.[39]

The foregoing is indicative again of the double standard characteristic of American thinking: The French must not act in anticipation of the peace treaty, but German irredentism should be sympathetically viewed. It mattered not that the DPS had been striving to achieve the early return of the Saar to Germany—action which would substantially prejudice the peace treaty decisions. The pro-Western Adenauer regime must be safeguarded at all costs and the French should be willing to make reasonable sacrifices to assure that end.

Franco-American disagreement delayed an early Allied reply to Adenauer's protest of May 29. The United States preferred a brief and polite answer which did not brusquely contradict German claims. The French, however, desired a firm reply. The Allied note of August 3, 1951, represented something of a compromise. Couched in unctuously conciliatory language, it nonetheless implied continued support for the existing Saar settlement and rejected the claims of the Federal Republic to represent all of Germany, i.e, within its 1937 frontiers (including the Saar). As for the German complaint against the undemocratic Saar regime, the Allies offered no remedy except the sanctimonious assurance that they of course favored the development of democracy and liberty in the territory. The note concluded with the admonition that in any case the Saar issue must not be allowed to harm the great goal of European cooperation.[40] It thus constituted a mild rebuff to West Germany.

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[37] Confidential source.

[38] *Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages,* 1. Wahlperiode, Band 8 (July 6, 1951), pp. 6245ff.

[39] Confidential source.

[40] The Allied Note is printed in *La Documentation française,* Bulletin quotidien de Presse étrangère, No. 1946 (August 6, 1951), pp. 1-3.

The British had meanwhile accepted the American proposal of a joint approach to Paris on behalf of a new Saar settlement. The Department of State accordingly drafted an *aide-mémoire* intended for the Quai d'Orsay. It reaffirmed American support for the *de facto* settlement, but stressed the desirability of ending a dispute harmful to German relations with the Western powers. Characteristically, the *aide-mémoire* was never delivered for fear that it might complicate EDC negotiations. Also, it was feared that France might use it as an opening to request confirmation of the past American pledges on the Saar[41]—which evidently the Department of State wished to forget. The *aide-mémoire* was shelved, and instead the British and American ambassadors jointly informed Schuman in the autumn of 1951 that their governments favored a *permanent* Saar settlement in advance of the peace treaty. Schuman declared his desire for such a solution and suggested that one could be found within the framework of a federated Europe.[42] He probably was thinking of the "European" solution suggested in June 1951 by the *Rheinischer Merkur,* a Christian Democratic journal closely associated with Chancellor Adenauer. It had proposed that the Saar become a federal European territory and the seat of European organizations.[43] Schuman insisted, however, that any new accord must maintain the Franco-Saar economic union.

III

It took yet another Saar crisis to precipitate the first feeble Franco-German efforts to negotiate such a settlement. In January 1952 the French transformed their High Commission in the Saar into an Embassy. Simultaneously the Saar government announced that it would establish a diplomatic legation in Paris. These events hardly came as a surprise, for the French plans had been aired beforehand in both the French and German parliaments.[44] The United States nevertheless feared trouble and had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the French to delay these measures until a more advantageous time.[45] The French reasoned that West Germany would be displeased at the exchange of diplomatic missions no matter when it took place. Perhaps they really wanted a Saar crisis to slow down the European Army discussions and to show their annoyance at American pressure.[46]

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[41] Confidential source.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] O. Roegele, "Aspects of the Saar Problem," *The Review of Politics,* XIV (1952), p. 495.

[44] The Quai d'Orsay had furthermore notified Bonn of its plans. The *Times* (London), January 27, 1952, p. 2; *Le Monde,* February 2, 1952, p. 2.

[45] Confidential source.

The Germans responded with the usual complaints that France was trying to consolidate the existing Saar status into a permanent settlement. Bonn officials inspired a rumor that the Federal Government would not join the EDC without a prior settlement on the Saar.[47] Chancellor Adenauer denied this rumor while sharply deploring the new French moves. German hopes of winning Anglo-American support were damaged by the rumor and by a premature German demand for admission to the North Atlantic Pact. Acheson implied in a press statement that the German clamor was unjustified, as the Franco-Saar exchange of diplomatic missions had been too well advertised beforehand to have occasioned surprise. In a concurrent message to Schuman, he urged the Quai d'Orsay to help in calming tensions. He earnestly requested the French government to consider issuing a declaration that it did not intend to prejudice peace treaty decisions. Lastly, he proposed that the three Western powers collectively declare their aim to achieve a satisfactory solution to the Saar problem.[48]

Early in February the German Foreign Office requested Washington and London to propose that France and Germany initiate conversations seeking a "European" solution.[49] Both powers rebuffed this German overture. U.S. diplomats wanted their European partners to complete the EDC Treaty and the Contractual Accords on German sovereignty before attacking the knotty Saar problem. American thinking also favored a different procedure on the Saar issue: The three Western powers should reach a preliminary agreement on the Saar and then renegotiate it with the Federal Republic. In the end, the accord would be submitted for approval by the Saarlanders.[50] Under such a procedure France would incidentally have surrendered its chief bargaining card—its veto over German rearmament—before Saar negotiations began. The French would also have had to come to terms first with the Anglo-Saxon powers and then with Bonn, and in the process the

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[46] McCloy confided to Adenauer's emissaries that he believed the crisis to be a "volley of certain anti-European French circles against the European idea and certainly against the European Defense Community. . . ." Adenauer, *Memoirs,* p. 405.

[47] *Le Monde,* January 29, 1952, p. 3.

[48] Confidential source.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] *Ibid.*

Franco-Saar economic union would surely have been diluted or abolished.

Schuman quickly declared his opposition to the German attempt to gain Anglo-American mediation. He was nevertheless pleased that Bonn wished to discuss a "European" solution. He sent the Chancellor an informal message indicating French acceptance in principle of the "European Territory" idea and asking Adenauer to spell out his views more clearly.[51] The United States had received advance knowledge of Schuman's note to the Chancellor, and raised energetic objections to its delivery. The Department of State feared that French conditions for a "European" solution might prove unacceptable to Germany and the dispute might be aggravated. U.S. officials also felt that they should have been consulted at greater length on the question, and regarded as "extraordinary" Schuman's advice that Adenauer might use the French readiness to negotiate as a means of strengthening his hand in a forthcoming Bundestag foreign policy debate. The French hastened to reassure the United States that Schuman's note was informal in character and did not bind the occupying powers.[52] As for Schuman's gratuitous advice, the Chancellor proved more comprehending than the Americans, and in fact put the note to good use in the Bundestag debate.

Late in February, the Western Foreign Ministers conferred with the Chancellor in London. Schuman re-emphasized his readiness for Franco-German negotiations but not for Anglo-American mediation. He nevertheless wanted the United States and Britain to guarantee any Paris-Bonn accord. Believing that any Franco-German agreement would satisfy the United States, Secretary Acheson chose not to insist on the aforementioned American procedure for negotiations.[53] If the French and Germans were unable to agree, Acheson and Eden could then offer their good offices.

The Franco-German conversations in fact became immediately snarled. On March 20 Schuman and Adenauer decided to create a commission to study the subject of Saar political liberties. Each statesman proceeded under pressure of domestic critics to interpret the accord differently, and at the end of April negotiations were indefinitely suspended.

On May 26 Acheson and Eden, meeting at Bonn to sign the

[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*

Contractual Accord, agreed that their governments should formulate a common policy on the Saar. On June 20 British and American diplomats drafted a joint program for a European solution along the following lines: (1) the settlement was not to prejudice peace treaty decisions on the German frontiers; (2) the Saar should become the seat of European organizations; (3) it should be subject to the tutelage of a European organization, preferably the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe; (4) the French might continue to lease the mines and jointly operate the railroads; (5) France should re-examine its other economic agreements with the Saar; (6) France and Germany should negotiate the new Saar accord subject to Anglo-American approval; (7) a newly elected Saar *Landtag* should accept the accord; and (8) the new settlement would last until the peace treaty.[54]

Among the more interesting elements in this joint program are the fifth and seventh points. The fifth would place in question the Franco-Saar monetary and customs union, the extension of French economic legislation into the territory, and French administration of the sequestered steel properties. This accorded with the subsequent German demand for the abolition of the Franco-Saar conventions. The seventh point paralleled the position Adenauer would later take in opposition to the French preference for a Saar referendum. On the other hand, the joint program indicated clear British-American support for Europeanization of the Saar and for protection of certain important French economic interests in the territory. This writer has not ascertained whether France and West Germany were informed of this joint program, but since their own negotiations would take similar directions in the future, they at least would encounter friendly Anglo-American encouragement.

At the end of June the Western Foreign Ministers conferred in London. Schuman reported that he and the Chancellor wanted the Europeanization solution but their parliaments did not. He promised to cooperate with Adenauer in minimizing the Saar issue until after parliamentary ratification of the EDC Treaty.[55]

In practice this strategy proved unworkable in the face of domestic critics who used the Saar dispute as a weapon against the EDC. Schuman reversed himself and in July 1952 initiated new

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[54] *Ibid.*

[55] *Ibid.*

Saar discussions with Adenauer. The United States appeared willing to extend its good offices, but refrained therefrom lest its assistance would be unwelcome. Schuman dispelled any doubt on this score by reiterating his opposition to third-power mediation.[56] The negotiations broke down in October in disagreement over economic questions and the degree of liberty to be allowed to the outlawed pro-German parties in the Saar. New Saar elections without the participation of these parties followed on November 20, 1952, with resultant strain to Franco-German relations and much to the displeasure of American observers. The United States kept official silence, however, for fear of arousing new French opposition to the EDC. Although the elections returned Hoffmann's Francophile coalition to power, nearly a quarter of the Saar voters heeded Bundestag and pro-German appeals and cast spoiled ballots. The Saarlanders had emphatically provided Paris with fresh evidence of the urgent need for a new settlement.

IV

In January 1953 a new Premier, René Mayer, dropped the good "European" Schuman from the French cabinet and replaced him with the more nationalistic Georges Bidault. Mayer also announced that he would not seek parliamentary approval of the EDC Treaty and the Contractual Accord until several "preconditions" had been fulfilled. One of these required the "definition" of a "European statute" for the Saar.[57] Thus Mayer had linked the Saar and EDC questions. This French position bordered on desperation. In effect the French could no longer rely on their allies' backing to maintain their dominance over the Saar in the face of German revisionism and internal Saar nationalism. Hence they resorted to the one great weapon near at hand to enhance their bargaining power: their power to veto the immensely important European Army project.

Mayer's declarations displeased the new Republican administration in Washington. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was impatiently exhorting the Europeans to make the EDC Treaty a reality or risk U.S. withdrawal from the Continent. While the French were procrastinating, the good "European" Adenauer won American applause by securing Bundestag approval in March of the EDC Treaty and the Bonn Contractual Accord. French fears of a Washington-Bonn axis mounted, and such fears did nothing to aid the cause of the treaties in the National Assembly.

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[56] *Le Monde,* September 13, 1952, p. 2. Yet, as negotiations approached a climax in October, British High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick mediated behind the scenes. *New York Herald-Tribune,* January 17, 1954, Section IX, 7.

[57] *Journal officiel,* l'Assemblée nationale (January 6, 1953), p. 4.

During a visit to Washington in March 1953, Mayer and Bidault tried to convince their hosts of the need for an early Saar settlement. This was necessary, they held, not only to assure parliamentary approval of the treaties but also to prevent Germany from dominating the European Coal and Steel Community. Dulles objected that a Saar settlement should not be a legal condition for EDC ratification. Mayer responded that the two problems were politically, not legally, connected. Eisenhower jested that Americans found it hard to appreciate the importance of a territory no bigger than a Texas county—if that large.[58] A joint communiqué of March 28 called for an early "European" settlement. The communiqué took note—without giving U.S. sanction for it—that the French considered a Saar settlement necessary before the ratification of the EDC Treaty.[59]

In April it was Chancellor Adenauer's turn to visit Washington. He found Dulles as opposed as ever to the French linkage of the Saar and EDC questions. Nonetheless, Dulles suggested that a Saar settlement might be negotiated concurrently with parliamentary consideration of the treaties. The German-American communiqué of April 9 vaguely called for an early accord on the Saar. Adenauer held that the recent French governmental crisis had delayed the resumption of negotiations.[60] If anything, the Chancellor himself was more responsible for the delay, as he did not wish to harm his chances in the forthcoming September parliamentary elections by unpopular concessions on the Saar.

The French and Saar governments meanwhile were negotiating new conventions to replace those of 1950. The American Embassy in Paris made representations to the Quai d'Orsay expressing fear that these talks might generate new tensions.[61] The signature of the new agreements in May 1953 provoked little more than perfunctory protest in Germany as the Adenauer regime did not wish to strengthen further the anti-EDC forces in France.

In September 1953 two events prepared the ground for new efforts toward a settlement: Adenauer scored a resounding election victory and the Council of Europe under the leadership of a

[58] *Le Monde,* March 28, 1953, p. 1, and March 29-30, 1953, p. 1; *New York Times,* March 28, 1953, p. 5.

[59] *New York Times,* March 29, 1953, p. 12.

[60] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* April 10, 1953, p. 1; *New York Times,* April 8, 1953, pp. 1, 5, April 10, 1953, p. 10; *Le Monde,* April 9, 1953, p. 3; *Journal de Genève,* April 9, 1953, p. 3.

[61] Freymond, *op. cit.,* p. 133, n. 6.

Dutchman, Marinus van der Goes van Naters, assumed the role of a mediator. The van Naters proposal of a compromise "Europeanization" settlement was adopted in April 1954 by the French and German governments as the basis for their discussions. The van Naters Report recommended that the Western powers guarantee the new solution until the peace treaty or an equivalent treaty took effect and that the United States and Britain promise to support the inclusion of the statute in the peace treaty—with the Federal Republic acknowledging this undertaking.[62] It is highly doubtful whether the United States was at the time willing to take such a firm commitment.

By the spring of 1954 it was Adenauer who was most ardently seeking a settlement while the French regime of Premier Joseph Laniel and Georges Bidault seemed determined to spin out the negotiations *ad infinitum* in order to retain an excuse for postponing parliamentary consideration of the EDC Treaty.[63] The two governments were actually close to an agreement when the Laniel Cabinet fell in June 1954. The new Premier, Pierre Mendès-France, ended the agony of the EDC in August by submitting that treaty to its sudden death in the National Assembly.

When the Western powers turned to the alternative course of creating a German national army, Mendès-France asserted that a "European" Saar settlement was a prerequisite.[64] Dulles and Eden encouraged the Premier and the Chancellor to come to terms. On October 23, 1954, a Saar agreement was signed at Paris along with the treaties on German sovereignty, rearmament, and admission to the North Atlantic Pact.[65] Soon afterward, however, the French and German governments quarreled over the interpretation of the Saar accord. One important factor in dispute concerned the Anglo-American pledges supporting the French Saar policy. Article VIII of the Saar agreement called for an Anglo-American guarantee of the European statute until the peace treaty. Article IX further made the Saar provisions of a future German peace treaty subject to a new Saar referendum. The German government claimed that the two articles in effect nullified the Anglo-American obligations to support the French position in the peace treaty. The French government on the other hand served notice that it would expect the United States and Britain to honor their past pledges by supporting the incorporation of the European statute into the peace treaty.[66]

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[62] The van Naters Report was published under the title "The Future Position of the Saar," Document 225 and Appendix, Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Sixth Ordinary Session (1954).

[63] The French government amply confirmed this impression by brusquely denying a reported Saar agreement between Adenauer and Vice-Premier Teitgen in May 1954. This agreement appears in *Le Monde,* May 27, 1954, p. 5.

[64] *Journal de Genève,* September 13, 1954, p. 10.

[65] The text of the accord appears in *La Documentation française,* Notes et Études documentaires, No. 1951, Textes diplomatiques, CXXXIX (November 23, 1954), pp. 2-3.

Such contradictory interpretations endangered Bundestag acceptance of the Paris treaties. Adenauer accordingly declared in December 1954 his intentions to seek clarification in a new meeting with Mendès-France, and failing that, to seek Anglo-American mediation.[67] Mendès-France was ready to confer only after the National Assembly had acted on the treaties. He warned Dulles and Eden not to attempt Anglo-American mediation,[68] but he asked Dulles to reaffirm past U.S. pledges on the Saar. Dulles refused for the ambiguous reason that it was inopportune for the United States publicly to take such a position at the time.[69] Dulles and Eden nonetheless gave Mendès-France identical letters by which they promised, on the request of France and West Germany, to extend an Anglo-American guarantee of the new Saar statute.[70]

During the Bundestag ratification debates in February 1955, Adenauer reiterated his view that the new statute would render defunct the old Anglo-American pledges to France. He added cryptically that this was not simply his own conclusion but rather a "communication" given him by an "authorized source." Although he admitted that he had no document to this effect, he explained that no written document was necessary when his information came from such an unimpeachable authority.[71] Was he referring to some informal assurances given him by Dulles or Eden, or both?

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[66] For the contrasting views of the two governments, consult the French official interpretation in *Journal officiel,* Documents parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, Session de 1954, Annexe No. 9658 (December 7, 1954), pp. 2731-2732; and Ludwig Dischler, *Das Saarland, 1945-1956: Eine Darstellung der historischen Entwicklung mit den wichtigsten Dokumenten,* II (Hamburg: Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg, 1956), pp. 119-128.

[67] *Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages,* 2. Wahlperiode, Band 22 (December 15, 1954), pp. 3127-3130.

[68] *Le Monde,* December 21, 1954, p. 2.

[69] Cf. statement by Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay in *Journal officiel,* l'Assemblée nationale (March 30, 1955), p. 2116.

[70] *Ibid.* (December 23, 1954), p. 6813. General de Gaulle opposed such a guarantee: He argued that such an Anglo-American arbitration would end by putting in question the Franco-Saar economic union and the political separation of the Saar from Germany. *Le Monde,* December 7, 1954, p. 6.

[71] *Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages,* 2. Wahlperiode, Band 23 (February 25, 1955), p. 3692.

Adenauer had touched the French on a sensitive nerve. In a communiqué of March 4, 1955, the startled Quai d'Orsay declared its disbelief that any change had occurred concerning the force of the Anglo-American pledges.[72] Nevertheless, when the Gaullist deputy Jacques Vendroux called on the new government of Premier Edgar Faure to secure Anglo-American disavowal of the Chancellor's statements, Foreign Minister Pinay refused. He suggested rather lamely that at best any new Anglo-American statement would represent a retreat from the earlier assurances.[73] This virtually yielded the argument to Adenauer. It was a confession that France really could not depend any longer on the ephemeral backing of the United States and Britain. Pinay was left with little but the stand taken earlier by Mendès-France: Paris could assure its wishes in the peace treaty in the last resort by invoking its power to veto such a treaty.[74] In view of power realities, its veto in such a case might not be effective.

In fact the French position in the Saar deteriorated more rapidly than most French pessimists and German optimists believed possible. The German nationalist parties in the territory decided to oppose the statute, and early in the 1955 referendum campaign it became clear that they had majority backing among the Saarlanders. Even Adenauer's appeals for an affirmative vote had no effect. The French hoped also for an Anglo-American exhortation on behalf of the statute, but none came. In any case, foreign intervention would have violated provisions of the Saar agreement calling for a free referendum. On October 23, 1955, the Saarlanders overwhelmingly rejected the statute. Their vote led to new negotiations culminating in the Luxemburg agreements on October 27, 1956, which assured the political reunion of the Saar with Germany in return for protection of French economic interests and German agreement to the canalization of the Moselle.

V

Throughout the long Franco-German dispute over the Saar, U.S. policy was heavily tempered with opportunism. The United

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[72] *Le Monde*, March 6-7, 1955, p. 1.

[73] *Ibid.*, March 10, 1955, p. 2.

[74] *Journal officiel*, l'Assemblée nationale (December 22-23, 1954), p. 6813; *ibid.*, Débats du Conseil de la République (March 25, 1955), p. 1054. Cf. Eden's written statement to the Commons on March 9, 1955 declaring that Her Majesty's Government would sustain any Saar settlement resting upon the "willing acceptance of the Saar people and of the French and German Governments." This statement hardly constituted one-sided support of the French. *House of Commons Debates*, 5th Series, 538 (1954-1955), pp. 61-62.

States originally gave provisional support to the French only to gain their concessions on other issues, especially the creation of a West German state. And once the West German state came into being, its stability and resurging economy provided a sharp contrast to a France burdened with unstable politics, a sluggish economy and chronic colonial wars. Finding the French unwilling or unable to assume the desired role in European defense, the United States turned to Germany. While pretending a righteous devotion to past commitments backing French policy in the Saar, Washington in practice hampered French efforts to solidify the provisional Saar status into a permanent arrangement. West Germany inevitably possessed a stronger hand than a France given only token support by its Anglo-American partners. This is not to suggest that the American policy was unsound: A French-dominated Saar would have been a lingering, festering sore in Western Europe. Nor was the American role the critical factor which led to French failure—though the American pressure for German rehabilitation and rearmament may have been of decisive effect in hastening that failure. The Saarlanders would probably have preferred the German Fatherland to even a strong France firmly backed by the United States and Britain. Once West Germany revived, French efforts to control the territory became untenable unless sustained by naked force, and French political traditions and desire for German friendship militated against the use of force.

It may therefore be validly contended that insofar as the double-edged American policy contributed to an amicable final settlement without serious damage to Franco-German relations, it contains its own justification. The effect of the Saar dispute on future Franco-American relations, however, is another question. To the American observer, the French efforts to dominate the Saar seemed a typically inept French exercise in diplomacy all too characteristic of recent French history. Cynical Frenchmen, on the other hand, could note the American habit of sacrificing an ally's interests whenever expedient—while protesting withal its righteousness, devotion and loyalty. Other issues—the EDC, the Suez Crisis of 1956, NATO and nuclear questions—have contributed more to the current climate of distrust between Washington and Paris. Yet it would be unrealistic to deny that the Saar dispute also played a part. Many Gaullists were among those Frenchmen disappointed with American conduct on that question.

INDIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME AND REVOLUTION

by G. Eric Hansen

THE dramatic deterioration of relations between India and China since August 1959 signals the failure of the Indian diplomatic position of *panch sheel* and a whole revolutionary conception of contemporary Asian history and development. This is true because the development process in an emerging country such as India tends to create intellectual and psychological attitudes that have an impact on foreign policy and are in turn affected by it; in addition, the foreign policy of a developing nation is more than ordinarily inextricable from the deeper task of nation-building itself. This study analyzes the Indian perception of the Chinese communist revolution as well as its significance for India and all of the less developed world as a model of socio-economic development. Our concern is consequently both more and less than a study of Sino-Indian relations. While diplomatic and military modes constitute one context for understanding Sino-Indian relations, there can be little understanding of India's China policy—certainly up to 1959—without attention to the Indian intellectual and emotional atmosphere as it relates to the Peking regime. It is this attitudinal aspect of India's relations with China that accounts for much of the Indian debacle in the Himalayas: Where one is not prepared to see an adversary or to appraise him with reasonable accuracy, one is not prepared to deal with him.

The military and diplomatic consequences of the Indian perception of Communist China are only the most obvious and immediate ones. Of longer run significance is the Indian perception of the Chinese model of political and economic development, especially as it affects the ongoing Indian socio-economic debate. Many in the West have tended to overlook the Indian debate on development alternatives in the easy assumption that Indians have taken on themselves the role of democratic protagonist in a Herculean confrontation with totalitarian China. Given the infancy of Indian democracy and the context within which Indians have viewed their relations with China—a context that differs greatly from that of the West—it would appear that the West has devolved upon India a role she is indisposed to play. We should view India's quest for modernity from her own perspective, for in so doing we can hope to understand the impact of the Chinese military incursion on the Indian socio-economic and political debate. We will come to understand what India's former Ambassador to Peking, B.K. Nehru, meant when he asserted that "Indian political and economic thought has undergone a traumatic experience"[1] as a result of the Chinese invasion.

I

The Indians perceived long before independence that the Chinese revolution seemed to speak to the Indian situation. The history of Sino-Indian intellectual relations during the Congress struggle for independence is one of constant empathy by Indians for the Chinese cause. The common experience of Western imperialism no doubt was at the root of much Indian sympathy. Indians were avid viewers of the Chinese revolutions of 1911 and 1927. Nehru wrote in *The Discovery of India:* "The triumph of the Chinese Revolution was hailed with enthusiasm as portents of the approaching freedom of India and the elimination of European aggression in Asia."[2]

Another more subtle, yet enduring and powerful, element in Indian empathy for the Chinese seems to have been the Indian elites' alienation from the social status quo. The Chinese revolution represented "modernity" in all its aspects. Sympathy with an idealized vision of the Chinese revolution, so pronounced among Indian nationalists during the 1920's and 1930's, led India's great poet, Rabindranath Tagore, to write after his visit to China in 1924: "I took a Chinese name, dressed in Chinese clothes."[3] Even Nehru surrendered himself to a thoroughgoing Sinophilia, a love for China excelled only, "if at all," according to Gandhi, "by his love for his own country."[4] Nehru wrote to his sister from prison that "the future of which I dream is inextricably interwoven with close friendship and something almost approaching union with China."[5]

[1] Quoted in *Quarterly Economic Report of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion,* December 1962, p. 3.

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: John Day, 1946), p. 503.

[3] Quoted in *The Indian Annual Register,* January-June, 1942, p. 214.

[4] Letter to Chiang Kai-shek, printed in *The Nation,* October 24, 1942, p. 411.

[5] Krishna Nehru Hutheesingh, editor, *Nehru's Letters to His Sister* (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), p. 95.

This romanticized affinity with China, which often seems to have been only marginally political in nature, conditioned much of the Indian perception of the struggle among Chinese factions and the nature of the civil war. Only rarely in Indian accounts of China before 1949 can reservations be found about the quality of China's Kuomintang (KMT) leadership, or fear expressed for India's future vis-à-vis China. In addition, Indian newspaper comment generally made no distinctions and showed no favoritism between the KMT and the communists during the civil war.[6] Indians knew little about Mao Tse-tung's communists and tended to think of them as "agrarian reformers."[7] The tone of Indian comment during the civil war period, as before, was essentially apolitical and romantic. The mood of Indian feeling toward China during the civil war was summed up at the end of 1948 by the editors of the *Sino-Indian Journal:* "At the moment the Chinese political horizon seems dark with clouds, but clouds are meant to pass. The kingdom of the Spirit survives all political upheavals and the link that connects China with India will last."[8]

This Indian attitude can be traced in large part to the relative isolation of India and China from one another for many centuries, the general apolitical tone of the Indian intellectual community, and the revolutionary romanticism of an Indian elite whose own revolution had passed through its 1947 climax into the more tedious and mundane tasks of nation-building. In addition, since Indians did not view the Chinese scene in the context of the Cold War as the West did, they did not seem to realize that they had a stake in the outcome of the Chinese civil war. A small Indian leadership elite, however, did begin to take a more realistic view of the Kuomintang in its later years. Closer postwar contacts with the Chiang Kai-shek regime apparently dampened much of Nehru's earlier romanticized conception of that government.[9] Some observers have argued that much of the Indian enthusiasm for Mao's regime in its early years derived largely from the decline of the KMT in Indian estimation.[10]

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[6] 'Hindi-Cheeni' [pseud.] in collaboration with D. Amba Bai, *Indian Views of China Before the Communist Revolution* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, Monograph, May 18, 1955).

[7] See, for example, S. Radhakrishnan, *India and China* (Second edition, Bombay: Hind Kitabs Ltd., 1947), especially pp. 27-28; and K.P.S. Menon, *Delhi-Chungking: A Travel Diary* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1947), especially p. 201.

[8] *Sino-Indian Journal,* December 1948, p. ii.

[9] See, for example, K.M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat* (Third edition, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), especially pp. 26-27. This period is well treated in P.C. Chakravarti, *India's China Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), especially pp. 8-10.

II

The general enthusiasm with which attentive Indians greeted the ascension of the new regime in 1949 was unmistakable. A rash of publications giving accounts and impressions of the "New China" appeared in Indian book shops, especially in 1951 and 1952 when many Indians began to visit China.[11] In the first five years of the Peking regime's existence no less than ten major Indian cultural and goodwill delegations toured Communist China, in addition to visits by many smaller groups and individuals. Among the distinguished visitors were Nehru himself in 1954 and his sister and his brother-in-law, important members of his government, and numerous distinguished economists and planners.

The Indian government, in spite of frequent protestations that it simply recognized the "fact" of Mao Tse-tung's regime, did little to conceal its enthusiasm for the new order in China. Nehru told the Colombo Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in January 1950 that there had "always been a crying need for change" in China, and that "in recent years, the Nationalist Government had been unable to provide the basis of that change." He further commented that while he did not endorse the Chinese communists, they had "at least given the promise and, to that extent, begun the fulfillment of that long needed change." The Chinese communist regime had also, "in some ways, partially met the requirements of social justice, which was a crying need throughout South East Asia."[12]

Indian foreign policy during the Tibetan affair and the Korean War was undoubtedly influenced by this basic sympathy. Even Peking's blunt hostility toward India during the early 1950's could not dissuade Nehru from his course or most Indians from their enthusiasm. Nehru often found himself excusing Chinese hostility. He told Britain in January 1951 on the BBC that "China in her new-found strength, has acted sometimes in a manner which I deeply regret. But we have to remember the background of China, as of other Asian countries, the long period of struggle and frustration, the insolent treatment they received from imperialist powers. . . ."[13]

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[10] 'Hindi-Cheeni' with Bai, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[11] An "observer" of the *Times of India* noted at the height of this period that "out of nine books sold in one hour in a well-known book shop in Bombay, three related to the Chinese revolution and its 'People's Program'." (May 20, 1951.) Also, see Margaret Fisher and Joan V. Bondurant, "The Impact of Communist China on Visitors from India," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, February 1956, p. 249.

[12] *Times of India*, January 10, 1950.

A survey of Indian comment on the new regime illuminates the manner in which basic sympathy with the Chinese revolution informed Indian perceptions. One of the most interesting subjects of debate in India during the early 1950's was whether China was "really communist." Some of this debate was undoubtedly influenced by foreign — especially left-wing British — intellectual trends, yet it took a peculiarly Indian form. A sizable and representative portion of Indian intellectual opinion held the remarkable view that Peking was not a communist regime, including the noted historian and first ambassador to both Nationalist and Communist China, K.M. Panikkar. He launched a lively debate when, after nearly two years in Peking, he reported that "The Peking Government today is not a Communist Government. It has never claimed to be a Communist Government. In fact it objects to being called Communist." While he did not deny that the top leadership was Marxist-Leninist, Panikkar affirmed that they had "limited activities for the next few years to a common program evolved between the leaders of various groups."[14] What is even more remarkable is that a substantial portion of Indian opinion seems to have supported this view and that a lively discussion of Peking's alleged noncommunism was carried on in the Indian press for some time.[15]

A parallel debate on whether the Peking regime was "democratic" or not brought many to its defense, among them the distinguished economist V.K.R.V. Rao, who shared the tendency of many intellectuals to see in China a new kind of "Asian Democracy."[16] Those who espoused this view were guarded and to a degree ambivalent in their comments, for many of them had been schooled in the Western liberal democratic tradition. Such prominent intellectuals as K.M. Panikkar and K.T. Shah explicitly expressed their mixed feelings about the "New China" in these terms.[17] Yet the very debate on whether China was

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[13] *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1946-1957* (Three volumes, New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1957), II, 127.

[14] *The Statesman,* October 29, 1951.

[15] A typical selection of these viewpoints is found in Sundarlal, editor, *China Today* (Allahabad: Hindustani Culture Society, 1952).

[16] V.K.R.V. Rao, "Some Impressions of New China," *India Quarterly,* January-March 1952, pp. 3-14.

[17] Panikkar, *op. cit.,* p. 72: K.T. Shah, *The Promise that is New China* (Bombay: Vora and Company, Ltd., 1953), p. 4.

"really communist" or "democratic" indicates the depths of emotional involvement of many intellectuals. Three elements in the Indian environment contributed to this aspect of the debate on China.

In the first instance, the revolutionary (not to say Marxist) temperament of much attentive opinion in India, coupled with general hostility in the West toward the new order in China, caused many to over-react in their affirmation of the Peking regime. If the West made an issue of China's communism or its lack of freedoms, the inclination was to deny that Peking was communist or that its peculiar brand of "people's democracy" was inferior to that practiced elsewhere. Branding the Peking regime as communist and undemocratic seemed to many Indians to be simply a means to obscure the more fundamental fact of Asian revolution and progress. To dismiss the great events in China as only an extension of the conflict between East and West in Europe was to many Indians an insult to their own revolution, which they often regarded as the guiding spirit of the new forces of Asian resurgence. Western hostility to Peking was often interpreted as a backhanded slap at Asian revolution in general and the Indian revolution in particular. At the time of the first general elections in 1951-1952 the ruling Congress Party told its members that "not to recognize the new regime in China is to be unsympathetic to the aspirations of Asia. Without an eastern orientation they are apt to be misunderstood and confused with other issues."[18] Indians seemed to overlook much in order to gain recognition for the fundamental fact of Asian resurgence. "Forget communism, forget everything," admonished Nehru with reference to the Peking regime during his 1953 visit to Britain.[19]

Second, the Indian debate on China's communism and its style of democracy evidenced many predispositions of a traditional society which has historically affirmed an apolitical social monism.[20] The ascendence of many aspects of Marxist intellectuality in India reinforces this predisposition. The idea of a "coalition government" of all parties and groups working together, free from the political factionalism and tension that afflict less fortunate polities, appealed to many Indians. Thus the lack of dissension in Chinese speech, press or politics was interpreted by Indian visitors to China as indicating not an absence of democracy but the deep-rootedness of the revolutionary process itself. This sort of affirmation was implicit or explicit in much of Indian comment (especially of Marxist or Gandhian inclination) and was very widespread.[21] Even so sensitive and balanced a critic of China as Mohammad Mujeeb made the statement that, although the seeming identity of people and government in all aspects of Chinese life might cover a party dictatorship, evidence on this point was "purely subjective"; given this uncertainty, the "idea of government and people working together appeals to me much more than the practice of the people continually judging, criticising and opposing their government."[22] One can appreciate the special power of this predisposition among leaders in an open and developing society, torn by endemic factionalism and afflicted with an enormous gap between goals and accomplishments. In a developing society the gap between expectations and reality is necessarily great, and there is consequently an abiding tendency toward ideology and myth-making. To many Indians, China was a semi-myth world which provided escape from the tensions of the domestic *milieu.* Given the infancy of democratic institutions in India and its long tradition of social monism, this tendency must have been very powerful.

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[18] *Handbook for Congressmen* (New Delhi: Congress Central Publicity Board, 1951), pp. 28-29.

[19] *Sunday Standard* (Bombay), June 14, 1953; quoted in M.R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 182.

[20] A good discussion of this and related points is to be found in Amaury de Riencourt, *The Soul of India* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960).

The third element, related to this predisposition, was the escape which China offered to those who had become disenchanted or altogether alienated from the Indian political and social status quo. It was tempting for many to believe that the promised land could be found in China when Indian involvement promised so little. Among the Left and much of the intellectual community this factor was undoubtedly often decisive. The editor of the left-wing *Blitz,* an Indian magazine of large circulation, probably reflected a tendency of many intellectuals when he exclaimed, "only while we are still groping in the dark, in China some magician had put on the switch and—lo—their darkness had turned into brilliant light!"[23] The more balanced and sensitive comment of Nehru's brother-in-law, Raja Hutheesingh, is more instructive:

> I felt the frustration and despair of the Indian people who had hoped that free India would fight against misrule, oppression and poverty. But

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[21] See Fisher and Bondurant, *op. cit.,* for more on this point.

[22] Mohammed Mujeeb, *A Glimpse of New China* (Delhi: Maktaba Jamia Ltd., 1952 [?]), pp. 92-93.

[23] R.K. Karanjia, "How China Solved Its Problems—And Ours?," in Sundarlal, editor, *op. cit.,* p. 420.

> our leadership had been found wanting and millions continued to live without hope in hunger and ignorance. China seemed to offer a new way by which the Asian people could acquire the means of improving their lot.[24]

The hope was often its own fulfillment.

III

While the Indian perception of the Chinese communist regime and revolution was largely favorable and permeated with these intellectual and psychological preferences, there was often a strong infusion of political realism as well. While many, if not most, Indians were in varying degrees favorably disposed toward the Peking regime,[25] there was also a substantial body of opinion, on the political Left as well as on the Right, which was vociferous in its condemnation of China and those who glorified her, especially at India's expense.

In the late 1940's, top-level right-wing elements in the Congress Party, led by Sardar Patel, correctly saw that the Left (including the Gandhians and those around Nehru) would use Chinese events and experience as a wedge against the bureaucratic conservatism with which the Congress Right was identified. Dissatisfied elements within the Congress, most notably Acharya Kripalani, saw a lesson to be learned from the final years of Kuomintang rule in China. The revolutionary dust had hardly settled in China when Kripalani rose in the Lok Sabha to warn that India would go "the way of China" if the government's conservative economic policies remained ineffective. The *Times of India* editorialized on Kripalani's statement:

> True it is that the same mixture of deadly ingredients is present. Profiteering, blackmarketing, corruption and maladministration are rampant, while there is an ever-present danger of the Governmental machine, if it becomes more enfeebled, slipping into the hands of reactionaries with the seeds therein of self-destruction.[26]

The Congress Right did not miss the challenge thrown to them by the Kuomintang defeat. They were particularly cognizant of the effect of the Chinese revolution on the intellectuals and impatient youth. Speaking at Ernakulam on May 14, 1950, Patel warned: "Certain young men believed that a few bombs thrown on our own people, a few murders committed and a few dacoites will convert this land into the heaven which they think has come to China and will come to us."[27] It was during this period that the Right hoped to strengthen its position by engineering the admittance of more conservative elements into the Congress, among them the communalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS): The distinguished commentator "Candidus" noted that part of this move "is explained away by the impact of developments in the outside world, particularly China."[28]

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[24] Raja Hutheesingh, *The Great Peace: An Asian's Candid Report on Red China* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 3-4.

[25] While this is ultimately a subjective judgment based on a survey of the literature, it is corroborated by other observers, among them Norman D. Palmer: "Most of the books on Communist China published in India have been written by admirers of the new regime." *The Indian Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 252.

[26] *Times of India*, December 27, 1949.

After Patel's death in 1950 Nehru and the Left consolidated their control over the Congress, and then found themselves subjected to the same sort of attacks that had been directed against the Right. During the first general elections, China figured prominently in the debate. Kripalani, who had broken with the Congress to form his own Kisan Mazdoor Praja (KMP) Party, continued to compare the Congress Party to the Kuomintang and to praise the Chinese communist regime. The party's official organ, *Vigil,* commented on the return of the first "goodwill" mission to China: ". . . the efforts and achievements which have so deeply impressed a trained observer like Prof. Kumarappa are worth the closest study in India where some factors, similar to those that contributed to the final phase of the Kuomintang's chaotic and corrupt misrule, are already perceptible to the discerning eye."[29]

The Indian communists, having abandoned the terrorist tactics initiated in 1948, made abundant use of the Chinese example to show the accomplishments of an Asian communist party and to draw pejorative parallels between the KMT and the Congress. The CPI election manifesto declared: "We have before us the glorious example of China which under a government of People's Democracy has registered an advance that has amazed the whole world." It went on to state that "Congress leaders lie when they say there is no alternative to Congress rule. . . . This is how Chiang Kai-shek also tried to frighten the Chinese people. What actually followed the end of Chiang's rule in China was not ruin but happiness and prosperity for the whole people."[30]

The Socialist Party from the beginning was circumspect in its use of the China model. Having existed independently since 1948, the Socialists, unlike the KMPP, seemed to have realized that citing Chinese experience would aid their competitors, the CPI, more than it would damage the Congress or gain support for their own position. Consequently, Socialist literature of the period tended to view China as a competitive system. The Socialist position was that neither the Congress nor the CPI could run a successful and democratic race with China. Ashok Mehta, a leading Socialist, voiced this very prevalent view when he wrote in 1951: "China has greater economic difficulties and it will not be easy for the new regime to organise economic reconstruction. If India is moving along democratic socialist lines simultaneously, the allegiance of the Asian people would rather turn to Delhi than to Peking."[31]

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[27] *Ibid.,* May 15, 1950.
[28] *Ibid,* October 13, 1949.
[29] Quoted in *Indian Press Digests,* May 1952, p. 73.
[30] *Manifesto of the Communist Party of India,* reprinted in *Asia Guide to the General Elections* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1951).

The sizable gains of the CPI in the first general elections and the relatively poor showing of both the Socialist Party and the KMPP (which merged shortly thereafter) convinced many Socialists that there was a close connection between the Indian communists and their Chinese exemplars. This awareness led to vehement denunciations of the Chinese, whom *Janata,* Socialist organ in Bihar, called "the enemy not merely of India but of the whole of Asia, the whole of the world. . . ."[32] About the same time, Raja Hutheesingh wrote in the national Socialist journal that China had had a powerful impact on the Indian people during the general elections.[33] Another leading Socialist, M.P. Masani, noted that "Communist China's 'example' and its 'achievements' were perhaps the biggest single factor in helping to achieve the [CPI] gains that marked 1952."[34]

The Socialists even accused the Congress of attempting to gain political advantage by praising the Peking regime. By thus neutralizing the Left, including the democratic Left, Congress leaders, according to Praja Socialist President Rammanohar Lohia, were pursuing a dangerous policy—"radical in speech and conservative in action." He went on to condemn Nehru's foreign policy toward China as being motivated in part by a desire to "obstruct a Socialist combination in Asia."[35]

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[31] Ashok Mehta, "A Socialist Foreign Policy for India," *Janata,* May 20, 1951, p. 3.

[32] Quoted in Masani, *op. cit.,* p. 290.

[33] G.P. Hutheesingh, "China Under Communist Rule," *Janata,* July 26, 1953, p. 6.

[34] Masani, *op. cit.,* p. 175.

[35] Rammanohar Lohia, "Concerning our Attitude Toward Red China," *Janata,* December 9, 1951, p. 3.

The character of the Indian China debate was thus determined in large part by the political views and situations of the contestants. Nehru's China policy sought undoubtedly to neutralize the impact of China on domestic leftist propaganda as well as rightist resurgence. The Socialists, though leftist, often found themselves taking rather conservative stances toward Peking out of fear of the China model's usefulness to their competitors, the Communists. The CPI, which had for long been very suspicious of Mao's brand of communism, quickly changed its attitude once its leaders recognized the political power inherent in the pervasive Indian sinophilia. Perhaps most importantly, the China model continued to influence the intra-Congress dialogue throughout the 1950's as the leadership attempted to deal with complex political, social, and above all economic problems.

IV

The Chinese example seemed most relevant to Indians in the area of economic development. While there was almost universal agreement (except among the far-Left and far-Right) that India's route was to be one of parliamentary democracy, there was a very large group, probably in the majority, which felt that India nevertheless could learn much from China's programs of economic development. This separation by the Indians of the economic from the political in the Chinese paradigm seems somewhat strange in view of the fact that the Indian leaders were strongly committed to state sponsorship of economic development. Yet this is perhaps the most pervasive aspect of the copious Indian literature on the relevance of Chinese economic experience. At the level of techniques of paddy cultivation, such a separation of the economic from the political in development is possible. But from the very beginning what captured Indian emulative interest was not narrow technique, but fundamental economic revolution: land reform, cooperative farming, industrial-agricultural priorities in resource allocation, economic planning and implementation, as well as the whole relationship of government and people in economic development.

One can suggest a partial resolution between the Indian affirmation of a democratic, parliamentary path on the one hand and the almost total affirmation of the basic relevance to India of Chinese economic experience on the other. Because Indians tended to romanticize the Chinese regime and revolution, to see it as "democratic" (if not "parliamentary"), the lack of the institutional appurtenances of democracy were secondary to many Indians. Indian predispositions toward social and political monism created a tendency to underestimate the very real social and political fissions attendant upon any fundamental reorientation, such as that which began with "land reform" in China. Indeed, one is continually impressed with the seeming indifference of Indians to the serious tensions in Chinese society. Indian comment abounds with assertions that land reform and the later "cooperativization" was a completely voluntary, noncoerced movement, enthusiastically greeted (if not initiated) by the Chinese people.[36] The highly influential *Report of the Indian Delegation to China on Agrarian Cooperatives* noted in 1957:

> Coercion is the negation of enthusiasm. The enthusiastic outburst of energy which we saw, could not be expected from a people who have been coerced into cooperatives. We noticed among them a great patriotic zeal which had seized our own people in their fight for freedom in the thirties and forties of this century.[37]

This outlook on the Chinese experiment was common among advocates of cooperative agriculture in India, and Nehru seems to have been impressed with Chinese methods during his visit to China. The Congress move to the Left after its Avadi session in January 1955 was undoubtedly linked to Nehru's impressions of China gained during his trip the previous October.[38] Several months after his return he asserted that "During the last five years, China has made sensational progress because of the cooperative and disciplined attitude of her people."[39]

The Indian government reflected in microcosm the ambivalence of Indian public comment. One finds frequent statements by government officials that India must develop in her own

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[36] See, for example, S.K. Mukherjee, *A Visit to New China* (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee and Company, 1952), p. 58; A.N. Agarwala, *Some Aspects of Economic Advancement of Underdeveloped Economies* (Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1958), p. 71; Gyan Chand, *The New Economy of China* (Bombay: Vora and Company, Publishers, 1958), pp. xii, 56; and Subhash Chandra Sarkar, "The Chinese Communes," *India Quarterly*, January-March 1959, p. 32.

[37] *Report of the Indian Delegation to China on Agrarian Co-operatives* (New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, May 1957), pp. 94-95. A similar affirmation was made in the *Report of the Indian Delegation to China on Agricultural Planning and Techniques* (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, July-August 1956), p. 192.

[38] See R.J. Venkateswaran, *The Impact of Jawaharlal Nehru on Indian Economy* (Calcutta: Oxford Book Company, 1962), pp. 10-11. See also *The Hindu*, January 18, 1955, and the *Hindustan Times*, December 28, 1954.

[39] Jawaharlal Nehru, "Our Socialist Economy," *A.I.C.C. Economic Review*, December 1, 1958, p. 4.

(democratic) way,[40] yet no other group of Indians has been more eager to learn from Chinese experience. New Delhi sent representatives to China to study land reform, and in October 1953 the various State food ministers began to study a subsequent government report with a view to adapting suitable aspects of the study to the Indian situation. Such distinguished Indian economists as K.T. Shah and B.N. Ganguli made reports on Chinese economic conditions, and favorable observations were made by V.K.R.V. Rao, H.D. Malaviya, P.C. Mahalanobis, and Gyan Chand. In 1955 the Planning Commission sent Peking a twenty-one-point questionnaire covering a wide range of problems. In 1956 two distinguished agricultural delegations went to China to study techniques and cooperation. During the Great Leap era the government sent several delegations to study water conservation methods, small-scale industry and agriculture.

This pervasive emulative interest in the Chinese economy did not mute the voices of the anti-China forces, especially among the Socialists and conservative Congress Party members. The Indian debate on agricultural cooperativization, given great impetus by China's "surging tide of agricultural cooperation" in 1956, brought forth a respectable body of anti-cooperative, anti-China comment. The major thrust of these attacks emphasized the place of coercion in the Chinese economy and the intimate connection between the dialectics of totalitarian control and economic change. An influential monograph prepared by the Indian Cooperative Union (ICU), noting the great importance which Indian cooperative enthusiasts gave to Chinese experience, charged that Chinese peasants "have been and are being made to join these cooperatives mainly through force or the threat of force, or irresistible administrative pressure exercised through discriminatory taxes and other measures."[41] "A Minute of Dissent" from the *Cooperative Report* made the same point.[42] Conservative Congressmen, and especially political leaders on the state level who would have to implement any vast agricultural reform, were also skeptical of the relevance of Chinese experience. Among these was Dr. Sampurnanand, Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, who warned on the eve of the Cooperative Delegation's departure for China that he did not see how Communist Chinese agricultural policy could instruct a very different Indian situation.[43]

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[40] See, for example, Nehru's speech in Parliament on February 18, 1953, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, op. cit.*, II, 259.

[41] Raj Krishna, L.C. Jain and Gop Krishnan, *Cooperative Farming: Some Critical Reflections* (New Delhi: Indian Cooperative Union, 1956), pp. 24-25.

[42] B.J. Patel and F.N. Rana, "A Minute of Dissent," to the *Report of the Indian Delegation to China on Agrarian Co-operatives, op. cit.*, pp. 193ff., 199.

In the end the voices of those who were convinced of the relevance of the Chinese agricultural model prevailed. Many commentators in India pointed to the influence of the China model and its champions on the Congress Nagpur session in January 1959, when the party committed itself to production cooperatives.[44] Certainly the chasm between policymaking and policy-implementation (what one observer has called the gulf between "unification" and "action"[45]) in the Indian political structure accounts in part for this unrealistic approach to Indian agricultural problems.

Even more pertinent in explaining the magnetism of the Chinese model for so many Indian intellectuals is their pervasive belief in the efficacy of "socialism."[46] This is not to say that there are not many good reasons for state planning and control of the basic economic apparatus in a country such as India. But the ethos of socialism has tended to reduce the number of intellectually and emotionally satisfying options in economic and political development for many Indians. Many Indian economists and intellectuals have tended to dismiss out of hand the lessons to be learned not only from advanced Western countries, but from nonsocialist Asian economies like Japan and Malaysia. H.D. Malaviya, then a leader of the Congress far Left and editor of the Congress organ *A.I.C.C. Economic Review* wrote in early 1957:

> Politically, Japan has hardly anything to tell us, since it is following a policy of unrestrained capitalistic growth, [under which] the old financial oligarchies have again been revived, pregnant with dangerous implications for the future of Japan and Asia. Since we are aiming at a socialist pattern in India, we share with China the common objective of Socialism, but we have no such identity with Japan.[47]

The Cooperative Delegation to China noted after its visit to Japan that the "atmosphere" there was not conducive to cooperatives, whereas China offered the right setting for such an effort.[48] Even those standing in the mainstream of Gandhian traditionalism, including J.C. Kumarappa, tended to reject models like the Japanese and to affirm the Peking method because the latter's social monism suited their own vision of India's future.[49] The Indian choice of emulative models has thus been influenced by the subjective factor of socialism. There is much to be said for P.T. Bauer's assertion that

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[43] *Thought,* July 21, 1956, p. 18.

[44] Among them was *The Hindu* which noted critically: "The Nagpur programme appears to have been borrowed from China where the fabric of society was destroyed by war and revolutions and where the Communist Party was in a position to do anything it wanted." (January 11, 1959.)

[45] Robert N. Bellah's review of Max Weber's *Religion in India: The Sociology of Hinduism,* in *American Sociological Review,* October 1959, p. 733.

[46] See Margaret Fisher and Joan V. Bondurant, *Indian Approaches to Socialist Society* (Berkeley: Indian Press Digests Monograph Series, 1956).

[47] H.D. Malaviya, "Agriculture and Cooperation in Japan: An Appraisal," *A.I.C.C. Economic Review,* February 1, 1957, p. 20.

> The insistence with which the Chinese performance is publicized rather than that of these other countries [Japan, Malaya, Hong Kong], is a significant pointer to the political position of the articulate classes in Asia, especially to that of the intelligentsia and of politically ambitious individuals and groups in India, who wish the country to adopt the all-out socialist policy.[50]

Indian interest in the Chinese model can also be in part attributed to the paradigmatic inclination of Indian intellectuality —an inclination with strong manipulative undertones in the field of economic planning. Many Indians, especially Indian economic planners, seemed to be most impressed with the totality of the Chinese economic vision and the manner in which this supported total control, perhaps a reflection of Hindu religious predispositions. In his contribution to the *Papers Relating to the Formulation of the Second Five Year Plan,* B.N. Ganguli proposed a "disciplined national labour force" to be organized on military lines and "deployed all over the country like a vast mobile force imbued with patriotic emulation to undertake and complete in record time projects of national construction." As if to suggest that "patriotic emulation" would not be sufficient inducement, he went on to suggest that the "labour force that I contemplate should not be a voluntary service corps which may operate on small projects for short periods, although I am not ruling out enlistment in an honorary capacity."[51] The same manipulative tendency is set in even sharper relief in his enthusiasm for the Chinese "mobilization of rural savings." "India can learn much from the Chinese experience in the field of mobilisation of savings," he asserted, "particularly in the rural areas." He went on to describe how peasant "savings" become capital for industrialization.

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[48] *Report of the Indian Delegation to China on Agrarian Co-operatives, op. cit.,* p. 179.

[49] See "Communism and India," *Thought,* September 13, 1952, p. 1.

[50] P.T. Bauer, *Indian Economic Policy and Development* (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 138-139.

[51] B.N. Ganguli, "Institutional Implications of a Bolder Plan With Special Reference to China's Experience," *Papers Relating to the Formulation of the Second Five Year Plan* (New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, 1955), p. 547.

> To simplify banking business the deposit [in a rural bank] is not personal and the name of the person does not appear on the deposit notes, though they are not negotiable. Farmers are told that the money deposited will be utilized for industrial development which will benefit agriculture. The Communist Party, Youth Corps and Women's Organizations participate in the campaign. . . . The rural cooperative which buys agricultural produce for the Government and sells farmers' requirements also plays a very important role in regulating the income and expenditure of the peasants, apart from contributing to the mobilisation of savings in rural areas.[52]

In sum, the attraction of the Chinese economic paradigm derived at least as much from intellectual and emotional predisposition among attentive Indians as it did from awareness of objective similarities between the Chinese and Indian situations. The vision of socialism has tended to reflect and reinforce those aspects of Indian intellectuality which are firmly rooted in a religious, monistic tradition. Again and again in Indian comment on the Chinese economy one finds this quasi-religious emulative interest.[53] A facile blend of Marxism and Gandhism has tended to militate against the application of Western pragmatism and empiricism to the choice of economic models. Very little in the body of Western economic literature and economic vision supports what appears to be an overriding aim of the Indian economy, articulated by one prominent Indian economist as a system in which "All activity will then become dedicated work, work will become love, and society will begin to be ruled by the principle, from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. Thus truly will economic utopia lead to real utopia. . . ."[54]

V

Their perception of the Communist Chinese economy and government left most Indians ill-prepared for the collapse of the Great Leap Forward in 1960 and 1961 or the startling display of Chinese hostility during the Border War of 1962. The fact that the two occurred more or less contemporaneously further confused the Indians.

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[52] *Ibid.,* p. 545.

[53] The Cooperative Delegation described its vision of the cooperative future in India: "Briefly it will be an atmosphere of patriotism, of socialism, of democracy and a planned economy, which will provide the urge and the idealism for the whole nation to sacrifice for the common cause and the farmers as part of the nation could be persuaded to pour their offering of what will be a national yagya (sacrificial fire)." *Report of the Indian Delegation to China Agrarian Cooperatives, op. cit.,* p. 148.

[54] V.K.R.V. Rao, "Some Reflections on the Economic Utopia," *The Indian Economic Review,* February 1961, p. 241.

The massive Chinese economic upheavals, the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes, aroused great interest and admiration in India. Nehru praised the experiment in his letter to Chou En-lai in the fall of 1958, and the Government of India dispatched three delegations to examine salient aspects of small-scale industry and agriculture.[55] Other Indians appeared to be particularly excited by the communes, evoking as they did both the Gandhian and traditional Indian visions of society as a series of self-contained communities. Advocates of *Panchayati raj* showed particular interest in the Chinese happenings in the face of a determined opposition from those favoring a centralized, industrial basis for the new Indian economy.[56]

When the full extent of the Chinese economic failure became known and large-scale grain imports became necessary, Indian public comment was split. Some on the Left defended the Chinese experiment, repeating Chinese explanations about unfavorable weather conditions and pointing out that, while the Chinese economic advance may have slowed, "They are still going about 100 miles an hour, even if they do not call it 150."[57] Indian comment on the Right, especially from the perennial anti-China forces, among them *Thought,* took the opportunity to say "We told you so."

> On the innocents in this country these facts will, it is to be hoped, have a sobering effect. Peking's and Communists' and fellow travellers' propaganda had all these years built up a myth about the superiority of China's Plan mainly on the strength of the propped up achievements in China's agricultural sector. That myth has now been exposed by facts which even Communist China has found impossible to hide.[58]

If the leftist and rightist perceptions of Communist China appeared to be relatively unaffected by the collapse of the Great Leap and commune experiments, one could detect a more critical attitude among the centrist elements: The *Times of India* claimed that the drastic scaling down of Chinese claims served as "a stern warning" to Indians that rational planning does not admit of "miracles." "The Indian Government which rushes a delegation to Peking on the least pretext particularly must learn to base our planning on our own experience."[59]

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[55] Nehru's letter is printed in Chanakya Sen, editor, *Tibet Disappears* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 441.

[56] See editorials in *The Hindu,* September 23, 1958, and *The Economic Weekly,* December 6, 1958. See also Subhas Chandra Sparker, "The Chinese Communes," *India Quarterly,* January-March, 1959, p. 50, and B.N. Ganguli, "People's Communes in China," *The Economic Weekly,* February 14, 1959, p. 253.

[57] *The Listener* (Delhi), September 10, 1959; quoted in *The Economic Weekly,* October 10, 1959, p. 1391.

[58] *Thought,* September 10, 1960, p. 3.

The shocking Chinese military actions in Tibet and along India's borders during and after 1959 reinforced these more discriminating Indian perceptions of China. Indian comment often connected Chinese hostility toward India with Peking's economic difficulties.[60] The atmosphere in India had never been so favorable to a wide-ranging attack on previous governmental policies and their underlying philosophies, and the forces on the Right attempted to capitalize on this situation. This new atmosphere helped to bring forth the Swatantra Party, the first major Indian political party to question socialism and nonalignment. The Right sought to discredit the Congress, especially the Congress Left led by Krishna Menon, as well as the Indian communists, and to question the results of a decade of economic planning.

The issue of the communist nature of the Peking regime again became an issue of debate as it had in the early 1950's. The anti-China forces, especially in the Swatantra and Praja Socialist parties sought to discredit leftist domestic policies by equating socialism and communism. Acharya Kripalani charged in the *Lok Sabha* in November 1959: "I submit that an estimate of the character of the Chinese Revolution and rule was incorrect."[61] The same charge was repeated by M.R. Masani, now a leading Swatantra spokesman: "The story goes back to 1950. Ever since the Chinese Communist revolution, a policy of sentimental misreading of history has been inflicted on this country. . . . Communist history is always expansionist; it is always imperialist."[62]

The right-wing attack also attempted to discredit the Soviet Union by linking communism with aggression. Soviet influence on Indian planning had been as great as the Chinese, and the Indian Right was out to discredit all communist influences. Nehru reacted by attaching almost no significance to Peking's communism: "I am not going into the question, as some people do, of communism or anti-communism," he asserted in the *Lok*

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[59] *Times of India,* August 29, 1959.

[60] See *Times of India,* August 31, 1959; *The Economic Weekly,* September 5, 1959; Hirandas Mukherjee, "Chinese Expansionism As A Threat To Asian Freedom," *The Modern Review,* January 1963.

[61] *Parliamentary Debates* (Lok Sabha), November 25, 1959, col. 1735.

[62] *Ibid.,* col. 1752.

Sabha during the 1962 war. "I do not believe that this is a major issue in this matter or any other."[63] Nehru obviously feared offending the Soviet Union when he was in need of all possible international support. As late as 1965 the Indian ambassador to Moscow was asserting that "India was not a victim of Communist aggression but rather of Chinese aggression. . . ."[64]

While Nehru would not, for a variety of reasons, attribute Peking's hostility to its communist leadership, one can detect at least a change of emphasis in his thought. In dealing with Peking one faced the difficulty, he told the *Lok Sabha,* of dealing with "a one track mind—very much so"[65]—a statement that stands in contrast to Nehru's earlier admiration for Peking's pragmatism. His previous admiration for Peking's revolutionary qualities diminished for he now saw revolutions as possessing an "irrational" momentum which produce "abnormalities." "Now, China is very, very far from normality, and that is our misfortune, and the world's misfortune. . . ."[66] When China's revolutionary fervor was directed against imperialism and toward socialist construction it was for Nehru a force to be praised and emulated. Once these energies were directed against India they took on a very different, threatening aspect. This amounted to a basic change of attitude and led Nehru to confess that India had been living in an "artificial atmosphere."[67]

The Right's linking of socialist policies with Chinese aggression was one of the most important factors in Indian politics in the early 1960's. During the 1962 General Elections a major but vain attempt was made to defeat Krishna Menon, whose position as Defense Minister and leading leftist made him the logical target of the rightists. Menon's opponent, Acharya Kripalani, long-time China critic and a leading traditionalist, was well-financed and actively supported by a wide range of anti-Left groups. Menon was championed not only by Nehru personally and the Congress Left, but by the Indian communists. Nehru's concern for Menon's fate in the General Elections and during the Chinese invasion the following autumn was due to his personal friendship with the Defense Minister and to his interpretation of the attack on Menon as an indirect attack on himself and leftist ascendence in the Congress and the government. Surindar Suri has written of the contest:

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[63] *Ibid.,* November 8, 1962, col. 117.

[64] K.P.S. Menon, "Nehru—Architect of Foreign Policy," *Indian Foreign Affairs,* February 1965, p. 16.

[65] *Parliamentary Debates* (Lok Sabha), November 25, 1959, col. 1693.

[66] *Ibid.,* November 27, 1959, col. 2206.

[67] Quoted by A.M. Rosenthal, "Warfare Alters India Profoundly," *New York Times,* October 29, 1962, p. 1.

> In examining the election literature and campaign output, one was left with the impression that foreign affairs played in fact a much more important role than was apparent on the surface. Questions such as those of socialism and, more particularly, cooperative farming, were bound up intimately with the sympathies which the Government professed for one side or the other in the cold war. If sentiments of the voters could be aroused or influenced against the Communist countries by using issues such as that of Chinese aggression, then, so the logic seemed to run, the left-ward drift inside the country would be checked.[68]

The Chinese assault along India's borders in October-November 1962 intensified the political wars inside India. While the Right attempted to discredit the government's domestic policy by linking socialism to the failure of nonalignment and *panch sheel,* the Left was intent on salvaging its foreign policy by linking it to socialism and democracy at home. At the height of the Chinese military incursion Menon pleaded that "the future of socialism and democracy depends upon goodwill between our peoples."[69] The previous week he asserted that the country should not depart from the goal it had set for itself—economic development along socialist lines, adding, "If this is crypto-communism, you can have it."[70] Nehru did all he could to shield his Defense Minister from the demands for his resignation and to protect his domestic program, asserting that he would not permit war with China to alter the Third Five-Year Plan "or any important element in it."[71] The following May he told a meeting at Ankleswar that "socialism is the best defense against the Chinese."[72]

In spite of Nehru's attempt to protect Krishna Menon and leftist domination within the Congress and government, the very scale of the Chinese hostilities and of India's humiliation gave him no choice but to dismiss his Defense Minister and with him much of the Left's political future. A.M. Rosenthal wrote prophetically in the midst of the attacks on Menon:

> Before the Chinese attacks, Mr. Menon was at the height of his career. He had won a smashing victory at the polls in Bombay and had created a well-financed political foundation, that he and his followers hoped

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[68] Surindar Suri, *1962 Elections: A Political Analysis* (New Delhi: Sudha Publications Pvt., Ltd., 1962), p. 35.
[69] *Times of India,* October 21, 1962.
[70] *Ibid.,* October 15, 1962.
[71] *Ibid.,* October 23, 1962.
[72] Quoted by Ram Sing, "Not Malice Alone," *Thought,* May 18, 1963, p. 19.

would one day make him Prime Minister. The elimination of Mr. Menon as a contender would substantially increase the chances that the next Government of India would be led by moderates and conservatives of the Congress party rather than the left-wing led by Mr. Menon.[73]

The collapse of the immediate fortunes of the political Left was reinforced by the disarray which the Chinese attack caused among the intellectual Left, although the latter was a more gradual process. During the developments of 1959-1961 (commune and Great Leap failures in China and repression in Tibet), leftist discourse behaved almost as if nothing untoward had happened. At a meeting of the India-China Friendship Association on October 1, 1959, R.K. Karanjia, its president and leading sinophile of the previous decade, asserted that "friendship between India and China continues and must continue."[74] Mulk Raj Anand, ignoring current events, contended that the "two mature countries" could not fight one another.[75] *The Economic Weekly,* not easily moved by Chinese hostility, called on its readers not to "allow ourselves to be dissuaded by these pin-pricks or irritations."[76] The intellectual Left's idealized, euphoric conception of Sino-Indian relations and of Communist China offered no basis for explaining Peking's hostility. The tendency was to ignore the evidence or deny the obvious as did the Indian Ambassador to Washington, M.C. Chagla, when he asserted in September 1959 that "It is impossible to understand the Chinese action. There is no reason why China should have aggressive designs against India."[77]

As the full impact of Chinese hostility became clearer in the following years, leftist comment was marked by the dual themes of incredulity and betrayal. *Indian Foreign Affairs,* a champion of Peking in previous years, noted in November 1961 that "It is difficult to understand the aggressive moves of the People's Republic of China on India's border, except that the leaders of that seemingly great country have become insane." The same editors complained that "India and her people have been by far the best friends that China and her people ever had since Mao Tse-tung established the first 'clean' government China ever had."[78]

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[73] A.M. Rosenthal, *New York Times,* October 29, 1962.
[74] *Times of India,* October 1, 1959.
[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *The Economic Weekly,* September 5, 1959, p. 1217.
[77] *Times of India,* September 2, 1959.
[78] *Indian Foreign Affairs,* November 1961, p. 1.

After the border war of 1962, these same themes marked the virtual collapse of the sinophile Left. When the India-China Friendship Association was dissolved, a statement by its leaders charged that "The treacherous attack which the Chinese Government has launched against India has shocked us. The rulers of China have spurned the friendship of our country. They have repaid all that India has done to promote China's interests with crass ingratitude."[79] Two other leading sinophile organizations were similarly affected: the Indian branch of the World Peace Council was abandoned by its principal noncommunist members, including Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru and Dr. Anup Sing; the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee collapsed completely. The most vociferous China advocates of the 1950's, among them R.K. Karanjia, Pandit Sunderlal, Choudhry Brahm Perkash, Mulk Raj Anand and K.A. Abbas, became silent or assumed the role of national defenders.[80] Manjo Bose, a prominent writer, withdrew from circulation his eulogistic book, *I Have Visited China.*[81]

The discrediting of the political and intellectual Left and the collapse or severe disorientation of their institutions affected Indian economic trends. The Chinese paradigm lost its efficacy because it was inextricably tied to Sino-Indian friendship. There must have been many in India who agreed with Dr. Krishnaswami's statement that even "if the border dispute is settled, China will have to be accepted no longer as a good neighbor with whom we have a fair amount of identity in political and economic objectives. . . ."[82] The visits of Indian delegations to China ceased entirely, and the number of articles appearing in Indian economic journals treating Chinese experience dwindled to a trickle. The literature of the agricultural cooperative enthusiasts was notable for the absence of citations of Chinese conditions. A leading apologist of Chinese economics of the 1950's, B.N. Ganguli, ceased stressing the relevance of China to Indian conditions. Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao began to describe China as "totalitarian."[83] It was natural that Indians, who had suffered at the hands of Peking along her borders, would now view Peking's treatment of her own people in a different light, and, like U.N. Dhebar, regard China as a country "itself in the grip of a clique, most perfidious,

[79] *Times of India,* November 9, 1962.

[80] See *Thought,* December 22, 1962, p. 3.

[81] *Ibid.,* February 25, 1967, p. 20.

[82] *Parliamentary Debates* (Lok Sabha), November 25, 1959, col. 1826.

[83] V.K.R.V. Rao, *Modern India* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960), pp. 12, 40.

most brutal and ruthless. I sympathize with the people of China also. It is poverty driven to fight poverty, simply because the men at the helm of affairs think it is necessary in the interests of their ideological expansion to lead them into a fight."[84]

This sharper image of the totalitarian basis of the Chinese regime and economy undermined the principal interest of Indian planners in Chinese methods. In the preparation of the Second Five-Year Plan, and to some extent the Third, Chinese influence had supported the theory that proper methods of energizing manpower could offset shortages of material resources in meeting ambitious Plan targets. It was the vision of millions of enthusiastic Chinese workers happily and voluntarily undertaking great tasks, armed only with "enthusiasm for socialist construction," that had impressed so many Indians during the 1950's. The collapse of the Great Leap, the border war, and most importantly the continued failure of the Second and Third Five-Year Plans to achieve their targets in critical fields like agriculture caused some hesitancy and confusion in Indian economic planning. In the preparation of the Third Plan some of the formulations and assumptions of the earlier period were questioned. A.H. Hanson detected this shift as early as 1959. He commented, for example, on the planning paper of J.J. Anjaria that "although he confined himself to asking questions, he appeared to be leading the unprejudiced reader to the conclusion that an effort on the 'Chinese' scale was not feasible and that therefore the investment target would have to be reduced."[85] This attitude was in marked contrast to the optimism of 1955.

The abysmal failure of Indian agriculture has done much to dampen the enthusiasm for socialist-oriented policies in this field. By November 1965 the Ministry of Food and Agriculture called for a reorientation of agricultural programs, if necessary—"a clear departure from some old principles having a bearing on production."[86] While some members of the Planning Commission, among them V.K.R.V. Rao, continued to push for "socialist and egalitarian ideals that constitute the motivational base of Indian planning,"[87] moderate and conservative forces gained strength in the Government of India and the Congress Party, depriving these left-wing planners of much of their political support. The necessity for massive increases in defense expenditures and emergency measures to ward off famine have changed Indian attitudes, making them much more receptive to pragmatic rather than ideological solutions. The Chinese attack thus has had a three-fold impact on the Indian economy: it necessitated a reallocation of resources for defense; it demolished much of the political future of the Left by discrediting Krishna Menon; and it destroyed much of the Indian planners' faith in Chinese-type "popular mobilization" as a basis of economic growth.

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[84] *Parliamentary Debates* (Lok Sabha), November 8, 1962, col. 167.

[85] A.H. Hanson, *The Process of Planning* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 173.

[86] Quoted by Francine R. Frankel in "Ideology and Politics in Economic Planning," *World Politics*, July 1967, p. 643.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 644.

VI

Indians perceive the Chinese economy today as a competitor and a threat. When Chinese agricultural productivity recovered by the mid-1960's Indian comment turned apprehensive.[88] Indians began to suspect that Chinese hostility was an attempt to wreck the Indian economy and to destroy "India's image as a reckonable alternative attraction for Asian and other developing countries."[89] And they became increasingly aware of Peking's habit of scoffing at Indian efforts to achieve social and economic progress.[90]

Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese attack has caused Indians to look at themselves and their world in a different light. During the *panch sheel* period, Indians had viewed their relations with China as a central feature of Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism abroad and for socialism at home. These twin quests seemed to bind India and China and caused Indians to assume the similarity of their own and China's revolution. The Chinese attack demolished this notion and caused many Indians to confess, as did Nehru in October 1962: "We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation."[91]

The lifting of this "artificial atmosphere" challenged some basic Indian beliefs regarding socialism. Underlying Afro-Asianism has been the usually unvoiced assumption that a "socialist" country is incapable of aggression.[92] Indian neglect of her northern defenses, in spite of frequent evidences of Chinese distaste for the Government of India, is attributable in part to the refusal of most Indians to believe that "socialist China" could ever be an aggressor. While this belief was badly shaken on the Himalayan battlefield, it was undermined even more by developments elsewhere in Afro-Asia. The refusal of India's socialist friends in Egypt, Ghana and Indonesia to condemn China or render aid was further evidence of the fragile structure of Afro-Asian solidarity. The *Modern Review* complained in February 1960 that "The dispute between India and China over the northern border shows that India has practically no friends to stand by her in her support."[93] Four years later Robi Chakravorti wrote in *The Economic Weekly:*

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[88] Nath Pai, a Praja Socialist spokesman, warned the *Lok Sabha* that India's slow rate of economic growth as compared to China's was a major threat to the country. *Thought,* March 23, 1963, p. 5. See also S.D. Punekar, "The Chinese Economic Model," *The Economic Weekly,* December 5, 1959.

[89] *Thought,* August 29, 1964, p. 1.

[90] See, for example, Sudhakar Bhat in *Times of India,* August 19, 1959.

[91] Quoted by A.M. Rosenthal, *New York Times,* October 29, 1962.

[92] Nehru typified this attitude. His biographer, Frank Moraes, wrote that as a young revolutionary Nehru had become convinced that "imperialism is a product of capitalism. The feeling grew upon him and has remained that an anti-imperialist must therefore be both a nationalist and a socialist." *Report on Mao's China* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 193-194.

> Our position in the Afro-Asian world is no longer what it was, say four years ago. The reason for this reduction in our standing is that we seemed more eager to cash in on the predominant but somewhat inchoate feelings that reigned in newly independent countries than to develop narrow, hard-headed interests. . . . India's image of power and prestige, blurred first by the Chinese gunsmoke and now by the fallout from Lop Nor [site of Chinese A-tests] is being further distorted in the eyes of Afro-Asian viewers.[94]

Recent trends in Afro-Asia—Nkrumah's fall, Sukarno's eclipse, and Nasser's misfortunes—serve to reinforce Indian disillusionment with the guiding principles of the 1950's. Even the turmoil of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China is a mixed blessing from the Indian viewpoint. Not only could its excesses spill over into India, but the Chinese confusion also adds to the feelings of disorder and hopelessness in India itself. An Indian critic wrote in this vein in January 1967:

> Which of the two, China or India, offers the sadder sight? To watch China, the subtle, the profound, the wise, lowered to the level of the machine-made slogan and the mechanical puppet gesture, is infinitely sad. To observe India, the ever creative, penetrating diviner of truths, roped by puny politicians like a gigantic Gulliver to a world of sordid deeds and empty words is sadder still.[95]

In this sense hostile relations with China have been a real tragedy for India. The era of *panch sheel* may have been deceptive in that it tended to delude Indians into believing that Peking could teach parliamentary India lessons in economic and social development. At the same time, however, friendship with China gave the Indian elite an indispensable atmosphere of optimism and self-confidence within which to direct India's quest for modernity. As delicate and artificial as socialism and Afro-Asianism may have been as guides to realistic policy, they provided a unifying force to India's national elite, transcending regional, caste, language and class affiliations. The Chinese attack discredited the leftist, westernized elite which had dominated India for decades; the death of Nehru confirmed this process politically. The emergence of government and Congress Party leaders of a bureaucratic and conservative bent, typified by the party's national president, Kumaraswami Kamaraj, has created a political atmosphere dominated by parochial concerns. According to one noted student of Indian affairs, the border crisis, far from inspiring national unity and concentration on pressing national and international issues, has "set in motion a process of political deterioration which still continues."[96]

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[93] *The Modern Review,* February 1960, p. 89.

[94] Robi Chakravorti, "The Bomb Debate and India's Foreign Policy," *The Economic Weekly,* November 28, 1964, pp. 1885-1886.

[95] Salvador de Madariaga, "The Approaching Darkness," *Thought,* January 7, 1967, p. 6.

The 1967 General Elections confirmed what various studies of Indian opinion had posited: the Chinese attack has not produced a deep or long-lasting effect on most Indians.[97] It can be argued that Chinese hostility impeded rather than aided the growth of Indian national unity. The great mass of Indians do not feel sufficient identification with "India" to overcome their primary attachment to region, language, caste or religion. At the same time the Chinese attack has discredited those who seemed best able to preserve national unity in the face of these pervasive disintegrative tendencies in Indian society. The leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who has been identified with the westernized Left, is widely considered to be inadequate to this task. One point on which observers of the 1967 General Elections usually agree is that it was almost completely lacking in national issues, let alone international ones: the winners tended to be those who could best maximize parochial grievances against the Congress Party.[98] The consequence is that the Congress, the only truly national party, has been severely weakened and no alternative national leadership is available. Confrontation with China has in a real sense brought India face-to-face with a multitude of internal problems, for which her present leadership seems to have few solutions.

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[96] Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbors," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1965, p. 312.

[97] See Albert H. Cantril, Jr., "Indian Perceptions of the Sino-Indian Border Clash," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Summer 1964.

[98] See J. Anthony Lukas, "Third State in India Lost by Top Party," *New York Times,* February 25, 1967.

THE HAITIAN-DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CONTROVERSY OF 1963 AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

by Robert D. Tomasek

THE controversy between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1963 presented an extremely difficult challenge to the Organization of American States. Its causes were extraordinarily complex and posed the problem whether the Organization could deal with it effectively. As the dispute developed, the Dominican Republic threatened to invade Haiti, raising the question whether the OAS under the principles of collective security should be ready to defend what was considered by many to be a corrupt and tyrannical regime. Finally, the United States was determined to bring about the departure of the Duvalier regime in Haiti, an attitude that brought up the point whether the Organization should act as an adjunct to U.S. foreign policy goals.

The first part of this article develops the events of this dispute in some detail in the belief that the effectiveness of the Organization can be more accurately evaluated by relating its actions to problems as they arose. The second section analyzes the causes of the controversy in an attempt to ascertain the most significant of these. The last part appraises the effectiveness of the Organization through a critique of its strategy, goals, and ability to influence the various parties.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY

The controversy erupted on Saturday, April 27, 1963, when Haitian police broke into the Dominican Embassy in Port-au-Prince in their search for Haitians who had taken asylum there. On the next day Dominican President Juan Bosch delivered a twenty-four-hour ultimatum to Haiti, appealed to the Council of the Organization of American States, and used the Dominican radio to emphasize the seriousness of the events. The ultimatum declared that the Embassy violation had been the culmination of a series of provocations. It demanded the immediate withdrawal of the police from the Embassy and requested reparations and assurances of improved future conduct, all within twenty-four hours. Failing that, the Dominican Republic threatened to take action.[1] In the Dominican presentation before the Council of the Organization, the grievances were expanded to include an assassination plot against President Bosch, the presence of Trujillo relatives in Haiti, the refusal of Haiti to issue safe conduct passes to political asylees in the Dominican Embassy, and the harassment of Dominican consular agents and citizens in Haiti.[2]

Haiti denied these charges before the Council and argued that the accusations were simply a pretext for a military action that had been planned for some time to overthrow the Duvalier regime.[3] Further, in a diplomatic note to the Dominican Republic, Haiti rejected the accusation that she had willfully violated political asylum, gave notice of a rupture in diplomatic relations, and accused the Dominicans of harassing Haitian agricultural workers and of harboring Haitian political exiles.[4]

The gravity of the situation became evident when the Dominican Republic went on a war footing to back her ultimatum, moving tanks and troops to the border and sending warships to waters off Haiti. On April 28 the OAS Council met twice, heard the charges of both governments, set up a five-nation Investigating Committee to travel to both countries,[5] and sent telegrams to Presidents Bosch and Duvalier asking them to cooperate with OAS efforts to reach a peaceful solution.[6] The United States, fearful of a civilian massacre in Haiti in case of a Dominican invasion, was preparing to evacuate its citizens to warships stationed outside Haitian territorial waters. Finally, President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela offered President Bosch armed support.

On the next day, Monday, April 29, the threat of war was reduced sharply when Haiti announced the withdrawal of her police from the Dominican Embassy. On Tuesday the OAS Investigating Committee arrived in Haiti and, during its stay on Wednesday and Thursday, was able to visit the Embassy and confirm the departure of Haitian police. A new factor inflamed the controversy, however, when President Bosch insisted that the twenty-two asylees in the Dominican Embassy be given safe passage out of the country. The Investigating Committee, after turning its attention to this matter, received assurance from Haitian officials that safe passage would be given to fifteen of them, but not to seven who were suspected of participating in an attack on President Duvalier's two sons the week before. With this concession, Haitian officials requested that the Investigating Committee examine their charges against the Dominican Republic regarding the "extermination" of Haitian laborers, abetment of Haitian exile leaders, defamation of President Duvalier, and violation of Haitian air space. This the Investigating Committee refused to do.[7]

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[1] See *New York Times*, April 29, 1963, p. 2 for the full text of the note.

[2] *El Caribe* (Santo Domingo), April 29, 1963, p. 1.

[3] OAS, Document Series G/II/C-a-488, *La Sesión Extraordinaria celebrada el 28 de Abril de 1963* (Washington, 1963), pp. 11-12.

[4] See *Le Nouvelliste*, Port-au-Prince, April 29, 1963, p. 1 for the full text of the note.

[5] The five-nation Investigating Committee consisted of the Chairman, Alberto Zuleta Angel of Colombia, and Ambassadors Gonzalo Escudero of Ecuador, Enrique Gajardo Villaroel of Chile, Emilio Sarmiento Caruncho of Bolivia, and Francisco Roberto Lima of El Salvador.

[6] OAS, Document Series G/II/C-a-489 and 490, *Las Sesións Extraordinarias celebrada el 28 de Abril de 1963* (Washington, 1963).

On Friday, May 3, the Investigating Committee arrived in the Dominican Republic and stayed through Sunday before most of its members returned to Washington. During this period the situation deteriorated rapidly. The Dominican government was perturbed that none of the asylees had been released and insisted on safe passage for all twenty-two. It was feared that the continued slaughter of President Duvalier's enemies could lead to a new Embassy violation, especially since Haitian police were stationed in the streets surrounding the Embassy. Furthermore, the Dominican government complained to the Investigating Committee about the presence of members of the Trujillo family in Haiti and about an assassination plot against President Bosch.[8] In a press conference Bosch made it clear that he expected the Organization of American States to oust the Duvalier regime through collective security sanctions and the support of democratic Haitian politicians.[9]

On Sunday and Monday, May 5 and 6, the crisis reached its peak. Press correspondents cited heavy Dominican troop concentrations along the border augmented by a parachute company, tanks and jets. They reported a general feeling that Haiti, with a demoralized and poorly trained army of 4,000 and an undisciplined militia of 10,000, would be no match for the Dominican army of 16,000, which in a pincers movement could reach Port-au-Prince in four hours.[10] And they thought that President Bosch was looking for almost any pretense to invade Haiti.

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[7] For a detailed description of the Investigating Committee's activities in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, see OAS, Document Series, *First Report,* G/IV/C-i-618, May 13, 1963 (Washington, 1963).

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *El Caribe,* May 3, 1963, p. 1.

During these two days officials made many hurried moves to prevent an invasion. On Sunday members of the Investigating Committee in the Dominican Republic talked with President Bosch, and on returning to Washington the same day reported their belief that he would not take action while the OAS searched for a pacific solution.[11] On Monday morning the Council met in emergency session, and during the day Gonzalo Facio, the Council President, not only telephoned the Dominican Foreign Office but also sent telegrams to the two presidents reminding them that the Charter of the Organization prohibited the use of force.[12] Other actions were equally noteworthy. U.S. Ambassador John Martin spoke for fifty minutes with President Bosch and expressed concern about an invasion. Haiti decided to seek protection in the United Nations through the Security Council. Finally, although the Duvalier regime refused to give safe passage to the twenty-two asylees, it avoided any incidents that might have led to an invasion.

The next few days, when the threat of an invasion receded, were the turning point of the crisis. On Tuesday, May 7, Ambassador Martin informed President Bosch that the United States would back any Dominican request for OAS sanctions against Haiti, and then convinced the President of the feasibility of a proposed resolution that would have the Council Investigating Committee examine the controversy again, ask Haiti to guarantee the safety of the asylees and in general show concern for the United Nations Convention on Human Rights. On the next day the Council authorized the Investigating Committee to return to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, this time for the purpose of examining the entire controversy.[13] On the same day Gonzalo Facio and other Council members left for New York in order to persuade the Haitian Foreign Minister to remove the case from the United Nations, to assure the safe passage of the Embassy asylees from Haiti, and to allow the Investigating Committee to enter Haiti.

None of these objectives was easy to attain. In the United Nations Haiti had been able to obtain Security Council debate on the controversy for two days, charging the Dominican Republic with an aggressive twenty-four-hour ultimatum, troop concentrations on the border, and violations of air space. Her strategy was to gain Soviet and African support. It was not until May 9 that she was persuaded to return the case to the Organization of American States, after making it clear that she would appeal again to the United Nations if necessary.[14] In respect to the safe passage of the refugees, the Haitian Foreign Minister was evasive as to exactly when this would take place. Finally, although he at first balked at granting the Investigating Committee permission to enter Haiti, he agreed to do this after long talks with OAS Secretary General José Mora and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and communications with President Duvalier.[15]

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[10] *New York Times,* May 6, 1963, p. 1.

[11] *El Caribe,* May 6, 1963, p. 1.

[12] *Ibid.,* May 7, 1963, pp. 1, 2.

[13] *Ibid.,* May 8, 1963, p. 1.

By May 10 the possibility of a Dominican invasion of Haiti had lessened considerably. This was reflected in the actions of the Investigating Committee, which did not leave Washington until late Monday, May 13. The members of the Committee, assigned to study all of the causes of the controversy, were abroad from May 13 to May 23, spending their first four days in the Dominican Republic, the next two days in Haiti, and the remainder of the time back in the Dominican Republic. The report of their mission was submitted to the Council on June 10. During their first four days in the Dominican Republic, Dominican troop concentrations along the border were disbanded gradually, and President Duvalier gave safe passage to all but three of the twenty-two asylees in the Embassy. Thus, two of the major points of controversy were removed. A considerable amount of distrust still remained between the two governments, however, and efforts of the Investigating Committee to reduce the tension will be described later.

THE CAUSES OF THE CONTROVERSY

The complex causes of the Haitian-Dominican controversy can perhaps best be evaluated by examining the reasons for the Dominican action. Nine reasons can be distinguished, although there is a considerable amount of interaction and overlap among them. This evaluation is derived principally from Juan Bosch's book, his many speeches and press interviews on the controversy, the first and second reports of the Investigating Committee of the Council, the reporting of correspondents on the scene, and an interview with one highly placed U.S. official who was in contact with Dominican officials during the crisis. By probing the causes, it is possible to determine how strongly the Dominican government felt about the dispute and also to assess whether the Organization of American States was able to get at the real substance of the controversy.

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[14] *Ibid.,* May 9, 1963, p. 1, and May 10, 1963, p. 18.

[15] *Ibid.,* May 11, 1963, pp. 1, 18.

This writer believes that an objective evaluation of the causes lends support to those who assert that President Bosch actually intended to invade Haiti. The matter is admittedly controversial: some argue that Bosch never intended an invasion; others, that through a blitzkrieg he hoped to take over Haiti.[16] The evidence is not sufficient to disclose what his objectives would have been in an invasion. Bosch claims that the concentration of troops along the border and a plan to drop warning leaflets on the Haitian capital was designed to frighten Duvalier into resigning. If these threats did not work, it was Bosch's plan to have Dominican troops advance into Haitian territory for at least a few miles, to give the impression of a genuine attack, in the hope of forcing a resignation. President Bosch is not clear about what he would have done had Duvalier still refused to resign, but he denies emphatically that he ever intended an all-out invasion, arguing that no country would want to inherit all of Haiti's problems.[17]

The first cause of the controversy to be evaluated, and the one that led to the Dominican twenty-four-hour ultimatum on Haiti, was the violation of the Dominican Embassy in Port-au-Prince. On April 27 two armed Haitian policemen entered the Embassy and pestered a woman employee with questions about the twenty-two political asylees. After being ordered to leave by a higher Dominican official, they remained on the Embassy grounds until the morning of April 29, bothering people who came to visit the Embassy.[18] Was this grievance serious enough to lead to such a strong Dominican reaction, or was it, as the Haitians claimed, merely a pretext? The answer is not easy. Haitian officials argued that the violation was a minor one since the two policemen did not act on government orders, did not see or molest the twenty-two asylees, did not damage Embassy property, and had some cause to enter the Embassy since they believed that one of the asylees had temporarily left it to direct a surprise attack on President Duvalier's two children.[19] Haiti also felt that the withdrawal of the two policemen from the Embassy grounds should have put an end to the controversy.

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[16] The Haitian government argued before the Council that an attack had been planned for some time. Tad Szulc believed that a Dominican invasion was imminent but felt that it would be based more on a spur-of-the-moment decision. See *New York Times,* May 5, 1963, p. 1, and May 6, 1963, p. 1.

[17] See Juan Bosch, *The Unfinished Experiment, Democracy in the Dominican Republic* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 185-187. President Bosch claimed that this bizarre plan had to be kept secret or it would lose its effectiveness.

[18] OAS, Document Series G/IV/C-i-624, *Second Report of the Investigating Committee,* June 10, 1963 (Washington, 1963), p. 14.

Although the violation of the Embassy was not a major one, it can be argued that the Dominican government was justified in taking the incident seriously. The law governing political asylum in Latin America is firm and highly respected. President Bosch points out that the incident caused a strong reaction among the Dominican people,[20] and in a radio address he compared the act "as equivalent to an invasion of our country" and referred to it "as an unpardonable offense to our dignity."[21] Also, there are indications that the first reports of the incident were somewhat muddled, leaving him with the impression that the violation was much more flagrant than it turned out to be. After the two policemen were withdrawn, President Bosch seemed just as provoked that Haitian police set up machine guns in the street opposite the Embassy and located themselves in several of the surrounding trees.[22] At one time he warned the first Investigating Committee that his forces would invade Haiti if there were any more Embassy violations.[23] Considering that diplomats of other countries, including those of the United States, were being harassed, President Bosch may have had cause for concern.

The second cause, the question of the safe passage of the twenty-two asylees in the Dominican Embassy, is closely related to the first and remained one of the most persistent points of contention. Haiti again denied that the Bosch government had any justifiable grievance over this matter. Haitian officials pointed out that there were more than 100 asylees in various embassies in Port-au-Prince, and that according to the 1954 Convention on Diplomatic Asylum Haiti had the right to decide when safe passage would be given and to refuse exit to those asylees who were military deserters or common criminals.[24] Haitian officials believed that many of the asylees in the Dominican Embassy were of the latter type.

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[19] *Ibid.,* p. 15.

[20] Bosch, *op. cit.,* p. 184.

[21] *El Caribe,* April 29, 1963, p. 1.

[22] See his cable to the Council of the Organization of American States, OAS, Document Series G/V/C-d-1074, Annex C, May 7, 1963 (Washington, 1963), p. 34.

[23] *El Caribe,* May 5, 1963, p. 1.

[24] OAS, *Second Report . . . , op. cit.,* p. 17. Haiti's interpretation of the 1954 Convention is on weak grounds. After the confusion resulting from the rulings of the International Court of Justice on the Haya de la Torre asylum case, the Latin American governments made it clear at the Tenth Inter-American Con-

President Bosch placed great emphasis on the issue of safe passage. In a speech on the first day of the controversy he pointed out that during the previous year only six of twenty-eight asylees in the Embassy had received safe passage.[25] Two days later, after Haiti had met the Dominican ultimatum by removing the two policemen from Embassy grounds, he introduced his demand that safe passage be given to the asylees. The first Investigating Committee in Haiti believed they had Haitian promises assuring this, but when Haiti balked on immediate departure, and then announced that seven could not leave, President Bosch on May 5 threatened invasion unless all were released in a short time.[26] This was the height of the crisis, but after the threat of invasion passed the issue was still pressed. On May 10 the President said that the situation remained grave because of the asylees.[27] Even after Haiti had released all but three of them a week later, he declared that the crisis continued since three asylees were as important as twenty-two—problems of dignity and sovereignty did not depend on the numbers affected.[28] One would assume that this issue strongly affected President Bosch's actions because of the number of times it was raised. Yet Bosch does not mention it in his book. A skeptic could argue that this was the perfect type of issue to keep the controversy alive, since President Bosch knew that the Duvalier government would be adamant on it.

The third cause, a Haitian assassination plot against President Bosch, goes far to explain his actions. The actual existence of a plot is impossible to determine, since no substantive evidence has ever been presented.[29] However, Bosch firmly believed that Duvalier in January 1963 commissioned a former Trujillo intelligence agent to kill him.[30] This plot backfired, but as Bosch

ference during their drafting of the 1954 Convention that it was up to the state granting asylum to determine the crime, and that safe passage was to be given immediately. Furthermore, in 1958 the Council of Jurists of the Organization of American States gave the opinion that asylum could apply to military officers. This is pertinent since it would apply to some of the 22 asylees in the Dominican Embassy. For interpretations of the law of political asylum see Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., *Non-Intervention: The Law and its Import in the Americas* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956), pp. 392-399, and Charles G. Fenwick, *The Organization of American States* (Washington: Kaufmann Printing, Inc., 1963), pp. 324-329.

[25] *El Caribe,* April 29, 1963, p. 1.

[26] *Ibid.,* May 6, 1963, p. 1.

[27] *Ibid.,* May 11, 1963, p. 1.

[28] *Ibid.,* May 18, 1963, p. 1.

[29] The second Investigating Committee said it had no evidence, but also implied that it was ill-equipped to ferret out information of this sort. See OAS, *Second Report . . . , op. cit.,* p. 19.

[30] *El Caribe,* May 3, 1963, p. 1.

states in his book, he felt that the Haitian President was determined to kill him, even though he could not explain why except to attribute the motive to Duvalier's "super-natural" beliefs.[31] President Bosch's fear of assassination seems plausible. People close to him at the time noticed it,[32] and he showed a similar fear during the 1966 presidential election. The history of assassinations in the Dominican Republic is no doubt responsible in large measure for this state of mind.

The fourth cause concerns the entry of three Trujillo relatives into Haiti about the time of the Embassy violation. President Bosch stated that they were in Haiti to carry out a plan formulated in Madrid by members of the Trujillo family and exiled partisans of the deposed dictator Pérez Jiménez to overthrow the governments of the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.[33] He claimed that the three relatives had entered Haiti under different names, that Ramfis Trujillo was about to follow, and that Duvalier would collaborate with them in an assassination plot. Since the Trujillo relatives had the money and motives to engage in such an undertaking, it is understandable that Bosch pressed continually for their departure, which did not occur until late summer after the crisis had passed.

On the other hand, the Haitians pointed out logically that Bosch did little to check the activities of Haitian exiles in the Dominican Republic, such as Louis Dejois, Pierre Rigaud and the Cassagnol brothers—a move that might have been expected if he desired reciprocal treatment from Haiti.[34] Exile invasions of Haiti did in fact take place in August and September of 1963 with strong indications that they originated in Dominican territory.[35] President Bosch claimed that in a free society it was difficult to check the activities of exiles, and in his book he strongly denied any knowledge of who was responsible for the exile invasions.[36]

A fifth possible cause could have been fear of communist influence in Haiti. Such an eventuality might have come about through Cuban arms shipments to Haiti, a Haitian offer of military bases to Cuba in exchange for military support, economic aid from any of the communist countries, or, in the case of a complete breakdown of authority in Haiti, a coup d'état engineered by extreme leftists or invaders from Cuba. There are some indications that, at the beginning of the controversy, the communist issue worried the Dominican Republic. On April 28 the Dominican ambassador to the OAS Council stated that his government had confidential reports of Haitian secret relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia.[37]

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[31] Bosch, *op. cit.,* p. 184.

[32] Personal interview on July 27, 1966 with a United States government official who was in contact with the President at that time.

[33] *El Caribe,* May 3, 1963, p. 1.

[34] OAS, *Second Report . . . , op. cit.,* p. 7.

[35] See, OAS, Document Series G/IV/C-i-633, *Report of the Investigating Committee,* August 15, 1963 (Washington, 1963), p. 8.

[36] Bosch, *op. cit.,* pp. 187-188.

This issue, however, seems the least important of the nine. It was later established that the Haitian relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia concerned trade. President Bosch did not stress the communist threat in his speeches, did not mention it in his book, and did not show undue concern in his conversations with others.[38] Furthermore, he had never feared leftist influence in the Dominican Republic, so he would probably tend to disregard rumors of communist influence in Haiti. The United States believed that a Duvalier resignation could lead to disorder and a possible leftist takeover, but Bosch did not share these fears. As the dispute developed, there were no indications that Haiti had any special relations with Cuba or that leftists were infiltrating the Haitian government, and the two OAS Investigating Committees did not even touch on this issue.

A sixth cause was the clear violation of human rights in Haiti. The abortive attack on President Duvalier's two sons set off a bloodbath of killings by the *Tonton Macoute* which eventually consumed over 100 of Duvalier's political and military enemies and some of their families as well. President Bosch saw a close relationship between the violation of human rights and the disturbance of international peace, and believed that this interrelationship should be a major concern of the Organization of American States. The human rights aspect was important to him in three ways: First, the very violation of rights deeply disturbed him personally. Second, he felt that the killings in Port-au-Prince could easily spill over into Embassy violations and the massacre of political asylees. Finally, he feared that continued violations would eventually force 40,000-60,000 Haitians to flee the country for sanctuary in the Dominican Republic, raising all types of employment and assimilation problems.[39] Haiti argued that the human rights issue fell completely within its domestic jurisdiction.[40]

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[37] OAS, Document Series G/II/C-a-488, April 28, 1963, *op. cit.*

[38] The aforementioned U.S. government official did not feel that the communist issue greatly concerned Bosch. (Personal interview, July 27, 1966.)

[39] See *El Caribe,* May 9, 1963, p. 6 for Bosch's speech in which he compared the situation to the conclusion of the Spanish civil war when 500,000 Spaniards crossed into France. In mid-June some 500 Haitians did flee over the border, and the OAS, at a Dominican request, investigated the situation. See OAS, Document Series G29, *Session of the Council of the Organization of American States,* June 14, 1963 (Washington, 1963), pp. 3-8.

The seventh cause, interrelated with many of the others, is bound up with the personality, attitudes and ideological beliefs of President Bosch, who has always considered himself a crusader for democracy. This helps to explain his great animosity toward President Duvalier, which was heightened by the fear of assassination. The intensity of his hatred stood out in Bosch's speeches and book, where he referred to Duvalier as a "demented, crazed man," the "type found in primitive societies" who are "receptacles of uncontrolled passions," and are "mad with power, as Hitler was on a much grander scale."[41] He warned that Haiti would remain a "powder keg" as long as Duvalier ruled, and felt it was his historic mission to eliminate the Duvalier dictatorship and "liberate" the Haitian people.[42] In his speeches Bosch always emphasized that he held nothing against the Haitian people. Although he seemed to be free from racial prejudice, the Haitian government implied prejudice existed when it charged in the United Nations that this had been the only case of aggression "against a black republic of the Americas."[43]

Would Juan Bosch have retained his ideological fervor against the Duvalier regime had he been re-elected to the Dominican presidency in 1966? No definitive answer can be given: the Duvalier government has not changed a great deal, but other causes of the controversy no longer exist. Since he took office, President Joaquín Balaguer, a completely different personality type, has been responsible for restoring diplomatic links and improving relations between the two states.

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[40] The question of the protection of human rights and the strengthening of democratic practices has been a difficult one for the OAS. Many of the Latin American governments would like to do away with dictatorships, but balk at any action by the OAS for fear it would violate the doctrine of nonintervention—a doctrine that has been sanctified in many inter-American treaties and especially in Articles 15 and 16 of the OAS Charter. An attempt to promote human rights and democratic governments was made at the Fifth Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs when the Declaration of Santiago (1959) was drawn up. This Declaration, although listing the attributes of a democratic regime and reaffirming human rights, shed very little light on how democracy and human rights could be forced on a regime without giving the OAS authority to intervene. The Santiago meeting created an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but this Commission cannot enter a country unless permission is granted by its government. During this dispute President Duvalier did not give the Commission the right to investigate the violation of human rights in Haiti. For further elaboration on the OAS and human rights see Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., *The Organization of American States* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), pp. 212-246.

[41] See Bosch, *op. cit.,* pp. 183-184, and *El Caribe,* May 9, 1963, p. 6.

[42] This was the impression Tad Szulc had after a number of interviews with President Bosch. See *New York Times,* May 6, 1963, p. 1.

[43] *New York Times,* May 9, 1963, p. 1. The Haitian charge may have been due more to the desire to win African support than anything else.

An eighth cause is the historical antagonism of the two countries,[44] which goes back to the Haitian occupation of Dominican territory from 1822 to 1844. It was exacerbated in more recent times by the 1937 Dominican massacre of several thousand Haitian peasants[45] and charges by both countries before the OAS in the late 1940's and 1950's of propaganda warfare and exile plots and attacks.[46] The long-standing antagonism does not mean that the 1963 controversy was inevitable, but it is worth noting that President Bosch's perception of the controversy was partially in historical terms. In his book he makes reference to the twenty-two-year occupation, and goes so far as to say that with Haiti on the same island "we can never realize our full potential" and "will sooner or later be dragged down to our neighbor's level."[47] In several speeches also he bemoaned how the fate of the two countries was inseparably intertwined. The logical consequences of his thought would seem to lead him either to accept such a situation in great reluctance and despair or to invade Haiti in the belief that it was his historic mission to remake the country.

A possible ninth cause is that one or both of the presidents might have created the controversy to mitigate difficult domestic situations. Whether a ruler, confronted with factionalized politics or dissatisfied people, has deliberately provoked a foreign incident in order to unify his people behind him, is difficult to determine. It is a charge that governments frequently bring against one another.

The charge does not seem applicable to Haiti. The Haitian violation of the Dominican Embassy seems not to have been planned by the government beforehand. Moreover, President Duvalier had his own way of dealing with his opposition, and he must have been reluctant to provoke the Dominican Republic because of his fear of invasion. President Bosch, on the other hand, was having a great deal of trouble with the opposition parties in April 1963 over the introduction of a new constitution, and his relations with the military were strained. He, therefore, had a motive: to use the controversy to gain domestic support.[48] He was successful at first, when the parties, unions, agricultural associations, professional societies, students, and both houses of Congress backed him.[49] But support withered away quickly, as some of the most important parties refused to sanction an invasion and the military complained that it was being misused for political reasons. Military leaders, in fact, have said that they felt somewhat embarrassed throughout the whole affair and later listed this as one of their reasons for the overthrow of President Bosch in September 1963.

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[44] See Jean Mars, *La République d'Haiti et la République dominicaine; les aspects divers d'un problème d'histoire, de géographie et d'ethnologie,* Volumes I and II (Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 1953).

[45] *Ibid.,* II, 309-334. Also see John Lloyd Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 174-176, for a description of the incident and its surprising settlement by inter-American peace procedures.

[46] See Organization of American States, *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Applications, Volume I, 1948-1959* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1964), pp. 69-155, for a description of the controversies and the work of the OAS.

[47] Bosch, *op. cit.,* p. 180.

The foregoing evaluation of the causes of this controversy suggests two general conclusions: First, the background and nature of the dispute was exceedingly complex and presented a real challenge to the Organization of American States in its effort to bring about a peaceful settlement. Second, several of the causes, such as President Bosch's personality, his sense of historic mission, his fear of assassination, the presence of Trujillo relatives in Haiti, and the state of Dominican domestic politics, could have triggered a Dominican invasion of Haiti. This was not a controversy to be taken lightly, as many participants discovered belatedly.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

The effectiveness of the Organization of American States in resolving the controversy was limited at best. The OAS began properly by taking immediate cognizance of the dispute. Speed was of the essence due to the Dominican Republic's twenty-four-hour ultimatum to Haiti. The Council met twice on April 28 and, after hearing the complaints of both sides, voted the application of Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.[50] The Council then asked for and received an extension of the ultimatum deadline from the Dominican Republic. The Investigating Committee left immediately for Haiti to determine whether Haitian police were still in the Dominican Embassy. The fact that the police had left the premises before the Council members arrived was a development partly attributable to the Council's action. The Investigating Committee's presence in Haiti through May 2 also guaranteed that no new Embassy violations would take place. Thus, the Organization was helpful in eliminating the immediate cause of the controversy although President Bosch's threatening action may have been a more significant factor.

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[48] The aforementioned U.S. government official believes, from his observation at the time, that this was one of the most important causes. (Personal interview, July 27, 1966.)

[49] See *El Caribe,* April 29, 1963, p. 1, and April 30, 1963, pp. 1, 9, 10, 11, for a description of student demonstrations in front of the Haitian Embassy and statements of support from parties and groups.

[50] In this case Article 6 of the treaty was appropriate, for unlike Article 3, which deals with armed attacks, it covers "aggression which is not an armed attack" and "any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."

The Council members failed to comprehend, however, that the immediate cause was only the surface element of a very complex, serious and emotional controversy. This should have been obvious to the Council as early as April 28 when the contending governments introduced and elaborated numerous charges. If it had been alert to the gravity of the dispute, the Council could have given its Investigating Committee greater leeway and flexibility. Instead, the Investigating Committee felt that it was restricted to examining only Embassy violations,[51] and refused to budge from this narrow interpretation even after listening to personal pleas from Haitian and Dominican officials during the next week. The refusal of the OAS to examine the controversy in its totality led both disputants to look with some disdain on its efforts and prevented the Organization from weighing judiciously its responsibilities under regional collective security to determine which side was more likely to be the aggressor.

While the Investigating Committee was still in Haiti, the situation began to deteriorate due to President Bosch's insistence that the Haitian asylees in the Dominican Embassy be given safe passage out of the country. The Committee's actions on this problem illustrated its dilemma. It received Haitian assurances that safe passage would be given to fifteen of the twenty-two asylees. However, Haitian frustration over the Committee's refusal to take up its complaints was so great that the Haitians did not say when this would be done, and after the Committee departed on May 3, Haitian officials did not carry out their promise. This infuriated President Bosch, and gave him the pretext he wanted to mobilize the Dominican Republic for war. Once the Investigating Committee decided to back President Bosch's strong request, it should have insisted on a specific date for the safe passage of the asylees or at least left some of its members in Haiti to work for their release. When the Investigating Committee arrived in the Dominican Republic it discovered to its dismay that the country was at the point of war.

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[51] The authorization given the Investigating Committee was somewhat ambiguous. It was to "make an on-the-spot study of the events denounced by the Dominican Republic in the Council Meeting held this afternoon, and to submit a report thereon." (See OAS, Document Series G/II/C-a-490, April 28, 1963, *op. cit.*). The Investigating Committee felt that it was restricted to investigating only the Dominican charges regarding Embassy violations.

From May 3 to 7, a Dominican attack on Haiti was only narrowly averted. It is unlikely that the Organization of American States alone could have prevented an attack. The Investigating Committee members discussed the gravity of the situation with Dominican officials on Friday and Saturday, before returning to Washington on Sunday, May 5. Their refusal to examine a long list of Dominican charges reduced their influence, however, just as a similar refusal to take up Haitian complaints a few days earlier had diminished their effectiveness. On May 6 the Council's telegrams and telephone calls to both governments may have had some influence, but other factors seem much more important. The U.S. message on May 6 that it was opposed to an invasion evidently surprised President Bosch since he had assumed that earlier State Department silence signified tacit approval.[52] Haiti's strategy of utilizing the United Nations from May 6 to 8 had some effect for she skillfully publicized her complaints of Dominican aggressiveness—the twenty-four-hour ultimatum, troop mobilization on the frontier, and aerial overflights.[53] Venezuela and Costa Rica announced that they would not support a Dominican attack.[54] President Bosch also lost some of his domestic political support as several of the opposing parties denounced the threatened invasion[55] and the Dominican military demonstrated a decided lack of enthusiasm for an attack against Haiti.[56]

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[52] *El Caribe,* May 8, 1963, p. 1. High U.S. officials admitted to reporters that this probably was President Bosch's assumption, based on the U.S. government's general dislike of President Duvalier.

[53] Haiti sought protection of the Security Council under Articles 35 (1) and 34 of the UN Charter. These Articles are part of Chapter VI dealing with the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, which gave Haiti the right to bring the dispute to the United Nations, and the Security Council the right to investigate it. (For the full text of Haiti's plea and the United Nation's proceedings and texts of speeches, see *New York Times,* May 7, 1963, p. 2; May 9, 1963, p. 1; May 10, 1963, p. 3; and *Le Nouvelliste,* Port-au-Prince, May 14, 1963, p. 1.) The position of the United States on this procedure was that, while it did not oppose debate in the Security Council, it felt that the matter should have been properly left with the OAS. The Dominican Republic urged the Security Council to suspend consideration of the matter and leave it to the OAS, which was considering it at the same time. For an excellent analysis of the subtle interplay of the United Nations and the Organization of American States on many disputes since 1954, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The O.A.S., the UN and the United States," *International Conciliation,* March 1964.

[54] *El Caribe,* May 8, 1963, p. 8.

Throughout the crisis President Bosch asked the OAS to impose sanctions on Haiti. At his press conferences he called for diplomatic and economic sanctions, the formation of a Latin American multinational force to re-establish order in Haiti, and the encouragement of Haitian exile groups. He insisted that President Duvalier was a "threat to the peace of the continent" and argued that the Organization's sanctions against the Trujillo dictatorship a few years before had set the precedent for similar actions in this case. When the Organization did not adopt sanctions, Bosch declared that he had lost faith in it due to its "extraordinary juridical" approach and lack of concern for democracy and human rights.[57]

Any OAS attempt to declare sanctions, however, would have presented a number of practical and legal difficulties. The chances of securing a two-thirds vote for sanctions in the Council would have been slim due to the feeling of Mexico, Brazil, Chile and other nations that this would involve unjustifiable intervention in Haitian domestic politics. If diplomatic sanctions had been voted, they would have been counterproductive since Haitian asylees in Latin American embassies in Port-au-Prince would have been deprived of their places of refuge. The Organization had been able to take specific action against Rafael Trujillo a few years earlier because of specific evidence linking him to an assassination plot against President Betancourt of Venezuela. In the present case, however, there was no clear proof of the alleged assassination conspiracy against President Bosch.[58] The only possible legal grounds for action would have been to show that the lack of human rights in Haiti had produced an international disturbance of the peace; although Haitian laborers were crossing the Dominican border, this was a rather slender legal thread on which to hang strong sanctions.

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[55] *Ibid.,* May 8, 1963, p. 1. The opposition of Viriato Fiallo and his *Unión Civica Nacional* party had the most influence.

[56] President Bosch states that the military used the alibi of a lack of trucks to transport troops. See Bosch, *op. cit.,* pp. 186-187.

[57] See *El Caribe,* May 3, 1963, p. 1; May 4, 1963, p. 6; May 8, 1963, p. 1; May 11, 1963, p. 1; and May 12, 1963, p. 1, for the President's numerous statements to the press on this matter.

[58] For the specific evidence against Rafael Trujillo in the assassination plot and the actions of the Organization, see Organization of American States, *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Applications, Volume II, 1960-1964* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1964), pp. 1-27. Also, for an excellent case study of how the Organization was able to utilize the sanctions for the added purpose of liberalizing the Dominican Republic, see Jerome Slater, "The United States, the Organization of American States, and the Dominican Republic, 1961-1963," *International Organization,* Spring 1964, pp. 268-291.

The Organization of American States would have been more justified in using the threat of sanctions against the Dominican Republic at the height of the crisis. Dominican troop movements to the Haitian frontier were extensive, Dominican ships cruised off Haitian territorial waters, and Haitian air space was allegedly violated by Dominican aircraft. Many reporters were predicting a Dominican blitzkrieg attack on Port-au-Prince. President Bosch was deterred at the last moment, but this was not due to the castigation of his threatening action by the OAS Council. Under collective security principles, the participating states should help the threatened state no matter how much they dislike its form of government; otherwise, the whole purpose of collective security is lost. The Organization was correct in dealing first with the Embassy violation question, but this was a minor incident compared to the possibility of full-scale war. If the OAS assumed that the Dominican threat of attack would be enough to lead to the downfall of President Duvalier, it was a risky assumption. President Duvalier remained in power and an attack almost took place; if it had occurred, some of the credibility of the Organization as an effective regional collective security system would have disappeared with it.

Although the danger of a Dominican attack had passed by May 8, a great deal of tension between the two countries remained. In an attempt to reduce this, the OAS Council on May 8 authorized the Investigating Committee to return to both countries and this time gave it instructions to examine the controversy in its entirety.[59] The Committee arrived in the Dominican Republic on May 13 and during the following four days heard Dominican complaints about the Trujillo relatives remaining in Haiti and the failure of the Embassy asylees to receive safe passage. This last complaint was partly resolved when nineteen of them were released and arrived by plane in the Dominican Republic on Wednesday, leaving only three in Port-au-Prince under Dominican protection. Dominican officials assured the Committee that their troops were being withdrawn from the frontier.[60]

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[59] The Committee remained the same except for the addition of the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States, William Sanders of the United States. The Committee's authority was broadened in that it was to "offer the parties its services for the purpose of finding a prompt solution to the conflict" and was "to use all means at its disposal to settle this matter." See OAS, *Actas del Consejo*, May 8, 1963 (Washington, 1963).

On May 17 the Committee arrived in Haiti for a stay of two days. In conversations with Haitian officials members stressed the concern of President Bosch over the presence of Trujillo relatives on Haitian soil, urged safe passage for the few remaining asylees, and informed them of the withdrawal of Dominican troops along the border. Haitian officials emphasized their willingness to evict the Trujillo relatives if Haitian exile leaders residing in the Dominican Republic were similarly evicted, and expressed their doubts about the withdrawal of Dominican troops from the border. On returning to the Dominican Republic, the Committee was unable to persuade Dominican officials to reaffirm agreements dealing with the regulation of exile activities, but it was able to get permission to investigate the frontier areas by jeep and helicopter to verify reports that Dominican troops had withdrawn some five days before. To its relief it found the reports to be true, and then returned to Washington where it submitted a report on June 10.

This second effort of the Investigating Committee was an improvement in several ways. It probed all of the controversial issues between the two countries about which it could gain information.[61] It relayed the exact feelings of Dominican officials to Haitian officials and vice versa, and while in each capital city offered useful suggestions for ameliorating the controversy. Its very presence in the Dominican Republic may have hastened that government's decision to remove its troops from the border, and the awareness of Haitian officials that the Committee would visit them next may have induced them to give most of the asylees safe passage. The Committee's investigation along the border assured everyone concerned that Dominican troops had actually been withdrawn from the frontier. Finally, the Committee's Report of June 10 was informative in that it disclosed complete details on various incidents, including the original April 27 Embassy violation, on which full and accurate information had not previously been available.[62]

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[60] The Investigating Committee fortunately gave a detailed day-by-day account of its activities in both countries. See OAS, *Second Report . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 2-11.

[61] The Committee felt that the impossibility of gathering accurate evidence precluded it from investigating the Dominican charge of an assassination plot against President Bosch, the Haitian charges of previous Dominican aerial overflights along the border, and Dominican harassment of Haitian agricultural laborers living in Dominican territory. See *ibid.*, pp. 19, 22, 23, 26.

The Organization of American States in its report of June 10 apportioned the blame for the controversy about equally between the two countries, and in the July 16 Council vote on the report made mild recommendations to both for easing the situation.[63] These actions were representative of the Organization's strategy of utilizing gentle persuasion instead of forceful action. The strategy was not a complete success, for it relied too much on the good will of both countries. Fortunately, during the summer the Trujillo relatives left Haiti and the last three asylees under Dominican protection in Port-au-Prince were given safe passage, removing more elements of the controversy.

The second effort of the Organization was partially successful in reducing the tension between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, for it dealt with the dispute in its totality. In many ways the work of the second Investigating Committee was made easier because the threat of an imminent Dominican invasion had passed. The Organization might have accomplished more if it had followed through on its recommendations, especially the one urging the two countries to negotiate their remaining differences.

There was one other way in which the Organization of American States could have become seriously involved in this whole episode. The United States was convinced that President Duvalier would voluntarily leave office on May 15 when his first legal term as president expired. His departure from Haiti would have pleased the Kennedy Administration because of its strong distaste of the dictatorship. However, it was feared that as a last gesture Duvalier would order his *Tonton Macoute* to massacre all foreigners, and in the ensuing chaos leftist extremists might take power. The United States had 2,500 marines on an aircraft carrier near Haiti, but was hesitant to intervene unilaterally because of the strong Latin American emphasis on nonintervention and the burdens of running a country such as Haiti.

Thus, as the May 15 date approached, the United States discussed with Latin American governments a plan to have the OAS give approval to marine intervention of Haiti, the marines acting ostensibly as an inter-American force. Hopefully, other countries such as Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic would later contribute troops to this force as the second phase of an OAS tutelage or trusteeship plan. The short trusteeship period would be designed to help democratic Haitians create a responsible government and achieve economic progress. On May 15 Council members remained on alert until 1:00 a.m., waiting for the departure of President Duvalier that never took place.[64] One can only speculate about the ramifications this plan of operations would have had for the Organization of American States. The experience of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 indicates that the Organization might have exposed itself to numerous hazards in becoming an adjunct to U.S. foreign policy goals.

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[62] The Committee felt that the Embassy violation was not ordered by the Haitian government and was minor in nature. See *ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

[63] The Committee suggested that Haiti give safe passage to the remaining asylees, ask the Trujillo relatives to leave, and pay more respect to human rights, and that the Dominican Republic control the activities of Haitian exiles and stop the defamation of President Duvalier. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

President Duvalier remains in power, and the United States has long since abandoned efforts to oust him. With the election of President Balaguer in the Dominican Republic in 1966, diplomatic relations were restored between the two countries, giving evidence that much of the tension had disappeared. The controversy of 1963 has thus been relegated to the status of a historical case study, but one which still raises difficult questions about the nature of the dispute and the proper role of the Organization of American States.

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[64] See *New York Times*, May 12, 1963, p. 1, and June 4, 1963, p. 1, for a more detailed description of this plan.

Reviews

WHO ARE THE VIET CONG?*

by Edwin F. Black

As diplomats, soldiers, policymakers and the press try to understand the strategy and political motivation behind the unsuccessful February-March Viet Cong offensives in South Viet Nam, they would do well to study Douglas Pike's scholarly text, *The Viet Cong,* which bears the subtitle, *The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.* Those responsible for totaling up the grim balance sheet of the battle and for determining the net gain or loss sustained by the Free World as a result of General Giap's desperate and bloody Tet gamble will find in the 500 pages of this well-documented book a large part of the answer to the elusive question, "What makes the VC tick?" It is not and could never be the full answer, as the Viet Cong and especially the men who comprise the political leadership of the National Liberation Front are not free agents. They are too thoroughly caught up in the organizational and propaganda tentacles of the international communist movement to which they have sold their souls.

Although Pike's book is concerned chiefly with events prior to the spring of 1965, these very events foreshadowed with ominous accuracy the situation as it developed this spring. The author points out that the National Liberation Front has consistently held that the proper course of the "revolution" in South Viet Nam was to move toward the classic crescendo of the "General Uprising." Three times before, he notes, the NLF mistakenly judged that this crucial moment had arrived: once in the first three months of 1962, again after the overthrow of Diem in November 1963, and again in the spring of 1965. Each time the South Vietnamese army failed to defect, the government failed to crumble, and the people failed to respond to the communist call for revolt.

Despite this singular lack of success, the NLF apparently was able to persuade the authorities in Hanoi not only to try once more for a general uprising, but to commit in support of this effort some of the best "main force" VC units augmented by North Vietnamese regular troops. In making this decision, Ho Chi Minh and his Soviet and Chinese superiors rejected, at least for the time being, their two other main options: to "militarize" the struggle and move on into the decisive Mao-Giap Phase III of the "peoples' war," or to seek a lesser victory at the conference table.

Pike's background and experience qualify him for making this

The Viet Cong. By Douglas Pike. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966. 582 pp. $8.95.

type of sophisticated analysis. With the exception of some nine months during the academic year 1964-1965 when he had leave of absence to accept a grant at the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he served the entire period between October 1960 and August 1966 as a Foreign Service Officer with the United States Information Agency in Viet Nam. It was during his time at M.I.T. that he was able to do most of the work on his book, sorting out the data and knowledge he had acquired during his long assignment in South Viet Nam. It was his Vietnamese friends, particularly one Nguyen Hung Vuong of Saigon, who helped him most to understand Vietnamese reactions to the changing stresses and strains of the long war.

According to the author, his book is about the first of the two wars that have been fought in Viet Nam since the 1954 Geneva Accords ended France's role in Southeast Asia. The "first war" began in 1958 with the decision of the Hanoi authorities to launch a major guerrilla offensive to bring down President Diem's regime. It ended in early 1965 when the United States began to deploy combat forces to South Viet Nam.

The basic data from which the book was fashioned fall primarily into three categories: captured communist documents, some 100 interviews with Viet Cong defectors, and long conversations with knowledgeable Vietnamese friends, both in and out of the Saigon government. Out of this, Pike has developed a text that could, and hopefully will, be used for college study. In most cases, each chapter opens with a well-written introduction and ends with a concise summary. The book is supplemented by six excellent appendices, including one containing the most complete unclassified biographical data on the leaders of the National Liberation Front currently available.

It is these elusive and relatively anonymous personalities who have built and today lead the NLF organization. Through them the authorities in Hanoi are able to exercise command and control of the Viet Cong infrastructure and to administer, supply and motivate the resistance forces in the South. Although these leaders are practically unknown to the general Vietnamese population, they nonetheless, through their organizational structure at the village and hamlet level, have been able to frustrate and confound the best efforts of both the South Vietnamese government and the United States to bring peace to the country. However, even the data in this appendix must be viewed with caution; the author himself admits it is highly suspect because it is based primarily on the mythology of the NLF and Hanoi propaganda media.

Of the twenty chapters, several are of special interest. One on "The Communist Role" describes how the dissident forces in the South were gradually captured by the hard-core communists who had been infiltrated into free Viet Nam for this purpose. The communist technique was to join the NLF while keeping their own organization small, disciplined and intact. At first they represented themselves as members of the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party, the Communist Party of North Viet Nam. Finally on January 1, 1962 they formally established in the South a Communist "Peoples' Revolutionary Party." From that date forth, they gradually extended their control until, as Pike says, they were for all practical purposes "managing NLF affairs at all levels from the National Central Committee to the villages." The communist tactic of "capturing the revolution," practiced so successfully in Cuba and in other parts of the world, was used again in South Viet Nam. This whole process happened so gradually, inconspicuously and painlessly that the unsuspecting rank and file of the Viet Cong supporters scarcely realized what was going on.

Another chapter warranting special attention deals with the communist philosophy of violence. Here Pike gives credit to earlier analyses by Thomas Perry Thornton in his essay on "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation" and to Brian Crozier's book, *The Rebels: A Study of Postwar Insurrections.* He points out that the NLF doctrine of violence is coldly precise. It divides the subject into five macabre categories: military or paramilitary assaults, ambushes, harassing of villages, sabotage and subversion, and violence against individuals, the latter being primarily assassinations and atrocities. The communists have developed these brutal techniques into a concept which might be called "enforcement terror," designed to reinforce their domination over the defenseless villagers and to give an appearance of greater substance both to their "shadow government" and to their nationwide clandestine infrastructure.

Of particular interest in light of the current fluid situation in South Viet Nam is the chapter on NLF foreign relations. The author points out that in the early days, before the NLF had been captured by the Moscow-directed international communist movement, the NLF's *campaign to gain political control* of the South involved a threefold effort: militarily, by increasing the tempo of its armed attacks upward through the three stages of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, escalating if necessary into a limited conventional war; politically, through a mass struggle movement culminating in a general uprising; and diplomatically, by forcing the Saigon authorities to accept a coalition government according full political recognition to the NLF. However, by the spring of 1965, with the commitment of regular PAVN divisions from North Viet Nam and the subsequent deployment of U.S. combat troops, the NLF lost control of its own destiny. The decision as to the strategy and tactics for conduct of the war in South Viet Nam now passed to the DRV authorities in Hanoi and their superiors in Moscow.

As Pike sees it, the basic objectives of the principal external powers having an interest in the war in South Viet Nam could be summarized as follows:

The United States sought from the start only to prevent communist domination of South Viet Nam. It had no specific policy objectives toward or designs on North Viet Nam.

The DRV's chief interest was the unification of South and North Viet Nam under its control. In pursuit of this goal it made the miscalculation of committing its regular forces south of the DMZ in hope of achieving a decisive victory in the spring of 1965. That this was a fatal mistake is now abundantly clear. The DRV had nothing to gain and everything to lose from an escalation of the war. By invading South Viet Nam with regular PAVN units it brought about the massive U.S. deployments of military force into South Viet Nam which, by any arithmetic in the equation of power, can only result in its eventual defeat.

Communist China's overriding objective appeared to be the elimination of U.S. military forces from the mainland of Asia. However, as the Sino-Soviet dispute deepened, the Chinese became prisoners of their own concept of "liberation wars," which they are doing their best to spread throughout Latin America and Africa. Having once committed themselves to this doctrine and having thereby publicly rejected the Soviet Union's leadership which urged a more conservative, political approach to the advancement of communism throughout the world, the Chinese found themselves in danger of "losing face" if the war in the South de-escalated or was shifted from the battlefield back into the political arena.

The Soviet Union's chief concern was that events in Viet Nam would not force it into a position where it either had to confront the United States in a military showdown or abandon North Viet Nam. While the Soviet Union was apparently deeply interested in an end to the fighting if this could be coupled with a withdrawal of U.S. military forces, it wanted to bring this about under circumstances that could not be interpreted as a clear-cut victory for the Communist Chinese thesis of "liberation wars." In general, Moscow exerted its influence on the war through the DRV authorities in Hanoi. It did not show any particular interest in the NLF or make any serious attempts to deal directly with this organization in the South.

The last chapter in the book is entitled "Mystique." Here Pike attributes the success of the NLF to its organizational ability. It was through its organization, operating at the village level, that the NLF was able, through a slow and gradual recruitment process, to develop within the minds of large numbers of the rural peasantry a feeling that the Front exercised a significant measure of governmental authority throughout the country. Having converted large numbers of ignorant farmers to this point of view, it then began a program of indoctrination and subversion which transformed them into active Viet Cong. Thus the author concludes that "the strength of the NLF was the result of careful organization building, not the product of some unique spirit or elan." The mystique resulted from indoctrinational efforts, shared social myths and leader-led relations. The key personalities of the NLF were not fashioned from the typical hard-core, disciplined, Marxist mold. They did not necessarily embrace communism as an infallible, almost religious doctrine. However, they did see definite advantages in allying themselves with the communist bloc and in acknowledging Moscow's leadership of the world communist movement. As Pike puts it, "The NLF was Communist not because it incorporated Communist doctrine but because it linked itself to foreign states that did."

One must remember, however, that all of this relates to what the author calls the "first war" which ended in the early part of 1965. Since then the escalation of the military effort by both sides has decisively subordinated the role of the NLF in influencing the course of events in South Viet Nam. As pointed out earlier, the NLF, which may have begun as a nationalist movement, has now been captured and made totally subservient to the communist authorities in Hanoi.

As one reads this book in the context of the critical tests facing our country in the summer of 1968, one is well advised to read carefully and ponder Pike's final words in his preface. These represent the conclusions of a man who has lived in this unfortunate, war-torn country during a period when South Viet Nam was subjected to the most rending internal and external pressures. They reveal him as a scholar, a philosopher and a man possessing deep empathy for the Vietnamese people.

"Having lived in Viet Nam for six years, I have to a degree put down roots there and have come to care very deeply about what happens. The plight of the Vietnamese people is not an abstraction to me, and I have no patience with those who treat it as such. Victory by the Communists would mean consigning thousands of Vietnamese, many of them of course my friends, to death, prison or permanent exile. Speeches by American leaders saying that the issue is promulgating the Vietnamese people's freedom of choice is reality to me, not a platitude. I am appalled by those who suggest that the Vietnamese are in Communist China's 'proper sphere of influence.' This kind of dehumanized political thinking, which eliminates the individual man as the measure of all things, is totally alien to me. My heart goes out to the Vietnamese people—who have been sold out again and again, whose long history could be written in terms of betrayal and who, based on this long and bitter experience, could only expect that eventually America too will sell them out. If America betrays the Vietnamese people by abandoning them, she betrays her own heritage."

WASHINGTON'S SUBMISSIVE JOURNALISTS*

by H. Bradford Westerfield

James Reston has usually been a good reporter but an undistinguished editorialist. His new book, *The Artillery of the Press,* is in the same vein. Modestly, near the end, he calls it "random observations"; regrettably he is in truth being honest as much as modest.

**The Artillery of the Press: Its Influence on American Foreign Policy.* By James Reston. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 115 pp. $3.95.

His introduction to the Council on Foreign Relations Elihu Root Lectures (1966), which form this book, sets his purpose as "practical suggestions for improving the relations between reporters and officials rather than . . . ideal solutions which neither would be likely to accept." The overall effect is to mute Reston's protest over the increasing centralization and closedness of Washington's decision-making processes; grounds for protest are explicit in much of the book but ultimately Reston cannot bring himself to cut loose from the insiders. He never could. He goes along, hoping.

The problem is partly that he is temperamentally so very much a moderate. He always sees both sides. "Who is to say where the balance lies between the good aspects and the bad aspects of an aggressive critical press? The system does serve as a check on reckless adventures, and at the same time it often limits negotiation and adds greatly to the personal strain on the officials concerned. . . . Lippmann argues that it is a fallacy to consider that a divided public opinion in the United States will have any effect on the enemy. I do not agree. The essence of the problem is that there is a great deal to be said for both the dangers and the necessity of criticism." Put this way, of course Reston is more reasonable than Lippmann — but almost at a level of cliché; Reston is unable to provide the standards and criteria which are needed to give some depth to his attractive but shallow agreeableness. He himself, like the rest of us, has to reach back to Lippmann's classics of the 1920's (*Public Opinion* and *The Phantom Public*) when he wants to try to say anything profound about the press in democratic society. Half a century later surely the time has come for fundamental reappraisal, but Reston can only provide illuminating empirical examples and assure us that the press ought to become even more of an ally of the government than it already is, by devoting itself to interpretive feature articles on big problems and avoiding day-to-day sensationalist harassment of officialdom: "Both sides . . . have more to gain by cooperating with one another, and with the rising minority of thoughtful people," [people who want "to face, rather than evade, reality"] "than by regarding one another as 'the enemy.' "

Yet Reston's personal aversion to adversary relationships is a less significant part of the problem exemplified by the shallowness of his book than is the evident degree to which a Washington correspondent's *role* and role image, increasingly as the years go by, are tending to interrelate with such aversions in a mutually confirming pattern that constricts the flow of information to the public. At least the flow is constricted concerning various stages of the intra-Executive decision-making process, and thus about the timing which is crucial for effective exertion of any outside influences that lack privileged access. The reporters, including

Reston, are less and less help to any activist audience outside. Most of them have felt a role-need and a personal need to be on the inside in order to have something to report. But officials are able to make the reporters' inside status conditional upon their not actually reporting "too much" to outside readers. So the reporters, if they remain there inside, must somehow redefine their role and find satisfaction through participation in the nonpublic communications flows: gossiping, advising, and promoting. Perhaps, as Reston urges, they can also find self-justification by highlighting a function of long-range interpretive reporting that will not get in the officials' way, indeed may help to pave the way for what the farsighted insiders and a "saving remnant" outside see as the country's real needs. Thus does the captive kiss his chains.

The irony of the book is that its argument is mainly addressed to the captor—as is perhaps understandable in such a citadel of the foreign policy Establishment as the Council on Foreign Relations. Reston nearly begs the captor (officialdom) to recognize the impotence of the captive press—to cease to fear it paranoically—and allow it to behave as a trusted collaborationist.

At least this seems to me to be the essential thrust of Reston's book. But superficially much of it reads otherwise. He is at such pains to show how impotent the press is that one could first suppose the rich details are intended to shock an audience about the state of American democracy, whereas actually Reston is more anxious to reassure officials (Johnson?) that their authority is so secure that they could afford to be less suspicious and more generous to reporters: "The trend of power is running with the President, the major danger of excessive use of power lies not in the newspapers but in the White House, and even the most casual look at the influence of reporters and commentators today makes this fairly obvious. . . . We may be a nuisance, but we are not a menace. And the way power is running to the President, it would be unwise, I think, to concentrate too much on weakening whatever influence we have left."

In his introduction Reston explains his book's title by claiming that his "theme is that the rising power of the United States in world affairs, and particularly of the American President, requires, not a more compliant press, but a relentless barrage of facts and criticism, as noisy but also as accurate as artillery fire." But Reston's emphasis is heavily upon the accuracy factor and upon long-range education of the elite public, not upon opening up current decision-making processes in ways that would stimulate immediate exertion of outside influences. On the latter score, only once does his book sound really aroused from defeatism: when he complains about the White House doctrine that advance speculation about the President's intentions constricts unduly Johnson's latitude to make the best possible decision at the last possible moment. "No doubt such latitude is necessary in many circumstances, but not in all. . . . No speculation before war and no criticism after" ["the White House argument"] "is an interesting thesis" that Reston clearly finds repugnant. Speculation, he seems to be saying, should usually remain untrammeled, even in print. But Reston is no longer waging the fight he used to wage for access-to-publish hard news of early stages of bureaucratic decision-making.

Thus, timeliness of coverage by the Washington press corps is continuing to erode. And Reston, for the most part, rationalizes this situation by asking the elite press to direct its energies to public education—education of an elite public, to be sure, a "saving remnant" not the mass—but without inquiring very searchingly just how and when this new enlightenment, if it is to be more than simply a good in itself, is to feed back influentially upon government policies. "There is a whole new generation of well-educated reporters [and increasing numbers of sufficiently concerned, attentive readers and listeners] who would welcome the opportunity to do more conscientious and careful work on major problems. . . . the more we get into this field of reporting, the less we are likely to be in conflict with officials." Hurray!?

Reston observes elsewhere in his book that "the universities of America . . . have a kind of intellectual contempt for the press, but read it more avidly, more critically, and probably more accurately than we read it ourselves." He may be right. But he should be reminded that, like other active citizens who are already fortunate enough to possess wide sources of information, we of the universities depend on the daily press not for general education but for timely news, so that we can discern when and where to try to make our influence felt. The press will merit our "intellectual contempt" only if it shirks the hardships of its own job—on which democracy depends — and then tries to excuse itself by taking on ours.

THE "DEGLOBALIZATION" OF AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITIES*

by Alvin J. Cottrell

Just as revisionism was in vogue among some conservative scholars (e.g., Charles Callan Tansill and Charles A. Beard) with respect to American involvement in World War II, so now has revisionism become fashionable among the so-called liberals and what is being termed the New Left with regard to U.S. policy in and responsibility for the Cold War. Such writers as Richard J. Barnett, Marcus G. Raskin, Edmund Stillman, William Pfaff, Gar Alperovitz and D.F. Fleming have criticized the basis of U.S. policy in the post-World War II environment, some going so far as to accuse the United States of provoking, or at least prolonging, the Cold War. These high-powered efforts have been picking up steam as disillusionment with Viet Nam spreads.

Ronald Steel, author of a much-read book on NATO entitled *The*

**Pax Americana*. By Ronald Steel. New York: Viking Press, 1967. 371 pp. $6.95.

End of Alliance, published in 1964, has now written a larger volume, *Pax Americana,* which extends his earlier analysis of U.S. policy toward NATO to encompass the whole world. While he produces a somewhat more credible, albeit highly polemical, analysis of U.S. policy in the Cold War than the above-named authors, he nonetheless falls within the same broad category of revisionists.

This reviewer questions Steel's analysis regarding NATO in *The End of Alliance* and has major reservations about his present tour de force on U.S. global policy. There are two themes that persist throughout *Pax Americana.* One is Steel's contention that the United States has been obsessed with communism and that this obsession has tended to make our policy inflexible and devoid of the pragmatism which characterized it in the early years of the republic. The other, closely related to our fear of communism, is our penchant for intervening anywhere and everywhere.

While in virtually all theories there is a grain of truth sufficient to make them appear slightly plausible, neither of the author's arguments stands the test of close scholarly scrutiny regarding U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II. Both tend to assume a sort of monolithic American society and government, in which there are no differences of opinion regarding communism and U.S. foreign policy among government officials themselves, between government and intellectuals, or within the intellectual community.

Obviously there are many different opinions over Viet Nam and other key issues in U.S. foreign and military policy, and these have been reflected in U.S. policy as it has of necessity sought consensus. Are the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the nonproliferation treaty, and the various efforts at détente with the still relatively closed society of the Soviet Union not evidence of U.S. flexibility? Steel and other strident critics seem to forget that Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe following World War II was not exactly designed to convince the United States and the West of the Soviets' good intentions, no matter what motivated it—even if it stemmed in some measure from traditional Russian security considerations (e.g., the desire for a buffer against the West) which antedate the advent of communism in Russia. It should be recalled that we had just fought a long war against a notorious ideologue named Adolf Hitler, and that the Western powers were justly criticized for having paid little or no attention to the German dictator's views as expressed in *Mein Kampf.* Thus, even if we concede that some ominous Soviet moves in Eastern Europe following World War II may have been motivated by traditional Russian security concerns, it seems unfair now to revise history to the point of blaming Western observers who, having read communist manifestoes proclaiming eventual communist world domination, viewed Soviet policy as a prelude to further Soviet expansionist efforts on the continent of Europe and elsewhere.

The problem for the West was

once aptly described by George F. Kennan: "Their own aggressive intransigeance with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced to use . . . [a] Gibbonesque phrase, 'to chastise the contumacy' which they themselves provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right."[1]

In short, Western Europe and the United States would have been less than prudent had they not taken the Soviets at their word, given the high degree of secrecy that has so pervasively shrouded their society to this day. U.S. policymakers here most certainly recognized the changes taking place in Soviet Russia, and have kept as much flexibility in their policy vis-à-vis the USSR as seems safe in view of the fact that this superpower still falls far short of being the kind of open society whose intentions can be gauged with any real degree of accuracy. The Chinese communist regime has not even begun the evolution that has brought the Soviets to the present hopeful dialogue. Many of the neo-revisionists seem to forget that it was in no small measure U.S. persistence, particularly in Europe, Iran, and later in Cuba during the missile crisis, that helped to induce the Soviets to enter this dialogue, precisely because they were unable to substitute external success for internal deficiencies, as is so common with dictatorial regimes, communist and otherwise. In this sense the concept and application of the containment policy have operated according to plan.

Turning to Steel's other theme, i.e., the view that the United States has become the interventionist power par excellence and hence sees itself in the role of global policeman, it can be said that this also fails the test of good scholarship or balanced analysis. If Steel is well grounded in the fundamentals of international relations, as one would assume, he should recognize what has long been true, that a superpower cannot help but intervene. Even if it merely sits on its hands in a crisis or confrontation, it has in fact intervened. The Spanish Civil War, for better or worse, was a classic example of this. The West insured Franco's victory, which so many "liberals" today abhor, by adopting a neutral posture, while Germany and Italy intervened militarily in Franco's behalf.

Obviously, anyone who says that the United States cannot act as gendarme for the entire world is stating a truism. But the United States has not precisely undertaken to do that. There have been several dozen insurgencies in the Third World since World War II, and one can count on the fingers of one hand the number of cases in which the United States has directly intervened with military force. Given the developing international and domestic opinion with respect to Viet Nam, it is at least doubtful whether, in the absence of a direct attack against ourselves or a vital ally, we will do so again in the near future. It should be clear to any observer with a modicum of objectivity that this nation, with its enormous military might, has exercised great restraint against smaller powers, including North Viet Nam, for which it should be commended rather than chastised as so many pundits of the New Left are quick to do. Without arguing the case for or against escalation, it can be concluded that the danger of a U.S. loss in Viet Nam is due to political causes — humanitarian constraints and domestic dissent. There could be no possibility of a genuine military defeat for the United States if it wished to bring its full military power to bear.

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[1] "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Appendix I, in *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 111.

Steel does say that there are times when we might be required to intervene. To quote him: "There will be instances when, if we have exhausted other possibilities, it may be necessary to intervene with American military power to defend a vital national interest. Intervention, like surgery, is not an evil in itself, but it must be applied sparingly and with consummate skill. Just as intervention cannot be a guiding principle of diplomacy, so nonintervention cannot be observed irrespective of time or place. All situations are not equally important. All do not justify American support, and even fewer justify American military intervention." (p. 334.)

These are fine words, but one is hard put after reading Steel's sweeping criticism of U.S. foreign policy to think of any place where he would see a justification for intervention. He appears to be one of those writers who always are ready to justify in theory a future intervention but are seldom willing to support in practice an impending or ongoing intervention. Significantly, he says almost nothing about the great crisis area of the Middle East where the United States carried out, in the opinion of most knowledgeable commentators, a very successful intervention in the Lebanon in 1958. Even Arab leaders have admitted, privately at least, that had the United States not intervened, it is highly likely that the entire region would have erupted into open warfare, perhaps eventually involving the large powers.

As suggested above, it is now doubtful whether even such a limited and successful intervention as that carried out jointly by the United States and Britain in the Lebanon and Jordan could be carried out again in view of the nihilistic attacks on U.S. policy which have been leveled with such sweeping and uncontrolled emotion by prominent senators, congressmen and scholars who have opposed the Viet Nam war (calling it, e.g., "unjust," "immoral," and "criminal"). It is important to recognize the attacks by some of these people for what they really are: in many instances they go beyond the war in Viet Nam to oppose the idea of military intervention per se. To a certain extent, they contribute to creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, namely, that if you keep up the momentum of criticism over a period of time, you will inevitably prove to be right.

The same can be said in the case of NATO. Without arguing against the view that NATO indeed faces many serious problems, we can raise the question whether such problems have not been exacerbated by the constant flow of rhetoric to the effect that—to use the title of Steel's previous book—*The End of Alliance* is already here. If Americans keep proclaiming the demise of the alliance, the Europeans should not surprise us by taking our proclamations seriously and acting accordingly.

Many criticisms of *Pax Americana* could be added to those above, but they are too numerous to mention here. Whatever good scholarship and sound analysis is contained in it—and there is some of both—is obscured by the rush of Steel's polemical pen and rhetorical overkill. His comments on the significance and acceptance of Gaullism in Europe appear to be overstated. They are certainly imprecisely stated. One might think that de Gaulle's views on NATO and the United States were *the* crucial issues within the French body politic and within NATO as a whole. In France, the issue most clearly has been not his NATO policies, but de Gaulle himself and the question who will replace him when he leaves the scene. His withdrawal from the NATO-integrated commands has stirred up the opposition of the military who were responsible for bringing him to power in the Algerian crisis. His re-election as President in 1965 and his June 1968 electoral successes did not amount to a resounding mandate to continue his present anti-U.S. course in NATO. And within Europe, granting that there is some general support for his views, the issue again is not NATO integration and U.S. domination, as de Gaulle poses it, but rather in many cases the leverage he wields within the European communities, particularly the Common Market.

Steel's suggestion—held by a number of de Gaulle's belated admirers—that NATO would not be much better off without de Gaulle's destructive tactics, is incomprehensible to anyone close to the situation. This is also true of the inference to be taken from Steel's remarks that the defects in NATO and the need for revision of the 1949 treaty to meet the changing political-military environment in 1969 were not recognized by many U.S. statesmen and scholars before de Gaulle began turning them to his own political ends. Hearing about de Gaulle's "great vision" and "realism" can become boring, especially since they might better have been applied to France and Europe one or two centuries ago.

On Steel's conclusion we can perhaps find a measure of agreement; but even here there exist some dubious assumptions about what the rest of the world wants and expects of America. Steel argues that we must turn inward to deal with our problems at home, for presumably straightening out things here will have the effect of radiating our goodness to the rest of the world. "That," he says, "is a fitting measure, and an arduous test, of America's greatness." (p. 354.) One is all in favor of this if only for our own domestic well-being, but it is doubtful whether it would bring about the world-wide respect for us which Steel implicitly anticipates. As one European, discussing world opinion with regard to the war in Viet Nam, recently said to this reviewer: "There will always be something new to criticize you for even when the Vietnamese conflict is over. You will find that you [the U.S.] really cannot win with world opinion, no matter what you do."

Steel tends throughout to "shoot over dead horses." He argues that we have failed to bring the world democracy and must now allow for diversity. This reviewer is not aware that bringing the world democracy has been U.S. policy for sometime now, desirable though most U.S. policymakers deem it to be. He was under the impression that President Kennedy, who is called a "globalist," announced U.S. acceptance of the need for diversity as our policy several years before this book was written. Indeed, we are often violently criticized by American intellectuals and others for our recognition of the need for diversity in such cases as Franco Spain, and in our support for dictatorships in Latin America. One could cite other examples. Diversity, we should not forget, cuts in two directions—Left and Right.

In fairness to Steel, it can be said that he does state, as some other critics of U.S. policy do not, that our intentions were good even though our policy has often been poorly conceived and executed. Steel asserts that the United States has intervened on a large scale "to be sure, for the most noble motives and with the most generous impulses." This is certainly true, and it is also true that, despite many failures and only partial successes, the U.S. foreign policy record over the past twenty years is much better than Steel allows. There is naturally much to be criticized in American foreign policy. No nation, including the British whom Steel rightly lauds for their long period of effective global stewardship, ever contended with so complex a world, even leaving aside the specter of nuclear conflict which bedevils U.S. policy-makers today. Much can be done to correct and improve the quality of U.S. foreign policy, but it does not deserve sweeping and emotional criticism such as that contained in *Pax Americana* and other similar volumes now being disseminated.

CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR: YALTA TO POTSDAM*

by Harland B. Moulton

In a small but important book investigating the origins of the Cold War, Martin Herz, a U.S. Foreign Service Officer currently serving in Washington, concludes that the die was cast "in the period between Yalta and Potsdam (February and July 1945) when the division of Europe was in effect determined by the relationship of military power as it existed at the time, and when the United States failed to throw into the balance its economic power. . . ." (p. 188.) His findings in *Beginnings of the Cold War* throw serious doubt on the conventional wisdom which has held the Cold War to be the direct outcome of a preordained Stalinist plan to spread communism everywhere in Europe and the Middle East.

**Beginnings of the Cold War*. By Martin F. Herz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966. 214 pp. $4.95.

Having carefully examined government and private records of the U.S.-U.K. negotiations with Stalin at Yalta and Potsdam, Herz produces convincing evidence that portrays the Soviet leader as part realist, willing compromiser and sometime opportunist, but pre-eminently a nationalist dedicated to guaranteeing the security of the Soviet Union against a possible future attack from the West. Herz says very little about the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in motivating Stalin to seek consolidation of Eastern Europe into a Soviet sphere of influence; he seems persuaded that practical security objectives and not world communist goals were foremost in Stalin's calculations during the crucial period in 1945.[1]

Herz adduces solid evidence that the breakdown of the wartime collaboration between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union and the coming of the Cold War in 1945 and 1946 can be understood primarily in nonideological terms, as due to fundamental policy differences between Roosevelt and his chief advisers and Stalin over the postwar organization of the peace in Eastern Europe. The United States—against Churchill's advice—rigorously championed a policy of high idealistic principles in direct conflict with Stalin's insistence on spheres of influence and maintenance of the balance of power as the preferred approach to securing the peace. Such irreconcilable differences in approach to postwar Europe explain in large measure the mounting friction and suspicion of each other's motives that characterized U.S.-Soviet relations during the late phases of World War II and the early postwar period.

Herz's chapter on "Spheres of Influence" is particularly illuminating in support of his thesis that key negotiating mistakes by the United States and Britain as well as basic differences in approach to peace in Eastern Europe played a more fundamental role in the emergence of the Cold War than communist ideological imperatives. The trouble began in the fall of 1943 with the capitulation of Italian forces to the Allied armies. In denying Stalin a meaningful share in a military-political commission to control and supervise

[1] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., writing in the October 1967 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, makes a highly persuasive case for the "Origins of the Cold War" in nonideological terms. He agrees on almost all major points with the Herz thesis. In a concluding section he argues that because the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state motivated by an infallible and all-consuming ideology, it could not be considered a traditional national state (p. 46). Unfortunately, Schlesinger fails to give us any useful *specific* clues as to how important ideology was as a factor in the emergence of the Cold War.

Italian affairs the United States and the United Kingdom were not only shortsighted, but they established a precedent which the Soviets later invoked in Rumania.

When in 1944 the tide of war began to turn decisively in favor of the Allies, Churchill in particular was concerned about the composition and political orientation of the governments which would emerge in Eastern Europe in the wake of Soviet advances. Realizing that spheres of influence were anathema to the U.S. government, Churchill nevertheless sought Soviet agreement whereby Rumania would fall in the USSR's and Greece in Britain's sphere of responsibility. He approached Roosevelt with Stalin's approval, in full knowledge of the realities of the power situation in the area, arguing that in order to avoid paralysis "somebody must have the power to plan and act." (p. 119.) Secretary Hull flatly opposed Churchill, stating that abandonment of our basic declarations of policy, principles and practice would surely sow the seeds of future conflict.[2] Roosevelt sustained Hull. The upshot was the installation of a Soviet-supervised government in Rumania, in which initially the communists were clearly a minority—unlike the situation in Poland. Similarly a Soviet-supervised government was installed in Bulgaria, this one more heavily weighted in favor of the communists, but understandably so in view of Bulgaria's past pro-Russian leanings.

The British meanwhile were striving to bring about moderate coalition regimes in Greece and Yugoslavia. With respect to Greece, during 1944 and early 1945 Stalin adhered strictly to a noninterference policy, allowing the British to destroy by military force communist opposition to the establishment of a stable pro-Western government. In Yugoslavia, the British sought to reconcile Marshal Tito and King Peter, and when Tito flew to Moscow in September 1944, Stalin urged him to let King Peter return to Yugoslavia. Here again are signs of substantial Soviet flexibility on the resolution of the East European question, marked by willingness to pursue a moderate line and seek compromise.

In October 1944, when Churchill went to Moscow to discuss with Stalin the whole range of problems of East and Southeast Europe, he proposed and Stalin accepted the "notorious" division between themselves of southeastern Europe into a series of exclusive and shared spheres of influence. (p. 124.) Advisers Harry Hopkins and Charles Bohlen persuaded a generally approving Roosevelt to oppose the Churchill-Stalin bargain in a message which read: "There is in this global war literally no question, either military or political, in which the United States is not interested." (p. 125.) But the United States did not remonstrate when the deal was carried out, and Roosevelt sent greetings to Churchill and Stalin which appeared to convey his blessing.

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[2] Churchill later reminded Hull that Britain followed the lead of the United States in South America "as far as possible, as long as it is not a question of our beef and mutton." (*Ibid.*)

The British were given a free hand in Greece, which proved advantageous in light of the fierce opposition thrown against their military forces by the Greek resistance troops, many of whom were communists. Churchill later noted that Stalin had adhered strictly and faithfully to the October 1944 agreement. (p. 129.) In Yugoslavia, British efforts to create a stable government were blocked by Tito's stubborn resistance. Soviet behavior was generally correct, and in fact it appears that Stalin admitted he had very little influence with Tito. It is interesting that on two occasions Stalin urged the British to send troops into northwestern Yugoslavia, whence they would be directed toward Vienna. On both occasions Churchill failed to gain approval from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff for the operation. At Yalta in February 1945, Stalin proved pliable on the issue of fifty-fifty influence with Britain in Yugoslavia, and Herz concludes that there was no disagreement between the major powers. (p. 131.) While it is true that Yugoslavia was soon subjugated by the communists and Tito, it appears equally true that Stalin very early found Tito to be an intractable adversary. (p. 133.)

In the case of Hungary, an enemy state, Soviet military entry did not result in a communist-imposed government. During 1945 the Hungarian Communist Party worked constructively with non-communist groups to achieve major land redistribution. In November of that year, relatively free elections resulted in victory for non-communist political forces. The communists did not take over Hungary until 1947. In Czechoslovakia, a wartime ally of Moscow, Soviet military occupation did not result immediately in a communist-dominated government in 1945. Ruthenia was ceded amicably to the Soviets in June 1945, and in 1946 free elections were held. Not until 1948 did the Soviets, using terror tactics, take over the country.

Shortly before his death in April 1945, Roosevelt wrote to Stalin reminding him of the firm obligation to carry out the provisions of the Declaration on Liberated Europe respecting Rumania and Bulgaria. Truman followed this up after he became President by insisting to Stalin that democratic procedures be followed with respect to the Bulgarian and Rumanian governments and stating bluntly that they were not being observed. (p. 137.)

By the time of Potsdam in July 1945, the American position on Eastern Europe had hardened substantially. The written position supplied Truman for the meetings concluded: "Eastern Europe is, in fact, a Soviet sphere of influence." (p. 138). By sticking to principle and refusing compromise on the issue of free elections, Western style, in Eastern Europe, the United States may have induced Stalin to refuse free elections of any kind. In a candid moment Stalin is reputed to have said "a freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow." (p. 140.) Thus, the Cold War began.

Three other factors contributing to the origin of the Cold War need mention. First, during the second plenary meeting at Yalta, Roosevelt remarked in the presence of Stalin and Churchill that he did not believe American troops would remain in Europe more than two years after the war. (p. 131.) Stalin's reactions are not known, but this possibility undoubtedly had considerable impact on a man of his opportunistic and pragmatic character. Second, the failure of the United States to develop a policy on the issue of postwar economic assistance to the Soviet Union, illustrated by the abrupt halt of Lend-Lease shipments, contributed to exacerbation of U.S.-Soviet relations. Finally, the United States and Britain could reach no satisfactory agreement with Stalin on size and allocation of German reparations, a matter closely related to Soviet postwar reconstruction and the future of Germany in Europe. The evidence does not permit a conclusion as to the importance Stalin attached to reparations, but it seems clear that the partition of Germany was in part a direct consequence of this failure to reach agreement.

The controversy continues to thrive between orthodox historians and revisionists over the principal causes of the Cold War. While it is undoubtedly true that wholesale attempts at historical revision have generally not withstood the test of time, revision is an essential process by which history enlarges its perspectives and enriches its insights. It seems evident that important though limited modifications are gaining greater acceptance, and it is in this context that the Herz book ought to be appraised. Herz has not undertaken a major challenge of supposed conspiratorial or mechanistic views of Soviet communism during the closing phases of World War II and the immediate postwar period. Rather he has meticulously searched the public records of the period in order to describe dispassionately and accurately the attitudes and positions of Allied and Soviet leaders toward a negotiated peace.

Herz succeeds in making a modest yet convincing case that the origins of the Cold War lay in the events of the period between Yalta and Potsdam. He does not place the major share of the blame for the emergence of the Cold War on the United States, and he does not caricature Stalin's goals and leadership for the purpose of holding him responsible for the deterioration of the wartime collaboration.

There can be little doubt that Roosevelt and his principal advisers, Hull and Hopkins, viewed the basis for a negotiated peace in fundamentally different terms than did Stalin. With but minor deviations, the United States held throughout the war to legal and moralistic principles as preconditions for negotiating peace. Stalin, on the other hand, was equally consistent in demanding spheres of influence that reflected both the actual power situation and the basic needs of Soviet security. Herz has thus sharpened the issue of whether in the future the United

States can afford to stand firm on high principle in negotiating peace with its adversaries, or whether compromises such as those urged by Churchill—and almost invariably spurned by Roosevelt, Hull and Hopkins—ought to govern future U.S. policy even when they entail a wholly new calculus of risks.

As for the role played by Marxist-Leninist ideology in deciding Stalin's policies, Herz's research fails to produce any clear patterns of a communist plan to dominate Eastern Europe during the period from late 1944 to September 1945. To the contrary, Stalin appears to have remained firm on the issue of spheres of influence while maintaining a surprisingly flexible bargaining position on Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. More than likely a succession of irreconcilable differences between the Soviet Union and the Allies combined to precipitate the Cold War with its subsequent strong ideological flavor.

Herz would not, I am sure, argue that the Cold War might have been avoided even if U.S. policy during 1945 had been based solely on the realities of power and geography. Implicit in his study is the conclusion that certain trends and extremes of what we today call the Cold War might have been moderated by a different U.S. policy. However, it seems doubtful in retrospect that the wartime Allies could have maintained close harmony in a postwar environment dominated by such opposing personalities and national purposes.

LIMITS OF POWER OR NEO-ISOLATION?*

by John W. Spanier

The Cold War is currently receiving much attention from two sets of revisionists. The first, whose founders were British physicist P.M.S. Blackett and Vice President Henry Wallace, and whose most prominent recent representative is Gar Alperovitz, asserts that the United States precipitated the Cold War. FDR's policy of good will toward the Soviet Union was intended to alleviate the fears of a Kremlin made suspicious of the West by the intervention of 1917, the *cordon sanitaire* and Munich. When Harry Truman switched to a tough anti-Soviet policy whose purpose was to eject the USSR out of her Eastern Europe security belt, this revived Moscow's apprehensions of the West. Stalin's foreign policy, in other words, was not the offspring of a paranoid personality, a totalitarian political organization or preconceived ideological conceptions, but a reaction to American policy.

The second form of revisionism, while accepting the orthodox interpretation of the American-Soviet conflict as a consequence of the latter's expansionist aims, asserts that the Cold War is over, or would be if only Washington recognized that the Soviet Union had changed domestically, that her commitment to world revolution is now more

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***The Limits of Power.* By Eugene McCarthy. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. 246 pp. $5.95.

The Rise and Decline of the Cold War. By Paul E. Seabury. New York: Basic Books, 1967. 171 pp. $4.95.

liturgical than political, that the communist world is deeply divided, and that therefore the anti-communist slogans and dogmas of the 1950's are outdated. Thus, while the first type of revisionism charges that the Cold War need never have started but for militant U.S. anti-communism, the second argues that it need no longer continue if we would only perceive the world in terms of the new realities instead of the old myths of the Dulles period.

In *The Limits of Power,* Senator Eugene McCarthy argues that the Truman-Acheson containment was restrained, limited and European-oriented. Dulles, a moralist and ideologue, transformed this policy into a global crusade burdening us with commitments beyond our capacity to sustain. Such an analysis, however, overlooks the Truman Doctrine which horrified Kennan and Lippmann at the time because it provided the rationale for universal anti-communism. The fact that it was applied primarily in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean was because Soviet pressures were limited to these areas; but containment was, after all, applied in Korea and aid was sent to the French in Indochina. No ideological pronouncement of John Foster Dulles ever surpassed that of the Truman Doctrine; even his "liberation" policy adhered to the containment policy's assumption that a "mellowing" of the Soviet Union would result in a retraction of Soviet power.

In fact, as Paul Seabury emphasizes in *The Rise and Decline of the Cold War*—an excellent analysis of the assumptions of U.S. Cold War policy from its origins through the post-Cuban détente—Dulles believed less in a crusade than a containment that would permit an "irreversible" liberalization and a return to a Russian foreign policy seeking only limited purposes. Dulles' delineation of the Cold War "frontier" at Quemoy and Matsu and later in Viet Nam was consistent with his predecessor's policy. The CENTO line was, as is usually overlooked, Britain's attempt to preserve her influence in the Arab world after her ouster from Egypt, and the United States had little choice but to support its closest ally. Seabury clarifies that U.S. Cold War policy has always had an ideological strand, stemming from a longstanding commitment to democratic values, and a pragmatic strand, concerned with preserving the balance of power when it was challenged, whether this occurred in Europe or Asia.

To link Dulles with a crusade and then, as McCarthy has done in speeches, to identify Johnson's Asian policy with Republican policy, is to disregard both the continuity of postwar U.S. policy and its flexible nature. It supported Tito, began "building bridges to the East" after 1956, and increasingly moved toward cooperation with Moscow to stabilize the strategic environment—and hence toward lowering international tensions—long before critics asserted that U.S. policymakers were not adjusting their policies to a changing environment.

What is disturbing about the

liberal McCarthy-Fulbright indictment is that under the slogans of "American overcommitment" and the "necessity to bring means and ends into balance" it rejects the world balancing role which was thrust upon the United States at the close of World War II. What is even more startling is its likeness to the conservative reaction during the Korean War. The conservatives asserted a decade and a half ago that the U.S. global involvement had been brought about by a conspiracy of policymakers who, because they were either too pro-communist or naive about Soviet intentions, had formulated a policy permitting a communist advance in Eastern Europe and China; the liberals argue today that the American overcommitment is the fault of those officials in the White House, the State Department and the supporting military-industrial complex who were still too anti-communist or had a continuing vested interest in a tough foreign policy.

Further, both conservatives and liberals interpreted the communist threat in a manner which would allow them to concentrate on domestic affairs and preserve only a limited foreign policy role. The former were dedicated to a *laissez-faire* society with a government of limited authority in which the legislature was supreme; since private enterprise was the source of all bounty, the budgets of a government restricted to minimal responsibilities would be small and balanced. Extensive and expensive foreign policy commitments, like the New Deal at home, would undermine this society because they required Big Government where the Executive was the dominant branch, large and unbalanced budgets leading to inflation and inflationary controls, and higher taxes that would stifle individual initiative. Thus, conservatives could not first inquire whether U.S. security was at stake; they had to assume it since not only war but even deterrence could undermine the society they cherished. They saw the communist threat, therefore, as largely internal. This permitted them to be anti-communist and yet oppose most of the measures to restore the balance.

By contrast, liberals saw the communist threat as properly external but largely diminished, if not passed. Nationalism, they now assert, has divided the communist countries as it has the noncommunist states. Vietnamese nationalism, for instance, will contain China. In turn this means that the United States need not play the role of global gendarme. American security is guaranteed by the polycentrism plaguing the communist world.

The deduction from these positions is that this country can concentrate its attention and energies on itself. To conservatives the principal task has been to combat the "collectivism" sapping the philosophical, political and economic foundations of their idealized version of America; in short, to preserve the ideal society. Liberals have felt that their function was to fulfill the unfinished tasks of America democracy, particularly rebuilding our cities and providing the Negro with the same opportunities of life as the white citizen: they wish to realize the ideal society. McCarthy argues that the military adventures of past great empires led to a neglect of domestic problems and hence their decline; only if we learn from them that there are limits of power can the "American Empire" avoid that fate.

Yet both conservatives and liberals shrink from arguing that these limits require total isolationism. Realizing that this is impossible in the contemporary world, the former are willing to act unilaterally in Asia in order to bring to the "heathen" democracy, capitalism and Christianity. Isolationism for them has historically meant isolationism from Europe, which they characterized as lazy and untrustworthy. Europe can defend itself; it has the manpower and industrial resources. Conservatives were unwilling to grant that Europe might be exhausted and might need a period of recuperation under American protection. The fact that it relied on the United States was to them only indicative of a lack of will. This country could protect itself by guarding the Atlantic approaches with air and sea power.

Liberals, on the other hand, prefer to extend American military commitments only to Europe, the cradle of our culture, and the geographically connected southern hemisphere. As for Asian nations, these are deeply divided, economically underdeveloped, frequently corrupt and politically unstable, with a different cultural background. If they want to ensure their security, they should provide it for themselves. No matter that they are still unable to do so and that the Vietnamese war may be necessary to establish a regional balance, permitting them time to develop and to learn to cooperate more closely economically and militarily. The United States, it is claimed, need not involve itself on the Asian mainland; it can guard itself with air and sea power over the Pacific. The fact that both conservatives and liberals are willing to rely on these instruments alone to contain the world's two largest *land* powers demonstrates all too clearly that they would abandon continental Europe and Asia and disclaim the importance of the Eurasian rimlands to American security.

Finally, they share one last characteristic—their rejection of the neo-isolationist label. Yet just as conservatives in the middle 1950's argued for enhancing the role of Congress in foreign policy to control an "appeasement-minded" Executive, so liberals today crusade for limiting the discretion of a "too anti-communist" Executive whose perception of the world is alleged to be grossly distorted. Even so, after reading Seabury's sound examination of the assumptions underlying the postwar American policy formulated by the President and his advisers, one must wonder whether the Founding Fathers were not wise in providing the nation's Chief Diplomat and Commander-in-Chief with a high degree of discretion. It seems clear that if there are limits to

American power, they are less material than political, and that the word "limits" is being used by such critics as Senator McCarthy to reject the global role which only the United States can play to maintain the balance—and must play all the more in the wake of Britain's termination of her role "East of Suez."

OPEN INTELLIGENCE, OPENLY ARRIVED AT*

by Kurt L. London

The idealistic American view of international relations symbolized by Woodrow Wilson in his famous demand for "open covenants openly arrived at" seems to have spilled over into intelligence. The need for an intelligence organization in the United States, which should have been evident long before the outbreak of World War II, has been obscured by the Victorian concept of the late Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, who declared that gentlemen do not read each other's letters. Only reluctantly do Americans recognize the necessity of countering hostile propaganda; similarly, the thought of a powerful intelligence agency still repels them. There is a great deal of talk about "the right to know" and little recognition that this demand of the mass communications media is not universally applicable and that in intelligence it should be replaced by the "need to know." Indeed, as the popularity of spy thrillers has skyrocketed in the past twenty years, so has the publicity concerning a governmental institution that would be largely useless if it were not secret.

To this writer, the sensationalism surrounding the American intelligence establishment, the CIA, has been an appalling display of irresponsibility. It has resulted in a flood of publications, most of them slanted, anti-intelligence, and particularly anti-CIA. The fault does not lie solely with sensationmongers intent on best-seller markets. The government should not have permitted its intelligence officials to become well known public figures and intelligence offices should have been decentralized. It is deplorable that most of the "literary" output on the CIA has been distorted by venom. The Agency, obviously, cannot answer and defend itself.

For this reason—but for this reason alone—Lyman Kirkpatrick's book on the CIA is to be welcomed. It is not a defense but corrective justification. While its narrative is centered around the author, thereby constituting somewhat of an autobiography, it nevertheless contributes toward purifying the air of distortions and insinuations. The first three chapters are dedicated predominantly to those aspects of the author's career that led him into intelligence work. He then traces the history of the CIA, whose rapid growth was paralleled by his own rapid rise to Inspector General and Executive Director. Like Franklin D. Roosevelt, Kirkpatrick heroically overcame a crippling polio attack; the need for a wheelchair did not prevent him from carrying out his demanding duties and traveling far and wide.

**The Real CIA*. By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 312 pp. $6.95.

The Espionage Establishment. By David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. New York: Random House, 1967. 308 pp. $6.95.

He tells the story of the workings of the CIA with candor but also with caution. He understandably wants to avoid adding further leaks to the many that already exist. Even if the reader is disinclined to accept Kirkpatrick's personal views and his judgment of men and affairs, only the prejudiced would deny that his disclosures and recommendations, borne out by many years of experience, are sound. In this sense his book is an antidote to the biased tirades of CIA-haters who pretend to be concerned over this country's political health but in reality give aid, comfort and information to the enemy. For all those interested in fact rather than fiction in U.S. intelligence, and for all students of international affairs, this book is recommended reading.

In *The Espionage Establishment,* David Wise and Thomas Ross apparently have tried to take advantage of the notoriety they gained with the publication of *The Invisible Government.*[1] If they were pleased with their royalty checks, so the spokesmen for Moscow, Peking and the rest of the communist camp were pleased with the propaganda capital they gained from exploiting this deplorable example of political sensationalism. It is doubtful that *The Espionage Establishment* will enjoy comparable "success." The book reviews the intelligence systems of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and Communist China (in that order) somewhat more rationally, but ends up with a mixture of gossip and soapbox oratory that political sophisticates can hardly take seriously.

The descriptions of the intelligence operations in Moscow, London, Washington and Peking have simply been compiled from already published materials. Such a technique, to use the authors' own word, is called "papermill." *The Espionage Establishment* is a papermill production spiked with such information as the addresses and telephone numbers of the British Secret Service. I trust that the service has since changed numbers.

There is little discussion of the organization and rationale of communist intelligence, whose operations differ widely from those of the Western services. Instead, these chapters are full of name-dropping and case studies rehashed from the "now it can be told" books and articles that fill yards of shelf space. Obviously the authors have no firsthand information about the Soviet KGB or GRU, and what they offer is a distillation of available overt material. They flounder helplessly in trying to present a picture of Red Chinese intelligence, about which very little is known; whatever reports exist are as confused as those on Mao's China during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The authors seem to be relatively better informed on the organization of the British secret services, although here, too, they reveal nothing new. What they have to say about the CIA is old hat, but they grudgingly admit that the United States needs intelligence machinery, even though they want to subject it to more Congressional control than already exists. They do not say how that can be done without weakening the heart of intelligence, which is secrecy.

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[1] Reviewed by the writer in ORBIS, Summer 1964, pp. 445-449.

Their concept of an "intelligence revolution" is meaningless. It is an unsuccessful attempt at explaining the worldwide intensification of intelligence activities in an era of fear and uncertainty. They are more concerned with the superficial symbols of intelligence than with the profound changes in the nature of international relations that have developed as a result of the hostility between the communist, anti-communist and "third world" camps.

For the politically conscious and for students of international affairs, this book has little to offer. It is one-sided, biased and pretends rather than substantiates.

ALLIED CURRENCY AND MONETARY POLICIES IN WORLD WAR II*

by Nicholas Balabkins

All history is essentially an exercise in remembering and reinterpreting. Vladimir Petrov's *Money and Conquest* falls in this category, dealing as it does with American policies of occupation during and after World War II, from the November 1942 landing in North Africa to the West German currency reform of mid-June 1948. It is a story of American concern with winning the war, muddling through after the shooting stopped, and failing to produce long-term plans to win the peace. The author's specific interest centers on the policies and mechanics of military occupation, the role of monetary policy in occupied territories, the differences between "regular" and "occupation" currencies, and the impact of troop-spending on the occupied economies.

Petrov devotes one chapter to the examination of German economic policies in occupied Europe during the war, emphasizing that, in contrast to the popular view, the Nazis tried to avoid economic dislocation and open inflation as much as possible—except in the Soviet Union and Poland. Since the Germans feared the monetary chaos of open inflation, they curbed the occupied countries by means of wage, price, rent and foreign-exchange controls, coupled with the rationing of consumer goods, allocation controls for raw materials, and labor conscription. The Reichsmark was overvalued by some 25 per cent, and Germany exacted supplies from occupied countries through levies, occupation costs and organized trade.

The chapter on the American landings in North Africa and France contains the by-now forgotten story of the clash between the Americans and de Gaulle's returning government over the right to issue occupation currency. Widespread American participation in the black market, continuously rising prices, disorganized distribution of essentials to the civilian popula-

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**Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II.* By Vladimir Petrov. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 282 pp. $8.50.

tion, and lax army remittance procedures netted U.S. servicemen millions of windfall dollar profits. When the final accounting between the French and United States treasuries took place, the French government lost "several hundred million dollars" (p. 66) on account of the low "net" troop pay. Since American soldiers obtained French currency by selling supplies to civilians, the needs of the U.S. Army for French currency were greatly reduced. The French "contribution" to the war effort was artificially minimized by enterprising American black-marketeers. Such experiences, Petrov believes, led to "the dissipation among Europeans of an enormous amount of goodwill for the United States which existed toward the end of World War II." (p. 20.)

The chapter on the American presence in Italy relates how the U.S.-sponsored "defascistisation" of the government apparatus led to administrative chaos and how U.S. participation in the black market helped to generate open inflation. The latter had negative social consequences on the fixed-income recipients of the Italian middle class, as a result of which, in the post-World War II period, this group joined the leftist "protest" voters. While in Allied-occupied southern Italy inflation was rampant and civilians lived on a food ration of 500 calories a day (p. 86), the German-held and Mussolini-administered north enjoyed monetary stability, with rigid price- and wage-controls. (p. 88.) Since American soldiers could pocket all the lire they needed by selling army supplies to civilians, the Italian government, in the final accounting, like the French, lost close to $140 million because the U.S. Treasury reimbursed the Italians only for the "net" troop pay (that is, less soldiers' savings, remittances home, and money spent in Army Post Exchanges). The situation improved when the early punitive spirit of American occupation policies came to an end in late 1944, and after the war Italy received more than $3 billion in U.S. aid to rescue her from economic collapse.

However, the author's prime concern is American policy toward Germany, and he devotes five chapters to that topic. According to Petrov, during and after World War II military currencies were used "as a major means of manipulating the economies of occupied countries" and were designed "to further the interests of the victors." Of course, the objectives of the Allies and the Nazis were not the same. The latter exploited the occupied countries but did their best to preserve monetary stability and avoid monetary chaos. Soviet monetary policies aimed at two objectives: to obtain maximum economic benefits from the vanquished and to undermine the existing socio-economic structure of the bourgeois social order by means of open inflation, à la Lenin's classical recipe. The American monetary policy in occupied Italy in 1943 and 1944 also appeared to follow Lenin's advice, marked as it was by rampant inflation and "defascistisation" of the administrative apparatus. Petrov thus infers that in Italy "economic chaos and inflation were part and parcel of the Allied policy." (p. 83.) The American occupation policy in Germany was likewise to be harsh and the peace punitive, the U.S. Treasury representatives wanting to assure "economic chaos in Germany" (p. 162) through monetary inflation.

Petrov creates the impression that the actual policy, in contrast to the policymaking debate, was indeed one of open inflation, but fails to introduce a clear-cut concept of that phenomenon. For instance, in discussing the Hungarian postwar monetary upheaval, he talks about concurrent price and monetary inflation. Does price inflation refer to the price-wage spiral, while monetary inflation means an increase of note currency? The author does not say. He talks about intensification of inflation in Germany via U.S.-made military marks, but fails to notice that in the combined British and American zones of occupation the total cost of living index stood at 125 in 1946; rose to 126 in 1947; and to 134 in June of 1948.[1] Furthermore, the weekly gross earnings of manual workers in manufacturing and construction industries in the Bizonal Area averaged 35.22 marks in June 1946; 37.41 marks in June 1947; and 40.51 marks a year later. These figures demonstrate beyond the shadow of a doubt that open inflation was avoided and that Petrov's discussion of this point is misleading. Mindful of the economic uprooting of the middle class during the violent open inflation of the early 1920's which contributed greatly to the rise of Nazism, the Americans sought to forestall monetary chaos. To nip the inflationary potential in the bud, they preserved the entire gamut of physical controls, such as price-, wage- and rent-controls, and rationing of all goods. As a result, "repressed inflation" became the order of the day. Prices remained stable, but the Germans could buy only a 1,500-calorie food ration, which was "too much to die on, but too little to live on."

The existing physical controls were enforced to avert capital accumulation in the form of industrial plants and equipment out of forced savings created in the process of open inflation, and thus facilitate "industrial disarmament." The Reichsmark remained a unit of account and a medium of exchange, but nobody knew exactly its future value; the rumors of currency-reform predicted various rates of conversion. This uncertainty gave rise to the "compensation trade," which involved the exchange of goods at fixed prices. It was a form of barter; to make such transactions look legal and acceptable to the tax authorities, accountants booked them as regular sales at fixed prices. Officially only 10 per cent of a company's output could be used for compensation purposes, while actually sometimes as much as 90 per cent of the output went into compensation channels. The black market turned over only 10 per cent of all goods—at exorbitant prices, of course. Legally, the consumer could buy practically nothing, except the ration of 1,500 calories a day.

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[1] U.S. Office of Military Government for Germany, *Monthly Report*, Statistical Annex, No. 20, October 1948, p. 136. The year 1938 is assumed to be the base.

Black-market activities and even the compensation deals (permitted only by *oral,* not written, authorization) were violations of the existing laws. Under the Nazis, serious violators of price-controls and rationing were declared nationally dangerous elements and were subject to the death penalty. But since, in Anglo-Saxon law, economic crimes are not subject to capital punishment, enterprising American blackmarketeers in uniform and German businessmen could violate the law with impunity.

Interestingly enough, the "hard" American policy and the resulting decapitalization of German industrial capital turned out to be a blessing for the Germans. The policy of "industrial disarmament" was actually an accelerated program of capital replacement. Once the Germans were given the green light for reconstruction, they replaced older facilities with new ones. The existence of such modern industrial machinery and equipment explains to a great extent the subsequent high productivity of German industry and the spectacular strength of the German balance-of-payments.

Petrov is to be commended for his excellent description of the emotional atmosphere in wartime Washington (p. 40 *et passim*) and for his stress on the role of the vociferous press, which frequently added heat instead of light to the consideration of policy issues.

The author's message is a crucial one: the apolitical, professional civil servant should have greater say in formulating and executing policy. This volume could be painful reading for former policymakers; with hindsight many of them would probably admit their failure to tailor policies in accordance with the standard British maxim: "No permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests!" For future policymakers, it may offer advice on things to avoid.

SUPRANATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS*

by Andrew W. Green

Peter Hay's volume, *Federalism and Supranational Organizations,* is a thorough scholarly examination of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and the literature of European Community law. He considers Court and Community law from several different analytical points of view.

Hay states that his book is "concerned mainly" with the "proper classification of the new phenomena in legal theory," or, in other words, with "the nature of supranational organizations and the consequences of a classification for the national legal system." (p. 6.) He is therefore not primarily concerned with the problem of causation, but has limited himself more strictly to the problem of exact classification and description. He is, however, concerned with causation, especially in the effect which supranational law may have on national legal systems, but this interest is limited to that of legal causation rather than the broader problem of political causation.

Hay's concern with classification

**Federalism and Supranational Organization.* By Peter Hay. London: University of Illinois Press, Ltd., 1966. 335 pp. $7.50.

leads him to consider three problems: (1) Whether the European Communities should be classified according to doctrines of international or municipal law, or according to a new classification of "federal" law. (2) The effect of "supranational organizational law" on national law. (3) The constitutional problems of national law arising from the formation of a new supranational organization.

With respect to the first problem, Hay concludes that neither international law nor municipal law provides a proper category of classification for the law of the European Communities. With respect to international law he says: "The international-law oriented approach takes little account of the sizeable body of 'supranational' law which the Community institutions have already promulgated . . . and which has already supplanted preexisting national law. . . . The international law approach, moreover, shows too little appreciation for the dynamics of integration and the resultant centralization which European integration has continually shown, and which suggests, in addition, that the promulgation and growth of 'supranational' law displacing national law may become the typical rather than the atypical aspect of the Communities." (pp. 74-75.) Analogies to state or municipal law are found unsatisfactory by Hay because "the literature stresses the 'analogy' factor and, therefore, disclaims the present, even partial, existence of a state [i.e., the Communities]." (p. 75.)

Consequently, Hay concludes, in effect, that Community law is not international law and is not "like" national municipal law, but that Community law is a form of national municipal law because the Communities have some attributes of sovereignty. Since he does not always state his conclusions explicitly, they must be paraphrased. However, in announcing his change of subject under discussion from the classification of Community law to the effect of Community law in national law, Hay states that his inquiry "will parallel the modified approach to sovereignty: that Community law has several aspects, including international law aspects, but that much of Community law is truly federal law." (p. 76.)

A similar conclusion concerning the relevance of federalism to Community law is reached by Hay after his study of the second problem, the effect of Community law on national law. Hay speaks of the "conclusion reached repeatedly" that "the Communities display federal attributes in their structure and organization and that, beyond such a descriptive identification, an *analytic* view of Community law shows it to be federal law." (p. 201.)

The conclusion seems sound and is in agreement with my own conception of the significance of the Court's jurisprudence and the proper way of studying its political effects. Unfortunately, Hay's conception of federalism is not as clear as his language, so that the clarity of his conclusions is blurred by his uncertain use of the term "federal."

The common sense view of federalism does not become confused by a theoretical analysis of sovereignty. In a common sense view, sovereignty is a bundle of powers which in a federation is divided between the federal and state governments. To ask whether states in a federation are sovereign is a false issue unless the question is related to the purpose of the inquiry. From the viewpoint of international law, if the states do not have the power to conduct diplomacy, they are not sovereign in any aspect. However, from the viewpoint of federal or state law, the states may not be deprived of any of their powers without their consent, nor the federation of its powers without its consent.

This division of sovereign powers is reinforced, and the observance of the "federal" character of the relationship compelled, if judicial procedures are used to define the uncertainties of the federal relation, and if the principle of federal supremacy in limited areas is maintained, particularly with regard to the power of the federal judiciary to define federal powers. This *Kompetenz-Kompetenz* can never completely destroy the states' powers except in an abuse so flagrant that the federal relation is already a pretense, because *Kompetenz-Kompetenz* is a judicial rather than a political concept. If the federation has bundle of powers "A," and the states bundle of powers "B," with a gray area "G" between them, (i.e., total sovereignty "S" equals "A" plus "B" plus "G") a judicial *Kompetenz-Kompetenz* and a federal judicial supremacy can only expand the federal powers to A plus G (or S minus B) and reduce the states' powers to B (or S minus A minus G). If the federal judiciary can (or does) do more than that, federalism is probably not present, since the states no longer have any independent sovereign powers.

Consequently, Hay misses the point when he says that "In sum, federation is associated with statehood; and the Communities, unquestionably are not States. The characterization of the Communities as federations therefore fails." (p. 87.) Despite the misadventures of Walter Hallstein, it is not unreasonable to consider the Communities as "states."

However, since Hay concedes that the Communities have "sovereign" powers, he comes to the unstated conclusion that the Communities are not "federations" in international law because they are not states, but that the Communities are "federations" for the purpose of Community and national law. He says: "However, this conclusion does not preclude that the member states have transferred sovereign powers to the Communities." (p. 87.) Later, he states that the Communities are *"limited federations* to the extent of their sovereign powers." (p. 89, emphasis added.)

However, instead of stopping with this simple and sound analysis that the Communities are federations (of some kind) because they possess some sovereign powers, even if not the sovereign power of being a "state" in international law, Hay prefers to reason that federal theory may be applied to the European Communities because they are a form of functional federalism. His use of the term "functional" federalism, even though valid in its own right, unhappily lends itself to confusion with the "functional" political integration of Mitrany and the "functional" law of Scheingold.[1] What Hay means is merely that federalism is present when some "functions" of sovereignty are transferred to the supranational organization. If an insufficient number of functions, particularly certain important ones, are not transferred to the supranational organization, then the supranational organization is not a true "federation," although the supranational organization may nevertheless be a "federal" or "functionally federal" organization. Whether anything has been added of substance to the analysis by speaking of sovereign or federal "functions" rather than sovereign or federal "powers" is uncertain. Hay puts it this way:

> "Federal is therefore used in an adjectival sense: it attaches to a particular *function* exercised by the [federal] organization and is used to denote, as to that function, a *hierarchical* relationship between the Communities and their members. (p. 90, emphasis added.)

Hay's insistence on the "hierarchical" character of the relation is open to question. The federal power need not be *superior* to state power for a federation to exist, but it must be *independent* of it. There are various devices for assuring the independence of federal power: one is a federal judiciary which has *superior* power to determine federal and state jurisdiction. Some think this federal judicial supremacy is an essential requirement of federalism. Perhaps by "hierarchical" Hay only means *Kompetenz-Kompetenz.* It is doubtful whether he is correct in holding that the superiority of federal judicial power is the critical test of federalism; what is essential to federalism is a uniform judicial determination of division between state and federal powers. The supremacy of federal law and federal judicial power is only a means to this end, and not a thing for its own sake.

Hay continues his analysis (which is basically correct, if stated in a new way) by considering certain "doctrinal approaches to federalism." He summarizes the test as to when "the 'federal principle' is present" by a long statement with numerous qualifications, but it is too long for practical use or understanding. Finally, he concludes his chapter on functional federalism by recognizing the role of the Court of Justice: "The most highly developed federal aspect of the Communities is the judicial function exercised by the Court of Justice." (p. 101.)

In his discussion of the second problem, the effect of Community law on national law, Hay gives extensive consideration to the role of the Court of Justice in defining its own jurisdiction, and its incorporation in national law.

Two comments on Hay's discussion of the effect of Community law on national law seem appropriate. First, he treats too lightly the distinction between interpretation and application of the EEC Treaty arising in cases referred to the Court of Justice under Article 177. He seems to say that the Court cannot interpret the Treaty without having the concrete factual situation before it. (p. 144.) The distinction which the Court has drawn between interpretation and application is an intelligible one; perhaps it is not a vaid one. But one may interpret the Treaty (and any law) without a detailed concrete situation before one, and one may, abstracting the legal questions, still enunciate the legal principles involved without deciding the case—although the decision may logically and unavoidably be determined on the basis of the legal interpretation.

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[1] David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966) and Stuart A. Scheingold, *The Rule of Law in European Integration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

Second, the view advanced by Hay that the member states should yield to Community law on the basis of "federal fidelity" is not persuasive. (pp. 194ff.) "Federal fidelity" is the principle that members *ought to yield to Community* law because of a duty owed to the Community. The European Community treaties do not seem to lend support to this principle, and its application in German law (which Hay finds) cannot be extended by analogy.

Hay's treatment of the third problem, national constitutional problems raised by adherence to a supranational, quasi-federal organization, is an important contribution to the understanding of federal problems. Hay demonstrates that the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 2) has some important qualifications, and that a United States treaty may not be used to amend the Constitution so as to eliminate constitutional prohibitions, although some amendment of the Constitution by treaty may be made and the trend is to interpret the treaty power more broadly than formerly. As Justice Sutherland said in *U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,* the treaty power "must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." This is a significant conclusion because the public debate on the Bricker Amendment and the continuing effort to have the Senate ratify the various UN conventions on human rights have proceeded on the assumption that the treaty power of the United States to modify its internal constitutional law was absolute.

It is apparent, after Hay's discussion, that the national constitutional problems created by adherence to a supranational organization are not much different in the United States than in the member states of the European communities. A treaty of adherence to a supranational organization which, either by its self-executing provisions or by rules adopted by the supranational organization, would contravene the U.S. Constitution in important aspects would be held invalid as American federal or state law. It is true that the ratification of the treaty in U.S. law makes the treaty effective as internal law, and that its internal effects are not to be repealed by an ordinary statute on the doctrine of *lex posterior,* since a ratified treaty has the status of constitutional law and not of ordinary legislation. However, the doctrine of *lex posterior* is not unknown in American case law.[2]

There is no logical necessity that supranational law and national law concur on the effect of supranational law in the national legal order. (Putting this in American terms, there is no logical necessity that federal law and state law concur on the effect of federal law in the state legal order, disregarding the supremacy clause.) Harmony is desirable, incongruity is unfortunate, but disparity seems no more shocking between supranational law and national law than the inconsistent results reached by different states (or nations) under private international law.

Hay's concluding chapter on the significance of his studies finds two problems unresolved: "First, what is the significance of the emergence of supranational regional associations as a new legal structure for the traditional dichotomic national and international order? Second and perhaps more important, what is its effect on the preservation of democratic values as developed by national constituent states and of the manner in which these values are secured, for instance, by constitutionalism." (p. 299.)

He goes far toward solving the first problem by concluding that the law of the European Communities (and by analogy, the law of supranational regional organizations generally) is a variant of federal law. To a large extent, the dichotomy between international law and national municipal law is a *faux problème*. It is a problem which has been created by theorists of international law, particularly European theorists. The practicing American lawyer is used to living in a legal house with three stories, state, federal and international, rather than two, and finds no insuperable problems involved. The possibility of a three-storied legal structure seems to give some European legal theorists vertigo, and so they try to find some way to build the house of law with only two stories.

The significant difference between the American federation and the European communities from the federal point of view is that the American federal government has a monopoly of the power to conduct foreign relations under the Constitution, whereas the member-states in the European communities retain the power to conduct their own diplomacy—and even this must be stated with qualification. However, this difference in the division of powers within the American federation and within the European communities does not create any problems which are qualitatively different. The problems are different in detail, and, as such, they merit examination of the kind which Hay has given them.

Part of the difficulty comes in expecting from supranational regional organizations something they cannot provide, namely, a solution to the problems of creating a universal international political order assuring peace. Nevertheless, regional supranational organizations tend to solve international problems of a regional scope. If the European communities contribute to maintaining the peace in Europe, must they be accounted a failure because war continues in the Far East and the Middle East? Supranational regional organizations are not designed to solve the problems of the world or provide, except in a very intermediate fashion, solutions to the problems of world peace. Nevertheless, regional supranational organizations contribute to world peace by removing regional issues from the list of problems which a universal political system must solve. This contribution should not be minimized, even by utopians.

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[2] Thomas M. Cooley, *Principles of Constitutional Law.* (Second edition), 1891, p. 32, citing *Whitney v. Robertson,* 124 U.S. 190 (1888) and *Ping v. United States,* 130 U.S. 581 (1889).

The second problem, namely, of democratizing regional supranational organization and of protecting national democratic values when nations join regional supranational organizations, is one of weighing conflicting values. National constitutions have established certain guarantees for "democratic" values. *Membership in supranational* organizations may jeopardize these values. Conceivably, supranational organizations can be fashioned so as to provide for the protection of democratic values within the member states and to extend these democratic values to the internal operations of the supranational organization, so that no conflict of values will be involved. Nevertheless, the practical necessities of supranational decision-making may impair some of the desirable national guarantees of democratic values. And as democratic societies become more extensive, democracy takes on more and more the character of a plebiscitory dictatorship rather than a system of considered popular reflection and deliberation.

There is, thus, no formula that provides an easy solution to the problem of balancing these two possible conflicting values. In each concrete situation one must seek the best possible compromise between democratic values and supranational decision-making. A study of the European communities at the present time can hardly show more than the existence of such a problem and create an awareness that national guarantees of democratic values may be impaired by the demands of supranational cooperation and decision-making.

In summary, Hay classifies the law of the European communities as federal law. He demonstrates that European Community law cannot be assimilated to systems of *international* law and systems of national municipal law. He describes the incorporation of European Community law into national law and its effect on national constitutional problems.

In addition, Hay sought to describe the attributes supranational law should have in order to protect the democratic values now recognized in national law. However, he has not yet succeeded in finding a focus for this laudable, but diffuse, concern. This does not really represent a deficiency, for Hay has attempted something that cannot presently be done.

Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Counter-Revolution: How Revolutions Die. By James H. Meisel. New York: Atherton Press, 1966. 237 pp. $6.50. A political scientist at the University of Michigan noted for earlier studies of elites and revolts, attempts to illuminate the "intractability of revolution, its relative immunity to the countermeasures of a baffled regime," by examining a dozen historical episodes of revolution and counterrevolution. His studies range from Cicero in ancient Rome to Sieyès and Louis Bonaparte; Pareto and other bourgeois rebels; the fascists; and T. E. Lawrence, Franco and de Gaulle.

Dynamics of World Politics: Studies in the Resolution of Conflict. Edited by Linda B. Miller. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 294 pp. n.p. (paper). In addition to an introductory essay by the editor on the contemporary international system as a setting for conflict, this work includes twelve essays on the general theme of conflict-resolution. Contributors include Arnold Wolfers, Fred Iklé, Henry A. Kissinger, Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, Stanley Hoffmann, Richard A. Falk, Wolfgang Friedmann, Robert L. Friedheim, Ernst B. Haas, Oran R. Young, and Lord Gladwyn.

Perspectives in the Study of Politics. Edited by Malcom B. Parsons. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968. 170 pp. $7.50 ($2.50, paper). Nine essays on the study of politics in the light of political philosophy, history, law, economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology and geography, each written by an eminent academician in his field.

Popes from the Ghetto: A View of Medieval Christendom. By Joachim Prinz. New York: Schocken Books, 1968. 256 pp. $1.95 (paper). Through this account of the Pierleone family which was converted from Judaism to Catholicism and which produced, between 1045 and 1138, three Popes, including the powerful Gregory VII (Hildebrand), Prinz depicts the history of the Jews in medieval Christian society.

Treatise on Justice. By Edgar Bodenheimer. New York: Philosophical Library, 1967. 314 pp. $10.00. The author, a Professor of Law at the University of California Law School and a former member of Justice Jackson's staff at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, presents a well-documented study of the concept and goals of justice, its relation to law, morality, utility and reason, and its meaning in various orders and levels—political, social, economic, penal and international. The work will be of special interest to philosophers, political theorists and students of jurisprudence.

II. MILITARY AFFAIRS, ARMS CONTROL, TECHNOLOGY

Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance. By Karl W. Deutsch. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967. 167 pp. $5.95. The results of a Yale study of French and West German attitudes toward arms control in relation to such issues as NATO, European security, détente, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the MLF. The research was based largely on interviews with elites, mass opinion data and content analysis of newspapers in the two countries.

Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence. Edited by Emile Benoit. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. 260 pp. $8.00. A collection of seventeen papers, many of them prepared for the Conference on Economic Aspects of World Disarmament and Interdependence, held in Oslo in 1965. Most of the contributions deal with the interrelationship between economic factors (such as trade, growth rates and development) and policies of arms acquisition, arms control and disarmament on a national, regional and worldwide scale.

In the Name of Science. By H. L. Nieburg. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. 431 pp. $7.95. Billed as "a chilling account of the growth of the scientific-military-industrial complex in America," this volume contends that the arms and space races have produced what the author calls the "Contract State" in which business corporations and governmental agencies are making vital economic and political decisions outside the democratic process. Nieburg praises McNamara for his efforts to reform the "Contract State" by bringing the military services and the arms-space industries under tighter control.

Science, Technology and American Foreign Policy. By Eugene B. Skolnikoff. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967. 330 pp. $8.95. Employing a combined analytic and case study approach, a political scientist, who was formerly a White House staff assistant to Dr. James Killian, offers a far-ranging survey of the uses of science and technology as tools of the U.S. foreign policy process. The author discusses such subjects as technical assistance, space activities, arms control, the brain drain and the responses of national, regional and international organization to modern technological developments.

The Social Function of Science. By J.D. Bernal, F.R.S. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967. 482 pp. $3.95 (paper). A near-classic work by a Fellow of the Royal Society, first published in 1939, is made available in paper. Bernal's thesis, that a concern for the welfare of man and society is an essential aspect of science, not a parenthetical obligation, is woven through his learned musings on the relations between science and industry, government, education, war, finances and social transformation.

The United States Navy in World War II. Compiled and edited by S.E. Smith. New York: Ballantine Books, 1967. 1128 pp. $1.65 (paper). The paperback edition of the book that quickly established itself as the outstanding account of naval operations in the Second World War, and as one of the best historical works on the war. It covers the story from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay, as seen through the eyes and first-person accounts of a hundred military leaders, correspondents, historians and others. It contains 64 pages of photographs.

III. UNITED STATES

America in the Sixties: An Intellectual History. By Ronald Berman. New York: The Free Press, 1968. 291 pp. $7.95. An Associate Professor of Literature at the University of California reviews the role, status and ideas of the intellectual in America during the present decade. Among the subjects examined are religion and the intellectuals, the civil rights movement, the New Left, the writings of several prominent novelists and poets, black and white, and the culture-heroes who reflect the tone of the 1960's.

Crisis Now. By James M. Gavin, in collaboration with Arthur T. Hadley. New York: Random House, 1968. 184 pp. $4.95. General Gavin, a noted critic of Administration policies in Viet Nam, deals with the two critical elements—Viet Nam and the urban crisis—of what he considers the most explosive period in American history. Claiming that the two are interrelated, he warns that unless quick, decisive solutions are found to these problems, America faces a dark and uncertain future. After a provocative critical assessment of our position in Viet Nam, in which he adheres to his proposed "enclave strategy," he goes on to devote the major portion of the book to the current urban revolution, offering several specific solutions to alleviate the root causes of our domestic crisis.

Economic Development and American Foreign Policy 1943-62. By David A. Baldwin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. 291 pp. $7.95. Within the broad context of the U.S. foreign policy objective of promoting international economic development, this book focuses on "soft lending" as a primary instrument of aid. Integrating political with economic analysis, the author concentrates principally upon an evaluation of the Point Four program and the soft loan agencies, and tests six hypotheses concerning foreign economic assistance.

The Experts. By Seymour Freidin and George Bailey. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 398 pp. $7.95. Two former editors from the *Herald Tribune* and *The Reporter* deliver a scathing, well-written indictment of the "instant experts" on foreign affairs—including many diplomats, academicians, wealthy-men-turned-statesmen, journalists and other "experts" who create the standards by which their expertise is judged, who inhabit an intellectually incestuous world in which criticism of their judgment is stifled, and yet who have been wrong more often and more resoundingly than they have been right. Most of these "experts," the authors charge, have lost faith in the values of their own society and yield willingly to the flattery and blandishments of totalitarian societies, whose brutality and aggressiveness they prefer to ignore. Citing chapter and verse from many different Cold War episodes in all regions of the world, Freidin and Bailey bring down most of the favorite oracles and cherished idols of the American Establishment.

The United Nations and United States Security Policy. By Ruth B. Russell. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968. 510 pp. $10.00. A penetrating study of the complex interplay of U.S. policy and UN activity since 1945, this book examines the problems inherent in adapting U.S. national security objectives to the structure and activities of the world organization. The author asserts that Washington has never fully appreciated the potential for conciliation possessed by the UN to help solve Cold War dilemmas. In the concluding chapter, she considers possible future directions of U.S. policy which would better utilize the resources of the UN to promote a lasting global peace.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

The British System of Government. By A. H. Birch. New York: Praeger, 1967. 284 pp. $8.50. In this introductory study of British government, Professor Birch has analyzed the constitutional principles which underlie the practice of British government and the roles played by various important political groups. Emphasis is laid on the importance of traditions that shape political behavior and the way in which the political system reflects the character and values of British society. Other chapters treat the administrative process, local government, the rights of the British citizen, and the nature of British democracy.

County Government in England and Wales. By Jeffrey Stanyer. New York: Humanities Press, 1968. 116 pp. $3.00 ($1.50, paper). This work discusses the administration in county areas of England and Wales, showing the interdependence between county, county district, and parish.

Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway. By Philip M. Burgess. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968. 179 pp. $6.25. Focusing on Norwegian foreign policy between 1940 and 1949, when it underwent a fundamental change from neutrality and withdrawal from international affairs to active participation in the Atlantic Alliance, Professor Burgess has analyzed changing elite attitudes and their relationship to policy formulation. The author also examines the strategic outlooks of Swedish and Danish leaders and suggests that differences in elite images constitute, at least in some areas, an obstacle to Scandinavian cooperation.

The French Parliament: Politics in the Fifth Republic. By Philip M. Williams. New York: Praeger, 1968. 136 pp. $5.75. A brief account of the French parliamentary system since 1958. After describing the legal framework within which the new parliament operates, the author probes such matters as the social background of the members, debates on five sample bills, the strategy of pressure groups, and the organization and character of the Gaullist party.

Local Government at Work: A Case Study of a County Borough. By H. Victor Wiseman. New York: Humanities Press, 1967. 104 pp. $3.00. A case study of local government at work, based on the author's personal experience in the County Borough of Leeds, where he served between 1951 and 1960 as a member of the Leeds City Council. In addition to examining the Council's work from actual debates, the author discusses the deliberations of its committees and the roles played by elected representatives and chairmen.

The New Sweden: The Challenge of a Disciplined Democracy. By Frederic Fleisher. New York: David McKay, 1967. 365 pp. $6.50. Drawing upon fifteen years as a student and journalist living in Sweden, Fleisher provides a candid, authoritative account of both the advantages and shortcomings of life in a "disciplined democracy." Characterizing their goal as the "self-realization of everyone," he reveals the ways in which the Swedes have striven to come to grips with the problems and challenges of a modern, highly industrialized society, analyzing such areas as labor-management relations, agrarian cooperatives, government planning and the sexual revolution. Calling the Swedish system a "laboratory" for the study of gradual, democratic adjustment to the stresses placed upon a modern, rapidly changing society, he claims it can serve as an excellent example to other capitalist democratic nations, including the United States.

The Nuremberg Party Rallies: 1923-39. By Hamilton T. Burden. New York: Praeger, 1967. 206 pp. $5.95. A case history of Hitler's use of modern propaganda techniques in the Nuremberg rallies to control the minds of the masses. The author describes the careful preparations, semi-religious ceremonies, torchlight parades, military reviews, pageantry and symbols which were used to attempt to create a rigidly disciplined people who would blindly follow their leaders.

Parliament and the People. By Bernard Crick and Sally Jenkinson. New York: Hillary House, 1967. 128 pp. $2.50. A brief account of how the British parliamentary system works.

Political Representation and Elections: Parties and Voting in Great Britain. By Peter G. J. Pulzer. New York: Praeger, 1968. 165 pp. $5.50. Throughout this work, the author stresses the similarities and parallels that characterize the American and British political systems. After examining the impact of the extension of suffrage on British politics, Pulzer considers the role of the parties in a two-party system and their internal operations and membership, as well as the voting behavior of the electorate. Also included is an assessment of campaigning techniques, the use of opinion polls, the value of canvassing, and the impact of the mass media on elections.

The Politics of the Vatican. By Peter Nichols. New York: Praeger, 1968. 373 pp. $6.95. Essentially a political history of the Papal institution and its role in the modern world, written by the former Vatican correspondent of the *Times* of London. Nichols places emphasis upon the pontificates of the last few Popes and their policies toward democracy and communism, ecumenical reform and Church reorganization, and the problems of war, peace, development, population, food and birth control.

The Tactics of Resignation: A Study in British Cabinet Government. By R.K. Alderman and J.A. Cross. New York: Humanities Press, 1968. 88 pp. $3.00 ($1.50, paper). This monograph addresses itself to the difference between traditional principles and actual practices in British government. Specifically, the British system of government, so far as executive-legislative relations are concerned, rests on the principles of collective and individual ministerial responsibility. The authors explain why ministers support policies which they privately disapprove and how so many ministers have been able to retain their posts despite adverse criticism or apparent inefficiency.

What Happened at Rome: The Council and its Implications for the Modern World. By Gary MacEoin. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. 187 pp. $4.95. An analysis of the meaning of the most significant decisions concerning ecumenical relations, the organization of the Church, and theological and social doctrines, which were taken at Vatican II, as seen through the eyes of a leading Irish Catholic journalist.

V. Communist Bloc

Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic. By Rudolf L. Tökés. New York: Praeger, for the Hoover Institution, 1967. 292 pp. $7.50. After decades of Stalinist suppression, the 20th CPSU Congress officially "rehabilitated" the history of Béla Kun and his short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic. Dr. Tökés, a Hungarian by birth and currently an Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan Universiy, has assembled the material released since 1956 into a fascinating study of Kun and his attempt to duplicate in Hungary what Lenin had accomplished in Russia two years before. The author gives a detailed account of the origins of the Hungarian Communist Party, the training of its leaders in Russia during World War I, its route to power in March 1919, its inability to maintain effective control over the political and economic situation in the following months, and its final collapse in August.

China Observed. By Colin Mackerras and Neale Hunter. New York: Praeger, 1968. 194 pp. $5.95. A first-hand report on Communist China by two young Australians who had accepted two-year teaching jobs from the Chinese government and lived with their wives in Peking and Shanghai from 1964 to 1967, the period of the buildup to the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guards. Fluent in Chinese, they were allowed to travel to Shansi and Kiangsi provinces and to the capital of Inner Mongolia, visiting many factories, communes, schools and hospitals. The authors assert that they have tried to approach Communist China with open minds in order to give a fair, objective picture of the Chinese, their cities and communes, arts and education, attitudes toward foreigners and other countries, and the events leading up to the Cultural Revolution.

Chinese Communism in Crisis: Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. By Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish. New York: Praeger, 1968. 279 pp. $6.00. The Senior Lecturer in Chinese studies at the University of Glasgow and a lecturer in the same department appraise the Chinese Cultural Revolution as an episode in the long history of China and as a stage in the development of communist ideas and methods. They examine the anarchic activities of the Red Guards, the personal power struggle, the role of the intelligentsia in China during the 20th century, and provide nearly 100 pages of literary, doctrinal and national policy documents.

Peking's Red Guard: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. By Stephen Pan and Raymond J. de Jaegher. New York: Twin Circle Publishing Company, 1968. 462 pp. $1.95 (paper). A comprehensive account of the background, developments, incidents and purposes of the massive Maoist revolution occurring on the Chinese mainland, with emphasis on the role of the Red Guards.

Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Edited, with an introductory essay, by Stuart R. Schram. New York: Praeger, 1968. 182 pp. $5.00. This is the first American clothbound edition of Mao Tse-tung's *Quotations*—the "little red book," complete with plastic cover, that has become the familiar symbol of Mao's Cultural Revolution. It contains the complete original text of the translation published and distributed by Foreign Languages Press in Peking. Professor Schram, head of the Contemporary China Institute at the University of London and author of *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung,* has written an analytical introduction and has annotated this edition.

The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism. By David MacKenzie. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967. 365 pp. $10.00. Concentrating on the years of the Eastern Crisis, the author, Associate Professor of History at Wells College, examines closely the nature and scope of the relations—both official and unofficial—between Russia and the Serbian people. In describing the response of the Russian government and of Russian Pan-Slavic groups to Serbian pleas for aid in achieving independence from the Turks, he emphasizes the fact that Russia was more interested in maintaining good relations with the Great Powers and in furthering her own expansionist desires than in promoting Pan-Slav unity and independence.

Soviet and Eastern European Trade and Aid in Africa. By Baard Richard Stokke. New York: Praeger, 1967. 326 pp. $15.00. A Development Economist at the Stanford Research Institute analyzes the economic relations that have developed between Africa and the Soviet bloc countries from the mid-1950's to the present. After examining the specific cases of several African nations, he deals with the problems involved in this trade and describes the impact it has had on African development programs. The study is well-documented with a large number of tables.

VI. Middle East and Africa

Africa in Search of Democracy. By K.A. Busia. New York: Praeger, 1967. 189 pp. $4.25. Focusing on the movement in Africa to establish societies that provide the optimal conditions for the growth of freedom and justice, this Ghanaian scholar scrutinizes democracy as a "moral language capable of being universally understood." Busia tries to analyze the extent to which the developing African states have been able to comprehend it and to incorporate its principles in their social and political institutions. In addition, the author shows the relationship to democracy of the concepts of the universe, man and society as expressed in African religion and of familial patterns rooted in the African tribal structure.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Black Revolutionary: George Padmore's Path from Communism to Pan-Africanism. By James R. Hooker. New York: Praeger, 1967. 168 pp. $5.50. Through numerous books and articles, George Padmore exerted an enormous influence on the shaping of modern African nationalism, and especially on the turning of this nascent movement away from communist dogma. In this first major study of his life and work, the author, presently Associate Professor of African History at Michigan State University, traces the origins and development of his ideas, from the early commitment to communism, through disillusionment with it in the 1930's, to the final emergence of the new creed of socialist Pan-Africanism in the 1950's.

Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara. By L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan. New York: Praeger, for the Hoover Institution, 1967. 435 pp. $8.50. In this reassessment of African history and Western imperialism, the authors question many of the current interpretations offered by historians and social scientists. Emphasizing the advance of technical knowledge brought about by imperialism, they attempt to place the false idealization of precolonial and postcolonial Africa in a new perspective. One section of the work assesses the extent to which various current theories about imperialism in Africa are compatible with actual events; another contains a more detailed examination of colonial policies in sub-Saharan Africa from 1870 to 1960, emphasizing the existence of many patterns of imperialism.

Education in Africa. By Abdou Moumouni. New York: Praeger, 1968. 320 pp. $8.00. In this survey of the history and future of education in independent African states, intended primarily for African teachers and intellectuals, the author assesses the purposes and kinds of education that should be offered in the future, stressing the value of African languages and culture.

European Powers and South-East Africa. By Mabel V. Jackson Haight. New York: Praeger, 1967. 368 pp. $9.50. In this detailed study of European naval, economic and missionary activity in the coastal areas of Mozambique and neighboring territories from 1796 to 1856, the author demonstrates how events in distant Europe and Asia influenced the history of this region. Focusing on an era which set the stage for the great colonial scramble of the late 19th century, she goes on to analyze the effects of the British-French-Portuguese rivalry over this area on the larger international scene.

Modern Egypt. By Tom Little. New York: Praeger, 1967. 300 pp. $7.50. After a brief review of Egyptian history up to World War II, the author examines in detail events, policies and personalities of the past thirty years: the Suez crisis, Egypt's position regarding Yemen, her desire to lead the Arab and African worlds, and Nasser's conception of Egypt's role in world affairs. In dealing with Egyptian domestic politics, the author analyzes particularly the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, the political ascendancy of the Wafd Party, and the course of Egyptian nationalism in its various stages and aspects.

Pan-Africanism and East African Integration. By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 307 pp. $7.50. This study seeks to determine the degree to which Pan-Africanism as an ideal represents a realistic solution to such problems as African economic development and unrealistic national boundaries. The author interviewed leaders of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika to learn what lessons their attempt to create an East African federation in 1963 might have for the future integration of African states.

The Politics of African Trade Unionism. By G.E. Lynd. New York: Praeger, 1968. 216 pp. $12.00. The African trade unions' search for political allies, both domestic and foreign, conflicts with the African concept of nonalignment and with the syndicalist tradition of autonomy from political parties. The author has studied union policies, both with regard to local nationalist parties and to international trade union movements, demonstrating how the unions sometimes become focal points of discontent.

Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957. By P.J. Vatikiotis. New York: Praeger, 1967. 169 pp. $7.50. The author of *The Egyptian Army in Politics,* now at the University of London, traces the emergence of Jordan as a state, the role played by the military in its creation and consolidation, and the history of the Arab Legion down through the turbulent period of the mid-1950's which saw the dismissal of General Glubb and the Suez crisis. Vatikiotis draws some conclusions about civil-military relations in this Arab country.

The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964. By Robert I. Rotberg. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 362 pp. $8.75. Following a detailed examination of the impact of British colonial rule, Professor Rotberg traces the origins of the full-fledged political parties in both Malawi and Zambia as sources of protest in the independence movements of these states. He also interprets the objectives and tactics of the ruling white settlers and examines their efforts to establish the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

South West Africa and the United Nations. By Faye Carroll. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967. 123 pp. $5.00. This study seeks to provide a historical background to the South West Africa case by reviewing the actions of the United Nations and of the South African government, evaluating the effectiveness of the UN in this matter, and looking at the probable future consequences of the dispute. The author believes that while the organization has been successful in achieving a degree of supervision over the mandate, the UN has failed to attain its major objectives.

Southern Africa and the United States. Edited by William A. Hance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 167 pp. $6.50. Four authorities on Africa—Leo Kuper, Vernon McKay, Edwin S. Munger, and the editor—assess the factors that bear upon U.S. relations with southern Africa (the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique) in the light of changing circumstances and attitudes in the United States, southern Africa, and independent black Africa. They agree that the United States must continue to uphold its long-standing principles supporting human rights and social equality, differ as to the strength of economic forces and the likelihood of their effecting a change in South Africa, and warn that there is a narrowing of options for American policy toward southern Africa.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem. By Alastair Lamb. New York: Praeger, 1968. 246 pp. $5.00. An objective and thorough account of boundary disputes, many of which have their origins in or before the period of colonial domination. The regions covered include Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North and South Viet Nam, China, Mongolia, and the Asian republics of the USSR. Explosive subjects, such as Kashmir, the Sino-Indian crisis and the Sino-Soviet border, are treated in detail. Thirty maps assist the reader in following the textual material.

Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia. By Edwin O. Reischauer. New York: Vintage Books, a division of Random House, 1967. 242 pp. $1.65 (paper). Only one of the five sections of this book deals specifically with U.S. involvement in Viet Nam. The second examines the many problems that U.S. policy confronts in Asia, from communism and the Chinese military threat to the dynamics of change and economic development. In the last three parts, Professor Reischauer develops a new U.S. Asian policy, with emphasis on Japan and China.

Formosa, China and the United Nations. By Lung-chu Chen and Harold D. Lasswell. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. 428 pp. $8.95. The authors recommend a formula of "one China, one Formosa" and support the proposal by examining the problems of implementation, including the transition to an independent Formosa free of Nationalist Chinese rule and the task of building a nation. Communist China would occupy China's seats in the General Assembly and the Security Council, and Formosa would be assured of admission to the UN after attaining independence through self-determination procedures.

Indonesian Upheaval. By John Hughes. New York: David McKay, 1967. 304 pp. $5.95. This book is an expansion and reworking of the articles for which the author, Far Eastern correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor,* won the 1967 Pulitzer Prize for foreign reporting. Hughes arrived in Djakarta just three days after the communists had murdered six high-ranking generals of the Indonesian Army. He reports on the events which were to lead ultimately to the downfall of the national hero, Sukarno. Because the story is so controversial, the author is careful to share with the reader the sifting of fact and rumor and the process by which he reaches his conclusions. One of these is that the fall of Sukarno has won a second chance for Indonesia.

VIII. Latin America

Development Assistance in Central America. By John F. McCamant. New York: Praeger, 1968. 351 pp. $15.00. A systematic analysis of the impact of development assistance on the politics and economics of the recipient society. In case studies of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, the author assesses, sector by sector, the techniques, problems and effectiveness of all bilateral and multilateral, financial and technical, assistance programs since the Second World War. Two central questions are investigated: the extent to which a foreign or international agency can affect the size, effectiveness and direction of a sovereign state's policy; and the extent to which government programs can generate economic growth. Sensitive to the broader context of his specialized topic, the author has included a final chapter dealing with the long-run effects of development assistance on the political structures and processes in Central America. His prognosis is cautiously optimistic.

Latin America and the Caribbean: A Handbook. Edited by Claudio Véliz. New York: Praeger, 1968. 864 pp. $25.00. This book consists of short essays on the countries of Latin America and on particular political, social, economic and cultural topics concerning the area as a whole.

Social Science in Latin America. Edited by Manuel Diégues Júnior and Bryce Wood. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. 335 pp. $4.50. A publication of the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, this book is a collection of papers presented at the Conference on Latin American Studies in Rio de Janeiro in 1965. As a critical overview of the state and role of the social sciences in Latin America by distinguished Latin American scholars, it is a welcome complement to the earlier Joint Committee volume, *Social Science Research on Latin America* (1964), edited by Charles Wagley.

Monographs and Reports Received

Alliances and the Third World. By George Liska. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, Studies in International Affairs, No. 5, 1968. 61 pp. $1.75.

The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy: A Theory of Growth and Some New Evidence. By James N. Rosenau. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 31, March 1968. 48 pp. $1.50.

Canada: Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, February 1968. 42 pp. 80 cents.

The Cap and the Straits: Problems of Nordic Security. By Jan Klenberg. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 18, February 1968. 19 pp. $1.00.

Charismatic Political Leadership: A Theory. By Ann Ruth Willner. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 32, May 1968. 113 pp. $2.00.

Communist Commitment to Force and Violence. Report by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, March 2, 1968. Washington: GPO, 1968. 41 pp. 20 cents.

Crisis Over Rhodesia: A Skeptical View. By Charles Burton Marshall. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Studies in International Affairs, No. 3, 1967. 75 pp. $1.45.

An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of International Politics. By Harold and Margaret Sprout. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, March 1968. 65 pp. $1.50.

Germany: Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 1968. 43 pp. 80 cents.

Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy. By George Liska. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Studies in International Affairs, No. 2, 1967. 113 pp. $2.25.

Intervention Against Communism. By Herbert S. Dinerstein. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Studies in International Affairs, No. 1, 1967. 53 pp. $1.45.

Ireland: Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 1968. 29 pp. 80 cents.

The Law of the Sea: The Future of the Sea's Resources. Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June 26-29, 1967. Edited by Lewis M. Alexander. Kingston: University of Rhode Island, February 1968. 155 pp. n.p.

Machiavelli: An Anti-Study. By William R. Campbell. Kingston: University of Rhode Island, Occasional Papers in Political Science, No. 6, 1968. 53 pp. 50 cents.

MONOGRAPHS AND REPORTS RECEIVED

Modern Nationalism: Towards a Consensus in Theory. By Konstantin Symmons-Symonolewicz. New York: The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, Inc., 1968. 66 pp. $2.75.

Problems and Prospects of the Developing Nation-State. Proceedings of the First University of Rhode Island Conference. By Thomas K. Burch, Martin Kilson, Samuel Decalo, Sudhit Sen, F.J. Tickner. Kingston: University of Rhode Island, Occasional Papers in Political Science, No. 7, 1968. 19 pp. 35 cents.

South-West Africa, 1960-1968: An Introductory Bibliography. By Samuel Decalo. Kingston: University of Rhode Island, Occasional Papers in Political Science, No. 5, 1968. 20 pp. $1.00.

Tanzania: An Introductory Bibliography. By Samuel Decalo. Kingston: University of Rhode Island, Occasional Papers in Political Science, No. 4, 1968. 56 pp. $1.00.

The U.S. and Foreign Economic Aid. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Intercom, Vol. 10, No. 2, March-April 1968. 80 pp. $1.00.

Vietnam: Issues for Decision. By the Editors of the Foreign Policy Association. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 188, April 1968. 63 pp. 85 cents.

The Vietnam War: The President versus the Constitution. By Francis D. Wormuth. Santa Barbara: The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Occasional Paper, April 1968. 63 pp. $1.00.

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